Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Language

Throughout his philosophical development, Wittgenstein was more concerned with language than with any other topic. No other philosopher has been as influential on our understanding of the deep problems surrounding language, and yet the true significance of his writing on the subject is difficult to assess, since most of the current debates regarding language tend to overlook his work. In this book, Thomas McNally shows that philosophers of language still have much to learn from Wittgenstein’s later writings. The book examines the finer details of his arguments while also clarifying their importance for debates outside the field of Wittgenstein studies. Presenting the issues thematically (as they relate to questions of reference, scepticism about meaning and the social dimension of language, among others), the book explores how the arguments in the *Philosophical Investigations* remain relevant, compelling us to reflect in novel and challenging ways on the nature of language.

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Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Language
The Legacy of the *Philosophical Investigations*

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For Sinéad
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Abbreviations

ACL        Wittgenstein’s Lectures: Cambridge, 1932–1935 (1979)
BB        The Blue and Brown Books (1969)
BT        The Big Typescript: TS 213 (2005a)
LCL        Wittgenstein’s Lectures: Cambridge, 1930–32 (1980a)
OC        On Certainty (1974b)
PG        Philosophical Grammar (1974a)
PI        Philosophical Investigations (2001)
PR        Philosophical Remarks (1975)
RFM        Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (1978)
RPP        Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (1980b/1980c)
TLP        Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (2005b)
Z        Zettel (1981)