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F. R. Tennant
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Natural science exchanges the realistic theory of knowledge, dictated by common sense, for phenomenalism, to which psychology also points. Science now renounces the claim to be ontology, or to be a substitute for metaphysics. Specific sciences are largely autonomous, or irreducible to one type, because they seek different kinds of explanation and involve different indispensable categories.
The pure sciences of mathematics and logic are not fundamental but, rather, instrumental to the natural sciences. Nor do they supply the primary data or prescribe the method of philosophy. The abstractive method is different from, and no substitute for, the metaphysical method.
There is no absolute hierarchy of sciences: their order is a matter of human interests pp. 130–160

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LECTURE VI

The Relation of Theology to other Departments of Knowledge

The view that theology is an independent and isolated science rests on the assertion that religious experience involves *immediate* apprehension of *unique* data, and thereby of a *real* (as distinct from an imaginal or ideal) realm. Religious experience *alone*, however, seems, from the point of view of the psychology of cognition, unable to establish either the immediacy, or the uniqueness, or the reality, in question.
The view that theology is independent of all existential knowledge and is derivable from judgements of value, or ethics alone, seems plainly to involve the ontological fallacy, or a confusion of the valid with the real. If these two views are convicted of unsoundness, it follows that revealed religion presupposes (epistemologically—not, of course, historically) natural theology, that religion presupposes theological conceptions, and that theology is an outgrowth from ordinary knowledge as to the world and man. It is the generalisations of science, synoptically regarded, which supply a 'reasonable' basis of reasoned theistic belief. Isolated from profane knowledge, theology becomes a science of subjectivity, or rather a knowledge concerning human mentality: as but a further venture in the faith which science itself involves, theism is the self-completion of science, a philosophical world-view, and a justification of religious certitude as to the religiously essential
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