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## **Contents**

	List of Figures	page 1x
	List of Tables	xi
	Preface	xiii
	Acknowledgments	XV
1	Introduction	1
2	Mortgage Public Policies and the Financial Crisis	12
3	Precrisis Executive Compensation and Misaligned Incentives	24
4	Managerial Incentives Hypothesis versus Unforeseen Risk Hypothesis	30
5	Bank CEOs' Buys and Sells during 2000–8	35
6	Executive Compensation Reform	73
7	Director Compensation Policy	101
8	Are Large Banks Riskier?	117
9	Bank Capital Structure and Executive Compensation	154

vii



Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-17064-3 — Financial Crisis, Corporate Governance, and Bank Capital Sanjai Bhagat Table of Contents More Information

## viii contents

10	Why Banks Should Be Mostly Debt Financed: Parade	
	of Non Sequiturs	168
11	Conclusion	174
	Appendix A: Credit-Rating Agencies and the Subprime	
	Mortgage Securitization Process	179
	Appendix B: Data Used in This Book: Available Online	183
	Notes	203
	Bibliography	228
	Index	241