Introduction

This Introduction begins by outlining what is meant by international relations. Second, it tells the story of how and why the study of international relations emerged when it did in the early twentieth century. Knowing something about the discipline's origins does not tell us everything we need to know about international relations today, but it will help us to understand the legacy left by the discipline's original purpose and by older traditions of thought. Third, it sketches the contours of the changing agenda of international relations, a shift that some scholars describe as a transition from international relations to world politics or from the 'traditional' to the 'new' agenda. Although there can be little doubt that as political reality has changed new theoretical and conceptual tools have become necessary to grasp it, we should not assume that the myriad changes to our world have rendered the 'traditional' agenda and its theories obsolete. Far from it; the ‘new’ agenda, as we shall see, supplements but does not supplant the ‘traditional’ agenda. It is now more important than ever to consider the relationships between ‘traditional’ and ‘new’ theories and issues. This textbook is intended to help you think about these relationships.

What is International Relations?

Every day the global news media carry stories of events involving foreign governments and their populations. Usually featured under the heading of 'international affairs' or 'world news', these stories all too frequently tell of political violence, lives and livelihoods lost, human rights violated, infrastructure damaged, and hopes for the restoration of peace and prosperity dashed. War rather than peace makes the news headlines, and understandably so, because the violent conflict of war so visibly ravages human societies. 'If it bleeds, it leads', as the cynical media adage goes.

For over 2000 years of recorded history humans have been fascinated and frustrated by war and its consequences, so we should not be surprised by its continuing preeminence. But human societies are harmed by so much more than war. Chronic underdevelopment, poverty, human rights violations, environmental degradation and climate change are no less harmful, if less visible. Occasionally, however, the plight of the world's impoverished populations becomes headline news when famines occur or natural disasters such as droughts, earthquakes, floods, tsunamis or avalanches strike, compounding already fragile or impoverished political societies. Sympathies will be aroused in faraway places, and celebrities, humanitarian organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the United Nations (UN) and canny politicians will talk the talk of collective grief, human community and global responsibility. Excitement will die down after a flurry of activity and the poor souls will inevitably be cast back to the margins of international attention as developed countries return to more pressing domestic matters – tax
cuts, elections, salacious scandals, and so on. And so goes the daily round of international relations – war and peace, poverty and underdevelopment, global attention and global neglect.

This common-sense understanding of international relations only scratches the surface of all that the discipline of International Relations covers (see Box 0.1). So what precisely do we mean by ‘international relations’? To answer this question, let us first say a few things about what it is not, before turning to an account of what it is.

First, the study of international relations is not to be equated with ‘current affairs’. It is important not to reduce international relations to the lead stories of the global news media. News, by its nature, is ephemeral; each day brings a new story to tell. Moreover, news agencies make no attempt at drawing connections between stories. Their concern is not with showing how the stories ‘hang together’ or relate to each other but is solely with reporting the news, so each news item is reported independently of others. International Relations (IR), by contrast, seeks to go beyond the ephemeral and common-sense: to reflect more deeply on events, structures, processes and actors, and to offer explanations, interpretations and normative analyses. Second, the study of international relations is not reducible to what happens in particular countries, even though it may include this within its scope (see Waltz 1979: 121–2 for one explanation).

Turning to a more positive definition of international relations, we can start by saying that it refers to external relations among nations, states and peoples – although, as
BOX 0.1: TERMINOLOGY

What are the differences between International Relations and international relations, and international politics and world politics?

It is conventional to differentiate the discipline of ‘International Relations’ from the subject matter of ‘international relations’ by the use of upper and lower case respectively. As Chris Brown (1997: 3) puts it, “‘International Relations’ (upper case) is the study of ‘international relations’ (lower case)’. *International politics* is used here as a synonym of international relations. It does, however, have the advantage of highlighting the political dimension of relations that are international.

*World or global politics*: Insofar as new actors, issues, structures and processes are thought to have emerged in recent decades as a result of *globalisation*, rendering the traditional state-focused agenda incomplete, some scholars prefer ‘world’ or ‘global politics’ to ‘international relations’. This has prompted some scholars to talk of an historic shift from ‘international relations’ to ‘world politics’ or ‘global society’ (R. B. J. Walker 1995; Barnett and Sikkink 2008).

we explain below, this statement will need to be considerably qualified. The adjective ‘international’ was coined by the English political philosopher, Jeremy Bentham, in 1780. The neologism’s purpose was to capture in a single word *relations among nations* (Suganami 1978). Although ‘international’ literally means relations among nations, it has for most of its existence referred to relations among *sovereign states*. In Bentham’s time ‘nation’ and ‘state’ were often used interchangeably, so his meaning was closer to what we should probably call ‘interstate’ relations. In any case, *international* relations have been distinguished first and foremost from *domestic* politics. Ian Clark (1999) calls this the ‘Great Divide’ (see Table 0.1).

Leading scholars have for decades defined international relations by opposing the international and domestic realms as if they represented a ‘Great Divide’. On what constitutes this ‘Great Divide’, the most influential realist IR theorist of the late twentieth century, Kenneth Waltz (1979: 103), remarks that '[t]he difference between national and international politics lies not in the use of force but in the different modes of organization for doing something about it’. What, then, are the possible modes of organization? Waltz offers two, and only two, organising principles: *hierarchy* and *anarchy*. Relations between units (or actors) are either *hierarchical*, involving clear lines of authority and obedience, or they are *anarchical*, involving no such lines of authority and obedience (Waltz 1979: 88). There would appear to be no other possibilities. The key, according to Waltz, is governance; is there a supreme authority with the right to lay down and enforce the law? If the answer is ‘yes’, then we must be in the hierarchical realm of domestic politics – politics *within* the state. If the answer is ‘no’, then we must be in the anarchical realm of international relations – politics *between* states. In any case, the presumed differences between domestic and international politics seem to vindicate Martin Wight’s (1966b: 21) observation that '[i]t has become natural to think of international politics as the untidy fringe of domestic politics’. I shall suggest below that while it has indeed become natural to think in these terms, there may be good reasons for casting doubt over the ‘Great Divide’ as the point of departure for IR today.

According to the ‘Great Divide’, domestic politics is what takes place on the *inside* of states whereas international relations is what takes place on the *outside*, as if they were two mutually exclusive realms. Domestic politics is premised on the presence of a central authority or government that has monopoly control over the instruments of violence, that can lay down and enforce the law, that establishes and maintains *order*...
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Table 0.1 The ‘Great Divide’

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<td>Inside</td>
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<td>Hierarchy</td>
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<td>Monopoly over instruments of violence</td>
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and security, and that permits justice and peace to be delivered to the community of citizens. International relations is the negative image of domestic politics. By contrast with the domestic realm, the international is premised on the absence of an overarching authority or government that can lay down and enforce the law because the instruments of violence are dispersed and decentralised. This establishes ripe conditions for insecurity, where injustice and war are permanent potentials and regular actualities for states. It is a world of friends and enemies where power rather than justice will determine international outcomes, and where states cannot afford to put their trust or security in others. States are trapped in a ‘security dilemma’ where measures taken to enhance their security lead others to take similar counter-measures and in the process generate further mistrust and insecurity.

Perhaps the term that distinguishes international relations more than any other is anarchy. Anarchy – meaning the absence of rule, but not necessarily disorder and chaos – has been the core presumption and constitutive principle for much of the discipline’s history (Onuf 1989: 166; Schmidt 1998). Richard Ashley (1989) has called IR the ‘anarchy problematic’ – that is to say, a field of knowledge revolving around the organising principle of anarchy.

International Relations as a discipline: traditions, origins and evolution

Universities, as centres of research and learning, have long divided knowledge into different disciplines. This division is heuristic: that is to say, it is meant to help facilitate learning. A discipline comprises a distinctive focus, a set of institutions and traditions of thought. All three are crucial to the development and growth of a field or body of knowledge. But it is worth noting that ‘discipline’ has another, not altogether unrelated, meaning: to bring under control, train to obedience, maintain order. Disciplines thus help to maintain intellectual order by keeping a focus and keeping clear of distracting, extraneous issues.

First, a discipline carves out a branch of learning focused on a relatively distinct subject matter. I say ‘relatively’ because attempts to cordon off one subject from all others are bound to fail or to appear arbitrary. For example, where do we draw the boundaries between international politics, international morality, international law and international economics? Politics, morality, law and economics intersect and overlap in so many ways that efforts to draw final boundaries around them would be futile and
possibly unhelpful, since understanding the politics of international relations cannot be separated from an understanding of the moral, legal and economic dimensions of these relations.

Nevertheless, if a discipline implies a subject matter relatively distinguishable from others, it must have questions and topics it calls its own. Though agreement will never be total, the questions and topics to be addressed should meet with broad agreement. Some disagreement about the scope of a discipline is to be expected, but there will always be dominant tendencies—questions and topics that occupy the thought and research of most students and scholars (see Box 0.2). These will define the discipline at any given moment, but there will always be other questions and topics that are neglected or ignored by the mainstream. I return to the question of subject matter in the final part of this Introduction where I sketch contending ‘traditional’ and ‘new’ agendas.

BOX 0.2: DISCUSSION POINTS

A divided discipline?
In the late 1980s International Relations undertook a self-examination. Eminent scholar K. J. Holsti (1985: 1) lamented that ‘International theory is in a state of disarray’. The ‘intellectual consensus’ that guided research and learning for over three centuries had, in Holsti’s opinion, ‘broken down’. No longer was there ‘a consensus on the subjects of inquiry and theorizing. The view that international theory should be organized around the structures and processes of the states system, the activities of the great powers and their decision makers, particularly as they relate to war and peace, is no longer accepted by a significant number of scholars’ (Holsti 1985: 2). Holsti’s concern was not so much that the dominant view of the discipline’s focus and purpose had been abandoned—this was reasonable given the fundamental changes that had occurred in the twentieth century—but that the ‘theoretical profusion’ had made coherent dialogue and debate very difficult. His fear, in short, was that the discipline might never regain its focus and sense of purpose. Holsti was not alone. Mark Hoffman (1987) accepted Holsti’s assessment of a discipline divided over purpose, focus or appropriate methodology, but advocated a ‘next stage’ in which Critical Theory (see Chapter 4) would reconstruct and reorient the discipline. Others, such as Yosef Lapid (1989a: 83) questioned whether establishing a ‘new hegemonic orthodoxy’ would be ‘possible’ or ‘desirable’, preferring to celebrate theoretical diversity (see also George and Campbell 1990).
For fuller treatment of this approach, see Chapter 1.

Second, disciplines grow within institutions and grow their own institutions. Universities are the most obvious sites for the institutionalisation of the research and teaching of particular subjects, but they are not alone, as we shall see. Departments, schools or centres have been established in universities around the world to study international relations. The first was established in 1919 at the University of Wales, in the seaside town of Aberystwyth, when Welsh industrialist and philanthropist David Davies established the Woodrow Wilson Chair of International Politics. The London School of Economics and the University of Oxford followed shortly after, with the establishment of Chairs in 1923 and 1930 respectively. In the US, the institutionalised study of IR began with the establishment of Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service in 1919, which was followed by the University of Southern California’s School of International Relations in 1924. The first university dedicated to the study of
international relations was established at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1927.

The institutionalisation of academic areas of study is vital because it provides housing for teaching and research. Both teaching and research, the two preeminent tasks of university departments, are crucial to the accumulation, expansion and transmission of bodies of knowledge. Teaching passes on knowledge and modes of analysis from one generation to the next in the classroom. Research, of course, needs to be published, so that findings and analyses can be widely disseminated and tested, not only from one generation to the next but to contemporary teachers and students as well. Journals, periodicals, books, conferences and workshops are sites for debate, the exchange of ideas, and the sharpening of arguments, all of which reproduce and revise a discipline's body of knowledge.

Disciplines also grow their own institutions such as academic journals and professional associations. I have listed some of the relevant journals in the 'Further reading' section at the end of this chapter. Added to journals are professional bodies such as the British International Studies Association (BISA) and the American-based International Studies Association (ISA), which not only organise conferences but publish journals: the Review of International Studies (since 1975) and International Studies Quarterly (since 1957, although it was published under the name Background on World Politics until 1970) respectively. In Australia, the Australian Journal of International Affairs has been published since 1946 (originally under the title Australian Outlook). Think tanks have also made a long-standing contribution to the advancement of learning, and are an integral part of the discipline's landscape. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace was established in 1910; the Royal Institute of International Affairs was established in 1920, and its antipodean offshoots, the Australian and New Zealand Institutes of International Affairs, in 1933 and 1934 respectively.

Third, a discipline draws upon traditions of thought that have developed and evolved around the subject matter. Although the first university department was not established until 1919 it would be a mistake to believe that the study of international relations began at that point. When departments were being established, scholars and students were not inventing a discipline out of thin air; they had over two millennia of recorded words, thoughts and actions to draw upon. Cognate departments such as Government, Law and History also provided useful resources (Schmidt 1998). But too did thinkers subsequently drafted into the International Relations canon. Thucydides (c. 460–406 BC), Machiavelli (1469–1527) and Grotius (1583–1645), for example, may not have taught in universities, but they wrote about the actors and events that shaped the ‘international relations’, as we now call it, of their day. Care must be taken here, however, because the actors and events they described and analysed are vastly different to the ones that now animate international relations. Moreover, none of these great thinkers limited himself to the external relations of actors, whether city-states, empires or sovereign states. Indeed, it is closer to the truth to say that they discussed what we would call IR either indirectly or only in occasional passages of their classic texts. So we need to be careful when discussing the past not to commit the sin of anachronism – discussing one historical epoch in terms of language, concepts and understandings borrowed from another. In other words, we risk anachronism when we speak of these great thinkers writing about ‘international relations’ because, in fact, they did not neatly distinguish international relations from domestic politics or international
Traditions of thought

What are the traditions of thought that have influenced the study of international relations? How one answers this question depends on which classificatory scheme one uses, and there are several such schemes. During the discipline’s early years, the dominant classificatory scheme was of idealism or liberalism on the one hand and realism on the other (see Table 0.2); this was how E. H. Carr (1946) presented the field of study. Arguably this scheme still dominates the discipline today in the USA – albeit in revised form as a debate between neoliberalism and neorealism (see Baldwin 1993).

It is vital to come to grips with these two dominant IR theories, as they have largely set the parameters of the discipline, shaping its core assumptions and key questions.

Realists argue that states exist in a condition of anarchy that compels them to seek and to balance power to ensure their survival and security (see Chapter 2). They paint international relations as a tragic realm of ‘power politics’ where ‘national interests’ clash and moral claims hold little sway. For realists, the character of international relations remains unchanged through history. Marked by what Kenneth Waltz (1979: 66) calls ‘a dismaying persistence’ of war, international relations is, in Wight’s (1966b: 26) words, ‘the realm of recurrence and repetition’. Thucydides, the great Athenian historian of The Peloponnesian War, brilliant Florentine diplomat and writer, Niccolò Machiavelli, and towering English political philosopher, Thomas Hobbes (intellectually and physically towering – he was almost six foot tall, well above average height in the seventeenth century) are canonical names in realism’s hall of fame. They not only provided insights into their own times, but also offered wisdom and insight that realists believe transcend time. In the realist view, if Thucydides or Hobbes were transported to our own time they would observe nothing different other than the names of the actors (Waltz 1979: 66; Wight 1966b: 26).

Liberals take a more optimistic view. If realists see history as static or cyclical, liberals see it as progressive. They tend to emphasise humanity’s capacity to improve: they are committed to ideals of technological and economic as well as moral, legal and political progress (see Chapter 3). That the world is anarchical and war-prone is as true for liberals as it is for realists, but the former believe it is possible and necessary for humankind to escape the Hobbesian ‘state of war’ – a condition in which states are insecure and constantly preparing for war. Strategies of ‘peace through law’ and ‘peace through commerce’ are the dominant liberal approaches. In international relations they
see the gradual development and strengthening of international trade, international law and international organisations as the key to world order (Suganami 1989). Names in the liberal pantheon include great English political philosophers John Locke and John Stuart Mill, and the superlative philosopher of Königsberg (now called Kaliningrad), Immanuel Kant.

Others have posited a tripartite scheme. One of the most common is the tripartite scheme of realism, liberalism and Marxism, or variations thereof (Doyle 1997; Holsti 1985; Walt 1998). This extends and complicates the realism/liberalism debate by adding Marxism, Kant. This tradition shifted emphasis away from states to the historical development of the capitalist system and the class conflict it generated (see Kubálková and Cruickshank 1985; Linklater 1990). It redirected the focus to an examination of how the twin logics of capitalist development and geopolitical rivalry interacted. It is worth noting here that Marxism played a vital role in stimulating the Critical Theory pioneered by Robert Cox (1981) and Andrew Linklater (1990), because Marx critically analysed the tensions between hopes of universal freedom and concrete realities of inequality and oppression (see Chapter 4).

In his famous lectures at the London School of Economics (LSE) in the 1950s, Martin Wight (1991) also distinguished three traditions of thought, but rather eccentrically called them realism, rationalism and revolutionism (also see Bull 1976). If realism was the tradition associated with power politics and ‘the blood and iron and immorality men’, as Wight called them (Bull 1976: 104), revolutionism was associated with the perpetual peace of liberal internationalism and the revolutionary internationalism of Marxism – ‘the subversion and liberation and missionary men’. Rationalism was a ‘middle way’ that sought to avoid the extremes of realism and revolutionism. It is a tradition of thought most closely associated with seventeenth-century Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius (who, by contrast with Hobbes, was barely five feet tall!), and eighteenth-century Swiss lawyer, Emer de Vattel – ‘the law and order and keep your word men’, to use Wight’s description (Bull 1976: 104). Rationalists accept the realist premise that states exist in a condition of anarchy (where no state has the authority to lay down and enforce the law), but deny that this condition is bereft of rules and norms. Rather, they argue that, to use the felicitous phrase of Wight’s foremost protégé, Hedley Bull (1977), states exist in an ‘anarchical society’. States tend to form international societies where order is maintained through mechanisms such as international law, diplomacy, balances of power, great power management and occasionally war (Bull 1977; see also Chapter 17). This ‘middle way’ continues today under the name of the English School (see Dunne 1998; Linklater and Suganami 2006), and has some affinities with neoliberal institutionalism (Hurrell 1995) (see Chapter 3).

In Wight’s hands, the three traditions (the ‘three Rs’) were not meant to be watertight containers, but more like ‘streams, with eddies and cross-currents, sometimes interlacing’ (Wight 1991: 260). To continue the metaphor: in practice, canonical thinkers tend to cross and sometimes straddle streams rather than soak their feet permanently in one. Wight’s purpose was merely to present the traditions as historically embodied styles of thought handed down by scholars and practitioners alike.

Needless to say, there are various classificatory schemes, each as arbitrary as the next. What matters is not so much the historical veracity of the scheme as the analytical tools it serves up. Traditions of thought, whichever scheme we choose to employ, provide us with the premises, tenets and concepts without which we could not intelligibly
discuss and analyse international relations. Traditions are the source of our lexicon, the common vocabulary we use to study our subject – even if, as Renée Jeffery (2005) contends, the very idea of a ‘tradition of thought’ is questionable.

We have to depart from somewhere (there is actually no point outside all tradition), so we start with what the competing traditions leave to us. But traditions are not given and homogeneous. They are ‘invented’, which is not to say that traditions are false or arbitrarily fabricated, only that the inheritance must be selected and interpreted before it can be received. Traditions are also heterogeneous, comprising multiple strands and legacies. What we believe they leave to us depends on how we sift through, select and interpret the tradition’s inheritance (see Box 0.3). As Jim George (1994: 196) rightly points out, ‘the “great texts” of International Relations can be read in ways entirely contrary to their ritualized disciplinary treatment’. Which is why IR has in recent years witnessed an ‘historiographical turn’ (Armitage 2004, Duncan Bell 2001, Keene 2005) – reflecting on the aims and methods of writing history, particularly intellectual history or the history of ideas. In keeping with this historiographical turn, this Introduction, and the textbook as a whole, aims to encourage and cultivate what Herbert Butterfield (1955: 17) called ‘historical-mindedness’.

**BOX 0.3: DISCUSSION POINTS**

**Was Thucydides a realist?**

As an illustration of how traditions depend on interpretation, consider the tendency of realists and others to assign Thucydides uncritically to the realist tradition. Behind this assignation lies the supposition that the realist tradition is centred around the concept of material or military power and that Thucydides is a realist par excellence. The one episode in his account of the Peloponnesian War that is always invoked is ‘The Melian Dialogue’. According to Thucydides (1972: 402) narrative, the Athenian envoy says to his Melian counterpart, ‘the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept’. Captured in this remark is one of the most powerful expressions of realism’s emphasis on material power determining international outcomes – which is why it is realism’s favourite hymn, and why Thucydides is viewed as the first great realist. It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that Thucydides subscribes to this realist view, since he is simply retelling the story. In fact, much else in his narrative suggests that Thucydides would be out of place in the realist tradition, not least because he places a good deal of emphasis on normative standards for assessing conduct and moral responsibility. Furthermore, the Athenian empire’s reliance on military force and war proves insufficient to prevent eventual collapse. We can conclude, therefore, that how traditions are understood and who is included in them is indeed a matter of selection and interpretation.

To summarise, as Wight has suggested, and as R. B. J. Walker (1993: chapter 2) and Jim George (1994: 192–7) have amply demonstrated, traditions of thought are never as internally coherent or self-enclosed as they appear. Common though it may be to bundle Machiavelli and Hobbes together in the realist tradition, they actually differ considerably on many key points, especially on how they view time and change in politics, with the Florentine seeing politics as permanently in flux and the Englishman holding to a more static and spatial conception that is perhaps more consistent with some aspects of the ‘Great Divide’.
Origins and evolution of the discipline

The origins of the discipline are to be found in one crucial historical moment: World War I (1914–18) as we know it now, but the ‘Great War’ as it was known before World War II. It was the most intense and mechanised war yet experienced, with new technologies, including the advent of air power, allowing for new heights of destruction to be reached. The unprecedented destructiveness prompted calls for the eradication of war; it was indeed often referred to as the ‘War to End All Wars’. The traumatic experience of the Great War for Europeans was perhaps compounded by the fact that the years preceding it were relatively peaceful and stable, witnessing marked increases in ‘the number of multilateral conferences, institutions, and organizations’ (Reus-Smit 1999: 133). In particular, significant strides were taken regarding the laws of war with the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, which seemed to vindicate liberal optimism for international reform.

After the war, an understandable tide of anti-war sentiment surged through Europe – the continent that had witnessed so many terrible wars over the centuries. It was not only war’s destructiveness that fuelled anti-war sentiment, it was also its apparent futility. As an instrument of foreign policy, war appeared to many to be ineffective and counterproductive (see Angell 1912).

We might think such sentiments to be a natural reaction to war. But until the eighteenth century, while war had always been lamented, it was rarely viewed as eradicable. This is why English jurist Sir Henry Maine (cited in Howard 2001: 1) observed in the middle of the nineteenth century, ‘War appears to be as old as mankind, but peace is a modern invention’. It was only with the initiation of ‘plans for perpetual peace’ in the eighteenth century, drafted most famously by the Abbé Saint Pierre and Immanuel Kant, that thinkers and scholars put their minds to determining how peace might permanently prevail over war in a system of states. But only after the Great War did a widespread ‘peace movement’ arise with the intention of eliminating war for all time.

To this sentiment were added practical, institutional measures, including the establishment of the League of Nations at Geneva in 1920 and, in accordance with the League’s Covenant, the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague in 1922 (originally the Permanent Court of Arbitration, as established under the 1899 Hague Conference). According to Chris Reus-Smit (1999), a new legislative principle of procedural justice emerged at this time which found concrete expression in these new institutions. Two precepts informed this new legislative justice: ‘first, that only those subject to the rules have the right to define them and, second, that the rules of society must apply equally to all’ (Reus-Smit 1999: 129). Reus-Smit (1999: 123–54) traces the origins of these ideas back to the eighteenth century – to the Enlightenment and to the American and French revolutions; but it is arguable that it was only in the aftermath of the Great War that a new diplomatic and legal order took shape based on contractual international law and multilateralism. The war not only marked a break with the previous peace, it brought about a different kind of peace, one where permanent international institutions were designed ‘to promote international co-operation and to achieve peace and security’, as expressed in the League of Nations Covenant (printed in Claude 1964: 409).

This is the general context in which the discipline of International Relations was established. It was a period of progressive institutionalisation of liberal–constitutional