In the search for explanations for three of the most pressing crises of the early twenty-first century (the housing meltdown and financial crisis, the Gulf oil spill, and the nuclear disaster at Fukushima), commentators pointed to the structure of the regulatory agencies charged with overseeing the associated industries, noting that the need to balance competing regulatory and non-regulatory missions undermined each agency’s ability to be an effective regulator. Christopher Carrigan challenges this critique by employing a diverse set of research methods, including a statistical analysis, an in-depth case study of US regulatory oversight of offshore oil and gas development leading up to the Gulf oil spill, and a formal theoretical discussion, to systematically evaluate the benefits and concerns associated with either combining or separating regulatory and non-regulatory missions. His analysis demonstrates for policymakers and scholars why assigning competing non-regulatory missions to regulatory agencies can still be better than separating them in some cases.

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Structured to Fail?

*Regulatory Performance under Competing Mandates*

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To my parents, who would be so overjoyed.
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Acknowledgments

Reflecting on the long and winding path I have taken to complete this book, which began as my dissertation research while at the Harvard Kennedy School, I am reminded of all the people who have helped, supported, and guided me along the way. I have been especially blessed to have had an incredibly accomplished and supportive set of mentors, both in my time as a doctoral student and as a faculty member at the Trachtenberg School at George Washington University. While challenging me to think more clearly about regulatory organization and politics, they have nevertheless been enduring in their promotion of my work, something that has made pushing forward much easier.

Certainly, without the involvement of many of these individuals, this book would never have become anything close to what it has turned out to be. I owe special thanks to Steve Balla, Dan Carpenter, and Cary Coglianese, who in addition to carefully reviewing the manuscript and offering immensely valuable suggestions, have, just as importantly, provided me with the guidance and encouragement to see this project through to the end. I am also extremely appreciative of my advisors and colleagues who have provided feedback on portions of or on the entire manuscript and assisted with the research at various stages, including Lori Brainard, Sharon Gilad, Steve Kelman, Yoon Ho Kim, Dave Lewis, Russ Mills, Susan Yackee, and Dennis Yao as well as several anonymous reviewers. This book is undoubtedly better because of their constructive feedback.

Moreover, in fleshing out the arguments which form the basis of the book, I have benefited from discussions with, and the advice of, Marc Eisner, Bob Kagan, Stuart Kasdin, Bert Kritzer, Susan Moffitt, Marcus Peacock, Stuart Shapiro, Laurence Tai, Dan Walters, and Richard Zeckhauser, as well as participants at various seminars and conferences in
which I presented portions of this research, including at Penn Law’s Penn Program on Regulation, two Midwest Political Science Association research conferences, the Law and Society annual meeting, and the GW American politics workshop. I owe special thanks to the Tobin Project, including John Cisternino and David Moss, as well as Duke University’s policy shock project, led by Ed Balleisen, Lori Bennear, Kim Krawiec, and Jonathan Wiener, for inviting me to participate in their research initiatives which further spurred my interest in the Gulf oil spill. I am especially grateful to Karen Maloney of Cambridge University Press for her support of the book. The Office of Personnel Management, particularly Rose Miller, as well as the staff of the BOEMRE Gulf of Mexico Public Affairs office were instrumental in helping me obtain some of the data used in the analyses. I also benefited from the careful research assistance of several George Washington University students, including Mike Brooks, Lindsey Poole, Lily Robin, Stefan Roha and Zhoudan Xie, as well as the Penn Law Library Reference Services group, including Ellen Qualey, Tim Von Dulm, and Ben Meltzer, who spent hours meticulously organizing the reference materials for this research.

Some of the most important advice and assistance I received was not directly tied to the book but, nevertheless, was instrumental in me being able (and willing) to complete it. In particular, I am thankful to the leadership and members of the GW Regulatory Studies Center, including Jerry Brock, Joe Cordes, Susan Dudley, and Kathy Newcomer as well as my colleagues at the Trachtenberg School, for their enduring support of my research agenda. I am also deeply indebted to my early mentors and advisors, including Torben Iversen, Bridget Madrian, Mike Moore, Clark Ross, and Paul Willen, for inspiring me to make the very rewarding decision to pursue a doctoral degree as well as for being continual sources of guidance and encouragement during my time as a student.

Finally, I thank my family, especially my Mom and Dad, whose unconditional love and enduring willingness to build me up have given me the confidence to take risks and try to achieve big things. While I miss them immeasurably, I know they are looking down from heaven very proud of the outcome of this project. I am so appreciative of my wife, Gwyn, who has endured every difficulty, shared in every success, and been willing to support my unrelenting and sometimes selfish pursuit of my goals. To her as well as my daughters, Bryn and Kinsey, who remain steadfastly supportive of their Daddy even though he “works all of the time,” I am so thankful for making my life infinitely better. I am indebted also to my grandmother,
Acknowledgments

who was a constant advocate, as well as my mother- and father-in-law, who have treated me like a son since the day I met them. To the rest of my family as well as my friends, many of whom I have known since childhood, I cannot thank you enough for supporting me in this endeavor. Most importantly, I am grateful to God, through whom everything I have and have been able to achieve has been made possible.