AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE
AND
COMBINED OPERATIONS
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes as ‘Director of Combined Operations’ 17th July 1940—19th October 1941
AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE
AND
COMBINED OPERATIONS

BY

ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET
THE LORD KEYES

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*Frontispiece: Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes as ‘Director of Combined Operations’ 17th July 1940—19th October 1941*

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*Maps II, III and IV by kindness of Messrs G. G. Harrap & Sons*  
*Maps VI and VII by kindness of Messrs Thornton Butterworth*
FOREWORD

I feel it a great honour to have been invited to give the Lees Knowles lectures, which were founded to encourage the study of military science.

I have chosen ‘Amphibious Warfare and Combined Operations’ as my theme because it is a form of warfare which is responsible for the foundation of our great world-wide Empire, and which is vitally important, if we are to wage war across the Narrow Seas, maintain what we hold in distant oceans, and recover the Far Eastern possessions which we have lost, through our folly in trusting to other means than Sea Supremacy for our security.

To launch and maintain an amphibious operation, it is necessary to possess Sea Supremacy in the theatre of the enterprise, and with the advent of Air Power it can only be obtained by a Navy possessing the means to fight, not only on the surface and submerged, but also in the air above. When the military campaign is opened, although strategic bombing can be of great value, it is even more important that the Military Commander should have complete control over all the aircraft he needs, both to work with his ground forces and to defeat the enemy in the air.

The lessons of history are invaluable and the record of scores of amphibious operations—some brilliantly successful, others disastrous—are available from which to gain inspiration and guidance. But as a race we are slow to learn and quick to forget, and the lessons that we might have learnt from a study of previous operations are often only learnt by trial and error and bitter experience in each successive generation.

This is as true to-day as it was in 1759, when Thomas More Molyneux in Conjunct Expeditions reflected bitterly on our failure to profit by past experience:

‘Thus shall we go again, should we stand with our arms across,
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despairing of ever learning better, though so strongly urged and stimulated by past errors and past misfortunes.'

‘...It is a palpable demonstration, from the number of conjunct armaments these Kingdoms have fitted out, and the many fruitless attempts that have been the issue of them, that there has been no right industry, no skill or watchful observation. That is, we have never employed our minds in the study of this war 'til we have been called upon to make use of our bodies also. Thus when it is too late, by knowing nothing beforehand we doubly fatigue our mental faculties, with the vain hope of retrieving lost opportunities.’

However, in that same year, 1759, General Wolfe and Admiral Saunders brought off a 'Conjunct Expedition' in North America, which laid the foundations of the great Dominion of Canada; a campaign which is a classic and an example of Naval and Military co-operation at its best.

I therefore give a brief account of this campaign, since there is much to be learnt from it, and have followed it with my own personal experiences in three 'Combined Operations' in past wars—China 1900, Gallipoli 1915, and the Belgian Coast 1918—ending with this war as far as possible.

These lectures are now published, in the hope that they may be of some help to a younger generation.

I have to thank Messrs Harrap and Messrs Eyre & Spottiswoode for permission to quote a few passages from my earlier books.

KEYES
A. F.

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