Index

Abramovich, Roman, 110n3, 129–31
Aburamoto, Mari, 154–55
administrative resources
  of gubernatorial elites, 213–14, 215–20
  political decentralization and strength of, 249–56
Africa
dominant party emergence in, 257–65
election outcomes in, 52
elite party structures in, 45
ethnic diversity and elite strength in, 253–54
financial liberalization and regime opposition in, 222–24
postcolonial dominant parties in, 14, 34
African National Congress (ANC), 5
Agrarian Party (Russia), 90–91
Aldrich, John, 35–37, 47, 51–52
All-Russian Coordinating Council (OKS), 93–95, 112–14
All Russian Party “Unity and Fatherland.”
  See United Russia Party
All Russia (Visya Rossii) movement, 109, 110, 112–14, 123–24
All-Russian Peoples Front (ONF), emergence of, 271–77
anti-colonial liberation movements, dominant party origins in, 46
“Apatit” company, 154–55
Arab Socialist Union, 277
ARENA party (Brazil), 45
Arriola, Leonardo Rafael, 222–24
Artyukh, Evgenii, 182n44
Assad regime, 7–8
asset-mobile sectors, party affiliation in, 238
audience costs for leaders, 62n8
authoritarian regimes
  agreements with elites, monitoring of, 63
  benefits of United Russia Party dominance for, 159–60
  breakdown of, 277–79
  commitment credibility and, 49
  democratic characteristics of, 1–4
democratization and, 37–39
dominant party as stabilizers of, 4–9, 10–13, 37–39, 277–79
future in Russia for, 279–81
Geddes’ typology of, 247–48
global patterns in party organization by, 245–49
liberal non-democracies, lack of dominant parties in, 257–65
limits of dominant parties in, 1–4
parties established by, 46
in post-Soviet Russia, 32–35
presidential succession in Mexico, 186
rent distribution (rent-seeking) in, 257–65
United Russia Party as commitment device for, 185–96
autonomous resources
  of business elites, 222–24, 229–33
  credible commitments and, 60
  elite commitment problems and, 67–70
  extent of leaders and elites control of, 249–56
governmental elites in Russia, 204–5, 211–15
Ayatskov, Dmitry, 104–5
Azarov, Nikolai, 280
Ba’ath party, 7–8
Baburkin, Sergei, 166–67
balance of power and resources
dominant party emergence and, 23–24,
202, 256–57, 265–66
individual and gubernatorial elite party
affiliation and, 203–5
institutional solutions to commitment
and, 65–66
maximization of dominant party
likelihood and, 70–73
probability of dominant party emergence
and, 262–65
bandwagon process, gubernatorial elite
party affiliation and, 214
banking institutions
business elites control of, 100n30
Our Home is Russia party and, 92–93
Barisan National alliance, 277
Belarus, authoritarian regime in, 2
Berezovsky, Boris, 103, 110n3, 111
Bespalov, Alexander, 124–25, 126, 195–96
Bienen, Henry, 11, 45
Bogatyr’eva, Lyudmila, 166–67
Bogomolov, Valerii, 126, 133–34, 140–41
Bolshevism
intraparty conflicts in, 46n6
power seizure by, 13
Botswana, dominant party in, 5
Botswanan Democratic Party (BDP), 5, 17
Brazil
authoritarian regime in, 2
elite control of resources in, 69–70
elite influence on election outcomes in, 52
factionalism in parties of, 270
Brownlee, Jason, 6, 12–13, 17–18
Brudny, Yitzhak, 102
Bulychev, Sergei, 198
Burbulis, Gennady, 77, 79, 82
business elites
dominant party affiliation of, 222–43
economic conditions and power of, 99–101
in Egypt, parliamentary clashes with,
162n7
executive branch influence on, 164–66
gubernatorial economic control and,
211–13, 215–20
models of party affiliation of, 233–42
Our Home is Russia party and,
92–93, 95
penetration of Russian parliaments
by, 163–64
in regional legislatures, 101n31,
224–29, 237–38
resource ownership and membership in
United Russia Party, 229–33
United Russia Party and, 129–31, 150,
153–55, 267–71
Yeltsin’s reelection campaign and role
of, 102–4
Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), 89f1.2
capitalist class, emergence in post-Soviet
countries of, 223n1
Castaneda, Jorge G., 32
causality
dominant party research and, 39–41
degenecity in neo-institutionalist
research and, 37–39
global patterns in dominant party
emergence and, 265–66
proliferation of dominant parties and, 14
quantitative analyses of, 41
Center for the Study of Business-State
Interactions, 160–68
center-periphery, strength of elites and
leaders and outcomes of, 249–56
Chaisty, Paul, 163
Chavez, Hugo, 277
Chechnya conflict, Russian political
division over, 92–93
Chemezov, Viktor, 129–31
Chernetsky, Arkady, 94n18
Chernomyrdin, Viktor, 89–90,
94–95, 104–5
Chiang Kai-Shek, 187
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 46, 277
Chirikova, Alia, 153–54
Christian Democratic Party (Italy), 4–5
Chubais, Anatoly, 79, 234–37
Citizens Union of Georgia (CUG), 7–8
civil war, dominant party emergence in,
255, 257–65
clientelist networks
of business elites, 234–37
commitment credibility and, 49
democratic regimes, dominant
parties and, 5
dominant party emergence in
Russia and, 4
as gubernatorial resource, 211
Putin’s regime and, 34–35
of Russian regional elites, 83–89,
99–101
strength of elites and leaders over, 249–56
United Russia Party and, 135, 136,
143–46, 151–52
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>collective action problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dominant parties and, 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of elites, 44n3, 62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gubernatorial economic control and, 211–13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political parties and, 35–37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Russia Party management of, 192–93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado Party, 7–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colton, Timothy, 82–83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>commitment framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>balanced resources and maximization of dominant party likelihood, 70–73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dominant party emergence and, 17–18, 58–65, 271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>institutional constraints on dominant party emergence and, 65–66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>leader's commitment problems, 50–55, 60–63, 66–67, 105–6, 185–96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political parties and, 47–48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>problems of, 17–18, 19–24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of Russian gubernatorial elites to United Russia Party, 206–10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>severity of problems with, 66–67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>solutions to problems in, 58–73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>two-sided commitment problem, dominant party formation and, 48–58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Russia Party and, 30–32, 154–58, 185–98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>commodity prices in post-Soviet growth of, 137–39, 142–43, 224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian central economy and role of, 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>common pool resource issues, commitment credibility and, 49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), 93–95, 111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cooperation and rent distribution by regional legislatures and, 163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gubernatorial membership in, 209, 214, 215–20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constitutional support for, 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>demise of, 24–26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>evolution of, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>legacy of, 40–41, 83–89, 96–99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>origins of, 46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Russia Party compared with, 159–60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>communist systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dominant parties in, 10–13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparative Constitutions Project, 250–51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress Party (India), 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cost-benefit exchange, leadership and elite commitment and, 107–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>court systems, in autocratic regimes, 1–4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>credibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>balanced resources and increase of, 70–73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for dominant parties, 21, 63–64, 267–71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of elite commitments, 63–64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>leader's credible commitments, 60–63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>repeated play for enhancement of, 58–65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>two-sided commitment problem and, 48–58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for United Russia party, 30–32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>crisis conditions, dominant party emergence in, 255, 257–65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba, single party regime in, 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuban Communist Party, 46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cultural institutions, United Russia Party dominance in, 131–32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>decentralized political institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>probability of dominant party emergence and, 262–65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strength of elites and leaders and, 249–56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>decree-making presidential powers, limits in Russia on, 176–79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>delegation of decision-making, leader's credible commitments and, 60–63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>democracies, dominant party formation in, 270–71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party (DP) (Turkey), 7–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party of Russia, 77–78, 80–81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party of Turkmenistan, 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>democratic regimes, dominant party characteristics in, 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Russia movement, 74–79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elections of 1993 and, 79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>democratization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dominant parties and, 37–39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>economic liberalization and, 242–43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>failure in First Russian Republic of, 74–79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>failure of Third Wave democracies, dominant party emergence and, 248–49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regime breakdown and, 248–49, 277–79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department for Internal Politics (DIP) (Russia), 132–34, 164–65, 186n50, 191–92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deripaska, Oleg, 129–31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Desalegnhas, Hailemariam, 89f1.2

developing countries

dominant parties in, 10–13

political decentralization assessment in, 249–56

dispersion per capita measurements (DPC), population dispersion and, 251–53
distance indicator, geographic resources of gubernatorial elites, 213–14, 215–20
distributional theories of institutions, 65–66
dominant parties. See also political parties actors in formation of, overview, 42–58 authoritarian survival and formation of, 10–13


logit models of affiliation, 234 modeling emergence of, 256–57 modeling existence of, 256n11 mutual investment in, 2–3 new institutionalism and, 35–37 predicted probability of emergence of, 262–65 proportion of regimes with, 1–4, 248–49 qualitative studies of outcomes for, 12–13 regime breakdown and, 277–79 replacement of leader with candidate from, 61 research methodology concerning, 39–41 revolutionary organizations and origins of, 46 rules and norms of, 64–65 society-based explanations for, 44–47 stabilization of regimes by, 4–9, 10–13, 37–39, 277–79 summary of research on, 267–71 terminology used for, 9 theories on formation of, 42–73 two-sided commitment problem and formation of, 48–58

United Russia Party as example of, 159–201

Unity Party case study and, 108–23 Duma


Dyachenko, Tatyana, 110n3

Earth Institute of Columbia University, 252

Eastern Europe, dominant party emergence in, 257–65

EBRD-World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), 232–33

economic conditions autonomous resources of regional elites and, 116–21 democratization and liberalization of, 242–43

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gubernatorial control over, 211–13, 215–20
Kremlin power linked to, 129–31, 141–42
large public economies and authoritarian rule, 222–24
leadership strength and, 254–56
political institutions and, 49
privatization initiatives in Russia and, 87
United Russia Party rise linked to, 142–43
economic elites. See business elites
Edinstvo (Unity) bloc, 109, 110–11, 122
Egypt
dominant party-leadership commitment problems in, 187
NDP influence in, 6
parliamentary clashes with business elites in, 162n7
electoral authoritarian regimes, emergence of, 277–79
Eliseev, Evgenii, 171–72
elites. See also regional elites
agency of, 67–70
autonomous resources of, 67–70, 267–71
balance of resources and cooperation with leaders, 70–73, 256–57, 265–66
career advancement of, 55
cohesion of, 5, 11–12, 16–19, 44n3, 203
collective action problems of, 44n3, 62, 192–93
commitment problems for, 55–58, 66–67
costs of cooperation and incentives to renge by, 54–55, 56–57, 198–99
definition of, 16, 42–43
democratization and endogenization of, 37–39
dominant parties and role of, 19–24, 41, 42–58, 242–43, 267–71
duration of authoritarian regimes and cohesion of, 277–79
electoral politics and, 52
incentives for party affiliation, 44
independent authority of, 61–62
individual elites, Russia’s governors and, 203–5
leaders’ cooperation with, 2–3, 45–46, 50–53, 55–56, 63
leadership strength separate from strength of, 254–56
maximization of gains and cooperation of, 70–73
measurements of strength of, 41
modeling of strength of, 256–57
policy influence of, 56
political parties and commitment of, 47–48
population dispersion and strength of, 251–53
reduction of transaction costs through cooperation of, 56
regime breakdown and cohesion of, 37–39
routinized political appointment of, 53
schisms among, as threat to leaders, 50–51
society-based theories of dominant party origins and, 44–47
spoils distribution and, 12, 56
strength of, 249–65
support for regimes and role of, 47
United Russia Party cooptation of, 176–85
United Russia Party example of, 28, 32–35
endogeneity
global patterns in dominant party emergence and, 265–66
in leader-elite relationships, 37–39, 138n50
of resources strength of elites and leaders linked to, 249–56
Ethiopia, Haile Selassie’s regime in, 280–81
Ethiopian People’s Democratic Revolutionary Front (EPRDF), 89f1.2
ethnic minorities
eight strength and concentration of, 253
gubernatorial ethnic resources and, 213, 215–20
Russian regional elites and, 85, 101–2
event history model, of gubernatorial party affiliation, 214–20
Executive Branch, United Russia party influence over appointments in, 171–72
exogenous factors, in leader-elite power distribution, 43n2, 138n50
Fatherland (Nur-OTAN) (Kazakhstan), 7–8, 17, 45
Fatherland-All Russia (OVR) party formation of, 110
Kremlin relations with, 112–14, 122
Index

Greene, Kenneth E., 222–24, 247
Gridded Population of the World Project, 252
Grief, Avner, 58–59
Gromov, Boris, 90–91
GRP per capita variable, gubernatorial economic resources and, 212–13, 215–20
Gryzlov, Boris, 126, 127, 133–34
Guysinsky, Vladimir, 103
Guyana, dominant party regime in, 5
Guzhin, Anatolii, 115n8
Haber-Menaldo data, 254n8
Hagopian, Frances, 52
Haile Selassie, 280–81
Hale, Henry, 48, 65–66, 103–14, 211–13, 229–33, 237
hazard rate, statistical analysis of gubernatorial party affiliation and, 214–20
hegemonic parties, dominant parties vs., 89f1.2
Herfindahl index, 212, 251–53
Higher Council (Vyshii Soviet), 206–10
Hough, Jerry, 84
Huntington, Samuel P., 14–15, 64
Igumov, Gennady, 104
immobile assets
business elites with, 222–24, 229–33, 238
in economic resources of gubernatorial elites, 211–13
imperative mandate laws, introduction in Russia, 193–95
India, dominant party regime in, 5
Indonesia
dominant party-leadership commitment problems in, 187
election outcomes in, 52
industrial concentration, gubernatorial economic resources and, 212, 215–20
infrastructure projects, United Russia Party spoils distribution through, 167–68
institutional nesting, leader’s credible commitments and, 60
Iran Novin party, 45
Isayev, Andrei, 170–71, 192–93
Italy, dominant parties in, 4–5
Ivan Rybkin Bloc, 90–91, 95–99
Ivlev, Leonid, 132n39
Japan, dominant parties in, 4–5
Jatiya Party (Bangladesh), 45
Jordan, parliamentary clashes with business elites in, 162n7
judicial independence, commitment credibility problems and role of, 58–59
Just Russia party, 191–92
Kalmykov, Yuri, 81
Kazakov, Aleksandr, 93–95
Keefner, Philip, 62, 192–93
Ken尼亚 African National Union (KANU), 7–8, 9, 246–47
Kenyatta, Uhuru, 7–8
Kerimov, Suleiman, 129–31
Khasbulatov, Ruslan, 75–76
Kochanovskii, Eduard, 184n49
Kokor, Valery, 104–5
Kolisk Metallurgical Company, 154–55
Kostin, Andrei, 129–31
Kostin, Konstantin, 164–65, 187
Kozak, Dmitrii, 146n71, 172n24
Kozyrev, Andrei, 79
KPRF. See Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF)
Krashennikov, Pavel, 152–53
Kuchma, Leonid, 2, 176, 280
Kudrin, Alexei, 179n41, 192–93
Kuomintang (KMT), 7–8, 187
Laos, single party regime in, 9
large companies, party affiliation of, 222–24, 232–33
Latin America
dominant party emergence in, 257–65
elite influence on voting behavior in, 52
Law on Political Parties (Russia), 193–95
Law on Voters’ Rights (Russia), 193–95
leadership in authoritarian regimes. See also regime leaders
balance of resources and cooperation with elites, 70–73, 256–57, 265–66
benefits for elites from, 50–53, 55–56
breakdown of, 277–79
commitment problems for, 50–55, 66–67
costs of cooperation and incentives to renege in, 54–55, 56–57, 198–99
credible commitments in, 60–63
dominant parties and, 12–13, 19–24, 267–71
dominant party affiliation of, 42–58, 247
elite commitment to, 2–3, 67–70
elite strength independent from, 254–56
equilibrium constraints on, 18
future in Russia for, 279–81
Index

308  Index

leadership in authoritarian regimes (cont.)
global patterns of party dominance and characteristics of, 245–49
modeling of strength of, 256–57
parallel party organizations and, 59–60
population dispersion and strength of, 251–53
PRI in Mexico and, 32
pro-regime candidates, election outcomes and coordination of, 53
regime typology and, 255
relinquishing authority to parties by, 61–62
rent distribution (rent-seeking) by, 257–65
replacement of, 61
reputation mechanisms for credibility enhancement, 62
routinization of political appointments by, 53
strength of, 249–57
United Russia Party and, 26–32
legislative branch. See also Duma;
parliamentary institutions
career advancement opportunities in, United Party influence and, 168–73
collective action problems in, 36n14
cooptation and rent distribution in Russia by, 163
cross-national measures strength of, 163
defections from United Russia Party in, 179–83, 224–29
economic elites in regional legislatures, 222–29
in First Russian Republic, 74–79
global patterns of party dominance and presence of, 245–49
governors’ power concerning, 188–92
leader’s control of, 51–52
logrolling procedures in Russian Duma, 160–68
political parties, 47
Putin’s cooptation of, 1–4, 145
regional legislative autonomy, 58–59, 149–50
voting discipline of United Russia in regional legislatures, 177–78
Levitsky, Steven, 12–13
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) (Japan), 4–5
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), 79–80
liberal non-democracies, lack of dominant parties in, 257–65
Libya, authoritarian regime in, 2
lobbying efforts of United Russia Party, 166–67
local governments
coordination of elections for, 184n49
defections from United Russia Party and, 179–83
influence on elites of, 152–53
legislative-governor clashes and, 162
logrolling in local and regional parliaments, United Russia Party role in, 161–62
political decentralization and strength of, 249–56
political machines of, 183–85
United Russia Party dominance in, 131–32, 135, 274–75
LogoVaz group, 103
Lukashenko, Aleksandr, 2
Luzhkov, Yuriy
business elites and, 140–41
commitment problems for, 198
political machines and, 109, 110, 146–47
post-Soviet politics and, 94–95
Russia’s Choice Party and, 81
United Russia Party and, 25, 124–25, 179n41, 205–6, 208–9
Lysytin, Anatoly, 114–15, 148, 166–67
Maddison, Angus, 255
Magaloni, Beatriz, 18, 59–60
Makarenko, Boris, 94
Malaysia, dominant party rule in, 187, 277
Markov, Sergei, 115n8
mayors
coordination of elections of, 184n49
defections from United Russia Party and, 179–83
dominant party influence on, 152–53
legislative-governor clashes and, 162
logrolling in local parliaments, United Russia Party role in, 161–62
political machines of, 183–85
United Russia Party influence over, 131–32, 135, 196–98
McFaul, Michael, 115n8
McMann, Kelly M., 222–24
media
business elites control of, 100n30
Russian regional elites control of, 87
United Russia Party dominance in, 131–32, 153–54
Index

Medinsky, Vladimir, 171–72
Medvedev, Dmitry candidates list selections and, 188
Federation Council and, 171–72
Presidential Administration and, 136–37
Putin and, 26–32, 271–77
United Russia Party and, 89f1.2, 185–86
Melik’yan, Gennadii, 81
Mexico opposition parties in, 246–47
patron-client ties in, 32
policy brokerage in, 186
“presidencialismo” period in, 176–77
Mezhregionalnnoy Dvizheniye (“Edinstvo”) (Interregional Movement “Unity”). See Unity Party (Russia)
Migdal, Joel, 16, 34
Milgrim, Paul, 58–59
Miller, Alexei, 129–31
Milosevic, Slobodan, 7–8
modernization dominant party origins and, 14–15
postcolonial proliferation of dominant parties in Africa and, 14
Mohammed, Mahathir, 187
Moiseev, Boris, 153–54
Molodaya Gvardia (Youth Guard), 170–71
monetization of social benefits business elites role in, 140–41
government-United Russia Party conflict over, 192–93
United Russia Party cohesion over, 176–77
Morozov, Oleg, 136–37, 171–72, 273n5
Most Group, 103
Motherland party (Russia), 142–43
Movement for Democratic Reforms (Russia), 77–78
Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), 46
Mubarak, Gemal, 6
multiparty elections, lack of dominant parties in years with, 257–65
Murashev, Arkadii, 79
Muslim indicator, gubernatorial ethnic resources and, 213, 215–20
Namibia, dominant party regime in, 5
national agenda, dominant parties’ influence on, 6
National Democratic Party (NDP) (Egypt), 1, 6, 89f1.2, 187, 277
National Liberation Front (FLN) (Algeria), 9
National Resistance Movement (NRM) (Uganda), 1
natural resources dominant party emergence and role of, 270
leadership strength and revenues from, 254–56
party affiliation of business elites in, 229–33
political impact of, 222–24, 242–43
Navalny, Alexei, 272, 275–76
Neverov, Sergei, 170–71
new institutionalism dominant party analysis in, 11–12, 35–37, 277–79
endogeneity in research of, 37–39
on post-Soviet Russia, 32–35
Nigeria, absence of dominant parties in, 1, 7–8, 17, 45, 200–1, 270
nomenklatura system in Soviet Union, 5, 10–13, 53
nomination procedures Russian electoral coordination and, 184n46
Russian legislation concerning, 193–95
North, Douglas C., 58–59, 66
North Korea, single party regime in, 9
oil prices decline in, 17
Kremlin-elite relations and, 2–3, 107–8, 116–23
lack of Our Home party support and, 96–99
leader’s commitment, 54–55
Putin’s ascendancy and, 17, 40–41
United Russia party and, 24–26, 129–31, 141–42
Orlovsky, Daniel, 279–80
OTAN. See Fatherland (Nur-OTAN) (Kazakhstan)
Otechestvo (Fatherland) movement (Russia), 109, 110
“Our Home is Our City” movement (Russia), 94n18
Our Home is Russia (NDR) party, 24–26, 74
commitment problems and failure of, 105–6
electoral losses of, 90–91
failure of, 89–105
formation of, 89–90
Kremlin lack of support for, 95–99, 104–5, 121–23
national elites and, 92–93, 104–5
presidential and regional neglect of, 92
regional elites lack of support for, 92, 93–95, 99–105
rump status of, 108
parliamentary institutions
commitment problems and, 66
cross-national measures strength of, 163
independence of, 58–59
regional parliaments, business elites
in, 224–29
United Russia Party control of, 169–70
Parliamentary Powers Index, 163
Partido Revolucionario Institucional
(PRRI), 1, 7–8
as dominant party, 200–1
elite circulation and, 10–13
factors in dominance of, 13
hegemony of, 89f1.2
opposition to, 246–47
patron-client ties and, 32
policy direction controlled by, 186
"presidencialismo" period and discipline of, 176–77
Party for Russian Unity and Accord
(PRES), 80–81, 88, 92–93
Party of Life (Russia), 142–43
party-state model in communist regimes, 186
party substitutes, in electoral campaigns, 48
patron-client ties
Mexican PRI and, 10–13, 32
proliferation of dominant parties and, 14
Putin’s development of, 112–14
in Russia, 30–32
Pempel, T. J., 4–5
Penn World Tables, 255
People’s Democratic party (PDP)
(Nigeria), 1, 7–8, 17, 45, 200–1
People’s National Congress (PNG)
(Guaya), 5
People’s Party (Russia), 142–43
People’s Republic of China
dominant party rule in, 277
parliamentary clashes with business elites in, 162n7
single party regime in, 9
Percent Russian indicator, gubernatorial ethnic resources and, 213, 215–20
personalism, future of authoritarian regimes and role of, 279–81
Philippines
elite control of resources in, 69–70
political bosses in, 52
Platov, Vladimir, 114
Pugin, Vladimir, 165
Poland, dominant party rule in, 277
Polish United Worker’s Party, 277
political appointments
avoidance of term limits through, 150–53
costs of cooperation and incentives to renege, 54–55
dehlegation of elite control over, 63–64
elected officials as, 146n70
routinization of, 53
political decentralization
probability of dominant party emergence in, 262–65
strength of elites and leaders and, 249–56
political machines
autonomous resources of, 116–21
in collectivized agriculture, 237
economic resources controlled by, 211–13
elite dismantling of, 63–64
in ethnic regions, 85, 99
ethnic resources of, 213, 253
geographic and administrative resources for, 213–14
as gubernatorial inherited political resources, 211
Our Home Party neglected by, 92
in post-Soviet Russian politics, 80–81, 84–85
Putin’s cooptation of, 143–46
of regional elites, 87, 108–9, 115–16, 141–42, 155–58
strength of elites and leaders over, 249–56
United Russian Party cooptation of, 183–85, 196–98
political parties. See also dominant parties in autocratic regimes, 1–4
commitment problem and formation of, 65–66
elite commitment and formation of, 47–48
First Russian Republic and absence of, 76–78
new institutionalist theory and, 35–37
Our Home is Russia party, 89–105
in post-Soviet Russia, 48
Russian legislative reforms concerning, 193–95
Russian regional parties, 115n8
Russia’s Choice party, failure of, 79–89
Yeltsin’s initiatives for creation of, 89–90
politsovet (political councils).
business elites and, 131–32
conflicts within, 183–85
delegation of authority to, by United Russia Party, 188–92
gubernatorial membership in, 208
local elites and, 135
mobility and turnover in, 170–71
regional governors in, 95
regional politsovets, 166–67
United Russia Party organization and role of, 133–34
Popov, Gavril, 77–78, 80–81
Popov, Sergei, 122, 139–40
popularity of regime leaders
dominant party investment and, 45n5
Putin’s popularity decline and, 271–77
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), 46
population dispersion, strength of elites and leaders and, 251–53
power-sharing
balance of resources and, 23–24, 70–73
by elites and leaders, 23–24, 42–43, 45–46
First Russian Republic manipulation of, 75–76
regime survival and, 7–8
regional elites and, 84–85
strength of elites and leaders linked to, 249–56
by United Russia party, 25
Presidential Administration (Russia)
absence of party affiliation in, 185–86
declining United Russia Party influence in, 273n5
dominance of legislative process by, 162
Duma list of candidates and, 188
regional elite relations with, 188–92
Primakov, Yevgenii, 25, 110, 111
primary party organization (PPOs), 185
prisoner’s dilemma, commitment credibility and, 49–50
private sector, party affiliation of business elites in, 229–33, 234
privatization
business elites and, 222–24
demise of dominant parties and, 13–16
Russian regional elites’ power over, 87, 99–101
proportional electoral system, Russian shift to, 145, 193–95
Przeworski, Adam, 12, 245–46, 277–79
public sector
party affiliation of business elites in, 229–33, 234–37
patronage resources in, 222–24
Putin, Vladimir
declining popularity of, 271–77
defections from regime of, 179–83, 195–96
dominant parties and, 40–41
Duma negotiations of, 176–77
economic conditions and rise of, 137–46
election as president, 111
gubernatorial elites and electoral reforms of, 204–5, 209–10
limits on United Russia imposed by, 185–96
party coalition building and, 112–14
public approval of, 142–43
regional elites and, 4, 17, 24–26, 34, 107–8, 116–23
Yeltsin and, 110–11
qualitative analysis
dominant parties and democratization outcomes, 12–13
dominant party emergence and, 41
Rakhimov, Murtaza
commitment problems of, 198
federal government and, 112–14, 146–47
Russia’s Choice Party and, 81
United Russia Party and, 124–25, 205–6, 208–9
Rally of the Togolese People, 277
RAO-Unified Energy Systems, 234–37
rational choice theory
dominant party analysis and, 35–37
political party formation and, 47
regime leaders
agreements with elites, monitoring of, 63
balance of resources and cooperation with elites, 70–73
beneits for elites from, 50–53, 55–56
commitment problems for, 50–55, 66–67
costs of cooperation and incentives to renege, 54–55, 56–57, 198–99
credible commitments of, 49, 60–63 defined, 42
dominant party emergence and, 42–58, 247, 267–71
failure of, 277–79
generating support and winning elections, 52
global patterns of party dominance and characteristics of, 245–49
modeling of strength of, 256–57
parallel party organizations for, 59–60
population dispersion and strength of, 251–53
preexisting party constraints on, 46
presidential succession in Mexico, 186
regional elites and, 43–44
relinquishing authority to parties by, 61–62
rent distribution (rent-seeking) by, 257–65
replacement of, 61
reputation mechanisms for credibility enhancement, 62
routinization of political appointments by, 53
strength of, 249–65
United Russia Party beneits for, 160–75
United Russia Party beneits for, 176–96
regional elites. See also business elites; elites; ethnic regions; gubernatorial elites; national elites
access to policy and spoils through United Russia Party, 160–68
autonomy of, 83–89, 108–9, 149–50
beneits of United Russia Party for, 160–75
business elites and, 101n31, 237–38
career advancement through United Russia Party for, 168–73
coercion of, to join United Russia, 150–53
collective action problems of, 192–93
commitment problems in Russia of, 105–6
definition of, 42–43
discipline of, under United Russia Party, 154–55
dominant party emergence and, 4, 40–41, 74, 123, 267–71
in early post-Soviet Russia, 24–26, 40–41
economic conditions in Russia and, 83–89, 99–101
electoral politics and, 102–4, 109–10, 183–85, 188–92
ethnic minorities and strength of, 253
federal government in Russia and, 85–87, 108–9, 112–14, 123, 137–46
in First Russian Republic, 74–79
lack of party afiliation in Russia of, 89–90
leaders’ ties with, 37, 43–44
legislative-governor relations, 162, 188–92
lobbying activities of, 166–67
logrolling in local and regional parliaments by, 161–62
multiple political afiliations of, 114–15
Our Home Party and, 92,
93–95, 99–105
political decentralization and strength of, 249–56
political machines of, 109, 183–85
population dispersion and strength of, 251–53
professions of regional deputies, 231
putres by United Russia Party of, 170–71, 177–78
Putin and, 111, 137–46
regional legislatures, economic elites in, 222–29
regional parties and movements and, 115n8, 115–16
Russia’s Choice party failure and, 80–81
uncertainty reduced by United Russian Party for, 168–73
Unity Party of Russia and, 111–12, 114–21
voting discipline in regional legislatures, 177–78
Yeltsin and, 83–89, 102–4, 108–9
Remington, Thomas, 161–62, 163
trent distribution (rent-seeking) costs of cooperation and incentives to renege, 54–55
democratization and, 222–24, 242–43
dominant parties and, 17, 257–65
leadership strength and, 254–56
Our Home is Russia party and lack of, 96–99
by Russian regional elites, 89, 163
United Russia Party role in, 161–62
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Section</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Ora John Reuter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>163</td>
<td>revolutionary organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>172</td>
<td>dominant party emergence and role of, 270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>179–83</td>
<td>dominant party origins in, 46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>163, 172</td>
<td>Reznič, Vladislav</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>179–83</td>
<td>Robertson, Graeme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>191–92</td>
<td>Rodina party, 191–92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>182n44</td>
<td>Roizman, Evgenii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>270</td>
<td>roll-call voting, institution of compulsory voting, 177–78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Russian Congress of People’s Deputies, 74–79, 85–87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Russian Federation, Russia regional elites and legacy of, 85–87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80–81</td>
<td>Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms, 80–81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80–81</td>
<td>Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, 129–31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>Russia’s Choice party Chechnya conflict and, 92–93 failure of, 79–89, 105–6 formation of, 79 loss of power by, 89–90 Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR), 7–8 Ryabov, Andrei, 115n8 Rybkina, Ivan, 89–90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
delegation of elite control over, 63–64, 191–92
elite commitment and, 12, 18, 61–62
independence of dominant parties concerning, 59–60
logrolling of legislation and, 51–52
loyalty to leaders and, 50–51
routinized political appointments and, 53
security of elite access to, 56, 191–92
United Russia Party role in, 28–32, 160–68, 186, 191–92
Stable Russia group, 92–93
Stalin, Joseph, 187
Stankevich, Sergei, 81
state-affiliated businesses
economic elites from, 222–24
party affiliation in, 229–33, 234–37
Stroev, Egor, 88, 94–95, 207n3
Strossner, Alfredo, 7–8
subnational elites. See regional elites
Sumin, Petr, 94n17
Surkov, Vladislav, 110n3, 124–25, 136–37, 139, 144–45, 186
Svolik, Milan W., 23n6
Sweden, dominant parties in, 4–5
Szikonyi, David, 52
Taiwan, dominant party-leadership commitment problems in, 187
Tanganyika Africa National Union (TANU), 11, 46
tax avoidance, in post-Soviet Russia, 232–33
tax policy commitment problems and establishment of, 66
immobile assets and, 222–24
temperature per capita metric, 252n5
The World Economy: Historical Statistics, 255
third-party institutions absence in dictatorships of, 2–3
commitment of political parties and, 47
commitment problems of dominant parties and, 58–59
dominant parties and role of, 267–71
Russian party development and, 103–4
Third Wave regimes, democratization and dominant party emergence in, 248–49, 277–79
Tishanin, Alexander, 190
Titov, Konstantin, 109, 112–14, 150–53
Tkhakusnov, Aslan, 146n71, 172n24
Togo, dominant party emergence in, 277

transaction costs in politics
elite cooperation and reduction of, 56
pro-regime candidates, coordination of linked to, 53
United Russia Party reduction of, 30–32
Transformation of the Urals Party, 94n17
Travkin, Nikolai, 77–78, 80–81
Trofimov, Evgenii, 187, 197
True Whig Party (Liberia), 45
Tuleev, Aman, 109, 148, 207–8
Turchak, Andrei, 172
Turkmenistan, single party regime in, 9
Turovsky, Rostislav, 169–70
two-sided commitment problem
dominant party formation and, 48–58
independence of dominant parties and, 59–60
summary of, 58

Ukraine
authoritarian regime in, 2
‘colored’ revolution in, 34–35
dominant party influence in, 176
Russian dominant party cohesion and crisis in, 276
uncertainty, United Russia Party dominance and reduction of, 154–55, 168–73
uncommon democracies, 4–5
Union for the Republic (Togo), 277
“United Election Days” (Russia), 145–46
United Front (China), 277
United Malays National Organization (UMNO), 1, 89f1.2, 187, 200–1, 277
United Russia Party, 1
access to policy and spoils and, 160–68
accommodative arrangements and membership rules in, 168–73
approval ratings for, 135–36
autonomous resources of, 183–85, 186
benefit to authoritarian regime of, 159–60
benefits of membership in, 150–53, 160–75
business elites and, 129–31, 150, 153–54
career advancement opportunities and, 168–73
cell organizations in, 135
collecion building by, 123–24
coercion to join, for regional and gubernatorial elites, 150–53, 209–10
collective action problems managed by, 192–93
commitment problems and, 30–32, 154–58, 185–98

current organizational structure of, 133–34
declining popularity of, 271–77
defections from, 179–83, 193–96, 224–29, 276–77

as dominant party, 89f1.2, 26–32, 39–40, 198–201, 267–71

Duma coalition, 176–77
electoral benefits of membership in, 173–75
electoral reforms and strengthening of, 146
electoral success and mobilization of popular support by, 183–85
evolution from 2001-2010 of, 123–55
executive branch influence on, 164–66
future challenges after 2011-2012 elections, 271–77

grassroots organization by, 185
Kremlin and, 137–46, 176–85
leadership commitment and role of, 185–96

lobbying activities of, 166–67
logit models of party affiliation, 234
membership statistics for, 126–27
natural resources affect on loyalty to, 222–24

origins of, 4, 24–26

party brand of, 150–53
popularity of, 173–75

purges in regional branches by, 170–71
Putin’s association with, 107–8, 195

“Putin’s Plan” platform of, 136
regime stability and, 32–35
regional elites and, 26–32, 45, 123–37, 139–40, 146–55, 196–98
regional legislative dominance of, 125–26, 127–29, 139–40, 224–29
resource ownership and membership in, 229–33

Russian governors’ support for, 127–29, 136–37
statistical analysis of gubernatorial affiliation with, 214–20
uncertainty reduction by, 154–55, 168–73
vote mobilization in support of, 47

United Socialist Party of Venezuela, 277

United States, political party formation in, 47

Unity and Progress movement, 94n17, 107–8

Unity Party (Russia)
decline in regional elections of, 123–24
electoral success of, 111
founding of, 110–11

Kremlin relations with, 112–14, 116–21

OVR merger with, 112, 123–24, 139, 146–47
regional elites and, 111–12, 114–21, 214
United Russia party and, 123

universities, United Russia Party dominance in, 131–32

Ural Rebirth party, 94n17

Urlashov, Evgenii, 182n44

Vargas, Getulio, 2

Vekselberg, Viktor, 129–31

Venezuela, dominant party rule in, 277

Vietnam, single party regime in, 9

Volodin, Vyacheslav
Executive branch and, 171–72
in Presidential Administration, 136–37, 186n51

Putin and, 152
regional elites and, 170–71

United Russia Party and, 133–34, 141, 273n5

Voloshin, Alexander, 110n3

Vorobyev, Andrei, 154–55

Vorobyov, Andrei, 172

vote mobilization candidates’ personal vote resources and, 48
elite role in, 47, 214
registration procedures for elections and, 173–75

United Russia Party role in, 183–85, 205–6

vote expectations dominant parties’ influence on, 6
leaders’ strength and, 254–56

Vozrozhdenie (Revival) movement, 109

Way, Lucan, 12–13
wealthy countries, lack of dominant parties in, 257–65

Weibull test, statistical analysis of gubernatorial party affiliation and, 214–20
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>58–59, 66</td>
<td>Weingast, Barry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>176–77</td>
<td>Weldon, Jeffrey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40–41</td>
<td>within-case analyses, dominant party emergence and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>254n8</td>
<td>World Bank Development Indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109</td>
<td>Yakovlev, Vladimir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>129–31</td>
<td>Yakunin, Vladimir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>280</td>
<td>Yanukovych, Viktor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>170–71</td>
<td>Yarovaya, Irina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80–81, 83–89</td>
<td>Yavlinsky, Grigory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Yeltsin, Boris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108–9</td>
<td>failing health of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79–89</td>
<td>failure of Russia's Choice party and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>Fatherland-All Russia (OVR) party and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74–79</td>
<td>as First Russian Republic leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83–89</td>
<td>leadership weaknesses of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92, 95–99, 104–5, 121–23</td>
<td>Our Home is Russia party and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82–83</td>
<td>political motivations of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102–4</td>
<td>reelection campaign of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74, 85–87</td>
<td>regional elites and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89–90</td>
<td>Russia's Choice opposition to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4, 105–6</td>
<td>undermining of parties by</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24–26</td>
<td>United Russia Party and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110n3</td>
<td>Yumashev, Valentin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89f1.2</td>
<td>Zelawi, Menes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160–68</td>
<td>'zero-reading' logrolling policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>170–71</td>
<td>Zheleznyak, Sergei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79–80</td>
<td>Zhurinovsky, Vladimir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>Zyuganov, Gennady</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>