

## Economics of Electricity

This comprehensive and up-to-date book explains the economic rationale behind the production, delivery and exchange of electricity. Creti and Fontini explain why electricity markets exist, outlining the economic principles behind the exchange and supply of power to consumers and firms. They identify the specificities of electricity, as compared to other goods, and furthermore suggest how markets should be optimally designed to produce and deliver electricity effectively and efficiently. The authors also address key issues, including how electricity can be decarbonized. Written in a technical yet accessible style, this book will appeal to readers studying power-system economics and the economics of electricity, as well as those more generally interested in energy economics, including engineering and management students looking to gain an understanding of electricity-market analysis.

**Anna Creti** is Professor of Economics at the Paris Dauphine University, senior research associate at the École Polytechnique and external affiliate of the Siebel Institute at the University of California, Berkeley. She is the Scientific Director of the Climate Economics Chair and the Natural Gas Chair at Paris Dauphine University. She is the author of numerous articles in international peer-reviewed journals.

**Fulvio Fontini** is Professor of Economics at the Department of Economics and Management, University of Padova (Italy). He has been co-chair of the ESS task force of the Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER), and member of several task forces of CEER and the Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), where he was seconded as national expert. He is the author of numerous articles in international peer-reviewed journals.

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# Economics of Electricity

## Markets, Competition and Rules

**ANNA CRETÌ**

Université Paris Dauphine, PSL Research University, France

**FULVIO FONTINI**

University of Padova, Italy



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***A. C.: A te, Manfredi.***

***F. F.: Alla mia famiglia. Loro sanno perché!***

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