Introduction: Slavery and Society in Global Perspective

Noel Lenski and Catherine M. Cameron

What is a "slave society"? At first glance it might seem simply to be a society that allows some individuals to hold others in a position of subordination as property. Just as humans treat cattle, sheep, or dogs as their "own," some societies permit their members to treat humans by right of ownership as slaves.[1] Any society that permits this could – in a general sense – be called a slave society. For some historians and social scientists, however, the phrase "slave society" constitutes a sociologically definable class that distinguishes a select and limited group of geo-temporally delimited cultures as different in quality and quantity from the many other social contexts in world history that permit slaveholding. Such "genuine slave societies," as they have been termed, are to be distinguished from "societies with slaves," where slavery also exists, but on a smaller and less intensive scale. For this subset of scholars, "Slave Societies" (and here we begin using capitals and quotation marks to set off this specialized sense of the term, a practice maintained throughout this volume) are few in number, many would say as few as five – ancient Greece and Rome, modern Brazil, the Caribbean, and the US South. They are also thought to be

[1] Jacoby 1994 attempts to link the rise of slavery with the domestication of animals and the rise of animal husbandry. His article is useful for its collection of references to slaves as "animals" across a broad pool of (mostly Western) sources. It does not account for the fact that slaves are referred to and treated as animals (especially dogs) in societies without developed husbandry; see Rushforth 2012, 15–71. On the same theme, see also Keith Bradley 2000.

unique in history in that they alone can be said to incorporate slaves and slavery at a "structural location" central to the functioning of that society's economic and cultural elite.

This distinction between "Slave Societies" and "Societies with Slaves" was first developed by groundbreaking ancient historian and sociologist Moses Finley in the 1960s. Finley expanded on the idea in two important monographs from 1973 and 1980, and the distinction was then adopted widely by other Greek and Roman historians until it has become a virtual corollary of ancient slavery studies.[2] It has also enjoyed widespread currency among modern historians, particularly historians of the West, which – Finley posited and subsequent Western scholars have maintained – was historically exceptional in developing "Slave Societies." Yet the idea has gained purchase even beyond the study of Western history to such an extent that it affects both the discourse and the methodology of many slave studies across disciplines up to the present.

The chapters presented in this volume arose as papers presented at a conference held at the University of Colorado, Boulder, during September 27–28, 2013, under the title "What Is a Slave Society? An International Conference on the Nature of Slavery as a Global Historical Phenomenon." The conveners of the meeting and editors of this volume organized the event in order to interrogate Finley's construct. Neither is of the belief that the "Slave Societies/Societies with Slaves" binary remains useful or even tenable in light of ongoing studies of the practice of slavery in a variety of cultures across global history. Nevertheless, both are convinced that the model's supporters still have a case to make, and that those of us who would question a paradigm so widely deployed should offer a forum for debate and perhaps also an alternative for its replacement. They posed the title of the conference – and of this volume – as a question with the deliberate intent of inviting inquiry, discussion, and potential dissent.

In the same spirit, this volume, containing chapters by most of the original attendees and four further contributors, all revised in dialogue with one another, retains contrasting and at times contradictory opinions about the subject. As a collection of individual studies by multiple authors with unique perspectives, it makes no apologies

[2] Finley 1968, 1973a, 1980.

for melding a series of divergent approaches and conclusions. Each author has been invited to engage not just the theme of the conference but also the content of the other chapters. The result is thus not a coherent line of argument, let alone a continuous narrative, but rather a series of debates, or an interconnected grid of opinions about the nature of slavery and slaveholding across history. The conference thus began with a question, and the resulting volume maintains an interrogatory stance.

This book opens with a lengthy chapter on the origins of the idea of the "Slave Society" written by Noel Lenski and intended to provide background and a jumping-off point for the debate that follows. It explores the rise of the model and its subsequent effects on the study of ancient history as well as its interpenetration into fields of history, sociology, and anthropology well beyond the Classical world. The chapter then questions the tendency to restrict the "Slave Society" distinction to just five Western cultures by illustrating how five non-Western societies not mentioned by Finley and his followers seem to fit his criteria for inclusion in the club. Having indicted the model's ethnocentrism, the chapter then moves to more fundamental problems with its construction. It explores issues arising from its assumptions about fundamental similarities between ancient and modern slave systems. It then formulates a new model that attempts to measure the "intensity" of slaveholding practices by comparing them with an "ideal" form of slavery that would balance equally benefits to the master with disadvantages to the slave. This model may or may not replace the Finleyan construct, but it should at least provide a credible alternative to the black-and-white distinction it has imposed.

The thematic chapters of this volume are articulated into four parts. The first explores **Ancient and Late Antique Western Societies**. It begins with Chapter 2 on Classical Greece by Peter Hunt, which opens with the fundamental question of definitions. Hunt examines the long-standing dichotomy between "property definitions" of slavery and Orlando Patterson's subjective definition based on violent domination, natal alienation, and dishonor.[3] While acknowledging the validity of Patterson's *depiction* of slavery, Hunt argues that the notion of property is determinative of the slave state. Slave societies,

[3] Patterson 1982, 1–17.

he contends, are those that most obviously treat humans as property. In addition, he reiterates Finley's emphasis on the structural location of slavery as a matter of paramount importance: slave societies are characterized by the predominance of slaves as the primary suppliers of surplus for the elite. By this definition, Athens was by all means a "Slave Society." Slaves were held as chattels, the proportion of slaves in its population – 20–50 percent of aggregate – was large, and these provided the primary source of surplus production. Sparta, by contrast, was not, for its helots retained limited but tangible rights in property and inheritance that set them above chattel slaves.

In Chapter 3, Kyle Harper and Walter Scheidel join forces to argue in favor of the Finleyan model. They begin by situating Finley's scholarship in its historiographical context. Reacting to Marx's historical materialism and Weber's conquest thesis, the former of which argued that the ancient economy was based in a "slave mode of production" and the latter that it depended on war captives for the generation of slaves, Harper and Scheidel point out that Finley charted a new path that emphasized the property nature of the slave–master relationship: the defining feature of the chattel slave was not his universality qua laborer nor her capture in battle but rather the fact of being treated as a piece of property. Harper and Scheidel continue by inferring that Rome's heavy dependence on slave labor – and thus on commoditized laborers – may have helped propel it to economic prosperity and even toward progressive sociocultural development. They then turn to questions of scale and structural location in an effort to prove that Roman Italy in particular was home to an economy built on and by slaves who then disappeared, by and large, when that economy collapsed in the fifth century.

Noel Lenski closes the first section with a chapter that explores how Finley developed his model within his own mid-twentieth-century context. It begins by exploring the various intellectual strains undergirding Finley's thought: Marx, Bücher, Meyer, Weber, and Polanyi. From these Finley derived his assumptions that the ancient Greek, and, by extension, Roman, economies were fundamentally primitive, based in agriculture, averse to free labor, and unique in ancient world history for the intensity of their slaveholding. Early on, his desire to understand what was unique about Classical Greek slavery (by which he meant Athenian slavery) led Finley to the conclusion

that Greece's invention of personal freedom necessitated the use of chattel slaves – making it the world's first "genuine slave society." He then grafted this idea onto a theory developed by István Hahn that emphasized the importance of large-scale private property holding and the availability of free-market exchange as catalysts for the growth of what Hahn termed the *Skavenhaltergesellschaft*. Lenski goes on to question the validity of Finley's model as a tool for comparing the slaveholding practices of ancient societies like Greece and Rome with the modern US South, which was always the paradigm for Finley's "Slave Society."

Part II of this book treats **Non-Western Small-Scale Societies**. In its first chapter, Catherine Cameron covers a broad spectrum of small-scale societies from across the globe, many of which fulfilled all of Finley's criteria for inclusion among the canon of "Slave Societies." Opening each section with a quotation from Finley, the chapter systematically lays out a kind of *koine* of captive-taking among these societies: they regularly raided for captives, often women and children but sometimes also men, and then detained these in subordinate statuses, sometimes over the short term but often throughout their lives and at times even across generations; they did so in numbers that varied widely from context to context but sometimes reached as high as 25 percent of the aggregate population. Their slaves were often structurally important to social differentiation, constituting the main avenue through which elite male status was expressed; they were treated as property, whether of individuals or, more commonly, male heads of household, and were gifted or exchanged for other goods. They were also economically productive, generating surplus while providing leisure for their elite owners. Ultimately, while small-scale societies display significant differences with more complex state-based social systems, in certain instances, they clearly intensified the practice of captive-taking and slaveholding to the point that they too could be considered "Slave Societies" within the terms of their own social complex.[4]

In Chapter 6, Christina Snyder explores the bewildering variety of slaveries practiced in native North America. Captive-taking and

[4] Many of these ideas are explored in greater detail in Cameron 2016a.

slaveholding on the continent preceded European contact and persisted in its aftermath, with native practices often conforming themselves to colonial patterns over time. In all instances precontact slavery was based on captive-taking, and many – though not all – native societies were "open" to the incorporation of captives into their cultures.[5] Some, however, like the Northwest Coast peoples, developed robust systems of trans-generational slavery.[6] Several – like the Cherokee or Chickasaw – merged their native traditions with colonial patterns by organizing plantations populated by African slaves, and others – like the Westos – came to specialize in slave raiding and trading as the basis of their economies.[7] Overall, Snyder argues, slavery in Native American societies was in constant flux, ever shifting in its forms, purposes, and intensity to meet changing social and economic circumstances. These insights obviously cast a shadow over attempts to view colonial New World slavery in essentializing terms, for it too developed over time and even in dialogue with the native forms – Amerindian and African – it encountered.

In Chapter 7, Fernando Santos-Granero carries the argument to tropical Native America, between southern Florida and the Gran Chaco of South America. He demonstrates the diffusion of captive-taking and slaveholding here too in the precontact period. Focusing on five societies, he shows how some of these – like the Kalinago and Conibo – practiced regular captive-taking raids and then used their victims as slaves for the remainder of their lifetimes, while others – like the Tukano, Chiriguaná, and Guaicurú – held slaves alongside serf-like or tributary dependent populations. Using three approaches, one structural, a second processual, and a third phenomenological, Santos-Granero shows that, while the groups he treats may not qualify as Finleyan "Slave Societies" for want of a "slave mode of production," they were societies structured around captive-taking and slaveholding. Thus, at least from the slaves' perspective, there would have been little difference between the level of violence and alienation imposed in these societies as compared to those that fit Finley's model more comfortably.

[5] Snyder 2010; Rushforth 2012; cf. Cameron 2011.
[6] See Donald 1997.
[7] See Bowne 2005.

Paul Lovejoy continues this section in Chapter 8 with an examination of "Slavery in Societies on the Frontiers of Centralized States in West Africa." Focusing on the interior of Upper Guinea in the eighteenth century and the Bight of Biafra in the nineteenth, when the Muslim states of Fuuta Jalon and Sokoto dominated the interior of these regions, Lovejoy draws into doubt the validity or usefulness of the Finleyan "Slave Society" even as he also questions some of the terms of discussion inherent in this volume: ideas of "statehood," of "society," of "modes of production" are none of them easily applicable to the African societies he investigates. Even so, slaves – people who could be bought and sold and who were subject to the will and whim of their masters – existed in these regions before Western contact, and societies that fit Finley's criteria for recognition as "Slave Societies" were also present and indeed common. Exploiting this situation, Aro merchants traveled the Cross and Niger Rivers collecting marketable slaves traded from the Igbo and Ibibio who were then sold to Western slavers. So too the small-scale societies surrounding the Sokoto Caliphate simultaneously retained slaves of their own and were subject to enslavement by the hulking "Slave Society" on whose frontiers they lived. In this sense, slave societies were common in this region of West Africa in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Ultimately, then, the notion of the slave society – when used as a descriptive term – remains useful as a way to identify societies that are fundamentally shaped by the institution of slavery. The chapters in this section would seem to agree, however, that the use of the notion of a "Slave Society" to establish a firmly bounded sociological category is as likely to distort as enhance interpretation. All indicate that too keen a focus on the illusory ideal of an archetypal "Slave Society" is at once overly rigid and less than productive of meaning for those seeking to explain the complexity of slaveholding systems across cultures.

Part III of this volume treats **Modern Western Societies** and offers a more sympathetic reading of the Finleyan idea. Aldair Carlos Rodrigues opens in Chapter 9 with an examination of "The Colonial Brazilian 'Slave Society': Potentialities, Limits, and Challenges to an Interpretative Model Inspired by Moses Finley." Brazil was the largest importer of African slaves in the transatlantic complex and it used these slaves to recreate a colonial version of the status regimes of the metropolis. At the start of the colonial period, slavery was

still very much alive in Portugal, albeit in a system restricted to the social elite. But the New World recreation of Portuguese slavery allowed entrepreneurs and social climbers to employ slave-owning as the fundamental tool for the creation and assertion of status. This is confirmed by demographic analyses that have emphasized that slaveholding occurred across a broad spectrum of social statuses in Brazil before the end of the transatlantic slave trade in 1850, giving it a solid purchase across Luso-American society. A closer look at regional variation demonstrates that the use of African slaves predominated in coastal regions with sugar production and access to the transatlantic market, while São Paulo and Amazonia made heavier use of indigenous peoples, often as semi-servile dependents, until late in the eighteenth century. After refuting recent efforts to downplay the difference between colonial and metropolitan slaveholding, Rodrigues closes with a look at recent research that has recovered a place for slave agency in Brazil, particularly in studies emphasizing the creative adaptation of the European tradition of godparenthood and African traditions of warfare. Thus, while defending the usefulness of Finley's model, Rodrigues acknowledges the limitations imposed by its emphasis on the perspective of masters rather than slaves.

In Chapter 10, Robert Gudmestad explores the question in North America with "What Is a Slave Society? The American South." He accepts the challenge to look past the Finleyan binary and apply Lenski's new intensification model to this context. Beginning with a survey of the history of slavery in North America, he shows how the introduction of cash crops invited the intensification of African slaveholding by white colonists. Over the course of the seventeenth century, these created the normative and administrative apparatus necessary for the large-scale use of slavery out of whole cloth, for the British had abolished slavery in the metropolis some four centuries earlier. The patchwork nature of American colonial settlement and the variegation in landscape and climate led to tremendous variability in American slaveholding. This tended to be smoothed out in the late eighteenth century as slavery intensified in the warmer climates of the South even as it withered in a North active in the invention of abolitionism. Even so, Gudmestad emphasizes that the Southern states hardly used slaves in any uniform way, as regards both their demographic and their economic importance. Ultimately, the welding

together of the United States after 1789 created a Manichaean political and economic system, unique in world history for the tensions it created over the question of slavery. When the country fissured in 1860, it was the level of intensification that dictated whether states would side with the Union or the Confederacy. In this sense, intensification best describes the patterns of slaveholding that emerged in some areas and the opposing trends that came to prevail in others.

In Chapter 11, Theresa Singleton introduces material culture to the debate in her exploration of "Islands of Slavery: Archaeology and Caribbean Landscapes of Intensification." After problematizing the whole notion of "the Caribbean" as a unified geographical, let alone political, space, she explores how the differential bias in Caribbean slave archaeology for larger plantations has masked the diversity in the scale and practice of slaveholding and other forms of dependent labor. She then turns to a diachronic investigation of the development of slavery, starting with *encomiendas* of the sixteenth century and moving to the large-scale plantations associated with English and French colonization in the region following the sugar revolution. Controlled by large-scale investment interests and populated by enslaved African laborers, these geo-temporal contexts did indeed give rise to structures Finley characterized as a "Slave Society" in places like Barbados, Jamaica, and St. Domingue. More difficult to explain is why these economies turned from indentured white to enslaved black labor, as is the question of why the Spanish waited to develop intensive slave-based production until the nineteenth century, a period when slave production was de-intensifying in the British and French contexts. The "Slave Society/Societies with Slaves" binary may then be useful in the broadest terms for modeling the Caribbean, but its two-dimensional simplicity falls short of offering an explanatory model for the regional variability characteristic of the Caribbean as whole.

Part IV of this book looks at **Non-Western State Societies** in a series of five chapters. The first, Chapter 12, by Matthew Hopper, covers nineteenth-century Eastern Arabia, which was home to tens of thousands of slaves who worked in the production of pearls and dates. Overturning entrenched notions that Islamic cultures hold slaves only for purposes of military or bureaucratic service, household maintenance, or sexual exploitation, Hopper elucidates a highly sophisticated, market-driven slave system that concentrated slaves

from East Africa and Baluchistan on plantations and pearl fisheries. Highly elastic international demand for these commodities and intensive capital investment in the infrastructure necessary to conduct them created the perfect market environment for the intensified exploitation of slave labor. Nevertheless, this occurred on terms consonant with the environmental and social conditions in the Persian Gulf, which were, of course, markedly different from those of plantation economies. Nevertheless, excluding these Eastern Arabian states (which meet all of Finley's criteria) from the canon can only reinforce unwelcome prejudices in favor of Western agricultural economies, as if these were uniquely capable of forging "genuine slave societies."

Focusing on the East African nexus of the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf slaving zone in Chapter 13, Bernard Freamon investigates "Slavery and Society in East Africa, Oman, and the Persian Gulf." He draws into question the implicit territoriality of Finley's "Slave Societies" and attempts to expand the definition of "society" to include the broader geographical matrix of East Africa, South Asia, and the Persian Gulf, a region interlinked by shared conditions of climate, geography, and migration patterns. Freamon shows that the traffic in slaves along routes between the Red Sea and East Africa reached back to the second millennium BCE but that it grew greatly in scale beginning in the fifteenth century CE as a function of the flourishing of Islamic empires. The growth of the transatlantic systems was paralleled in the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Indian Ocean, influenced simultaneously by the rise of European colonial slaveries on the Mascarenes and Réunion, as well as by Islamic slaveholding on Zanzibar and Pemba. Earlier historiography has often identified the characteristics of a Finleyan "Slave Society" without making explicit reference to the model, although some have also emphasized the broader variety of status relationships and the intercultural exchange of slaves common within this geosphere.[8] After reviewing the often massive sizes of slaveholdings, particularly among Arab magnates of the nineteenth century, whose cases are well documented, Freamon concludes that the broader West Indian Ocean region spawned a kind of "Slave Society" that was transregional and transcultural.

[8] See especially Cooper 1977, 1980, and Gwyn Campbell 2004.

In Chapter 14, Ehud Toledano examines the question of slave societies in reverse – that is, from the perspective of abolition. Strongly critical of Lenski's introductory chapter, he proceeds from the assumption that, taken broadly, Finley's model is defensible and useful. To prove the point, he undertakes to demonstrate that a strong indicator that Ottoman society was a "Society with Slaves" and not a "Slave Society" is the fact that no antislavery movement arose from within it. Building on recent work by Madeline Zilfi, he shows how Islamic law and scripture provide a strong cultural and social framework for the ongoing practice of enslavement that tended to help preserve the institution in the face of Western opposition.[9] Nevertheless, argues Toledano, slavery was insignificant enough as an economic or social institution in Ottoman society that few took the trouble to oppose it.[10]

In Chapter 15, Kim Bok-rae examines Korean *nobis* in the Chosun period (1392–1910). Long considered true slaves in Western scholarship, *nobis* were indeed subject to labor for their noble masters (*yangban*), could be sexually exploited by these, and could be bought and sold independent of the land on which they labored.[11] Nevertheless, Kim argues, *nobis* differed from chattel slaves in the Western world both because of their assimilation to the Korean commoner class (*yangmin*) and because the masters' property rights over the persons of the slaves were only rarely exercised. Ownership of a *nobi* was thus ownership over his labor product more than his person. To drive home the point Kim uses the micro-historical example of a *yangmin* named Damulsari who falsely claimed to be a public *nobi* in order to *protect* herself and her children from tribute claims of the master of her husband, thus proving that *nobi* status was at times something that could be coveted. In light of this micro-historical example, Kim urges caution about the cross application of Western models of dependency to non-Western societies: ownership rights on a human do not always or easily square with Western concepts of chattel slavery.

In Chapter 16, Tony Reid then offers a contribution entitled "'Slavery so Gentle': A Fluid Spectrum of Southeast Asian Conditions

[9] Zilfi 2010.

[10] See also Toledano 1998; cf. Erdem 1996. Note that Zilfi 2010, 100, is herself convinced that slavery "was culturally and institutionally integral to both state and society."

[11] See Palais 1996, 208–70, 1998; cf. Patterson 1982, passim.

of Bondage." After opening with a critique of holistic efforts to define "the slave" in absolute and culturally neutral terms, Reid explains that the entire region was characterized by persistent and widespread systems of status inequality, even if these do not always map easily onto Western notions of chattel slavery. Europeans arrived in the region in the sixteenth century, when commerce was burgeoning and warfare common, and witnessed large-scale captive-taking by both the Siamese and Burmese states, which often resulted in the transplantation of huge population groups onto state-controlled rice plantations, as well as chattel slave raiding by entrepreneurs working among the stateless peoples in the highlands surrounding the rice-growing states. Reid then narrows the lens to cover the "Malay world" of the Peninsula and Archipelago, where we find the best documentation on the problem in Southeast Asia. There Dutch sources reveal how preexisting systems of slavery and dependency were adapted to European legal and economic frameworks even as other systems developed under indigenous, Muslim, and Chinese hegemony. The Dutch colonists of Batavia attempted to corral this ferment of slave cultures using European law and in so doing provide us with our best evidence of a Finleyan "Slave Society" in the region. By the same token, Reid counsels against Finley's oversimplified schematism in favor of more differentiated and culturally contingent approaches to the complex comparative problem of slavery and dependency.

Finally, James Brooks concludes this volume with a lyrical and highly personal look at how experiences of captivity and enslavement have shaped the cultures of the American Southwest in ways that resonate even up to the present. Building on the folksong "La Cautiva Marcelina," he shows how enslavement colors the stories humans use to structure their identities. Even up to the present, the annual processions for Santa Rosa de Lima de Abiquiú in northern New Mexico trace their roots to a Spanish settler community devastated by Comanche raiders in 1747, then rebuilt and populated with Native American *genízaros* who guarded the frontier for their Spanish captors. Rescuing their identity from this tangle of traumatic memories, the people of this tiny community represent well the long-term effects of slavery and the adaptability it imposes upon its survivors.

In the aggregate a complex picture emerges that in many ways breaks itself down along disciplinary lines. Most of those invested

in the study of the Western European and colonial tradition wish to defend the Finleyan "Slave Society" model. Not only has it worked well up to the present as a conceptual and pedagogical tool, but it has also helped explain obvious similarities across the transatlantic slave systems, similarities that extend as well to ancient Greece and Rome. Those, by contrast, who work primarily on non-Western societies are much less comfortable with this construct. The basis of their dissatisfaction is twofold. First, many feel that the societies they study do meet Finley's criteria – loose as they are – for inclusion in the circle of "Slave Societies" even if the particular societies in which they specialize have often been overlooked by Western historians. Second, and more important, insofar as their disqualification has been or could be justified, the grounds for this result from the radical differences between the structures of these societies and "normative" Western slave societies like the US South.

At root, Finley's model emphasizes the crucial importance of "structural location" as the determinative factor for consideration as a "Slave Society." If slaves constitute the primary producers of economic surplus for the elite, they inhabit a "Slave Society." Detecting this has been easiest for historians among Western societies structured, like our own, around capitalist market exchange. The model is less obviously detectable among non-state and premodern state societies, the former of which lack market mechanisms and the latter of which could fairly be classed as proto-capitalist – with primitive market structures, but also severe limitations on capital investment imposed by much more circumscribed financial, technological, legal, and cultural horizons. For the model to be valid in a global historical context, however, it should be testable across a range of societies that are not Western and even those that are precapitalist. When such testing occurs, as it does in this volume, it becomes clear that Finleyan "Slave Societies" in the broadest sense do indeed arise in a variety of non-Western cultures, particularly in that period of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when capitalist exchange and its effects began spreading rapidly across world markets in the Persian Gulf, East and West Africa, and Southeast Asia.

Moreover, if we abide closely by Finley's criteria, we must admit that slavery can gain structurally significant importance for the creation and maintenance of the elite in a broad range of cultures that

are entirely precapitalist. Some small-scale societies of Native North and South America display a widespread tendency toward captive-taking which, in some groups, developed into fully fledged and relatively large-scale slaveholding. The same could be said of some African societies even in the precontact period, and arguments have been made – though not in this volume – that the same is true in Korea and Southeast Asia. Western contact of course changed the dynamics of slaveholding in these cultures even as it changed all aspects of economy and society, but this often meant simply adapting native slave-ways to suit an environment now governed by exchanges – economic, political, and military – with the West. Seen from the broadest angle, then, "Slave Societies" come to seem much less remarkable and much more variegated than Finley has argued. Each displays its own peculiarities dictated by a set of variables unique to a given culture, and all arise from both economic and cultural tendencies that favor the intensification of slaveholding in environments that devalue the humanity of some group or class to the point that fellow people can be treated as mere chattels.