A CRITIQUE OF PROPORTIONALITY AND BALANCING

The principle of proportionality, which has become the standard test for adjudicating human and constitutional rights disputes in jurisdictions worldwide, has had few critics. Proportionality is generally taken for granted or enthusiastically promoted or accepted with minor qualifications. *A Critique of Proportionality and Balancing* presents a frontal challenge to this orthodoxy. It provides a comprehensive critique of the proportionality principle, and particularly of its most characteristic component, balancing. Divided into three parts, the book presents arguments against the proportionality test, critiques the view of rights entailed by it, and proposes an alternative understanding of fundamental rights and their limits.

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A CRITIQUE OF PROPORTIONALITY AND BALANCING

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Thanks are due to Angela Wu, Thana Campos, Marcelo Barrientos, Nick Barber, Gonzalo Candia, Richard Ekins, Benjamín Gutiérrez, Luis Carlos Valdés, Clemente Recabarren, Ricardo Cruzat, Julie Maher, Fernando Contreras, Andrés Peñaloza, Pavlos Eleftheriadis, Jon Kirwan, Olivia Kirwan, Joseph Suttie, Madeleine Suttie, Bradford Wilson, José Manuel Díaz de Valdés, Isabel Zuluaga, Arturo Ibañez, Alberto Pino, Hna Ana Luisa, Daniel Wang, Marisol Peña, Arturo Fernandois, Sebastian Lewis, Tarek Yusari, Germán Vera, Andrés Biehl, Pierina and Antonia Orchard, Cristobal Orrego, Michael Sadler, Rama Ganguli, Sherif Girgis, Santiago Legarre, Roberto Durrieu, James Stoner, Felipe Mono Álvarez, G Allan Tarr, and Julian Nowag. I am also grateful to the anonymous reviewers contacted by Cambridge University Press for taking the time to assess my proposal and offering extremely helpful comments and suggestions, and to Finola O’Sullivan, Fiona Allison, Rebecca J Roberts, Helen Francis, Sarah Starkey, Geetha Williams, and their team at the Press for their professionalism and support from the beginning.

This book originated as a doctoral thesis at the University of Oxford. I am especially grateful to my supervisor, John Finnis, for his generosity and indispensable guidance. I was fortunate to have Timothy Endicott and Jeff King as examiners, and I am grateful for their insightful and meticulous comments, as well as for their valuable advice. Paul Yowell and Grégoire Webber deserve very special thanks for their constant encouragement and support.

I gratefully acknowledge the support of the Beca Chile scholarship and of the CONICYT FONDECYT Iniciacion N° 11150872 grant, awarded by the Chilean Ministry of Education, and of the James Madison Program at Princeton University, which allowed me to spend a year as a postdoctoral fellow at Princeton.

Chapter 3 is a revised version of a paper published as ‘Incommensurability and Balancing’ (2015) 35 OJLS 575. Parts of Chapters 6–8 were
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS


Most importantly, I owe a debt of gratitude to my family. My mother, my father, and my brother have been unwavering in their support. Francisco Javier has provided me with a deeper sense of purpose for everything that I do, including this book. Above all, I am grateful to my wonderful wife, Marguerite, for her wisdom, patience, and joy. This book is dedicated to her.
ABBREVIATIONS

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<tr>
<td>ECHR</td>
<td>European Convention on Human Rights</td>
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<td>ECtHR</td>
<td>European Court of Human Rights</td>
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### Abbreviations

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