

AN
 EXPOSITION OF THE CREED.

I ARTICLE I.

I BELIEVE IN GOD THE FATHER ALMIGHTY
 MAKER OF HEAVEN AND EARTH.

AS the first word CREDO, *I believe*, giveth a denomination to the whole confession of faith, from thence commonly called the CREED; so is the same word to be imagined not to stand only where it is expressed, but to be carried through the whole body of the confession. For although it be but twice actually rehearsed, yet must we conceive it virtually prefixed to the head of every article: that as we say, *I believe in God the Father Almighty*, so we are also understood to say, *I believe in Jesus Christ his only Son, our Lord*; as *I believe in the Holy Ghost*, so also *I believe the Catholic Church*. Neither is it to be joined with every complete article only; but where any article is not a single verity, but comprehensive, there it is to be looked upon as affixed to every part, or single truth, contained in that article: as, for example, in the first, *I believe in God*, *I believe that God* to be the *Father*, *I believe that Father* to be *Almighty*, *I believe that Father Almighty* to be the *Maker of heaven and earth*. So that this *Credo, I believe*, rightly considered, multiplieth itself to no less than a double number of the articles, and will be found at least twenty-four times contained in the CREED. Wherefore, being a word so pregnant and diffusive, so necessary and essential to every part of our confession of faith, that without it we can neither have CREED nor Confession, it will require a more exact consideration, and more ample explication, and that in such a notion as is properly applicable to so many and so various truths.

Now by this previous expression, *I believe*, thus considered, every particular Christian is first taught, and then

2 AN EXPOSITION OF THE CREED. [ART.

imagined, to make confession of his faith; and, consequently, this word, so used, admits a threefold consideration: first, as it supposeth belief, or faith, which is confessed. Secondly, as it is a confession, or external expression of that faith so supposed. Thirdly, as both the faith and confession are of necessary and particular obligation. When, therefore, we shall have clearly delivered, first, What is the true nature and notion of belief; secondly, What the duty of confessing of our faith; thirdly, What obligation lies upon every particular person to believe and confess; then may we be conceived to have sufficiently explicated the first word of the CREED, then may every one understand what it is he says, and upon what ground he proceeds, when he professeth, *I believe*.

For the right understanding of the true nature of christian faith, it will be no less than necessary to begin with the general notion of belief; which being first truly stated and defined, then by degrees deduced into its several kinds, will at last make the nature of christian faith intelligible: a design, if I mistake not, not so ordinary and usual, as useful and necessary.

Belief in general I define to be *an assent to that which is credible, as credible*. By the word *assent*¹ is expressed that act or habit of the understanding, by which it receiveth, acknowledgeth, and embraceth any thing as a truth; it being

¹ Πίστις δὲ—πρόληψις ἐκούσιός ἐστι, θεοσεβείας συγκατάθεσις. *Clem. Alex. Strom.* l. ii. [c. 2, p. 432.] Πίστις μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ συγκατάθεσις ἀδιάκριτος τῶν ἀκουσθέντων ἐν πληροφορίᾳ τῆς ἀληθείας τῶν κηρυχθέντων Θεοῦ χάριτι. *S. Basil. Ascet. de Fide*, c. 1. [Vol. II. p. 224 c.] The Basilidians, Ὀρίζονται γοῦν οἱ ἀπὸ Βασιλείδου τὴν πίστιν ψυχῆς συγκατάθεσιν πρὸς τι τῶν μὴ κινούντων αἴσθησιν διὰ τὸ μὴ παρῆναι. *Clem. Alex. Strom.* l. ii. [c. 6, p. 443.] Κατὰ δὲ τὸν ἡμέτερον λόγον, πίστις ἐστὶν ἐκούσιος τῆς ψυχῆς συγκατάθεσις. *Theodoret. Therap. Serm.* l. [Vol. iv. p. 717.] And yet he also afterward acknowledgeth they had that definition from the Greeks: Τὴν μὲν γὰρ πίστιν καὶ οἱ ἡμέτεροι φιλόσοφοι ὠρίσαντο εἶναι ἐθελοῦσιον τῆς ψυχῆς συγκατάθεσιν. ‘*Crederere—est cum assensione cogitare.*’ *S. August. [de Prædestin. Sanct.]* § 5. Vol. x. p. 792

E.] *Et de Spir. et Litter. ad Marc. cellin. lib.* [§ 54. Vol. x. p. 116 A.] ‘*Quid est credere, nisi consentire verum esse quod dicitur?*’ So I take the *συγκατάθεσις* used by the Greek fathers to signify *assensum* or *assensionem*, as A. Gellius translatheth the Stoic, *συγκαταριθεται, sua assensione approbat*, l. xix. 1. and before him Cicero, ‘*Nunc de assensione atque approbatione, quam Græci συγκατάθεσιν vocant, pauca dicamus.*’ [*In Lucullo*, § 37.] *Acad. Quæst.* ii. 12. So *ἀπιστία* and *συγκατάθεσις*, are opposed by the Greeks. As Sextus Empiricus, speaking of Admetus seeing Alcestis brought back by Hercules from Hades: Ἐπεὶ μέντοι ἦδει ὅτι τέθνηκεν, περιεσπᾶτο αὐτοῦ ἢ διάνοια ἀπὸ τῆς συγκαταθέσεως, καὶ πρὸς ἀπιστίαν ἐκλίενεν. *Pyrrh. Hypot.* l. i. 33.

I.]

I BELIEVE, &c.

3

the nature¹ of the soul so to embrace whatsoever appeareth true unto it, and so far as it so appeareth. Now this *assent*, or judgment of any thing to be true, being a general act of the understanding, and so applicable to other habits² thereof as well as to faith, must be specified by its proper object, and so limited and determined to its proper act, which is the other part left to complete the definition.

This object of faith is first expressed by *that which is credible*; for every one who believeth any thing, doth thereby without question assent unto it as to that which is credible: and therefore all belief whatsoever is such a kind of assent. But though all belief be an assent to that *which is credible*, yet every such assent may not be properly faith; and therefore those words make not the definition complete. For he which sees an action done, knows it to be done, and therefore assents unto the truth of the performance of it because he sees it: but another person to whom he relates it, may assent unto the performance of the same action, not because himself sees it, but because the other relates it; in which case *that which is credible* is the object of faith in one, of evident knowledge in the other. To make the definition therefore full, besides the material object or thing believed, we have added the formal object, or that whereby it is properly believed, expressed in the last term, *as credible*, which being taken in, it then appears, that, first, Whosoever believeth any thing, assenteth to something which is to him credible, and that as it is credible; and again, Whosoever assenteth to any thing which is credible, as it is credible, believeth something by so assenting: which is sufficient to shew the definition complete.

¹ Φιλαλήθης ἡ ψυχὴ οὐδέποτε κατὰ τὸ ψεῦδος ἀνεχομένη διατίθεται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ φανερὴν ἀληθῆς πάντως καὶ εὐθύς. *Simpli. in 3. Arist. de Anima.* [p. 59.] *Καὶ τις τἀληθὲς σκοπῆ, εὐρήσει τὸν ἀνθρώπον φύσει διαβεβλημένον μὲν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ψεῦδους συγκατάθεσιν, ἔχοντα δὲ ἀφορμὰς πρὸς πίστιν τἀληθοῦς.* *Clem. Alex. Strom.* l. ii. [c. 12. p. 458.]

² As *συγκατάθεσις*, the Greek word used for this assent, is applied to other acts of the understanding as well as that of belief, so Clemens Alexandrinus speaking of the defi-

nition of faith: "Ἄλλοι δ' ἀφανοῦς πράγματος ἐνωτικὴν συγκατάθεσιν ἀπέδωκαν εἶναι τὴν πίστιν, ὥσπερ ἀμέλει τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἀγνοουμένου πράγματος φανεράν συγκατάθεσιν. *Strom.* l. ii. [c. 2. p. 433.] And again: Πᾶσα οὖν δόξα, καὶ κρίσις, καὶ ὑπόληψις, καὶ μάθησις, οἷς ζῶμεν καὶ σύνεσμεν αἰεὶ, τῷ γένει τῶν ἀνθρώπων συγκατάθεσις ἔστω ἢ δ' οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ πίστις εἴη ἂν ἢ τε ἀπιστία, ἀποσύστασις οὐσα τῆς πίστεως, δυνατὴν δεικνυσι τὴν συγκατάθεσιν τε καὶ πίστιν. [*Strom.* l. ii. c. 12. p. 458.]

4 AN EXPOSITION OF THE CREED. [ART. 3

But for the explication of the same, farther observations will be necessary. For if that which we believe be something which is credible, and the notion under which we believe be the credibility of it, then must we first declare what it is to be *credible*, and in what *credibility* doth consist, before we can understand what is the nature of *belief*.

Now that is properly *credible* which is not apparent of itself, nor certainly to be collected, either antecedently by its cause, or reversely by its effect; and yet, though by none of these ways, hath the attestation of a truth. For those things which are apparent of themselves, are either so in respect of our sense, as, that snow is white, and fire is hot: or in respect of our understanding, as, that the whole of any thing is greater than any one part of the whole, that every thing imaginable either is or is not. The first kind of which being propounded to our sense, one to the sight, the other to the touch, appear of themselves immediately true, and therefore are not termed *credible*, but *evident* to sense; as the latter kind, propounded to the understanding, are immediately embraced and acknowledged as truths apparent in themselves, and therefore are not called *credible*, but *evident* to the understanding. And so those things which are apparent¹, are not said properly to be believed, but to be known.

Again, other things, though not immediately apparent in themselves, may yet appear most certain and evidently true, by an immediate and necessary connexion with something formerly known: for, being every natural cause actually applied doth necessarily produce its own natural effect, and every natural effect wholly dependeth upon, and absolutely presupposeth its own proper cause; therefore there must be an immediate connexion between the cause and its effect. From whence it follows, that if the connexion be once clearly perceived, the effect will be known in the cause, and the cause by the effect. And by these ways, proceeding from principles evidently known by consequences certainly concluding, we come to the knowledge of propositions in mathematics, and conclusions in other sciences; which propositions

¹ 'Apparentia jam fidem non habent, sed agnitionem,' *Greg. 4. Dial. cap. 5.* [*Hom. in Evang. xxvi. § 8.*]
 'Habet namque fides oculos suos, quibus quodammodo videt, verum

esse quod nondum videt, et quibus certissime videt, nondum se videre quod credit.' *S. August. Ep. 222.* [120. § 8, Vol. II. p. 349 F.]

and conclusions are not said to be *credible*, but *scientific*; and the comprehension of them is not *faith*, but *science*.

Besides, some things there are, which, though not evident of themselves, nor seen by any necessary connexion to their causes or effects, notwithstanding appear to most as true by some external relations to other truths; but yet so, as the appearing truth still leaves a possibility of falsehood with it, and therefore doth but incline to an *assent*. In which case, whatsoever is thus apprehended, if it depend upon real arguments, is not yet called *credible*, but *probable*; and an assent to such a truth is not properly *faith*, but *opinion*.

But when any thing propounded to us is neither apparent to our sense, nor evident to our understanding, in and of itself, neither certainly to be collected from any clear and necessary connexion with the cause from which it proceedeth, or the effects which it naturally produceth, nor is taken up upon any real arguments, or reference to other acknowledged truths, and yet notwithstanding appeareth to us true, not by a manifestation, but attestation of the truth, and so moveth us to assent not of itself, but by virtue of the testimony given to it; this is said¹ properly to be *credible*; and an *assent* unto this, upon such *credibility*, is in the proper notion *faith* or *belief*.

Having thus defined and illustrated the nature of *faith* in general, so far as it agreeth to all kinds of belief whatsoever, our method will lead us on to descend by way of division, to the several kinds thereof, till at last we come to the proper notion of *faith* in the Christian's *confession*, the design of our present disquisition. And being we have placed
 4 the formality of the object of all belief in *credibility*, it will clearly follow, that diversity of *credibility* in the object will proportionably cause a distinction of *assent* in the understanding, and consequently a several kind of *faith*, which we have supposed to be nothing else but such an *assent*.

Now the *credibility* of objects, by which they appear fit to be believed, is distinguishable according to the diversities of its foundation, that is, according to the different *authority* of the *testimony* on which it depends: for we having no other certain means of assuring ourselves of the truth, and consequently no other motives of our *assent* in matters of

¹ Αἱ δὲ τῶν μαρτύρων ῥᾶδιαι πίστεεις. *Aristot. Probl.* xviii. 3. 2.

6 AN EXPOSITION OF THE CREED. [ART.

mere belief, than the *testimony* upon which we believe; if there be any fundamental distinction in the *authority* of the *testimony*, it will cause the like difference in the *assent*, which must needs bear a proportion to the *authority* of the *testimony*, as being originally and essentially founded upon it. It is therefore necessary next to consider, in what the *authority* of a *testimony* consisteth, and so to descend to the several kinds of *testimonies* founded upon several *authorities*.

The strength and validity of every *testimony* must bear proportion with the *authority*¹ of the *testifier*; and the *authority* of the *testifier* is founded upon his *ability* and *integrity*: his *ability* in the knowledge of that which he delivereth and asserteth; his *integrity* in delivering and asserting according to his knowledge. For two several ways he which relateth or testifieth any thing may deceive us: one, by being ignorant of the truth, and so upon that ignorance mistaking, he may think that to be true which is not so, and consequently deliver that for truth which in itself is false, and so deceive himself and us; or if he be not ignorant, yet if he be dishonest or unfaithful, that which he knows to be false he may propound and assert to be a truth, and so, though himself be not deceived, he may deceive us. And by each of these ways, for want either of *ability* or *integrity* in the *testifier*, whoso grounds his *assent* unto any thing as a truth, upon the testimony of another, may equally be deceived.

But whosoever is so *able* as certainly to know the truth of that which he delivereth, and so *faithful* as to deliver nothing but what and as he knoweth, he, as he is not deceived, so deceiveth no man. So far, therefore, as any person testifying appeareth to be knowing of the thing he testifies, and to be faithful in the relation of what he knows, so far his testimony is acceptable, so far that which he testifieth is properly *credible*. And thus the *authority* of every *testifier* or relator is grounded upon these two foundations, his *ability* and *integrity*.

Now there is in this case, so far as it concerns our present design², a double *testimony*: the *testimony* of man to

¹ Τῷ γὰρ ποῖόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα, πιστεύομεν· τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν, ἂν ἀγαθὸς φαίνηται, ἢ εὖνους, ἢ ἀμφω. *Aristot. Rhet.* l. i. c. 8. § 6.

² *Fil.* 'Testimoniorum quæ sunt genera? *Pat.* Divinum, et humanum. Divinum, ut oracula, ut auspicia, ut vaticinationes, ut responsa

man, relying upon human authority, and the *testimony* of God to man, founded upon divine authority: which two kinds of *testimony* are respective grounds of two kinds of *credibility*, *human* and *divine*; and, consequently, there is a twofold *faith* distinguished by this double object, a *human* and a *divine faith*.

Human faith is an assent unto any thing credible merely upon the testimony of man. Such is the belief we have of the words and affections one of another. And upon this kind of faith we proceed in the ordinary affairs of our life; according to the opinion we have of the ability and fidelity of him which relates or asserts any thing we believe or disbelieve. By this a friend assureth himself of the affection of his friend; by this the¹ son acknowledgeth his father, and upon this is his obedience wrought. By virtue of this *human faith* it is that we doubt not at all of those things which we never saw, by reason of their distance from us, either by time or place. Who doubts whether there be such a country as Italy, or such a city as Constantinople, though he never
 5 passed any of our four seas? Who questions now whether there were such a man as Alexander in the east, or Cæsar in the west? And yet the latest of these hath been beyond the possibility of the knowledge of man these sixteen hundred years. There is no² science taught without original belief, there are no letters³ learnt without preceding faith. There is no justice executed, no commerce maintained, no business prosecuted, without this⁴; all secular affairs are transacted, all great achievements are attempted, all hopes, desires, and inclinations, are preserved, by this human faith grounded upon the testimony of man.

sacerdotum, haruspicum, conjectorum: humanum, quod spectatur ex auctoritate, et ex voluntate, et ex oratione aut libera aut expressa; in quo insunt scripta, pacta, promissa, jurata, quasita.' *Cic. Orat. Partit.* c. 2.

¹ 'Nec dicant, non credimus, quia non vidimus; quoniam, si hoc dicant, coguntur fateri incertos sibi esse parentes suos.' *De fide rerum invisib.* [§ 4. Vol. vi. p. 143 E.] amongst the works of St Augustin.

Αὐτὸν γὰρ οὐδεὶς οἶδε, τοῦ ποτ' ἐγένετο·
 ἄλλ' ὑπονοοῦμεν πάντες, ἢ πιστεύομεν

Menander apud Stob. ap. Eustath. in Hom. p. 1412, 17.

² Ἵποβάθρα μέντοι καὶ κρητὶς τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἢ πίστις. *Theodor. Therap. Serm.* 1. [Vol. iv. p. 721.]

³ Οὐδὲ γὰρ τὰ πρῶτα στοιχεῖα μαθεῖν οἶόν τε μὴ τῷ γραμματιστῇ πεπιστευκότα. *Ibid.* [717.]

⁴ Πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τελούμενα, καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων τῆς ἐκκλησίας τῇ πίστει τελεῖται. *S. Cyril. Hier. Catech.* 5, § 2 [p. 73 A.] *Orig. cont. Celsum*, l. i. § 11. [Vol. i. p. 329.] *Eus. de Præp. Evang.* l. i. c. 5. *Arnob. adver. Gen.* l. ii. c. 8.

8 AN EXPOSITION OF THE CREED. [ART.

In which case we all by easy experience may observe the nature, generation, and progress, of *belief*. For in any thing which belongeth to more than ordinary knowledge, we believe not him whom we think to be ignorant, nor do we assent the more for his assertion, though never so confidently delivered: but if we have a strong opinion of the knowledge and skill of any person, what he affirmeth within the compass of his knowledge, that we readily assent unto; and while we have no other ground but his affirmation, this *assent* is properly *belief*. Whereas, if it be any matter of concernment in which the interest of him that relateth or affirmeth any thing to us is considerable, there it is not the skill or knowledge of the relator which will satisfy us, except we have as strong an opinion of his fidelity and integrity: but if we think him so just and honest, that he hath no design upon us, nor will affirm any thing contrary to his knowledge for any gain or advantage, then we readily assent unto his affirmations; and this *assent* is our *belief*. Seeing then our *belief* relies upon the ability and integrity of the relator, and being the knowledge of all men is imperfect, and the hearts of all men are deceitful, and so their integrity to be suspected, there can be no infallible universal ground of *human faith*.

But what satisfaction we cannot find in the testimony of man, we may receive in the testimony of God; *If we receive the witness of men, the witness of God is greater*¹. Yea, *let God be true*, the ground of our *divine*, and every man a *liar*, the ground of our *human faith*.

As for the other member of the division, we may now plainly perceive that it is thus to be defined: *Divine faith is an assent unto something as credible upon the testimony of God*. This *assent* is the highest kind of *faith*, because the object hath the highest *credibility*, because grounded upon the *testimony of God*, which is *infallible*. Balaam could tell Balak thus much, *God is not a man, that he should lie*; and a better prophet confirmed the same truth to Saul; *The Strength of Israel will not lie*; and because he will not,

Num. xxiii.
19.

1 Sam. xv. 22.

¹ 'Quam indignum, ut humanis testimoniis de alio credamus: Dei oraculis de se non credamus!' S. Ambros. lib. i. de Abraham, c. 3. § 21. [Vol. i. p. 289.] Πῶς δ' οὐκ εὐλογώτε-

ρον, πάντων τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πίστεως ἡρημένων, ἐκείνων μᾶλλον πιστεύειν τῷ Θεῷ; Orig. cont. Cels. l. i. § 11. [Vol. i. p. 329 c.]

I.]

I BELIEVE, &c.

9

because he cannot, he is the Strength of Israel, even *my God, my strength, in whom I will trust.* Psal. xviii. 2.

For, first, God is of infinite knowledge and wisdom, as Hannah hath taught us, *The Lord is a God of knowledge*¹, 1 Sam. ii. 3. or rather, if our language will bear it, of *knowledges*, which are so plural, or rather infinite in their plurality, that the Psalmist hath said, *Of his understanding there is no number*². Psal. cxlvii. 5. He knoweth therefore all things, neither can any truth be hid from his knowledge, who is essentially truth, and essentially knowledge, and, as so, the cause of all other truth and knowledge. Thus the understanding of God is infinite in respect of comprehension³, and not so only, but of certainty also and evidence. Some things we are said to know which are but obscurely known, we see them but as in a glass or through a cloud: but *God is light, and in him is no darkness at all*: he seeth without any obscurity, and whatsoever is propounded to his understanding is most clear and evident; *neither is there any creature that is not manifest in his sight; but all things are naked and opened unto the eyes of him with whom we have to do.* 1 John i. 5. Wherefore, being all things are within the compass of his knowledge; being all things which are so, are most clear and evident unto him; being the knowledge he hath of them is most certain and infallible; it inevitably followeth that he cannot be deceived in any thing. Heb. iv. 13.

Secondly, The justice of God is equal to his knowledge, nor is his holiness inferior to his wisdom: *A God of truth* Deut. xxxii. 4. (saith Moses) *and without iniquity, just and right is he.* From which internal, essential, and infinite rectitude, goodness, and holiness, followeth an impossibility to declare or deliver that for truth which he knoweth not to be true. For if it be against that finite purity and integrity which is required of man, to lie, and therefore sinful, then must we conceive it absolutely inconsistent with that transcendent purity and infinite integrity which is essential unto God. Although therefore the power of God be infinite, though he *can do all things*; yet we may safely say, without any prejudice to his Job xiii. 2.

¹ אל דעת יהוה LXX. Θεός γινώσκων Κύριος.

² In the Heb. להבין אין מספר

³ 'Cujus sapientia simpliciter multiplex, et uniformiter multiformis, tam incomprehensibili comprehensione omnia incomprehensibilia comprehendit.' *S. August. de Civit. Dei*, l. xii. c. 18. [Vol. vii. p. 317 c.]

10 AN EXPOSITION OF THE CREED. [ART.

omnipotency¹, that he cannot speak that for truth which he knoweth to be otherwise². For the perfections of his will are as necessarily infinite as those of his understanding; neither can he be unholy or unjust, more than he can be ignorant or unwise. *If we believe not, yet he abideth faithful, he cannot deny himself.* Which words of the apostle, though properly belonging to the promises of God, yet are as true in respect of his assertions; neither should he more *deny himself* in violating his fidelity, than in contradicting his veracity. It is true, that *God willing more abundantly to shew unto the heirs of promise the immutability of his counsel, confirmed it by an oath; that by two immutable things, in which it was impossible for God to lie, we might have a strong consolation*: but it is as true, that all this confirmation is only for our consolation; otherwise it is as *impossible for God to lie*, without an *oath*, as with one: for being he can *swear by no greater, he sweareth only by himself*, and so the strength even of the oath of God relieth upon the veracity of God. Wherefore being God, as God, is of infinite rectitude, goodness, and holiness; being it is manifestly repugnant to his purity, and inconsistent with his integrity, to deliver any thing contrary to his knowledge; it clearly followeth, that he cannot deceive any man.

It is therefore most infallibly certain, that God being infinitely wise, cannot be deceived³: being infinitely good, cannot deceive⁴: and upon these two immovable pillars standeth the authority of the *testimony* of God. For since we cannot doubt of the witness of any one, but by questioning his ability, as one who may be ignorant of that which he affirmeth, and so deceived; or by excepting against his integrity, as one who may affirm that which he knoweth to be false, and so have a purpose to deceive us: where there is no place for either of these exceptions, there can be no doubt of the truth of the testimony. But where there is an intrinsical⁵ repug-

¹ Δύναται δὲ καθ' ἡμᾶς πάντα ὁ Θεός, ἅπερ δυνάμενος, τοῦ Θεοῦ εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι, καὶ σοφοῦ εἶναι, οὐκ ἐξίσταται. *Orig. contra Celsum*, l. iii. [§ 70. Vol. i. p. 493 r.]

² 'Si volunt invenire quod omnipotens non potest, habent prorsus: ego dicam, Mentiri non potest.' *S. August. de Civ. Dei*, l. xxii. c. 25.

[Vol. vii. p. 693 a.]

³ 'Cum sit omnipotens, mori non potest, falli non potest, mentiri non potest.' *S. August. de Symb. ad Catechum.* l. i. c. 2. [Vol. vi. p. 547 c.]

⁴ 'Deus facere fraudem nescit, pati non potest.' *Chrysol. Serm.* 62. [col. 372.]

⁵ 'Auctoritas Dei consistit in in-