CAMBRIDGE
Cambridge University Press & Assessment
978-1-107-14481-1 — Rational Decision and Causality
Ellery Eells
Table of Contents
More Information

Contents

Preface to this edition by BRIAN SKYRMS *page* ix
Preface xi

Introduction 1
1. Bayesianism 3
Subjective expected utility 3
Foundations of subjective probability 7
Learning 10
2. The philosophical and psychological significance of Bayesian decision theory 22
A theory of human rationality 23
A theory of human behavior 30
Foundations and applications of subjective probability 37
3. Bayesian decision theories: some details 59
Ramsey 59
Savage 64
Jeffrey 71
A comparison 74
4. The counterexamples 79
5. Causal decision theories 87
Gibbard and Harper 87
Skyrms 97
Lewis 122
Discussion 133
6. Common causes, reasons and symptomatic acts 137
7. A general defense of *PMCEU* 155
The "tickle defense" 155
The more general setting 159
The weaker assumptions 163
Causes, reasons and probability 175
The general defense 183
8. Newcomb's paradox 188

© in this web service Cambridge University Press & Assessment www.cambridge.org

CAMBRIDGE
Cambridge University Press & Assessment
978-1-107-14481-1 — Rational Decision and Causality
Ellery Eells
Table of Contents
More Information

Appendix 1 Logic 200
Appendix 2 Probability 203
Bibliography 206
Index 212

© in this web service Cambridge University Press & Assessment www.cambridge.org