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Brutal excesses were a daily occurrence on the Eastern Front of the Second World War. During the early stages of the German invasion of the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941, members of the elite SS-Division “Wiking” rounded up some sixty civilians, mostly Jews.¹ “Wiking” was no ordinary military formation, but rather a part of the Waffen-SS, the military wing of Heinrich Himmler’s SS. The SS was the Nazi party organization tasked with, among other things, coordinating “racial” policy, overseeing the police, and implementing the Holocaust. A “Wiking” soldier involved in this particular roundup of Jews recalled the grueling facts of what happened in an interview in 1943: The Jews were put to work digging a trench. Some of the soldiers fired into the huddled group of working men, while others swung their rifle butts at the condemned men’s heads. Finally, the interviewee concluded, “the rest had to fight to death with their shovels in the grave with the promise that survivors would be let out. These were also shot.”²

Before the beginning of the war, Himmler had established the Waffen-SS to compete with the regular German Army. As part of the SS it was a military force fully saturated with the racist and brutal Nazi ideology. Waffen-SS units regularly participated in the murders of civilians on the periphery of the battle front. The shooting of these sixty Jews was not, however, a standard story of Nazi violence. The man who recounted this story was not a regular German SS soldier, but instead a young Swedish

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² Förhör med Kurt Lundin, 24 December 1943, in RASA, Säpo PA, Kurt Lundin.
volunteer named Kurt Lundin. The citizen of a neutral country largely unaffected by the war, Lundin seems an unlikely candidate to perpetrate genocide. But he did, and he was not alone. By the end of the war the Waffen-SS had developed into a force of over half a million soldiers; of these some eight thousand were non-German volunteers from the neutral countries of Sweden, Switzerland, and Denmark.

Four years after the executions on the Eastern Front, in April 1945, a large contingent of Lundin’s fellow neutral Waffen-SS volunteers withdrew into Berlin. As the men entered Germany’s once magnificent capital, they found the city in ruins after weeks of bombardment. In the chaos of the nearly surrounded city, the men prepared to meet the Red Army’s onslaught. Concentrated around Hitler’s bunker in the center of Berlin, the men would be among the dictator’s final defenders. In the next few weeks all but a handful of them would die fighting for a murderous regime whose defeat was already certain.3

The questions raised by these examples are deeply perplexing. Neither the Axis nor the Allies threatened the homes of these men. Many of the volunteers had young children. Several were highly educated and came from stable, middle-class families. Why would these men from countries largely unaffected by the war volunteer to murder and die for a brutal, racist and foreign ideology? Nor were these neutrals citizens the only non-Germans who voluntarily fought for the Nazi regime. By the end of the war, over sixty thousand so-called Germanic Europeans and nearly half a million non-Germans had served under the Nazi flag.4


4 Germanic was a Nazi term for the supposedly racially and culturally related peoples of northwestern Europe, corresponding roughly to Scandinavia, Holland, Flemish-Belgium, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein. Whether Estonia was a Germanic country was contested within the SS leadership. Though the Germanic peoples included Germans as well, the term was used to refer to these non-German Western Europeans throughout the war, as opposed to Reichsdeutsche, German citizens, and Volksdeutsche, foreigners of German heritage and “blood,” mostly from the East. Estimates of the numbers of Germanic volunteers are hard to establish with certainty and vary from 60,000 to 130,000. The total number of non-Germans in the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS, including hundreds of thousands of Eastern Europeans, was well over a million. Rolf-Dieter Müller estimates that non-Germans accounted for 20 percent of the total Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS strength on the Eastern Front. Rolf-Dieter Müller, An der Seite der Wehrmacht: Hitlers Ausländische Helfer beim “Kreuzzug Gegen Den Bolschewismus” 1941–1945 (Berlin: Christoph Links Verlag, 2007), 422.
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This book examines the phenomenon of Germanic volunteers to the SS through the stories of the neutral volunteers to the Waffen-SS leadership corps – those who became officers or assumed other positions of responsibility – as well as the SS institutions they worked for. Although many of the hundreds of thousands of non-Germans who fought for the Nazi regime were likely coerced into joining by the occupying Germans, this book focuses on volunteers from countries outside of Germany’s control – Switzerland, Sweden, and Denmark – thereby eliminating coercion or propaganda as explanations for their decisions to volunteer. Unlike non-Germanic volunteers who were given a lower status within the Waffen-SS or came under the command of the German army, volunteers from the Germanic countries were fully integrated into the Waffen-SS and were simultaneously members of the elite SS umbrella organization. Moreover, out of the Germanic volunteers, those from the neutral countries proved to be particularly interested not only in fighting for the regime, but also in working as administrators to establish a Greater Germanic Reich.

Much has been written in the last decade on the SS plans for the colonial reorganization of the occupied Eastern territories. SS officers, many of them with academic doctorates, conceptualized and personally participated in the mass murder of the population in the East and the “Germanization” of the culture and landscape. The parallel SS plans for the West, in contrast, have been comparatively under-examined. This is partly because the plans for the West were to a large degree conceptualized by non-German SS men. Most of the Swiss, Swedish, and Danish volunteers came to the SS armed with ideological visions for the reorganization of Europe that were complimentary to those of their German colleagues. In the service of the SS they planned to create a Greater Germanic Reich, an empire in which Germanic racial and cultural unity would supersede artificial borders and institutions. The term “Germanic” is itself an artifact of this ideology, as it refers to the supposed racial and cultural links between peoples in the Northwestern regions of Europe. Moreover, the volunteers shared a thoroughly anti-democratic vision based on German-Germanic hegemony over the many “inferior” peoples of Europe. The Waffen-SS was central to this Germanic project. The bond

1 Sweden and Switzerland remained unoccupied and “neutral” for the duration of the war. Denmark was occupied by Germany in 1940 but until 1943 was allowed significant freedom in administering its internal affairs. Although some Danish volunteers may have been coerced after 1943, officer corps volunteers, with very few exceptions, joined in 1940 and 1941.
forged on the Eastern front between these elite Germanic men and their German colleagues intended to serve as both the catalyst for an organic alignment of the Germanic countries and as the glue that would hold the Greater Germanic Reich together. The Germanic “brothers in arms” of the Waffen-SS would be the seed for a new Europe and form the core of its elites and leaders.

The history of the SS and the Waffen-SS is hardly unknown. Even so, the significance of the Germanic volunteers has been misinterpreted. Too often, their stories have been molded to fit the more comfortable notion that National Socialism, the Holocaust and the Nazi New Order were purely German phenomena, anathema to Europe’s steady march towards democracy and human rights. Works focusing on the Third Reich and the Second World War often acknowledge the volunteers but examine them only from the German perspective. Nationwide focused studies on non-German Western European countries, for their part, have either ignored or portrayed the Waffen-SS volunteers as abominations of the national character, traitorous men who were unrepresentative of the societies from which they came. Both bodies of works portray these volunteers as non-actors of sorts, who represented an insignificant anomaly in an otherwise clear-cut story of National Socialist Germany and anti-Nazi Europe. Those few works that acknowledge the Waffen-SS’s talk of a Greater Germanic Reich typically reduce this endeavor to pure propaganda – a tale spun for the benefit of gullible foreign volunteers.

This book is, above all, an attempt at integrating the personal stories of Germanic volunteers to the Waffen-SS into the larger narrative of efforts to reorganize large portions of Europe under the Nazi regime. It examines who these men were, what drove them, how they contributed to various aspects of the Nazi project, and how their views developed during the course of the war. At the same time, the book seeks to link...
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these men to decision making on the part of the German SS leadership, including its chief, Himmler. That is, I wish to treat these men as the real historical actors they were. This is a study of perpetrators, of ideology, of the unique institution that was the SS, and, above all, of the interaction of the three.

In particular, this book examines the hundred most influential and high-ranking neutral volunteers, all of whom either worked for or closely with the Germanische Leitstelle, the office most central to the Germanic project within the SS. Hence, a narrative following the development of this office parallels the biographies of these men. Far from naïve fanatics or mentally disturbed individuals, as postwar myths and national historiographies usually regard them, they were well-educated and traveled members of the middle-class, of strong and adventurous character. They were leaders, not followers. In joining the Waffen-SS they were not running away from social isolation or economic dislocation at home. Instead, they sought to defend what they saw as the core of European civilization and culture from the dual threat of Soviet Bolshevism and Anglo-American Liberalism and to effect a radical reorganization of the European political and social order. Once in the service of the Waffen-SS, their goals were thwarted by friction with various competing Nazi institutions and the changing fortunes of the war. Along with elucidating the experiences and contributions of these Germanic volunteers, then, this book is additionally a case study of the "polyocratic" nature of the Nazi regime. Understanding why the plans for a greater Germanic Reich failed to take hold within the regime, or even fully within the SS, helps us better understand the workings of the Nazi regime.

By the end of the war, many Germanic volunteers to the SS had grown disillusioned. This did not, however, prevent many of them from participating in some of the most gruesome crimes of the Nazi regime – Lundin's story being a case in point. It must be said immediately and unequivocally that in examining who these men were and the decisions they made, I am no way attempting to excuse their behavior or beliefs; instead I am attempting to gain deeper insight into the perpetrator’s minds and motives and the complexity of the world in which they acted.¹⁰


¹⁰ In this I am influenced greatly by George L. Mosse’s concept of “methodological empathy.” George L. Mosse, Confronting History: A Memoir (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2000), 9. See also, Emilio Gentile, “A Provisional Dwelling: The Origin
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Much of the existing literature on the volunteers was written by former participants – or sympathetic “apologists” – who justified their involvement as a fight for the benefit of Europe. In arguing that the men were motivated by an ideal, the apologists are essentially correct. What the apologists fail to mention is that the world the volunteers were fighting for did not have room for everyone – Jews, communists, and others were to be expunged with the most violent methods – nor for what they saw as outdated and artificial institutions, such as parliamentary democracy and individual rights.

UNDERSTANDING THE WAFFEN-SS

After the Waffen-SS was labeled a criminal organization at the Nuremberg trials, its former members began a campaign to exonerate both the organization and their service. Hence, former Waffen-SS officers have been among the most prolific authors on the subject of the Waffen-SS. Foremost among these are the former generals Felix Steiner and Paul Hausser. The title of Hausser’s popular book, Soldaten Wie Andere Auch (“Soldiers just like others”), summarizes the thrust of both his and Steiner’s main argument. One or more former Waffen-SS volunteers wrote similar books for each country that supplied volunteers. These authors have been joined by a large number of apologists and military enthusiasts who portray the


Felix Steiner, Die Freiwilligen; Idee und Opfergang (Göttingen: Plesse, 1958); Paul Hausser, Soldaten Wie Andere Auch: Der Weg der Waffen-SS (Osnabrück: Munin, 1966); Richard Schulze Kossens, Militärischer Führernachwuchs der Waffen-SS: Die Junkerschulen, 3rd ed. (Coburg: Nation Europa, 1999). Apologetic literature on the Waffen-SS has proliferated into the current decade. This extensive body of works will not be catalogued here.

See Felix Steiner, Die Wehrbridee des Abendlandes (Frankfurt: Parma-Edition, 1951); Die Freiwilligen; Idee und Opfergang.

One of the most popular memoirs by an SS soldier similarly downplays the political elements of the organization. Of his time in the Waffen-SS, Johann Voss (pseudonym) writes, “The notion of the Waffen-SS as politically or racially indoctrinated fanatics driven by Party ideology and hate, was, in my experience, far from reality.” Johann Voss, Black Edelweiss. A Memoir of Combat and Conscience by a Soldier of the Waffen-SS (Bedford: Aberjona, 2002), 57.

The former Danish Waffen-SS volunteer Oluf Krabbe, is one such example. Oluf Krabbe, Danske Soldater I Kamp På Østfronten 1941–1945 (København: Bogans Forlag, 1998).
Waffen-SS as a modern fighting force and a forerunner to NATO and the multinational peacekeeping forces of the later twentieth century.¹⁵ Though not all of these works are overtly sympathetic to the Nazi ideology, their strict emphasis on military issues and their glorification of the German war-making machine is a clear attempt to distance the Waffen-SS from the bearers of the Nazi ideology and perpetrators of crimes and suffering. These works, and their interpretations, are easy to dismiss. More troubling is a second group of works produced by pseudo-academic historians whose thoroughly researched writings, imbued with the language of scholarship, straddle the line of apologia. These sorts of works, which claim to examine the phenomenon of non-Germans in both the Waffen-SS and Wehrmacht as a whole, usually withhold any sort of judgment in favor of documenting, in encyclopedic detail, the participation of volunteers from individual countries in particular Waffen-SS formations.¹⁶

Perhaps as a result of the monopolization of Waffen-SS literature by former Waffen-SS members and their apologetic supporters, serious historians long wrote the topic off. With the exception of studies by the German historian Berndt Wegner and the American historian George Stein, the history of the military arm of the SS was neglected for almost fifty years.¹⁷ As the historiography of the Nazi regime and its war crimes has become a lot more complicated over the past few decades, dealing with everything from race, class, gender, and sexuality to transnationalism, historians’ assumptions about the origins and role of the Waffen-SS were frozen in time.

This situation has begun to change in the last decade, with a resurgence in works on the Waffen-SS as an organization integral to the Nazi regime and its crimes.¹⁸ These works support the pioneering work of Wegner

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¹⁵ See, for example, the works of Patrick Agte with Munin Verlag and Chris Bishop with MBI Publishing.


and Stein in discrediting the apologetic readings of the Waffen-SS. Recent publications have also offered suggestive challenges to the readings of the Germanic volunteers as having been “outsiders” – either criminally inclined or mentally unstable. These studies paint a complex picture of collaboration. For example, a 2008 work on Christian Schalburg, the commander of the Danish Waffen-SS Legion until his death in 1942, caused an uproar in Denmark because it made clear that Schalburg, who had been a convinced Nazi and complicit in numerous acts of brutality, had been an influential Danish officer in the prewar years and a close friend of the royal family. My close examination of the roles of other leading non-German Waffen-SS volunteers suggests that Schalburg was the norm, rather than the exception.

Beyond its contributions to the history of the Third Reich, the Waffen-SS and the individual neutral countries, this book opens a critical dialogue with several key strands of twentieth-century European historiography. Primary among these are theories of transnational history, Täterforschung (examinations of the perpetrators of the crimes of the Third Reich), the appeal in Western Europe of fascism in general, and the Nazi New Order in particular. Considering these strands together allows me to make sense of what on the surface appear to be several contradictions represented by the volunteers: they were clearly fascists, yet for the most part did not belong to a fascist party; they were stout nationalists yet advocated for the abandonment of the nation state; they were ideologues yet saw themselves primarily as “actors,” not “thinkers”; they were “normal” citizens of neutral countries who enthusiastically participated in abhorrent acts of violence.

The phenomenon of neutral volunteers from several countries arriving at a similar ideological inclination cannot be fully appreciated without a
transnational lens. The very fact that a group of similarly minded men from different countries threw their lot in with the Nazi regime – a phenomenon that is obscured when viewing from the perspective of a single nation – hints at the cultural and social forces that affected men across European boundaries in the prewar years. Both the discourse that they consumed and produced and the very essence of their outlook were transnational. They imagined a utopia not within but instead of the countries from which they came. For these reasons, this book is transnational at its core.

The last decade has seen an explosive proliferation of literature on the methodological benefits and heuristic value of transnational studies as well as an accompanying reevaluation of the merits of comparative history. I have found the concept of ‘entangled’ history, or histoire croisée, particularly useful; it informs my underlying assumption that a nationally compartmentalized understanding of the war, including of National Socialism, distorts a very complex reality. The country of Switzerland, for example, cannot reasonably be portrayed as unified actor; instead various persons and institutions responded differently to the reality of the Nazi New Order. More importantly, of course, even if one were to accept a reified notion of Switzerland, its government’s decisions were intimately bound to decisions and conditions established abroad.

Though a problem in many areas of historical studies, the temptation to reify the nation-state has been particularly strong in historiography on the Second World War. Older accounts that portray Germany as a complete aberration of European culture, and therefore as solely responsible for the catastrophe in the surrounding countries, positioned non-Germans as victims who resisted Germany’s nefarious intentions at every turn. These assumptions have been challenged more recently, in particular in economic history. Recent studies of each of the neutral countries, for example, have revealed the extent to which their economies relied on Nazi Germany and, in turn, neutral economic assets sustained the


\[\text{Dan Stone has argued that the long tendency to ignore collaboration resulted from the Cold War paradigm. Dan Stone, Goodbye to All That? The Story of Europe since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), viii. The classic “Sonderweg” work is William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990).}]}
German war effort. With the ongoing recognition that small numbers of collaborators within societies largely opposed to Hitler is not an accurate reflection of wartime Europe, studies are emerging that examine the complex nature of Western Europe’s relationship to National Socialism. But while some of this work uses a transnational lens, much continues to operate within the confines of the nation-state. This has been especially true of studies of the Germanic volunteers referred to above.

In keeping with the notion of an “entangled” history, I portray the development and experiences of Germanic volunteers as shared and mutually informed. Though colored by their specific national upbringings, even in the prewar years these men held remarkably similar ideas – ideas informed by a transnational discourse and European-wide pressures. In this sense I seek to observe the transnational flow, effect and

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53 See, for example, Mario König and Bettina Zeugin, eds., Die Schweiz, der Nationalsozialismus und der Zweite Weltkrieg: Schlussbericht der Unabhängigen Expertenkommission Schweiz – Zweiter Weltkrieg (Zürich: Pendo, 2002); Martin Fritz, Sveriges Tyskgruvor. Tyskågda Gruvor I Sverige under Andra Världskriget (Kristianstad: Sekel, 2007); Phil Gilmour, “The Success of Collaboration: Denmark’s Self-Assessment of Its Economic Position after Five Years of Nazi Occupation,” Journal of Contemporary History 36, no. 3 (2001); Walter Hofer and Herbert Reginbogin, Hitler, der Westen und die Schweiz 1936–1945 (Zürich: NZZ Verlag, 2003); Adam LeBor, Hitler’s Secret Bankers: The Myth of Swiss Neutrality During the Holocaust (Seacaucus: Citadel Press, 1997).
