Introduction

Can there be any sense to existence once Being is recognized to be a fiction?[1] Is ethics possible without God? Is there any purpose to existence in this world, if this world is all there is? Is virtue possible without Transcendence? If nothing stands behind, let alone beyond, this world of becoming, can life still have meaning?

All these questions are variations on a single theme. This arresting theme will captivate anyone who has ears for Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy, and, more generally, anyone who is not lulled by theism or one of its surrogates. It announces what I call the *challenge of nihilism*. The challenge of nihilism is the challenge of developing an ethics after the collapse of the fiction on which all prevalent ethical systems formerly relied. Nietzsche rightly identified this fiction. It is Being – "what is, but does not become."[2] The challenge of nihilism, accordingly, is the challenge of formulating a human ideal in and for a world of evanescent becoming.

From Parmenides and Plato onward, the edifice of Western thought has been built on the "empty fiction" of Being.[3] This fiction has many faces: God, Substance, the Absolute, the Transcendent, etc. Being is what underpins the metaphysical concept of the Real, the epistemological concept of the True, and the moral concept of the Good. Contrasted to Being, becoming is thus unreal, false, and evil. On one side is the fixed, reliable Truth of what is; on the other, the shifting, treacherous appearance of what becomes.[4]

A philosophical, existential, and ethical vacuum attends the sobering realization that becoming is all there is, that Being is a lie. Nothing, it

[1] All the names (e.g. Being, God, Truth) and properties (e.g. Permanence, Bliss, Transcendence) of the "*wahre Welt*" (Real/True World) rejected in both Nietzsche's thought and Buddhist philosophy will be capitalized throughout this book. This serves the purpose of underlining the robustly metaphysical character of such concepts. Cf. Rorty's capitalization of "Platonic notions" such as Truth, Goodness, Rationality, and Philosophy in R. Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991).

[2] *GD* v §1. [3] *Ibid.* §2.

[4] Cf. J.-P. Sartre, *L'être et le néant: essai d'ontologie phénoménologique* (Paris: Gallimard, 1943), p. 12.

then seems, is real, true, or good. This vacuum Nietzsche calls nihilism. The crisis of nihilism follows on the heels of the death of God/Being. It is a crisis in so far as it threatens to undermine all value, meaning, and purpose. Hence the necessity of responding to the challenge of nihilism by formulating a genuinely post-theistic ethics. Without such an ethics, the world remains cloaked in valuelessness, any ground for evaluation is lacking, and all human beings are deemed equally worthless. No vision guides the way. Mediocrity and laissez-faire on every plane follow. Cultures decay, societies disintegrate, and people stagnate. The revival of mindless fanaticism and desperate religiosity we are witnessing today feeds off the ethical bareness of a culture (perhaps only temporarily) weaned off the soothing lies of theism. Lest a great opportunity should be wasted, the challenge of nihilism must therefore be met, though we have yet to begin really facing up to it, let alone understanding it. This is why Nietzsche remains the most relevant thinker of our day. He was indeed a posthumous philosopher. His time has now come.

Nietzsche's attempt to respond to the challenge of nihilism takes the form of his ethics of life-affirmation. Stability, Peace, and Bliss are properties of Being. But Being is a fiction. A world of becoming is therefore a world of ceaseless instability, struggle, and suffering. Accordingly, the ideal of life-affirmation consists of a stance toward suffering. This stance comports two fundamental features, namely a distinctive attitude toward one's own suffering (*amor fati*) and a distinctive attitude toward the suffering of others (the "overcoming of compassion"). The end goal envisaged by the ethics of life-affirmation is a state of great health which involves not only accepting, but embracing, affirming, and celebrating life's limitless suffering.

As they are presented in Nietzsche's writing, however, both *amor fati* and the overcoming of compassion are astonishingly vague ethical concepts. Nietzsche's vision of great health, as a result, remains something of a mystery. The incisiveness and acuity of Nietzsche's negative and critical views find no parallel in his positive philosophy. This might very well have been deliberate. The ethics of life-affirmation Nietzsche began to formulate in his later years is a sketch, a rough *brouillon*, a project. Perhaps a preamble?

In developing his response to the challenge of nihilism, Nietzsche modeled himself on the counter-example of the man he regarded as his greatest predecessor. "I could become the Buddha of Europe," he writes in 1883, "though frankly I would be the antipode of the Indian Buddha."[5] By the time he collapsed in 1889, Nietzsche had gone a long way toward becoming both.

[5] *NL 1882–1884*, 4(2).

Nietzsche knew that Siddhārtha Gautama, the historical Buddha, had done two of the things he was now doing. First, the Buddha firmly rejected the myth of Being and admitted only of becoming. Second, he sought to formulate an ethics which did not rely on the fiction of an Abiding, Blissful Absolute – an ethics designed to address the fundamentally painful nature of life in a world of turbulent becoming and frustrating impermanence. The Buddha's ethics, accordingly, was also geared toward an ideal state of supreme wellbeing, or great health (*nirvāṇa*).

This is why Nietzsche proclaimed himself the Buddha of Europe. Like his Indian predecessor, he is a defiant thinker, honest enough to denounce Being as a lie and brave enough to formulate an ethics of great health founded on the reality of becoming alone. But Nietzsche also presents himself as an Anti-Buddha. To the Buddha's ethics of life-negation, which he regarded as fundamentally unhealthy, Nietzsche opposes that of life-affirmation. *Amor fati* is *nirvāṇa* turned inside out, the overcoming of compassion the opposite of the Buddhist cultivation of compassion. Already, the story of Nietzsche's attempt to respond to the nihilist crisis becomes richer.[6]

The heuristic gains in the interpretation of Nietzsche's thought secured through a closer examination of its relation to Buddhism are only the tip of the iceberg. Buddhist thought has much to offer the Western philosophical tradition in and of itself.[7] Considered in connection with Nietzsche's thought, however, it offers no less than an opportunity to begin overcoming humanity's debilitating addiction to Being without tumbling into an ethical void. Nietzsche and the great Buddhist philosophers of Classical India called a spade a spade: practically all of philosophy and religion – East and West – has been built on the two-headed delusion of soul/ego/self and God/Being/Substance.[8] Moreover, in the Buddhist tradition, as in Nietzsche's writing, there is a firm push to *psychologize* the universe not only of religious, but also

[6] The relative scarcity of studies dealing with Nietzsche and Buddhism is entirely out of proportion with the significance of Nietzsche's engagement with Buddhism in the development of his thought. Such works exist, but tend to be ignored by the vast majority of Nietzsche scholars, sometimes with good reason. Be that as it may, failure to take Nietzsche's engagement with Buddhism seriously has resulted in a major blind spot in our understanding of both Nietzsche's thought and its broader philosophical significance.

[7] Those who need to be convinced of this should turn to two recent volumes which clearly exhibit the pertinence of Buddhist ideas for both the analytic and continental traditions of contemporary Western thought, namely M. D'Amato, J. Garfield, and T. Tillemans (eds.), *Pointing at the Moon* (Oxford University Press, 2009) and M. Siderits, E. Thompson, and D. Zahavi (eds.), *Self, No Self? Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological and Indian Traditions* (Oxford University Press, 2011).

[8] The juxtaposition of these two triads of concepts is not arbitrary. The soul is the personal, individual correlate of God – his *anima*, according to some. The "I" is supposedly "what is, but does not become," i.e. Being, qua ground of subjectivity. The self, finally, is the substance of which mental and physical events are attributes.

of abstract, theoretical thought. This psychological push is intimately tied to the broader medical discourse in which these philosophies are couched. Metaphysical thinking,[9] in particular, is interpreted in terms of the subject's specific (pathological) needs and desires. Drawing the relations between Nietzsche's thought and Buddhist philosophy, then, does not only add a significant measure of depth to our understanding of the implications of rejecting Being – at the metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical level – it also brings into relief a complex set of psychological considerations which point to a new, genuinely post-theistic conception of virtue.

Nietzsche believed the Buddha suffered from precisely that illness that he, Nietzsche, had diagnosed, namely *décadence*. He therefore opposed his ethics of life-affirmation to the Buddha's presumed *décadent* ethics of life-negation. But Nietzsche was wrong in believing the former and therefore misguided in doing the latter. As such, his response to the challenge of nihilism is no guiding light. Having said this, by dispelling Nietzsche's confusion and, in the process, enriching our understanding of both his thought and Buddhist philosophy, the road is paved toward a new ethical vision. Indeed, the psychological insights gained through the implosion of the life-negation/affirmation dichotomy point not only to something of a hybrid account of what is unhealthy about the common person's take on the world, but also toward something of a hybrid vision of great health. At stake, then, is a new response to the challenge of nihilism, which overcomes the limitations of Nietzsche's response. A new account of moral psychology, a new ethics, a new direction for human striving – this, ultimately, is what the present work aims to formulate.

The thrust of this enterprise is informed by clear methodological commitments. These include a particular method of interpreting Nietzsche's thought, a specific approach to Buddhism, and a distinctive hermeneutics for bringing Nietzsche's thought and Buddhist philosophy into dialog. A few words on each of these three points.

Nietzsche does not speak with one voice, but with a plurality of voices. Most philosophers strive for consistency and uniformity in their claims, arguments, and overall positions. This is not the case with Nietzsche. It is not that he reveled in inconsistency and contradiction, or that he cared nothing for consistency, as some of his less charitable readers might be

[9] Substance metaphysics is what Nietzsche and Buddhist philosophers had trouble with. It is not clear that they would have regarded so-called "process metaphysics" as meta-physics. Accordingly, except when otherwise stated, the terms "metaphysics" and "metaphysical" in this book refer to substance metaphysics.

inclined to believe. Rather, Nietzsche strove to give full expression to various viewpoints, or perspectives, and accepted that a consequence of doing so was the emergence of clashes, conflicts, and ambiguities among various perspectives.[10] Though it is inevitable to speak in this way, there is therefore always something slightly inaccurate about any statement beginning with "Nietzsche said/claimed/believed . . ." This is because there is no singular Nietzsche.[11]

Nietzsche's approach to writing philosophy is consistent with his broader theoretical positions. First, Nietzsche did not believe in a unified subject.[12] Instead he highlighted the "plurality" within the apparently singular subject. Nietzsche's polyphonic texts are consonant with the radical plurality of his own subjectivity.

Second, Nietzsche rejects the cognitive/emotive/conative trichotomy on which rests the very belief in the presumed impartiality of the philosopher.[13] Philosophical insight, for any of Plato's (or Aristotle's) successors, consists in a "knowing" untainted by what is considered lower in man, namely the deceptive senses, capricious emotions, and fickle volitions. Nietzsche has a different story to tell. He reduces both the cognitive and the emotive to the conative – all beliefs and feelings, he claims, have for their necessary condition and psychological ground certain desires and needs. Even abstract knowledge, which in effect falsifies reality – no true circle, triangle, or sphere exists in the actual world, numbers are mere empty place-holders, etc. – is a product of a primitive will to live and predominate in one's environment which leads the subject to ignore (irrelevant) particularities, to generalize, to generate universals, etc.[14] Nietzsche's view has important implications for

[10] In commenting on Nietzsche's method, P. Heller, *Studies on Nietzsche* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1980), and P. de Man, "Nietzsche's Theory of Rhetoric," *Symposium* 28(1), 1974: 33–51, emphasize the dynamics at play between the perspectives in Nietzsche's texts: the ways in which they supersede and overcome one another and thus mirror the mechanisms of the world's perpetual becoming. In contrast, my point here concerns the irreducible plurality of these perspectives, whose oppositions and dynamics, as we will see, are not always dialectical (contra Heller and de Man).

[11] This idea should not be confused with the standard view that there are, so to speak, three Nietzsches, corresponding to his so-called periods – early, middle, and late. See M. Clark, "Nietzsche, Friedrich," in *Concise Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 630–1. In fact, the present study pays little attention to the distinction between the three periods, focusing instead on the plurality of Nietzsche's voices, several of which span two or three "periods," and some of which make fundamentally contradictory claims within the same period.

[12] See, for instance, *JGB* §19.

[13] On this point, see *JGB* §§3, 5, and 6, in particular. (Nietzsche does not use the terms "cognitive," "emotive," and "conative," but that is irrelevant.)

[14] See, on this point, Nietzsche's striking remarks at *JGB* §§3, 4, and 14. It could be argued that this feature of Nietzsche's thought anticipates contemporary developments in evolutionary psychology. It should be kept in mind, however, that Nietzsche regarded evolutionary theory's emphasis on adaptation as reflective of a reactive and thus unhealthy will (*GM* II §12).

the figure of the philosopher. In expounding a system or a view, a philosopher is just giving voice to some feature of his will(s). More often than not, Nietzsche claims, the works of artists and thinkers are the fruit of conflicts among the plural wills within them.[15] In Nietzsche's own case, various voices are given the opportunity to expound various perspectives expressive of various wills. Hence the plurality of Nietzsche's voices.

Third, the demise of the metaphysics of Being, and with it of the apparent/true world divide, implies that there is no determinate Absolute Truth about any matter – that there is no "view from nowhere," to use T. Nagel's phrase.[16] There is only a plurality of perspectives stemming from and expressive of a plurality of interests.[17] The theory of perspectivism which emerges from Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics and psychology is in effect put into practice in his use of polyphony.

Such are the theoretical underpinnings of Nietzsche's approach to writing philosophy as a Bhaktinian play of masks and voices. This approach should not be dismissed as immature and narcissistic obscurantism; it is, though Nietzsche would not like this turn of phrase, the "logical implication" of his views on the subject, on the human psyche, and on Truth and knowledge.

The effects of Nietzsche's approach are threefold. First, Nietzsche uses key terms or concepts in apparently contradictory, inconsistent, or at the very least ambiguous ways – e.g. the terms "nihilism" and "nihilistic." A good way to understand this rather frustrating feature of his writing is to accept it as an unhappy consequence of his use of distinct voices which confusingly use the same word in different senses. Second, Nietzsche makes apparently contradictory statements – e.g. "Buddhism is beyond good and evil" (*A*) and "the Buddha remains under the delusion of morality" (*JGB*). Again, such confusing contradictions are the result of the plurality of Nietzsche's voices. Third, some of Nietzsche's voices adopt extreme positions expressed in particularly shocking language – positions that clash with what appears to be the more nuanced thrust of his overall philosophical project (e.g. his polemical claim that compassion thwarts natural selection).

It may be objected that a thinker such as Nietzsche cannot have an "overall philosophical project," that his texts are just a mumbo-jumbo of contradictory views, and that there is no way to adjudicate between his voices. On this view, Nietzsche is a literary figure, not a true philosopher,

[15] Some examples are discussed in *GM* III.
[16] T. Nagel, *The View from Nowhere* (Oxford University Press, 1989). [17] *NL 1885–1887*, 7(60).

because he fails to think systematically.[18] This is one of two extreme positions. The other is to treat Nietzsche's thought as a system, as J. Richardson does.[19] To do so, equal value and weight must be given to all of his voices so that all of his claims may be amenable to uniform treatment on the same discursive plane. This involves a veritable flattening out of Nietzsche's texts – a translation on a two-dimensional plane of what is three-dimensional – with various voices expressing perspectives from various angles, but also from various positions on the vertical reactive/active or unhealthy/healthy axes. Through formidable interpretative contortions, this approach makes for a relatively cogent albeit thoroughly unpersuasive "system." Most philosophers do their best to turn their thinking into a flat plane. Nietzsche's thinking is a harsh mountainous landscape and any attempt at turning it into a plane is bound to fail. This approach impoverishes Nietzsche's philosophy, which is no better than to dismiss it as "mere literature."

These two extreme positions are not exhaustive. Though Nietzsche very confusingly puts his perspectivism into practice, he can be read as a philosopher. He does not present a system, but there is nevertheless consistency and coherence in the overall attitude his thoughts give voice to, and in the overall direction in which it points. He might not have a system, but Nietzsche certainly has a project. The overarching ideal toward which his thought is geared is the great health of life-affirmation. This ideal finds its first articulation in Nietzsche's early discussion of Attic tragedy and remains the guiding star of his thinking until his collapse. The key hermeneutical principle at work in this book, accordingly, is to respect the irreducible plurality of Nietzsche's voices – to accept his playful practice of perspectivism – without losing track of what provides his thought with its overarching unity, namely the ideal of great health. This makes it possible to avoid despair before Nietzsche's contradictions and ambivalences without falling prey to the naivety of reading a fixed system into his writings.

This basic principle is manifested in two ways. First, it allows for an interpretative strategy which essentially consists in foaming the apparent inconsistencies, contradictions, and ambiguities in Nietzsche's texts with a view to arriving at the larger framework which makes sense of the various

[18] This seems to have been Russell's position in *History of Western Philosophy and its Connection with Political and Social Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present Day* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945) – a position uncritically accepted by almost an entire generation of Anglo-American early postwar scholars. Of course, Russell's assessment of Nietzsche was also (if not mainly) grounded in a harsh ad hominem assessment of Nietzsche's supposedly vile moral character.

[19] J. Richardson, *Nietzsche's System* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

perspectives Nietzsche gives voice to. This larger framework almost invariably involves Nietzsche's foundational ideas on health (the active, creative, affirming drives) and sickness (the passive, reactive, negating drives). It is therefore through the resolution of apparent contradictions among Nietzsche's views that a deeper understanding of his overall project will be attained.

Second, the hermeneutical principle outlined above makes it possible to adjudicate between Nietzsche's various voices and attribute different weights to his diverse claims. The principle at play here is that of relative healthiness. Some of Nietzsche's voices are more reactive (less healthy), others more active/creative (healthier). Keeping this in mind, it is possible to downplay what (healthy/creative) Nietzsche himself would most likely have regarded as more reactive, less healthy positions.[20]

I suspect Nietzsche would have approved of this approach. Not only does the reading it allows for take the plurality of his voices seriously, but it is also creative in and of itself. Mummy-like impartiality is not what guides this inquiry;[21] some ideas in Nietzsche's text are intentionally (and consciously) emphasized, others paid less attention to, and all of those that are engaged with are treated as living, plastic, dynamic ideas, which can be utilized and learned from, not merely analyzed and commented on. More importantly, my reading is, so to speak, a direct expression of my will to "go somewhere" with Nietzsche's positive philosophy. M. Foucault once observed that the truly interesting question, when it comes to Nietzsche and Nietzscheisms, is not "what did Nietzsche say?" but rather "what serious use can Nietzsche be put to?"[22] Like B. Williams, I agree with Foucault, and I am convinced Nietzsche would have agreed as well. This book puts Nietzsche to use for a specific purpose, namely that of formulating a new, better, healthier response to the challenge of nihilism than that which we find in

[20] Examples of these include naive glorifications of violence and cruelty designed, more than anything, to provoke his bleeding-heart contemporaries – the desire to provoke is obviously reactive – or his misogynist views – clearly the result of Nietzsche's reaction to his unhappy upbringing and his traumatizing experiences with Lou Andreas-Salomé. It may be argued that this lets Nietzsche off the hook too easily: nay, that I am resuscitating Kaufmann's gentle Nietzsche in his *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist* (Princeton University Press, 1974). My response is that I am simply applying the (Nietzschean) principle of "relative health" to isolate and downplay particularly immature, resentful, and reactive voices in Nietzsche. This is required if we are to remain focused on the ideal of great health without being distracted by the relatively irrelevant squeals of Nietzsche's angrier, more resentful voices.

[21] On philosophers' unhappy tendency to turn everything they touch into mummies, see *GD* III §1.

[22] Cited in B. Williams, *The Sense of the Past* (Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 300. Contra an objectivist critic, this approach to Nietzsche's texts in no way implies immunity from misinterpretation. Irrespective of its dynamism and creativity, my exegesis of Nietzsche's works remains as falsifiable as any other reading.

Nietzsche's work. In my opinion, it is time for Nietzsche himself to "go under" and thus, in a sense, to fulfill his destiny.[23]

Concerning Buddhism, it should be noted that this book engages with Buddhism as philosophy, not as religion. More specifically, in that the sources I draw from are exclusively South Asian, this book is about Nietzsche and Indian Buddhist thought.[24] From these sources are extracted, abstracted, and reconstructed a set of fundamental positions which taken as a whole is what I will call *Buddhist philosophy*. There is no doubt that Buddhism has played the role of a religion – i.e. a source of metaphysical consolation – for most of its followers since its inception, and that for millennia Buddhist institutions have played the social, cultural, economic, and political role that religious institutions have played the world over. Buddhist schools, moreover, began splintering up soon after Siddhārtha Gautama's death, which resulted in the rapid proliferation of opposed doctrinal positions on a number of philosophical points. Nevertheless, in its essence – i.e. in the teachings of its founder and a number of his erudite followers – Buddhism also bears a distinct philosophical core which is easily detachable from the culturally and historically contingent doctrinal components of various Buddhist schools. This core is what I am concerned with in this book.

There is no doubt that Buddhism is geared toward a specific practical goal, namely the attainment of a liberating wisdom which leads to radical qualitative change in one's experience of and relationship to the world. As M. Siderits has noted, however, the ethical character of Buddhism can be regarded as incompatible with the rationalism of Western philosophy "only when we assume that rationality is incapable of resolving soteriological or existential concerns."[25] The Buddha and his followers, however, never made this assumption. On the contrary, they thought resolving existential and ethical issues requires us to think clearly and to analyze the workings of the mind, the world we experience, the ways in which we engage with it, and so

[23] These turns of phrase are borrowed from *Z* (see *Z* I "Zarathustras Vorrede" §§9–10, especially).

[24] My sources are the Buddha's discourses as recorded in the Theravāda canon and the works of Indian Buddhist philosophers of the Classical period. When they are not translated, all Buddhist technical terms will appear in their Sanskrit form, even when I quote from a Pāli text; cf. A. K. Warder, *Indian Buddhism* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970).

[25] M. Siderits, *Buddhist Philosophy and Personal Identity: Empty Persons* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), p. xiv. Hayes takes offence at the use of the term "soteriology" in discussions of Buddhism. As he rightly notes, there is no *sōtēr* ("savior") in Buddhism and thus no *sōtērion* ("salvation"). As a consequence, Hayes argues, it is inaccurate to speak of soteriology in the Buddhist context. R. P. Hayes, *Diṅnāga on the Interpretation of Signs* (London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), pp. 34–5. I am inclined to agree. This is why I speak of Buddhist ethics and Buddhist moral psychology in this book, not of Buddhist soteriology.

on.[26] As a result, there is nothing wrong with treating Buddhism philosophically, as philosophy.[27]

The controversial task of isolating an "ideal" Buddhist philosophy from Buddhism as religion and ideology involves identifying those features of Buddhist doctrine which are non-dogmatic, falsifiable, and logically independent of dogmatic positions.[28] On the level of metaphysics, the Buddhist philosophy thus arrived at firmly rejects the existence of an abiding ego and is committed to a radical critique of substance metaphysics. In the ethical domain, Buddhist philosophy advances a set of claims about what makes people psychologically unhealthy and thus also about what striving towards the great health of *nirvāṇa* involves. When it comes to epistemology, it espouses a position which in today's parlance may be described as pragmatic contextualism. In the philosophy of language, finally, it subscribes to a form of nominalism. Things are far more complicated in the details, but in essence this is what the Buddhist philosophy at play in this book comprises.

There are two things about this approach to Buddhism which might prove particularly irritating for Buddhists and Buddhologists alike. The first is that no attention whatsoever will be paid to the scholastic metaphysical themes to which Buddhist authors throughout the ages have devoted much attention and which Buddhists have always regarded as central to their belief system. Principal among these are rebirth, natural moral retribution, and the status of such a perfected being as the Buddha after death. As important as these themes were in Classical Indian discussions, the fundamental philosophical (i.e. non-dogmatic, falsifiable) positions that form the core

[26] As Siderits notes, the supposed ideological gulf between Western philosophy and Eastern "wisdom" is the heritage of the nineteenth-century Romantic construction of Asian cultures as purely "spiritual" in opposition to a crudely positivist and rationalist West (*Buddhist Philosophy*, p. xiv). On the Romantic reception of Eastern texts in Europe and its enormous impact on contemporary attitudes to India and to Indian thought, see the excellent works of R. Schwab, *La Renaissance orientale* (Paris: Payot, 1950), R. Gérard, *L'Orient et la pensée romantique allemande* (Nancy: Thomas, 1963), R.-P. Droit, *L'oubli de l'Inde: une amnésie philosophique* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1989), and W. Halbfass, *India and Europe: An Essay in Understanding* (State University of New York Press, 1988). In reality, reasoning is not so foreign to Asia and Western rationality is not as detached from more practical and ethical concerns as some might think. As a result, it is not possible to develop a coherent argument to justify what Halbfass calls the "the exclusion of the Orient from the domain to which the concept of philosophy is applicable" (*India and Europe*, p. 155). For a more detailed discussion of the "Euro-contemporocentrism" characteristic of the mainstream Western philosophical attitude to Indian thought, see R. King's excellent *Introduction to Hindu and Buddhist Philosophy* (Edinburgh University Press, 1999), especially pp. 1–41.

[27] *Nirvāṇa*, the *summum bonum* of Buddhist ethics, is said to be accompanied by "wisdom/insight" (*prajñā*). Indeed, developing wisdom is essential to attaining *nirvāṇa*. As such, for all its emphasis on a practical, ethical goal, there is no doubt that Buddhism is, nominally at least, a form of "love of wisdom" (*philō-sōphia*).

[28] Cf. M. Siderits, *Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007).