1 Historical Background

Introduction

Throughout the ages, Ottoman authors have often used words related to the public in the Ottoman language, such as *âmm, âmme, umûm*, and a*vâm*, with a negative connotation. In one of the most popular books of all time, *Muhammediye*, Yazıcıoğlu Mehmed Efendi (d. 1451), after dividing the population into three classes, described the common people (*âmm*) as having negligible religious beliefs and being very much lost to earthly affairs.[1] A century later, Kınalızâde Ali (d. 1572), in his *Ahlâk-ı Alâ'î*, called it a calamity (*âfet*), when the *avâm* began questioning serious matters.[2] Perhaps the most sophisticated and prolific writer of Ottoman history, Kâtib Çelebi (d. 1657) took this elitist view somewhat further and portrayed the common people as vermin (*el-'avâm ke'l-hevâmm*),[3] an idea which found widespread approval among later generations.[4]

While Islamic concepts such as *maslahah*, the common good; *istihsân*, the promotion of the common good over strict legal reasoning through exceptions; and *istislâh*, the public interest, were very much parts of Ottoman legal discourse, they had little or no impact on the lives of ordinary people in conflicts with authority. In fact, these concepts, rather than providing legal refuge, more often than not

[1] Yazıcıoğlu Mehmed Efendi, *Muhammediye: Kitâb-ı Muhammediyye*, ed. Amil Çelebioğlu, 4 vols., vol. I (İstanbul: Tercüman Gazetesi, 1975), 115.
[2] Kınalızâde Ali Çelebi, *Ahlâk-ı Alâ'î: Kınalızâde'nin Ahlâk Kitâbı*, ed. Mustafa Koç (İstanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı, 2014), 590.
[3] Kâtip Çelebi, *Mîzânü'l-Hakk Fi İhtiyari'l-Ehakk* (İstanbul: Ebuzziyâ Matbaası, 1306/1888–1889), 15. In the Turkish edition, this Arabic phrase was translated as '*the rabble are like animals/ayak takımı hayvan gibidir*'. In the English translation, it becomes 'masses are asses'. Kâtip Çelebi, *Mîzânü'l-Hakk Fi İhtiyari'l-Ehakk (En Doğruyu Sevmek İçin Hak Terazisi)*, ed. Orhan Şaik Gökyay (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1972), 12. Kâtip Çelebi, *The Balance of Truth*, trans. Geoffrey L. Lewis (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1957), 29.
[4] Naîmâ Efendi, *Târîh-i Naîmâ II*, 931–32.

served as discursive tools of the political and economic domination of the ruling classes.[5] In a similar vein, Ottoman advice writers and chroniclers, under the intricate rhetoric of *adl*/justice, often recommended a firm approach towards the commoners to keep them in their stations in every sense of the word.[6] According to Mustafa Naîmâ (d. 1716) even the ban on tobacco, the enforcement of which terrorised Istanbul residents through on-the-spot executions during the reign of Murad IV (r. 1623–1640) was 'clearly just an excuse to leave the common people terrified' (*avâm-ı nâsı terhîb maslahatı için bir bahâne idüği bedîhîdir*).[7] Looking back, he unequivocally approved of this ban, which helped to deter members of the public from meeting to discuss governmental affairs in coffeehouses, barbershops, and residences.[8]

This policy of deliberate contempt and (when the centre had enough power) control remained more or less the norm up until the transformations, which form the theme of this book. So much so, in fact, that even at the beginning of the nineteenth century (in 1803), a book of advice presented to Selim III, with the very suggestive title, *A Brief for Speaking in Response to the Common People* (*Hulâsatü'l- kelâm fi reddi'l-avâm*), advocated the complete abstinence of the *avâm* from public affairs on pain of death.[9] Accordingly, this chapter will give a background of how the Ottoman public transformed itself from a rabble not given the time of day by authorities to the ultimate source of political legitimacy. It will be mainly suggested that only the complete breakdown of the old system allowed something akin to a

[5] Engin Deniz Akarlı, 'Maslaha: From "Common Good" to "Raison d'état" in the Experience of Istanbul Artisans, 1730–1840', in *Hoca, 'Allame, Puits De Science: Essays in Honor of Kemal Karpat*, eds. Kaan Durukan, Robert Zens, and A. Zorlu-Durukan (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2010), 66–67. Also see Frederick F. Anscombe, *State, Faith, and Nation in Ottoman and Post-Ottoman Lands* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 29.

[6] Lütfi Paşa, *Âsafnâme* (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Amedi, 1326/1908–1909), 25.

[7] Naîmâ Efendi, *Târîh-i Naîmâ II*, 757.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Koca Sekbanbaşı [Ahmed Vasıf Efendi], *Hulâsatü'l-kelâm fi reddi'l-avâm* (İstanbul: Hilal Matbaası, 1332/1916), 7. On the identity of Ahmed Vasıf and for more information on this interesting text, see Kemal Beydilli, 'Sekbanbaşı Risâlesinin Müellifi Hakkında', *Türk Kültürü İnceleme Dergisi* 12 (2005): 221–24, Ethan L. Menchinger, *The First of the Modern Ottomans: The Intellectual History of Ahmed Vasif* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 268–276.

modern public sphere and an endogenous public opinion, as understood by Habermas and others, to develop.

To this end, this chapter starts with the beginning of the famous Eastern Question. Here it is discussed that the *Great Divergence*, as Kenneth Pomeranz has shown, did not really take place, at least for the Ottomans, until the last quarter of the eighteenth century, and the Empire more or less remained competitive with Europe through its extensive artisanal industries. Next, the question of public debt is examined through specific references to the public and the makeup of the public. It is suggested that public debt created a new type of awareness between the state and society. This is followed by an account of the elimination of rival power centres as a crucial step towards the construction of a disciplinary space. Thanks to the transfer of their authority to the state, it is shown here how a discursive sphere emerged where public discussion was possible. The chapter then surveys the question of janissaries and their relationship with society. Here the main argument is that they were the most important component of the *Ancien Régime* and that only with their removal from the Ottoman system could an Ottoman public in its fullest sense be formed. Finally, the chapter concludes with a short account of the first Ottoman newspaper, *Takvîm-i Vekâyi*.

Beginning of the Eastern Question

By the early nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire looked like feudal Europe at its worst.[10] Perhaps it was still colossal in size – stretching from Bosnia to Algeria to Basra – but the old political structure was crumbling at every corner. As early as 1802 the *chargé d'affaires* of the British Embassy in Constantinople was expecting an imminent end, which would turn the Empire into 'numberless, petty, piratical states'.[11] Comte Auguste de Forbin, travelling through the Levant in 1816, found it difficult to believe how 'Turks' could still be

[10] 'In fact', Şükrü Hanioğlu wrote, 'the Ottoman state can only be considered an empire in the loose sense in which the term is used to refer to such medieval states as the Chinese under the late T'ang dynasty.' M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 6–7.

[11] Allan Cunningham, 'The Sick Man and the British Physician', *Middle Eastern Studies* 17, no. 2 (1981): 160.

present in Europe after witnessing the 'ignorance and indiscipline of their troops, [and] disorder of their finances'.[12] There were even rumours about the *Turk's* possible extinction which was seen as a historical opportunity by science-minded people like Hyde Clarke who invited the public 'to the spectacle of the extinction of a mighty and numerous people, such as took place with the ancient Greeks and Romans'.[13]

This gloomy picture was not, however, the result of an inevitable Ottoman decline begun in the late sixteenth century, as has been generally depicted.[14] The economy grew an estimated 50 per cent over the period, while some lost land was recuperated following the failure of the second siege of Vienna (1683).[15] Until the 1760s, Ottoman producers were major participants in international trade, and as Şevket Pamuk points out, the 'trend was toward balanced budgets, and surpluses were enjoyed in many years'.[16] Though the centre's political

[12] Comte Auguste de Forbin, *Voyage dans le Levant en 1817 et 1818* (Paris: de l'Imprimerie royale, 1819), 46–47. Thirteen years later, Adolphus Slade fretted over the fate of 'stately minarets' in Constantinople, as he feared that 'a mistaken zeal for religion' would remove them 'whenever the cross replaces the crescent'. Adolphus Slade, *Records of Travels in Turkey, Greece, etc. and of a Cruise in the Black Sea, with the Capitan Pasha, in the Years 1829, 1830, and 1831* (London: Saunders and Otley, 1854), 388. The Greek legends of the time also mentioned a 'Nation of Blondes', which would soon seize Istanbul from the hands of Turks. A. Ubicini, *La Turquie actuelle* (Paris: Librarie de L. Hachette, 1855), 100.

[13] Hyde Clarke, 'On the Supposed Extinction of the Turks and Increase of the Christians in Turkey', *Journal of the Statistical Society of London* 28, no. 2 (1865): 262.

[14] For the changing perspectives on the 'decline paradigm', see Cemal Kafadar, 'The Question of Ottoman Decline', *Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic Review* 4, nos. 1–2 (1997–1998): 30–75. Rifa'at 'Ali Abou Abou-El-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2005). For its treatment from a global perspective, see C. A. Bayly, *Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World, 1780–1830* (London: Longman, 1997), 16–73.

[15] Mehmet Genç, 'L'Économie ottomane et la guerre au XVIIIe siècle', *Turcica* 27 (1995): 177–178. Also see Ariel Salzmann, 'An Ancien Régime Revisited: "Privatization" and Political Economy in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Empire', *Politics & Society* 21 (1993): 405.

[16] Şevket Pamuk, *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 161. Also see Yavuz Cezar, *Osmanlı Mâliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim Dönemi* (İstanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1986), 74. Bruce McGowan, 'The Age of the Ayans, 1699–1812', in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Halil Inalcik and Donald Quataert, 2 vols., vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 695.

power dwindled, the periphery's sway became more and more pervasive in the new production hubs, which appeared throughout the Empire under local dynasties.[17] These emerging local households represented the shifting power structure of the eighteenth century.[18] In this new arrangement, the centre, rather than being subverted by decentralisation, was rationalised, as a power broker, via an extensive economic network.

Ironically it was this prosperity which would bring the Empire to the verge of collapse. After the Treaties of Belgrade and Niš in 1739 with the Habsburg Empire and Russia, respectively, the Ottomans avoided major conflict in Europe. The reigning economic stability and the mood of optimism of the time encouraged Mustafa III in his already pronounced military predilections. In fact, contemporary histories blame the 'abundant treasury' for the Sultan's bellicose policies.[19] Especially after the death of his influential and staunchly anti-war Grand Vizier, Koca Râgıb Pasha, in April 1763, Mustafa's martial inclinations found a more suitable atmosphere in which to bloom.[20]

The Sultan knew that the janissaries, Ottoman infantry, and much of the rest of the Ottoman army, with their obsolete training and decaying infrastructure, needed to be completely overhauled before embarking upon any campaign. But as Osman II would have testified – he was brutally murdered after such an attempt in 1622 at the age of seventeen – this was easier said than done. After letting this scheme slip to a close companion, Mustafa did not feel safe until he sent him to Mosul, where the unfortunate man was eventually executed.[21] Yet ambition blinded him to the existence of any options other than war: his

[17] Genç, 'L'Économie ottomane et la guerre au XVIIIe siècle', 178. For a good study of local household and its politics, see Jane Hathaway, *The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt: The Rise of the Qazdaglis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

[18] Salzmann, 'An Ancien Régime Revisited', 397.

[19] Cezar, *Osmanlı Mâliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim Dönemi*, 74. See, for instance, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Târîh-i Cevdet*, 12 vols., vol. I (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Osmaniye, 1309/1891–1892), 78.

[20] The reports coming from Russia purported the terror felt there against a possible Ottoman attack. On one of them, the Sultan wrote the following: 'This Râgıb Pasha, traitor to the religion and state somewhat vitiated our desire. If, God's willing, had he been an agreeable vizier (*yek-dil*), they would have compared him to Sultan Suleyman.' Uğur Demir, '1768 Savaşı Öncesi Osmanlı Diplomasisi (1755–1768)', (PhD diss., Marmara University, 2012), 166.

[21] Cevdet Paşa, *Târîh-i Cevdet I*, 123.

nom de plume was Cihangir, which means 'conqueror of the world' in Persian. This was not an idle whim. He really wanted to conquer the world. In his private correspondence, Mustafa bitterly complained about Râgıb Pasha, calling him a 'traitor to the religion and state' for stopping him from pursuing his warring career.[22]

Fortunately for the Sultan, it was not long before Russia gave him the very excuse he was looking for. In June 1768, some Cossack units chased Polish Confederate troops into the town of Balta and massacred, among others, its Muslim population.[23] After failed negotiations between St. Petersburg and the Porte, the Russian resident, Obreskov, was arrested and put into Yedikule Fortress on 6 October.[24] A fatwa was secured from the *Şeyhülislam* (the head mufti) stating that innocent Muslim blood has been shed, and after twenty-two years of peace and prosperity, the Ottoman Empire was formally at war once more with its archenemy.[25]

At the beginning, the odds looked grim for Russia. The period following the death of Peter I (r. 1682–1725) was plagued by instability and competing forces within the country. Between 1725 and 1762, there were eight coups d'état in Russia, each bringing a new emperor to the throne and a completely different composition of the ruling elite: historians simply know this time as 'the era of palace revolutions'.[26] Catherine the Great, who seized power after ousting her husband in 1762, had in reality little or no legal claim to the Russian throne. She was born Sophie von Anhalt-Zerbst in Poland to German parents. She learnt Russian as a young girl but never mastered it, and converted to Orthodoxy just before her

[22] Demir, '1768 Savaşı Öncesi Osmanlı Diplomasisi', 166.
[23] Ahmed Resmi Efendi condemned the spread of warmongering bravado in the capital for Mustafa's rush act. Ahmed Resmî, *Hülasatü'l-İtibar* (Dersaâdet: Mühendisyan Matbaası, 1286/1869–1870), 4–5, 11–12.
[24] Fındıklılı Şemdanizâde Süleyman Efendi, *Mür'i't-tevârih*, ed. M. Münir Aktepe, 3 vols., vol. II/A (Istanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyât Fakültesi, 1976), 113. Also see Virginia Aksan, 'The One-Eyed Fighting the Blind: Mobilization, Supply, and Command in the Russo-Turkish War of 1768–1774', in *International History Review*, 15, no. 2 (1993): 221–238.
[25] For the text of the declaration, see Nigar Anafarta, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu İle Lehistan (Polonya) Arasındaki Münasebetlerle İlgili Târîhi Belgeler* (Istanbul: Bilmen, 1979), 50.
[26] Aleksandr Kamenskii, *The Russian Empire in the Eighteenth Century: Searching for a Place in the World*, trans. David Griffiths (London: Routledge, 2015), 122.

marriage.[27] The country she took over was practically on the verge of bankruptcy and often afflicted with rebellions.

To put it another way, Mustafa III was in this for the glory, but Catherine for her life. The Empress was involved in every aspect of the war from the very beginning. She was clever, ambitious, and knew how to marshal Russia's giant resources.[28] Moreover, while the Russian army had gained great experience in the Seven Years' War against the most up-to-date armies in Europe, the Ottoman forces, were antiquated and prone to irregularities. As a result, commanders such as Pyotr Rumyantsev, who impressed even Gibbon for his role in the war, marched across Ottoman territory without encountering any major difficulties, taking key Ottoman fortresses one after another.[29] Despite two devastating rebellions racking Russia – the Plague Riot of 1771 and Pugachev's Rebellion of 1773 – the Ottoman Empire stood debased and almost destroyed.[30] Mustafa III died a broken man at the age of fifty-six in 1774 and his successor, Abdülhamid I, had to end his brother's war with a humiliating treaty.[31]

It will be difficult to exaggerate the effects of this long war on Ottoman society. One contemporary of the events, even after the passage of forty years, lamented the 'confusion in which the world has been involved' from that time onwards.[32] Setting aside the

[27] Lurana Donnels O'Malley, *The Dramatic Works of Catherine the Great: Theatre and Politics in Eighteenth-Century Russia* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006), 16.

[28] She was greatly influenced by the Enlightenment ideas, so much so that her life work *Nakaz* or *Instruction with a View to the Elaboration of a Code of Laws*, was banned by the French censor as a subversive document. See Derek Beales, *Enlightenment and Reform in Eighteenth-Century Europe* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), 40.

[29] David S. Katz, *The Shaping of Turkey in the British Imagination, 1776–1923* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 21.

[30] See Isabel De Madariaga, *Politics and Culture in Eighteenth-Century Russia* (London: Routledge, 1998), 211.

[31] It should be noted that the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774), which concluded the war with the loss of Ottoman suzerainty in Crimea, is considered the beginning of the Ottoman claims to a Universal Caliphate. See Azmi Özcan, *Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain, 1877–1924* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997), 30. Mustafa Kesbî Efendi calls the Sultan's death an *inhitat*/collapse. Mustafa Kesbî Efendi, *İbretnümâ-yı Devlet (Tahlil ve Tenkitli Metin)*, ed. Ahmet Öğreten (Ankara: Türk Târîh Kurumu, 2002), 30. Also see Şemdanizâde Süleyman Efendi, *Mür'i't-tevârih*, vol. II/, 115.

[32] [Vasıf Efendi], *Hulâsatü'l-kelâm fi reddi'l-avâm*, 6.

psychological trauma caused by the loss of Crimea, which had been a bulwark of the Empire, the financial strains caused by the war ended the economic boom and hit craftsmen and artisans with a blow from which they would not recover for many years.[33] The heavy war indemnity – half of projected Ottoman revenue – further burdened the administration, which was already barely coping with this new economic reality.[34] Confiscation (*müsâdere*), hitherto reserved to the ruling elite, was extended to cover all segments of the affluent to ease the pressure, but naturally proved to be detrimental to the already fragile commercial economy. The value of the Ottoman kuruş, which had been mostly stable between 1700 and 1760, lost about half its worth by the end of the century while the general level of European prices doubled over the same forty years.[35] In short, the Ottoman Empire was in the grip of an economic crisis which would last until the 1840s.

Public Debt

At the beginning of the war, the provincial administration was vested entirely in the hands of local notables. At that time this was thought to be a practical solution that allowed for micro-management and the

[33] Genç, 'L'Économie ottomane et la guerre au XVIIIe siècle', 177, 183. The wars had devastating effects on the Ottoman economy. Traditionally strict guild regulations had ensured protection against monopolistic practices. But when the state was the buyer, it could impose anything as a fair price. This resulted in mass bankruptcies for already fragile tradesmen. See Yücel Özkaya, *18. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Toplumu* (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2008), 324–355, especially 330–332.

[34] Even though the indemnity is called a 'relatively small' sum by Şevket Pamuk, it was, as Virginia Aksan pointed out, 'half of the projected Ottoman revenue'. Pamuk, *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire*, 170. Virginia H. Aksan, *Ottomans and Europeans: Contacts and Conflicts* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2004), 114, fn. 2. Also see Cezar, *Osmanlı Mâliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim Dönemi*, 76–78. The French Revolution, which severely interrupted Mediterranean trade, was especially important for the Ottoman economy. See Daniel Panzac, 'International and Domestic Maritime Trade in the Ottoman Empire during the 18th Century', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 24, no. 2 (1992): 191–194. For trade relations between the Ottoman Empire and France, see Edhem Eldem, *French Trade in Istanbul in the Eighteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 1999), Edhem Eldem, 'Le commerce français d'Istanbul au XVIIIe siècle: d'une présence tolérée à une domination imposée'', *Le Négoce International XIIIe–XXe siècles*, ed. François M. Crouzet (Paris: Economica, 1989), 181–190.

[35] McGowan, 'The Age of the Ayans', 725.

deployment of resources.[36] In the long run, however, it seriously undermined the centre's ability to secure taxes from the provinces. Sultan Abdülhamid cursed those responsible for the disturbance of the peace with Russia.[37] The situation was spiralling out of control: 'everybody is after personal benefit', the Sultan wrote bitterly, 'nobody cares for the State [and] there is no place to find money.'[38] The 'Circle of Justice' between the people and the authorities, if it had ever been implemented, was now completely broken. This had another important consequence: the first internal borrowing.

The palace knew that without adequate financial resources it would be impossible to curb already wilful notables. Hence, in April 1775, the Ottoman bureaucracy introduced a new system of *eshâm* (shares).[39] Other than increasing revenues, the scheme was intended to break the financial monopoly of the grandees, who dominated the previous *mâlikâne* system (long-term tax farming).[40] In contemporary histories, *eshâm* was presented as an antidote to the oppressive governing of the local elite, something that would save the Ottoman finances from ruination.[41]

The method was inclusive. Because the bonds were sold in small shares (which got smaller and smaller over time), people from every walk of life could invest in them.[42] As the state hankered for cross-societal popularity, traditional outcasts of the Ottoman polity such non-Muslims were also allowed to acquire these bonds.[43] Women especially rushed to invest their savings in *eshâm*.[44] This mutual

[36] Yuzo Nagata, *Muhsin-zâde Mehmed Paşa ve Âyânlık Müessesesi* (Tokyo: Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1976), 74.
[37] BOA, İE.HAT. 5/435, 29 Zilhicce 1190 (8 February 1777).
[38] BOA, HAT 1384/54777, 29 Zilhicce 1203 (20 September 1789).
[39] Cezar, *Osmanlı Mâliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim Dönemi*, 79–88.
[40] Pamuk, *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire*, 192.
[41] Ahmed Vasıf Efendi, *Mehasinü'l-âsâr ve Hakayıkü'l-ahbar*, ed. Mücteba İlgürel (Ankara: Türk Târîh Kurumu, 1994), 290.
[42] See, for instance, Mustafa Nuri Paşa, *Netâyic ül-Vuku'ât: Kurumları ve Örgütleriyle Osmanlı Târîhi*, ed. Neşet Çağatay, 4 vols., vol. III (Ankara: Türk Târîh Kurumu Yayınları, 1980), 132. Vasıf, *Mehasinü'l-âsâr*, 193.
[43] Mehmet Genç, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Devlet ve Ekonomi* (İstanbul: Ötüken Yayınları, 2000), 187.
[44] Yasemin Tümer Erdem and Halime Yiğit, *Bacıyân-ı Rûm'dan Günümüze Türk Kadınının İktisadî Hayâttaki Yeri* (İstanbul: İstanbul Ticâret Odası, 2010), 80. Câbi Ömer Efendi, *Câbi Târîhi: Târîh-i Sultan Selim-i Sâlis ve Mahmud-i Sâni Tahlil ve Tenkidli Metin*, ed. Mehmet Ali Beyhan, 2 vols., vol. II (Ankara: Türk Târîh Kurumu Basımevi, 2003), 733. Also see Yavuz Cezar, 'Osmanlı Mâli



Figure 1.1 'Those who are responsible for the disturbance of the peace during the reign of Mustafa Khan and departed from this world should not find salvation from the punishment of the grave/*azab-ı kabirden necât bulmasınlar*'. BOA, İE.HAT. 5/435, 29 Zilhicce 1190 (8 February 1777).

dependence created a new reciprocal awareness between state and society. According to Ariel Salzmann, 'it was these social groups [*eshâm* holders] who would become invaluable allies in the processes

Târîhinde "Eshâm" Uygulamasının İlk Dönemlerine İlişkin Ba'zı Önemli Örnek ve Belgeler', *Toplum ve Bilim* 12 (1981): 135–137.