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978-1-107-15821-4 - Commanding Military Power: Organizing for Victory and Defeat on the Battlefield

Ryan Grauer

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COMMANDING MILITARY POWER

Commanding Military Power offers a new explanation of why some armed forces are stronger than others. Ryan Grauer advances a 'command structure theory' which combines insights from organization theory, international relations, and security studies literatures to provide a unique perspective on military power. Specifically, armed forces organized to facilitate swift and accurate perception of and response to battlefield developments will cope better with war's inherent uncertainty, use resources effectively, and, quite often, win. Case studies of battles from the Russo-Japanese War, Chinese Civil War, and Korean War, based on new archival research, underscore the argument, showing that even smaller and materially weaker militaries can fight effectively against and defeat larger and better endowed adversaries when they are organizationally prepared to manage uncertainty. That organization often matters more than numbers and specific tools of war has crucial implications for both contemporary and future thinking about and efforts to improve martial strength.

RYAN GRAUER is Assistant Professor of International Affairs, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh. His research on military power, surrender in war, and military diffusion has been published in *Security Studies* and *World Politics*. He has been awarded funding from the Smith Richardson Foundation, the Christopher Browne Center for International Politics, and the Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies.

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*Organizing for Victory and Defeat
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Graduate School of Public and

International Affairs

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University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

It furthers the University's mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of
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www.cambridge.org

Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107158214

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First published in 2016

Printed in the United Kingdom by Lightning Source Ltd.

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data

Names: Grauer, Ryan, 1983– author.

Title: Commanding military power : organizing for victory and defeat on
the battlefield / Ryan Grauer, Graduate School of Public and
International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh.

Description: New York : Cambridge University Press, [2016] |
Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2016011382 | ISBN 9781107158214 (hardback)

Subjects: LCSH: Command of troops – Case studies. | Liaoyang,
Battle of, Liaoyang, China, 1904. | Huai Hai Campaign, China, 1948–1949. |
United Nations – Armed Forces – Korea – History. |

Korean War, 1950–1953 – Campaigns – Korea.

Classification: LCC UB210 .G825 2016 | DDC 951.904/24–dc23

LC record available at <http://lcn.loc.gov/2016011382>

ISBN 978-1-107-15821-4 Hardback

Additional resources for this publication at www.cambridge.org/9781107158214

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Acknowledgments

I have worked on the ideas and research presented in this book for over a decade. While the writing process often felt lonely, it really was not. More people than I could have anticipated assisted in one form or another, and all made the project better than it otherwise would have been.

Much of the credit for this book, but none of the blame, goes to Avery Goldstein, Rudra Sil, Michael Horowitz, and Edward Mansfield at the University of Pennsylvania. These four scholars initially trusted me to pursue a half-formed idea and then helped guide me through the process of crafting the earliest versions of my argument. They have continued to serve as bastions of advice and support, confident in the project even when I had my doubts. My graduate school colleagues also did much to help to shape my thinking, particularly Matt Tubin, Keren Yarhi-Milo, Kaija Schilde, Sarah Salwen, Rosella Cappella Zielinski, Barbara Elias, Allison Evans, and Murad Idris. I am eternally grateful for my time at Penn.

I have also benefitted tremendously from serving on the faculty at the University of Pittsburgh. Dean John Keeler has long supported the project and has read and commented on portions of this manuscript. Phil Williams, Taylor Seybolt, Michael Kenney, and Chuck Gochman have served as mentors and helped sharpen my argument. Special thanks go to Luke Condra, who has not only read my argument several times and offered innumerable suggestions on how to make it better, but also been a good friend and essential support as we both started our careers at Pitt. My other colleagues and students at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs have, in a variety of ways, also helped refine my thinking about and improve this book.

I owe a particular debt of gratitude to John Mearsheimer. His “War and the Nation State” course at the University of Chicago convinced me that the study of international relations would be much more interesting than law

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school and instilled in me a deep curiosity about why some states are better at fighting wars than others. I also thank him and Allan Stam for attending my book workshop, offering crucial feedback on the manuscript in its entirety, and helping me avoid a number of missteps.

A number of other scholars have provided advice and assistance with my argument, revisions, and efforts in getting this book published. They include (but certainly are not limited to) Richard Betts, Stephen Biddle, Barry Posen, and the participants of the 2008 Summer Workshop on Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy (SWAMOS), Jonathan Caverley, Stephen Grenier, Ian Hurd, Paul Kan, Nina Kollars, Matthew Levendusky, Ian Lustick, Patrick Porter, Daryl Press, Norrin Ripsman, Joshua Shiffrin, Hendrik Spruyt, Paul Staniland, Jessica Stanton, David Steinberg, Caitlin Talmadge, Dominic Tierney, and Alex Weisiger. I thank each and apologize to anyone I have forgotten to mention.

The research presented in this book could not have been completed without the assistance of a number of talented librarians and archivists, including particularly the staffs at the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library in Independence, MO; the Hoover Institution Archives at Stanford University; the Huntington Library in San Marino, CA; the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives at King's College London; the MacArthur Memorial Archives in Norfolk, VA; the Newberry Library in Chicago, IL; and the US Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, PA. I thank the Trustees of the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives for permission to use material from the Sir Thompson Capper, Sir Ian Hamilton, and Cold War Documentary collections. Closer to home, I thank Maria Liliana Devia and Alexander Halman for their research assistance. Alex also helped with the creation of the many maps in this book, as did Andrew Fichter, Seyeon Hwang, and Alexander Jendrek – work for which I am grateful.

For financial assistance, I thank the Smith Richardson Foundation, the School of Arts and Sciences and the Department of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics, the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs and the University Center for International Studies at the University of Pittsburgh, and the Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies.

I also thank John Haslam, my editor, and Christofere Fila, my content manager, at Cambridge University Press, as well as the anonymous reviewers who offered a number of incisive suggestions that helped guide the final revisions of the manuscript.

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A word of gratitude must also be said for my friends and family. Charles and Karen Tichy taught me how to structure arguments and spent far too many weekends shuttling me to debate tournaments. Norman and Ruth Grauer, Daniel Grauer, Ann Riggan, Tiffany Knowles, and Alisha Grauer provided consistent encouragement as I pursued my education and worked on this project. Scott and Kim Henry welcomed me into their family as a son and have been constant sources of support. My conversations with Scott, in particular, gave me much-needed insight into the operation of militaries as organizations. And I thank Mason Henry Haynes, who has patiently listened to me talk about Clausewitz and war since before he could speak.

My final and most profound thanks go to my wife, Lauren Henry. She has been by my side since before this project began and accepted the many oddities that come with writing a book. She has read and offered insightful comments on many more versions of this argument than any academic's spouse should, and always with good humor. Most importantly, however, she has been my best friend and biggest supporter. To her, and for everything she has done, I am and will be forever grateful.