The UK Economy in the Long Expansion and its Aftermath
Macroeconomic Policy Making

Series editors
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The 2007–10 financial crisis has asked some very hard questions of modern macroeconomics. The consensus that grew up during ‘the Great Moderation’ has proved to be an incomplete explanation of how to conduct monetary policy in the face of financial shocks. This series brings together leading macroeconomic researchers and central bank economists to analyse the tools and methods necessary to meet the challenges of the post-financial crisis world.

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The UK Economy in the Long Expansion and its Aftermath

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As the Series Editors of Modern Macroeconomic Policy Making, one of our purposes in this series was to encourage more work on and examination of the UK economy. The academic incentives to study macroeconomic developments in the UK have become somewhat limited, so there is only a dwindling band of those with a strong home bias to continue this important work of following the story of the First Industrial Nation. Between the conjunctural analysis of City scribblers and policy-oriented work at the Bank of England, there is room for some answers to the question of what happened to the UK economy after the end of the 1990–92 recession that left it so vulnerable to financial crisis. The conference that preceded this volume was held at Clare College, Cambridge, in September 2013, mirroring another conference held 10 years earlier in the same venue at which it was suggested that there might even be an end to monetary history. Given that we are all subject to the vagaries of fashion, in intellectual activities just as much as anything material, these new research papers allow us to set in print many of the views about the period immediately prior to the financial crisis, in the shadow of which we continue to live. We took the unusual step of having many editors, as each of Alec Chrystal, Joe Pearlman, Peter Smith and Stephen Wright acted as discussants at the conference and helped frame the set of chapters that we now hand over to posterity. We thank them, the authors and the anonymous referees of the chapters.

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