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PART I

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND EMPIRICAL OVERVIEW

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1

Regimes of Ethnicity

Comparative Analysis of Germany, the Soviet Union, Post-Soviet Russia, and Turkey

The Puzzle of Persistence and Change in State Policies toward Ethnicity

This book explains the dynamics of persistence and change in state policies toward ethnicity. How do state policies that regulate the relationship between ethnicity and nationality change?

When Mahmut Erdem, a Turkish citizen of Kurdish descent and Shiite-Davidic faith, who lived in Germany since the age of eight, was naturalized as a German citizen in 1989, he joined an exceptionally small category of people who acquired German citizenship without being ethnically German.[1] As late as 1986, twenty-five years after Germany began recruiting workers from Turkey, only 7,986 Turks were naturalized as German citizens, although nearly two million Turks lived in Germany. The situation was not different for the remaining 4,512,679 immigrants who lived in Germany.[2] Of Turks in Germany, 99.5 percent were not German citizens, because German citizenship law, since 1913, conceived of citizenship as the right, or privilege, of ethnic Germans, allowing for the naturalization of nonethnic Germans only under very restrictive conditions.[3] From the 1970s to the 1990s, attempts to grant citizenship to resident aliens failed. However, a new citizenship law was passed in 1999, and already by 2004, an estimated 840,000 Turks had German citizenship.[4] How did such a tremendous change occur?

[1] Christian Wernicke, "Langer Weg zum deutschen Pass," *Die Zeit* (March 24, 1989), in Deniz Göktürk, David Gramling, Anton Kaes, eds., *Germany in Transit: Nation and Migration, 1955–2005* (Berkeley: University of California, 2007), 156–9.

[2] Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, *Migration, Integration und Asyl in Zahlen* (Nürnberg, Germany: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2004), 71, Table 25.

[3] "Empire- and State-Citizenship Law (1913)," in Göktürk et al., *Germany in Transit*, 154. For an examination of this law's origins, see Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).

[4] Dirk Halm, "Jeder dritte Türke eingebürgert," Zentrum für Türkeistudien, *Ausländer in Deutschland-AiB 04/06*, sent to the author by Safter Çınar, former chairman of *Türkische Gemeinde in Deutschland*.

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As late as the 1980s, it was a crime in Turkey to claim that "Kurds" exist because such a claim was equated with "separatism" and "terrorism." In official publications, Kurds were described as Turks who forgot their origins and language,[5] or as "mountain Turks."[6] The Labor Party was closed down in 1970 for declaring that a people called Kurds live in Turkey.[7] After the 1980 military coup, it was claimed that, "Kurd is a sound that your boot makes when you walk on the snow."[8] Şerafettin Elçi, a former Minister of Public Works, was sentenced to two and a half years in prison for stating that "Kurds exist, and I am a Kurd."[9] In June 2004, Turkish state television (Turkish Radio and Television, or TRT), began broadcasting in Arabic, Bosnian, Circassian, Kurdish, and Zaza, five minority languages. In January 2009, TRT inaugurated an entire new channel, TRT 6, broadcasting only in Kurdish. How did such a momentous change occur?

Since 1932, Soviet citizens had internal passports that recorded their ethnicity, ostensibly for purposes of positive discrimination.[10] Dozens of ethnic groups acquired autonomous territories and benefited from affirmative action policies.[11] However, "passport ethnicity" also made possible the deportation of all ethnic Germans, Chechens, Crimean Tatars, and other ethnic groups, resulting in the decimation of their populations.[12] Passport ethnicity was also used to discriminate against Jews in politics and employment. Attempts to remove ethnicity from the passport since the 1950s failed. Even after the dissolution of the USSR, ethnicity was preserved in the internal passports of almost all the post-Soviet states.[13] Yet in 1997, ethnicity was removed from the Russian internal passport. How did such a historic change occur?

In answering these questions, I will explain the dynamics of persistence and change in state policies regulating the relationship between ethnicity and

[5] Şükrü Kaya Seferoğlu, *Anadolunun ilk Türk sakinleri Kürtler* (Ankara, Turkey: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1982).

[6] The usage of "mountain Turks" for Kurds dates back to the early republican period in Turkey. W. G. Elphinston, "The Kurdish Question," *International Affairs* 22, no. 1 (1946): 101.

[7] Artun Ünsal, *Türkiye İşçi Partisi (1961–1971)* (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2002).

[8] This thesis appeared in the "White Book" published by the Turkish General Staff after the 1980 military coup. Can Dündar, "Kart-kurt, alt-üst oldu," *Milliyet*, April 16, 2009.

[9] Constitutional Court of Turkey, case no. 1982/1, decision no. 1983/2, April 12, 1983.

[10] Victor Zaslavksy and Yuri Luryi, "The Passport System in the USSR and Changes in Soviet Society," *Soviet Union/Union Sovietique* 6, no. 2 (1979): 137–53. The exact year is contested. I have also used "1934" in previous publications for the issuing of the first Soviet passports, but the decree on the internal passport dates from December 27, 1932. Because the decree removing the ethnicity from the passport in Russia is dated 1997, passport ethnicity had a life of 65 years (1932–97) in Russia.

[11] Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001).

[12] Aleksandr Nekrich, *The Punished Peoples: The Deportation and Fate of Soviet Minorities at the End of the Second World War* (New York: Norton, 1978).

[13] The only exceptions are Belarus and Ukraine, where it was removed. Dominique Arel, "Interpreting 'Nationality' and 'Language' in the 2001 Ukrainian Census," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 18, no. 3 (2002): 224.

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nationality, which I conceptualize as "regimes of ethnicity." I will explain the causes of the momentous changes mentioned in the preceding text and elaborate a theory of ethnic regime change.

The Argument: Explaining Persistence and Change in Regimes of Ethnicity

Why do states' policies toward ethnic diversity often persist in very different national contexts and despite significant societal and political challenges aimed at changing them? What are the conditions for changing these policies, if change is at all possible? I explain the persistence and change in policies related to ethnicity and nationality in Germany, the Soviet Union, post-Soviet Russia, and Turkey since the 1950s through the presence, or absence, of three independent variables: if "counterelites" representing constituencies with ethnically specific grievances come to power, equipped with a "new discourse" on ethnicity and nationality, and garner a "hegemonic majority," they can change state policies on ethnicity. These three factors (counterelites, new discourse, and hegemonic majority) are separately necessary and jointly sufficient for change. This finding is an improvement in the studies on nationalism and policy making in the field of ethnic politics because it provides a parsimonious causal explanation, based on a detailed structured comparison of three important cases of persistence and change in state policies on ethnicity.

These three cases of substantive importance are examined through a combination of John Stuart Mill's method of agreement and his method of disagreement. The method of agreement is used across cases while the method of disagreement is used within cases. The analysis across cases is an example of "Most Different Systems Analysis," with Germany, the Soviet Union, Russia, and Turkey demonstrating significant differences in their dominant religious traditions, ethnic demography, population density, political systems, and levels of economic development (Table 1). Moreover, state policies toward ethnic diversity are very different in these three countries. Therefore, the observation of an analogous process of transformation in state policies across these countries provides a robust confirmation of my argument that three elements are separately necessary and jointly sufficient for change.

Regimes of Ethnicity as a New Typology of Nationhood: Monoethnic, Multiethnic, and Antiethnic Regimes along Axes of Membership and Expression

In order to better comprehend the nature of political contestation over state policies toward ethnicity, I developed a new typology, "regimes of ethnicity," and categorized states as having monoethnic, multiethnic, and antiethnic regimes. Ethnicity regimes are defined along dimensions of "membership" and "expression." If a state seeks to restrict membership in the nation to one ethnic category through discriminatory immigration and naturalization policies, then

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TABLE 1. *Most Different Systems Analysis: Germany, the USSR and Russia, and Turkey*

	Turkey	USSR and Russia	Germany
Dominant Religious Tradition	Islam	Eastern Christianity (Orthodoxy)	Western Christianity (Catholic and Protestant)
Ethnic Majority[a]	76%	51% (USSR); 78% (Russia)	90%
Second-largest Ethnic Category[b]	15.7%	15.2% (USSR); 3.8% (Russia)	2.5%
Political System: Freedom House Scores (2005)	3.0	5.5 (Russia, 2005) 6.0 (USSR, 1980)	1.0
Level of Economic Development: GDP Per Capita[c]	$9,370	$10,030 (Russia)	$38,520
Population Density[d]	85	9	230
Ethnic Regimes	Antiethnic	Multiethnic	Monoethnic
Process of Ethnic Regime Change	Analogous	Analogous	Analogous

[a] Because there is no official data on ethnicity in Turkey, the estimate for Turkey is based on KONDA's public opinion survey published in March 2007 in *Milliyet*. In fact, 81.3% of the respondents identified as "Turkish" in response to the survey question, but those administering the survey made adjustments based on language and differential family size that reduced the share of ethnic Turks by 6%, from 82% to 76%. See http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/03/22/guncel/agun.html (accessed July 22, 2011). In the 1965 census, the last one that asked about "mother tongue," 90% of the population declared their mother tongue to be Turkish, and only 7% declared it as Kurdish. Fuat Dündar, *Türkiye Nüfus Sayımlarında Azınlıklar* (Istanbul: Doz, 1999).

[b] Second-largest ethnic category is Kurds in Turkey, Ukrainians in the USSR, Tatars in post-Soviet Russia, and Turks in Germany.

[c] Economist Intelligence Unit, *The World in 2010*, 104–6.

[d] The Economist, *World in Figures: 2001 Edition* (London: The Economist, 2000).

it has a monoethnic regime, and the expression dimension becomes irrelevant because ethnic diversity is minimized through the construction of a monoethnic citizenry. Germany before 1999 is a very good example approximating the ideal-type of a state with a monoethnic regime – Japan, too, has a monoethnic regime. If a state accepts people from ethnically diverse backgrounds as citizens (membership), but discourages or even prohibits the legal, institutional, and public expression of ethnic diversity (expression), then it has an antiethnic regime. Turkey before 2004 is a very good example approximating the ideal-type of a state with an antiethnic regime – France, too, has an antiethnic regime. If a state accepts people from ethnically diverse backgrounds as its citizens (membership), and allows, encourages, or even participates in the legal and institutional expression of ethnic diversity (expression), then it has a multiethnic regime. The Soviet Union and the post-Soviet Russian Federation are

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very good examples approximating the ideal-type of a state with a multiethnic regime – Canada and India, too, have multiethnic regimes. Regimes of ethnicity denote the constellation of state policies and institutions related to ethnicity. This new conceptualization connects the study of nation building to studies of ethnic diversity and citizenship, while providing a coherent typology of state policies on ethnicity that accommodates the full range of variation across cases.

The conceptual confusion in the study of ethnicity and the nation-state is reflected in the terminology used. A commonly used distinction between *ethnic* and *civic nationalism* dating back to Hans Kohn is problematic because the two terms are not mutually exclusive. *Civic* is a vague, empty category; moreover *ethnic* and *civic* are derived from different roots.[14] Thus, the ethnic-civic dichotomy has been criticized by even some of its erstwhile proponents.[15] Furthermore, although labeling ethnic nationalism as "Eastern" and nonethnic nationalisms as "Western" is derogatory for Eastern nations, it is a disturbingly common practice.[16] If we seek to articulate a relationship between nationhood and ethnicity, the terms describing the universe of cases must have "ethnicity" as their reference point.[17] Semantically, the route to precision is to derive adjectives from the root "ethnic" in differentiating notions of nationhood in their relationship to ethnicity. Logically, one can deduce three distinct ideal-types: monoethnic, multiethnic, and antiethnic.[18] One can arrive at these ideal-types in two steps through the deductive test of membership and expression (Figure 1).

Membership in the political community is the most important outward attribute of nationhood, with significant domestic implications. Membership is denoted by citizenship. Nationhood is empirically constituted by the sum of citizens; therefore, restricting the acquisition of citizenship to one ethnic group would be the most significant symptom of a systematic effort to create a monoethnic nation.

Expression of ethnic differences becomes the key question, only if multiple ethnic categories are allowed membership. In such cases, there can be two different models of relating ethnic background to national identity based on the legal-institutional expression of ethnic categories. If multiple ethnic categories are legally and institutionally recognized, then we have a multiethnic regime. If ethnic categories are not legally and institutionally recognized, then we have an antiethnic regime (Figure 2).

[14] Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1944).
[15] Rogers Brubaker, *Ethnicity without Groups* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).
[16] For many examples of using "ethnic" and "Eastern" nationalism interchangeably, see Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (New York: Blackwell, 1986).
[17] In a similar vein, Steven Fish reclassified political regimes as "monocracies" and "democracies" based on the ancient Greek suffix "-cracy," meaning "to rule," instead of using the more common democracy versus authoritarianism distinction, in *Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 20–7.
[18] One can split "multiethnic" into biethnic, triethnic, and so forth, but these would be subsets of multiethnic.

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

FIGURE 1. Deductive Test of "Membership and Expression"

Ethnicity: A Social "Category" Based on a "Subjective Belief in Common Descent"

Max Weber's definition of *ethnicity* as "subjective belief in common descent" is the best definition of *ethnicity* insofar as it distinguishes ethnic from religious, linguistic, economic, ideological, and other social



FIGURE 2. Three Ethnicity Regimes: Monoethnic, Multiethnic, and Antiethnic

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categories.[19] Following Weber, I adopt the view that "subjective belief in common descent" is a necessary and sufficient condition for an identity to be considered "ethnic." However, it is common that an ethnic identity is also a linguistic identity (Slovenian), though it certainly need not be (e.g., Scottish and Pomak), and it is also possible that an ethnic identity is also a religious identity (e.g., Druze, Jewish), but it certainly need not be. Examples can be multiplied when an ethnic identity overlaps with religious, sectarian, linguistic, class, ideological, and other identities, as I discuss at length elsewhere.[20] What matters from the point of view of a political scientist investigating state policies on ethnicity is that, applying Weber's definition to this situation, any social category that the state considers as being based on (subjective belief in) common descent can be accepted as an ethnic category. Therefore, for the purposes of this work, any social category that the state in question (Germany, USSR, Russia, and Turkey) considered to be based on common descent is taken to be an ethnic category. As a useful reminder, Rogers Brubaker argued that we should abandon the term *ethnic groups* and substitute *ethnic categories* instead, because "group-ness" is a collective quality that should not be assumed.[21] I fully agree with this position because assuming otherwise would reify ethnic nationalists' vision of a humanity divided into self-conscious ethnic groups.[22]

Ethnicity was implicated in the development of the modern nation-state, at least through two channels: First, one influential variant of nationalism that developed in Europe, often associated with Germany, sought to equate the nation – the new, modern political community – with an ethnic group.[23] Second, language, often seen as a component of ethnicity, went through a process of standardization and transformation whereby almost always only one language was codified as the official, "national" language, hence creating a special affinity between the nation-state and the ethnic category whose language was adopted as an official language (e.g., Englishmen in Britain, Germans in Austria, and Persians in Iran). Therefore, studies on the development of the modern nation-state became intertwined with the study of ethnicity.

The Cluster of Policies and Institutions Symptomatic of Ethnicity Regimes: The Difficulty of Changing Even One Policy

Why do I use the term *regime* to describe state policies and institutions regarding ethnicity? The notion of a regime that I borrow from Gosta Esping-Andersen,

[19] Max Weber, "The Origins of Ethnic Groups," in *Ethnicity*, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 35–40.

[20] For a lengthy discussion of many such examples, see Şener Aktürk, "Etnik Kategori ve Milliyetçilik: Tek-Etnili, Çok-Etnili ve Gayri-Etnik Rejimler" (Ethnic Category and Nationalism: Monoethnic, Multiethnic, and Nonethnic Regimes), *Doğu Batı* 9, no. 38 (2006): 23–53.

[21] Brubaker, *Ethnicity without Groups*.

[22] Therefore, throughout this work, I try to use the term *ethnic category* instead of *ethnic group* when discussing ethnicity and politics in general.

[23] Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*.

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when applied to state policies toward ethnicity, indicates that "a complex of legal and organizational features are *systematically* interwoven."[24] State policies on the ethnic background of subjects "are not linearly distributed, but clustered by regime-types."[25] These policies are mutually reinforcing because they seek to maintain a particular and coherent relationship between ethnicity and nationality in each regime type. For example, Germany's citizenship policy before 2000 discouraged and prevented the naturalization of immigrants of nonethnic German origin residing in Germany, while its immigration policy encouraged ethnic Germans from Kazakhstan, Russia, Romania, and elsewhere to immigrate to Germany by guaranteeing them automatic citizenship. Although the two policies did not need to align this way, they did, in order to preserve and re-create a monoethnic German nationhood.

The axes of membership and expression define an ethnicity regime, but what kind of specific laws and regulations constitute these axes and hence could be considered symptomatic of ethnicity regimes? The "membership axis" of ethnicity regimes can be captured by the citizenship and immigration policy and by ethnic minority status: 1) Is citizenship restricted to one ethnic category only? 2) Is there ethnic-priority immigration? 3) Are there officially codified "ethnic minorities," indicative therefore of the existence and titular status of an "ethnic majority"? Monoethnic citizenship, ethnic-priority immigration, and ethnic minority status together provide a very strong indication that the state has a monoethnic regime. The "expression axis" of ethnicity regimes is a constellation of four institutions and policies: 1) recognition of more than one ethnicity in the constitution, census, and key official documents; 2) ethnic federalism; 3) multiple official languages; and 4) ethnically based affirmative action.

How are these seven policies and institutions systematically interwoven? For example, in a monoethnic regime, ethnic-priority immigration is complemented by preferential naturalization for immigrants who share the titular ethnic background. This identifies them as the titular and state-bearing ethnic majority. Other ethnic categories are codified as minorities. Recognition of multiple ethnicities in the constitution, ethnic federalism, multiple official languages, and affirmative action are unexpected, because of the identification of the political community with one ethnicity. These seven policies together constitute a regime (Table 2).

I focus on immigration and citizenship policies in Germany, demands for ethnic and linguistic rights in Turkey, and attempts to remove ethnicity from the internal passport in the Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia, because these are the policies in which political contestation over the relationship between ethnicity and nationality coalesced in each country. An explanation of

[24] Gosta Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 2. Emphasis added. However, neither Esping-Andersen, nor any other author except for the current author, applied the concept of regimes to ethnic policies.

[25] Ibid., 26.

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