

# UNDERSTANDING AND AVOIDING THE OIL CURSE IN RESOURCE-RICH ARAB ECONOMIES

For over eighty years the Arab region has derived massive wealth from its natural resources, yet the region's economies remain little diversified, while the oil market is experiencing major structural shifts with the advent of shale gas. Moreover, the resource itself is eventually exhaustible. Under these conditions economic prosperity cannot be sustainable. The critical question is how can the countries of this region escape the "oil curse"?

In this volume, leading economists argue that the curse is not a predestined outcome but a result of weak institutions and bad governance. A variety of analytical perspectives and examination of various international case studies leads to the conclusion that natural resources can only spur economic development when combined with sound political institutions and effective economic governance.

This volume, with its unique focus on the Arab region, will be an important reference for researchers and policy makers alike.

Ibrahim Elbadawi has been Director, Macroeconomics Research Department, Dubai Economic Council, since March 2009. Until February 2009 he was Lead Economist at the Development Research Group of the World Bank, which he joined in 1989; and before that he was Associate Professor of economics at the University of Gezira in Sudan. He holds a PhD in economics and statistics from North Carolina State and Northwestern universities in the USA.

Hoda Selim is an economist at the Economic Research Forum in Cairo, a position she has held since 2011. Previously, she worked for five years at the World Bank's Cairo Office in the Poverty Reduction and Economic Monitoring department. Her recent research focuses on the macroeconomics of oil management and the political economy of development, with particular focus on Arab economies. She holds an MA and PhD from Sciences Po in Paris.





# Understanding and Avoiding the Oil Curse in Resource-rich Arab Economies

## Edited by

### IBRAHIM ELBADAWI

Dubai Economic Council, Dubai, and Economic Research Forum, Egypt

### **HODA SELIM**

Economic Research Forum, Egypt







# **CAMBRIDGE**UNIVERSITY PRESS

One Liberty Plaza, New York NY 10006

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

It furthers the University's mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of education, learning, and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107141728

© Economic Research Forum 2016

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 2016

A catalog record for this publication is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Names: Elbadawi, Ibrahim, editor. | Selim, Hoda, editor.
Title: Understanding and avoiding the oil curse in resource-rich Arab economies /
Ibrahim Elbadawi, Hoda Selim.

Description: New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, [2016] | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2016000953 | ISBN 9781107141728 (Hardback)
Subjects: LCSH: Natural resources–Arab countries. | Economic development–Arab countries. |
Arab countries–Economic policy.

Classification: LCC HC498.Z65 U53 2016 | DDC 333.8/230953-dc23 LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2016000953

ISBN 978-1-107-14172-8 Hardback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party Internet Web sites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such Web sites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.



## Contents

List	of Figures	page vii
List	of Tables	xiii
List	of Contributors	xvii
Fore	word by Ahmed Galal	xix
Acki	nowledgments	xxi
1	Overview of Context, Issues and Summary  Ibrahim Elbadawi and Hoda Selim	1
2	The Global Impact of the Systemic Economies and MENA Business Cycles Paul Cashin, Kamiar Mohaddes and Mehdi Raissi	16
3	Real Exchange Rates and Export Performance in Oil-dependent Arab Economies Ibrahim Elbadawi and Linda Kaltani	44
4	Dutch Disease in the Services Sector: Evidence from Oil Exporters in the Arab Region Ndiamé Diop and Jaime de Melo	82
5	The Political Economy of Public Sector Employment in Resource-dependent Countries Omer Ali and Ibrahim Elbadawi	103
6	The Oil Curse and Labor Markets: The Case of Saudi Arabia Hend Al-Sheikh and S. Nuri Erbas	149
7	Resource Rents, Political Institutions and Economic Growth Ibrahim Elbadawi and Raimundo Soto	187



vi	Contents	
8	Fiscal Institutions in Resource-rich Economies: Lessons from Chile and Norway  Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel	225
9	Savings and Investment Decisions from Natural Resource Revenues: Implications for Arab Development Paul Collier	284
10	Labor Market Heterogeneity and Optimal Exchange Rate Regimes in Resource-rich Arab Countries Almukhtar Saif Al-Abri	301
11	The Institutional Curse of Natural Resources in the Arab World Hoda Selim and Chahir Zaki	322
12	Has the UAE Escaped the Oil Curse? Raimundo Soto and Ilham Haouas	373
13	Understanding and Avoiding the Oil Curse in Sudan Kabbashi M. Suliman	421
Ind	ex	461



2.1

Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-14172-8 - Understanding and Avoiding the Oil Curse in Resource-rich Arab Economies Edited by Ibrahim Elbadawi and Hoda Selim Frontmatter More information

## **Figures**

2.1	Four Quarters Cumulated Impulse Responses of Output	
	to a Negative GDP Shock in the United States (Relative	
	to the United States).	page 29
2.2	Four Quarters Cumulated Impulse Responses of Oil	
	Prices and Supply.	30
2.3	Four Quarters Cumulated Impulse Responses of Output to	
	a Negative GDP Shock in the Euro Area (Relative to the	
	Euro Area)	33
2.4	Impulse Responses of a Negative Unit Shock to Euro Area	
	Output	35
2.5	Four Quarters Cumulated Impulse Responses of Output to	
	a Negative GDP Shock in China (Relative to China).	36
2.6	Four Quarters Cumulated Impulse Responses of Output to	
	a Positive GDP Shock in the GCC Region (Relative to	
	the GCC).	38
2.7	Four Quarters Cumulated Impulse Responses of Output	
	to a Positive GDP Shock in the MENA Oil Exporters	
	(Relative to the MENAEX).	40
3.1	Export Concentration Index (HHI): (2000–2013)	49
3.2	Degree of Export Sophistication (EXPY: 2007)	53
3.3a	Export Concentration (HHI) and the Share of Hydrocarbon	
	Fuel Exports	54
3.3b	Export Sophistication (EXPY) and the Share of Hydrocarbon	
	Fuel Exports	54
3.4	RER Undervaluation - Oil Exporting vs. Non-oil Middle	
	Income	60



viii Figures

3.5	RER Undervaluation - Arab Oil Economies	60
3.6	RER Undervaluation - GCC vs. Populous Arab Oil	
	Economies	61
3.7	Government Effectiveness in Arab Oil and Comparator	
	Countries	68
3.8	Regulatory Quality in the Arab Oil and Comparator	
	Economies (2012)	68
4.1	Services Value-added Growth and GDP Growth in the Arab	
	Region	85
4.2	Composition of Exports in the Arab Region and South	
	Asia, 2008.	86
4.3	Changes in the Composition of GDP: 1980-1983 to	
	2007–2010	87
4.4	Services Share in GDP by Level of Income	87
4.5	Services Share in GDP, Arab World vs. Rest of the World	88
4.6	Share of Services in Non-mining GDP	89
4.7	Share of Consumption of Services in GDP (%)	90
4.8	Share of Imported Services in GDP (%)	91
4.9	Restrictiveness of Services Trade Policies and Share of	
	Services in GDP, Arab Region, GCC and other Regions	96
5.1	The Extensive Form of the Game between the Elite and	
	Citizens	111
5.2	The Extensive Form of the Game between the Elite and	
	Citizens When the Elite Have an Option to Form a State	
	Security Apparatus that Removes the Option of Citizens to	
	Revolt	115
5.3	The Optimal Policy of the Elite as R/N Increases	117
5.4	Resource Rent Per Capita Across the Globe (In Current US	
	Dollars: Average 2000–2007)	119
5.5	The Income and Resource Rents Scatter	124
5.6	The Extensive Form of the Game between the Elite and	
	Citizens with Imperfect Repression	132
7.1	Scatter of Political Variables Average 1975-2009	212
8.1	Selected Countries: Government Budget Transparency and	
	Accountability, 2010	237
8.2	Transparency of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 2011	238
8.3	Chile: Trend GDP Growth and Output Gap Projection by	
	MoF in 2010, 1990–2015 (%)	248
8.4	Chile: Committee's Projections, Average Actual Future GDP	
	Growth and Actual GDP Growth, 2002-2010 (%)	249



> ix **Figures** 8.5 Chile: Committee's Projected Copper Price, Average Actual Copper Price and Actual Copper Price, 2001–2011 250 Chile: Actual and Cyclically Adjusted Central Government 8.6 Balance, 1990-2010 (Ratios to GDP, %) 252 Chile: Central Government Expenditure and Revenue, 8.7 1990-2010 (Ratios to GDP, %) 253 Chile: Central Government Revenue and Expenditure Growth Rates, 1991-2010 (%) 253 Chile: Government Revenue, 2005-2010 (Ratio to 8.9 GDP, %) 254 8.10 Chile: Gross Assets, Gross Liabilities and Net Assets of the Government, 1990–2010 (Ratios to GDP, %) 256 8.11 Chile: Sovereign Risk Measures: International Country Risk Guide Index and EMBI Spread, 1990-2010 256 8.12 Chile: Government Foreign Assets Held in CRCF, ESSF and PRF, 2001-2010 (Ratios to GDP, %) 260 8.13 Chile: Current International Portfolio Composition of Sovereign Wealth Funds (PRF and ESSF) and Recommended Composition for PRF (%) 261 8.14 Norway: Past (1970-2010) and Projected (2011-2030) Oil Production 267 8.15 Norway: Government Budget and Pension Fund Performance 271 8.16 Norway: Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) Investment Portfolio, 1997–2011 (Ratio to GDP, %) 273 8.17 Norway: Government Pension Fund Norway (GPFN) Investment Portfolio, 1997–2011 (Ratio to GDP, %) 274 11.1 Natural Resource Rents, Percent of GDP 1970-2011 328 11.2 Natural Resource Rent Per Capita (Current US\$) 330 11.3 Structure of Value-added and Exports, 2011 or 2012 331 11.4 Percent of Total Fiscal Revenues, Average (1992–2012) 331 11.5 Hydrocarbon Revenues during Booms and Busts, 1998 and 2008, Percent of GDP 332 11.6 Fiscal Balances, 1992-2012 (Average), Percent of GDP 333 11.7 Fiscal Balances during Booms and Busts, 1998 and 2008, Percent of GDP 333 11.8 Natural Resources and Freedom House Scores, 2013 335 11.9 Natural Resource Rents and Long-run GDP Per Capita

Growth, Average 1981-2011

341



x Figures

11.10	Natural Resource Rents and Volatility of GDP Per Capita Growth, 1981–2011	341
11.11	Employment of Non-nationals in the Private Sector, Share	311
	in Total Private Sector Employment	345
11.12	Manufacturing and Rents, 1980–2011	346
	Manufactures Exports and Rents, 1980–2011	347
	Value-added Manufacturing (Percent of GDP)	347
11.15	Manufactures Exports (% of Merchandise Exports), 1975 and 2011	348
11.16	Hydrocarbons Rents and Public Consumption, Percent of GDP, 1980–2011	350
11.17	Hydrocarbons Rents and Domestic Investments,	
11 10	1980–2011	351
	Hydrocarbons Rents and Financial Sector Development, 1980–2011	352
11.19	Loan-to-Deposit Ratios in Resource-rich Arab Countries, 1980–2011	353
11.20	Marginal Effect of Natural Resources Rents with Political Institutions on Growth	359
11.21	Country Correlations between the Cyclical Components of	361
11 22	Real Government Spending and Real GDP, 1970–2012	301
11.22	Composition of Public Spending in 2008 and 2009, Percent of GDP	362
12 1	UAE: Real GDP (at PPP Prices)	383
12.2	UAE: Share of Oil in GDP, Exports and Government	303
12.2	Revenues	385
12.3	UAE: Real GDP, Capital Stock and Employment	
	(1975 = 100)	387
12.4	Average Labor Productivity (Real GDP per Worker)	388
12.5	UAE: GDP per Worker and Total Factor Productivity	
	(Normalized so that $1975 = 100$ )	391
12.6	UAE: Total Factor Productivity by Economic Sector	392
12.7	UAE: Overall Fiscal Balance (% of GDP) and Non-oil Real	
	GDP Growth (%)	397
12.8	UAE: Consolidated Government Revenue and Oil Price	398
12.9	UAE: Real Effective Exchange Rate (Normalized	
	2000 = 100)	401
12.10	UAE: Value-added, Employment and Average Labor	
	Productivity in the Public Sector (Normalized	
	1988 = 100)	404



	Figures	xi
12.11	Total Factor Productivity in the Non-oil Sectors of Abu	
	Dhabi and Dubai (Normalized 1988 =100)	411
13.1	Real GDP Growth, Inflation 1960-2010	425
13.2	Exports, Imports and FDI Net Flows 1970-2010	426
13.3	Contribution of Oil and Cotton to Exports and Oil GDP	
	1996–2010	427
13.4	Per Capita Income 1996–2010	427
13.5	Non-oil Exports, Crops Exports and RER Overvaluation	
	1996–2010	428
13.6	Quantity of Cotton Exported and Free Market Price	
	1980–2010	428
13.7	Agricultural Exports 1970–2010	429
13.8	Non-oil GDP: Contribution to Growth 1999–2010	430
13.9	Oil and Non-oil Revenues (Percent of GDP) 1999-2010	431
13.10	Tax, Non-tax and Oil Revenue (Percent GDP)	
	1970–2010	431
13.11	Government Expenditure (Percent of GDP) 1999–2010	432
13.12	The Budget Position (Percent of GDP) 1999–2020	433
13.13	Oil Price Index 1999–2010	433
13.14	GDP, Non-oil GDP Growth and Ratio of Expending to	
	Revenue 1998–2010	434
13.15	Cyclical Revenue, Expenditure and Output for Sudan	
	1970–2010	448
13.16	Cochrane's Variance Ratio (Several Samples)	452





### Tables

2.1	Countries and Regions in the GVAR Model	
	Including MENA	page 19
2.2	MENA Trade Weights	24
2.3	Variables Specification of the Country-specific VARX*	
	Models	27
3.1	Industrial Performance in Developing Regions (2005)	51
3.2	The Long and Short-run Determinants of the Real	
	Exchange Rate	58
3.3	Resource Rents, RER Undervaluation and Manufacturing	
	Exports (1980–2011)	64
3.4	Resource Rents, RER Undervaluation and Exports	
	Sophistication of Goods (1980–2011)	66
3.5	Resource Rents, RER Undervaluation and Exports	
	Concentration (1980–2011)	67
3.6	HP-gap RER Undervaluation and Export Performance	
	(1980–2011)	69
4.1	Share of Rents from Natural Resources in GDP%	92
4.2	Correlates of the Share of Services in GDP	93
4.3	Determinants of the Services Share in GDP	94
5.1	Public Wage and Correlates in Resource-rich and other	
	Countries	105
5.2	Public Sector Employment vs. Political Repression (Annual	
	Average: 2000–2007)	106
5.3	Probability of Regime Change (Full Sample)	123
5.4	Probability of Regime Change (Restricted Sample: Initial	
	Polity ≤6)	125

xiii



xiv Tables

5.5	Public Sector Wages Per Capita (Log_pw_pc) (Full Sample)	128
5.6	Public Sector Wages Per Capita (Log_pw_pc) (Restricted	
	Sample: Initial Polity $\leq 6$ )	130
A.1	Definition of Variables	140
A.2	Data Summary (1970–2007)	141
A.3	Public Wage and Resource Rents by Country (1970–2007):	
	In Real PPP Dollars	142
A.4	Probability of Regime Change (Full Sample)	146
6.1	Saudi Arabia: Summary Economic Indicators	155
6.2	Saudi Arabia: Fiscal Indicators (2003–2010 Averages)	156
6.3	Saudi Arabia: Demographic Characteristics	163
6.4	Saudi Arabia: Labor Force Characteristics	165
6.5	Saudi Arabia: Saudi and Non-Saudi Employment and	
	Unemployment, 2007–2009	167
6.6	Saudi Arabia: Unemployment Rates and Shares of Saudi and	
	Non-Saudi Workers in Saudi, Non-Saudi and Total Labor	
	Force by Age Group, 2009	168
6.7	Saudi Arabia: Private Sector and Government Sector	
	Employment Growth and Shares	170
6.8	Saudi Arabia: Composition of Private Sector Employment by	
	Occupation, 2008–2009 Average	171
6.9	Saudi Arabia: Weighted Average Monthly Salaries in Private	
	Sector, 1996–2010	173
6.10	Saudi Arabia: Weighted Average Government Sector	
	Compensation, 2005–2010	175
6.11	Saudi Arabia: Higher Education Degrees Obtained by Saudi	
	Males and Females, 2007-2009, and, Saudi Educational	
	Preferences, 2010	177
7.1	Econometric Results: Long-run Growth Determinants	
	Dependent Variable: Real GDP Per Capita	201
7.2	Econometric Results: Testing for Cross-country Correlations	208
7.3	Econometric Results: Long-run Growth Determinants	
	Allowing for Common Correlated Effects	210
7.4	Estimated Long-run Effect of Resource Rents on Economic	
	Growth Allowing for Common Correlated Effects	213
7.5	Democracy, Checks and Balances as Indicators of Credibility	
	and Intertemporal Commitments	215
7.6	Econometric Results: Long-run Growth Determinants	
	Allowing for Transmission Channels Low Democracy and	
	Low Checks and Balances	217



Tables xv

8.1	Central Government Accounts, Growth and Copper Price,	
	1990-2010	244
8.2	Correlations between Committee Forecasts and Actual	
	Variables, 1990–2011	251
8.3	Correlations between Government Budget Variables, GDP	
	Growth and Copper Price, 1990–2010 and Sub-periods	255
8.4	Correlations between Macroeconomic Variables, 1990–2010	
	(Quarterly Data)	258
8.5	Gross Foreign Assets of the Central Government by Funds,	
	2000–2011 (US\$ m.)	259
8.6	Asset Composition (%) and US\$ Returns (%) of Selected	
	Sovereign Wealth Funds, 2007–2010	262
8.7	Norway: Average Rates of Return on GPGF and GPFN	
	Investment Portfolios, 1998–2010 (%)	273
10.1	Natural Resources Abundance and Export Diversification in	
	the Arab Region	304
10.2	Selected Indicators of the Arab Region	305
A.1		
	Exchange Rate Regimes and Different Nominal Wage	
	Indexation	319
11.1	Proven Oil Reserves and Production, 2013	326
	Proven Natural Gas Reserves and Production, 2013	327
	Basic Statistics	329
	Government Revenues and Expenditures in Selected	
	Resource-rich Arab Countries, Averages 1997–2012,	
	Percent	338
11.5	Long-term Per Capita GDP Growth in Resource-rich Arab	
	Economies, 1981–2011	342
11.6	Selected Macroeconomic Indicators during Booms	
	and Busts	342
11.7	Deviations from Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate,	
	1975–2005, Percent	344
11.8	Empirical Results of the Growth Equation	356
	Empirical Results of the Growth Equation	357
	Average Natural Resource Rents (As Share of GDP,	
	Percent)	378
12.2	Real GDP Annual Growth Rate (%)	384
	UAE: Annual Earnings and Hours of Work in Different	
	Sectors in 2008	402
12.4	UAE: Economic Indicators by Emirate, 2009	408



xvi Tables

12.5	Average Annual GDP Growth Rate by Economic Sectors in	
	Each Emirate, 1997–2009	409
13.1	Growth Accounting Decomposition for Sudan 1961–2010	444
13.2	Aggregate Revenue and Expenditure Out-turns Compared to	
	Original Approved Budget	446
13.3	Causality Test Based on ECM	449
13.4	Forecast Error Variance from Revenue and Expenditure	
	Equations PP-period Ahead	450
13.5	Budget Allocation by Selected Spending Categories	453



### Contributors

Omer Ali, University of California, Los Angeles

Hend Al-Sheikh, Institute of Public Administration, Saudi Arabia

Paul Cashin, International Monetary Fund

Paul Collier, Oxford University

Ndiamé Diop, The World Bank

**Ibrahim Elbadawi**, Dubai Economic Council and Economic Research Forum

S. Nuri Erbas, International Monetary Fund

Ilham Haouas, Abu Dhabi University

Linda Kaltani, International Monetary Fund

Jaime de Melo, University of Geneva

Kamiar Mohaddes, University of Cambridge

Mehdi Raissi, International Monetary Fund

Almukhtar Saif Al-Abri, Sultan Qaboos University

Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, Catholic University of Chile

Hoda Selim, Economic Research Forum

Raimundo Soto, Catholic University of Chile

Kabbashi M. Suliman, University of Khartoum

Chahir Zaki, Cairo University

xvii





#### Foreword

One of the most distinguishing features of the Arab region is its endowment with tremendous hydrocarbon wealth. The magnitude of resource rents, that is, the difference between revenues and extraction costs, was estimated in 2012 at around US\$892 billion annually, or around a third of the Arab region's GDP. With such resources, the region has the opportunity to invest in the future and join the advanced world. But, as many would argue, this outcome is not inevitable and there is a real fear of the so-called natural resource curse. This volume contributes to this debate with a view to "avoiding the natural resource curse" in natural-resource-rich Arab countries.

The literature dealing with the "resource curse" has evolved over time. The initial interpretation of the curse was derived from economics, arguing that large resource windfalls lead to, among other ills, Dutch Disease, overall macroeconomic volatility and debt overhang. This explanation fell short of explaining the successful economic performance of developed countries like Norway, the world's seventh largest oil exporter and fourteenth largest oil producer and that of Chile, an emerging country, the world's biggest producer and exporter of copper. Capitalizing on its riches, Chile has succeeded in diversifying its economy and reducing poverty levels to a historic minimum. In comparison to the experiences of Chile and Norway, the economic performance of most resource-rich Arab countries has been much less impressive, to say the least. The question is, why? Or rather, what is so different about the Arab region that has prevented it from benefiting from its abundant natural resources?

To address this question, the work in this volume was initiated by the editors as part of a broader research agenda by the Economic Research Forum on different countries in the region. The volume comprises the work of a group of distinguished scholars. Topics include typical economic



xx Ahmed Galal

concerns, such as the impact of natural resources on the region's business cycle, Dutch Disease and the impact of real exchange rate adjustment on growth and economic diversification. It also includes discussions of the labor markets in Arab countries, which act as a mechanism for state patronage through the provision of well remunerated public jobs to nationals, particularly in the GCC countries.

Equally important, this volume helps dispel the myth of the resource curse as an economic phenomenon. This volume's most powerful message is that the resource curse in the Arab region, to the extent that it does exist, is rooted in the quality of institutions, both political and economic. In a context where governments do not face significant restraints on their power and enjoy ample access to rents, it is not surprising that some rulers may use the rents to further private ends at the expense of the social good, ultimately leading to a lack of sustainable development.

To be sure, the abundance of natural resources in the region, over the past eighty years or so, has brought about economic growth, improvements in the standards of living, large savings, significant reserves and external surpluses. Thanks to oil money, many governments have also embarked on massive investment programs in basic infrastructure. However, "avoiding the oil curse" and achieving sustainable development remain far from being achieved. I hope this book will allow us to make significant strides toward the achievement of these objectives.

**Ahmed Galal** 



## Acknowledgments

The achievement of this work would not have been possible without the contribution and support of many people whom we have had the honor and pleasure to collaborate with during the past few years.

The research presented in this volume was initially conceived as part of a broader research agenda on natural resources and economic diversification. The editors are deeply grateful for the guidance of eminent colleagues who helped refine this research agenda and our thinking about the oil curse in the Arab World. They include Hasan Ersel, Mustapha Nabli, Lant Pritchett, Khalid Sekkat, James Robinson, Nisreen Salti, Nadeem Ul-Haque and Anthony Venables. Our profound appreciation goes to Ahmed Galal, ERF's Managing Director, who through his intellectual leadership, wise counsel, encouragement and guidance helped shape this work.

We would like to warmly acknowledge the hard work of the contributors who give this volume its real value. Although each is credited with their own chapters, we are indebted to all of them for their timely response to our feedback and deadlines and patient work to bring this volume into existence.

Moreover, we would like to thank three anonymous referees who reviewed our proposal submitted to Cambridge University Press (CUP). We truly believe that their excellent comments contributed to improving the overall structure of the volume and final output.

Drafts of the chapters in this volume were presented in a workshop held in Cairo and disseminated in a large policy conference held in Kuwait. The chapters benefited greatly from the comments and suggestions provided by discussants and participants, who generously gave their time and expertise. In particular, we recognize several distinguished individuals whose views were of critical value. They include Rania Al-Mashat, Rabah Arezki, Sambit Bhattacharyya, David Cobham, Mahmoud El-Gamal, Alan Gelb,



xxii Ibrahim Elbadawi and Hoda Selim

Thorvaldur Gylfason, Clement Henry and Ragnar Torvik. The editors are extremely appreciative of the generous organizational efforts extended by the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD) in Kuwait, which proved critical in making the policy conference a success.

We are also deeply grateful to CUP, particularly Karen Maloney and Kate Gavino, who provided excellent advice throughout. Our warm thanks are also addressed to Mahmoud El-Gamal at Rice University for having introduced us to CUP.

Last but not least, we are deeply grateful to the ERF family, especially Hoda Azmi and Namees Nabil for well-organized events, as well as to Yasmine Fahim for her tireless support and advice. In particular, we thank Jala Youssef for help with revising the proof edits and Namees for coordinating the overall publication process with CUP. Mohamed Youssri and Sherif Ossama were invaluable on financial management behind the scenes.

The research presented in this publication is the outcome of an ERF project that benefited from the financial support of the AFESD and the World Bank – within the context of the Research Initiative for Arab Development (RIAD) – support without which this work would never have materialized.