Introduction

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I

Kant's German contemporaries – those philosophers and intellectuals active in the German-speaking lands of Europe[1] throughout the eighteenth century – participated in a formative but extraordinarily consequential period in the history of German philosophy. Even limiting ourselves to the time between the death of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and the publication of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, this period saw the clash between Christian Wolff and the Pietists, which brought distinctively Modern philosophical concerns such as the opposition of freedom and necessity, the limits of reason, the challenge of Spinozism and the freedom to philosophize to the forefront of the academic debate. It saw the first systematic treatment of aesthetics by Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, and the first textbooks devoted to anthropology and psychology published in any language. Moreover, it included multifaceted thinkers who made contributions of enduring significance to a variety of fields, such as Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Moses Mendelssohn and Johann Gottfried Herder. When we 'fill out' this picture of German thought in the eighteenth century with figures as original and widely influential as Johann Georg Sulzer, Johann Heinrich Lambert, Johann Joachim Winckelmann, Hermann Samuel Reimarus and Johann Georg Hamann, to name but a few, we begin to get a sense of its enormous intellectual richness, vigour and importance.

Given this, it is hard to believe that Kant-scholars, particularly in the Anglo-American tradition, have not always believed that an understanding

[1] For ease of reference, in what follows we will designate these lands (particularly the various states, territories and cities composing the Holy Roman Empire) merely as 'Germany'. It should also be noted that we number among Kant's 'German' contemporaries thinkers who, even if they were not native to Germany so understood, were nonetheless active in German philosophical circles. Nor should the reference to a German 'tradition' in the eighteenth century be taken to imply that there is a single, unified approach to, or doctrine regarding, philosophical issues among these figures, since, as will become clear, this was certainly not the case.

of these figures bears some relevance for our understanding of Kant's thought. This is due, in part, to the dismissive treatment of post-Leibnizian German philosophy itself, an attitude that goes (at least) as far back as G. W. F. Hegel. In his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, for instance, Hegel mocks Wolff's alleged syncretism of Leibnizian principles with crude observation, which approach is baldly contrasted with that of the 'popular philosophers' who are said to have elevated 'natural feelings and sound human understanding' into a philosophical principle.[2] Yet it is also the case that some of these figures were lost in the long shadow cast by Kant's Critical philosophy, which, after all, inaugurated the period of 'classical German philosophy', a phrase that appears to banish the antecedent tradition into a sort of pre-historical status. Indeed, a number of otherwise dynamic thinkers from this period, including Johann August Eberhard, Johann Christian Lossius, Ernst Platner, Johann Georg Heinrich Feder and Christoph Meiners, seem to have paid a high historical price for their outspoken opposition to Kant.[3] Yet it was not only insofar as this tradition and its representatives were directly displaced by the extraordinary success of Kant's thought that their historical significance was obscured, but also indirectly, insofar as the Kantian philosophy (and its adherents) exerted an influence upon the historiography of Modern philosophy itself. The work of thinkers such as Lambert and Johann Nikolaus Tetens, which conscientiously sought to incorporate British-influenced observational and experimental approaches within German rationalistic metaphysics and epistemology, did not fit neatly into the narrative advanced by Kantian historians in particular, which divided the pre-Kantian philosophical debate into warring rationalist and empiricist camps, the better to retrospectively prepare the way for Kant's own novel synthesis.[4] As a result, the contributions

[2] *Lectures on the History of Philosophy (1825–6)* vol. III, pp. 202–6.

[3] This is particularly evident in historical treatments by Neo-Kantians; thus Erdmann writes against the Göttingen critics of Kant: 'The abuse which Meiners, a naïve poly-historian through and through, eventually ventures against Kant in the introduction to his *Psychology*, is downright and excessively crude and foolish' (Erdmann, *Kant's Kriticismus*, p. 105, referring to the introduction to Meiners' *Grundriß der Seelenlehre*), and he likewise charges Eberhard, Lossius and Platner with 'incredible naïvity' (p. 103f). One might also compare Karl Vorländer's judgement that 'the school-philosophers *Feder* and *Meiners* were incapable of grasping the depth of the new philosophy' (*Immanuel Kant*, vol. 1, pp. 415–16). It bears noting that, for his part, Erdmann, in his *Martin Knutzen und seine Zeit*, lamented the dearth of historical work on Kant's philosophy that goes beyond an analysis of the pre-Critical writings, with the discussion of Knutzen in that work constituting a landmark contribution in this respect.

[4] This is a theme of, for instance, recent work by Alberto Vanzo; see 'Kant on Empiricism and Rationalism' and 'Empiricism and Rationalism in Nineteenth-Century Histories of Philosophy'.

by these figures towards the development of German philosophy in this period, and even their anticipations of Kant's 'revolutionary' project, were frequently dismissed as unsophisticated, unsystematic and mere 'eclecticism'.[5]

These historical and philosophical factors, as well as other, more mundane obstacles (including linguistic considerations, but also the limited availability of the texts themselves in a pre-digital era), meant that Anglo-American Kant-scholars frequently attempted to make sense of Kant's philosophical contributions without the benefit of the thinkers and debates that provided the conditions for its development and (particularly in the case of his German-language works) its primary audience. Such a decontextualization, though radical, was nonetheless thought to find a foundation of sorts in Kant's own conception of his mature project. So, while it may have been conceded that Kant's pre-Critical works betrayed the peculiar interests and engaged in the esoteric debates that preoccupied German academics while he laboured under their shared dogmatist yoke, the works of the Critical period are to be distinguished by Kant's conscientious casting-off of the burden of dogmatic thinking and the adoption of a radically new perspective from which he could offer novel solutions to the enduring problems of philosophy. With this in mind, that Kant should be taken to address the *minores* among his predecessors would be beneath the dignity of his monumental philosophical achievement. Indeed, the thinkers of the Leibnizian-Wolffian tradition have borne much of the brunt of this attitude, as is perhaps most evident in Jonathan Bennett's characterization of Wolff as 'a second-rate mind' who is regrettably 'interposed, as a distorting glass or a muffling pillow, between the two great geniuses of German philosophy', and for the sake of a more philosophically interesting comparison with Leibniz (and others) he proposes to 'ignore Wolff and write as though Kant's only Leibnizian source were Leibniz'.[6] Of course, one does not need to think that Wolff or any of

[5] See, for instance, Kuno Fischer's *Immanuel Kant und seine Lehre*, where Wolff is labelled an eclectic for making Leibniz's principles conformable to experience (pp. 29ff), and where this inspires subsequent German thinkers, such as Lambert and Tetens, 'who are openly eclectic in their attempt to combine German metaphysics with English empiricism, Leibniz with Newton and Locke, and Wolff with the English deists and moral philosophers and with Shaftesbury and Rousseau' (p. 32). Hans Vaihinger argues even more forcefully along these lines, as he claims that the second half of the eighteenth century saw misleading 'compromises' between rationalism and empiricism, which Vaihinger deems philosophically untenable. Disgusted by this eclecticism, Kant apparently returned to Leibniz and Hume, according to Vaihinger, and 'ignored his irresolute [*halbschlächtigen*] contemporaries' (Vaihinger, *Commentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, vol. 1, p. 5).

[6] The quote is from Bennett, *Kant's Dialectic*, p. 6. Bennett, of course, is by no means alone in thus rejecting the philosophical or historical relevance of the eighteenth-century context; see, for instance,

Kant's contemporaries were 'first-rate' minds in order to accept that they are important for understanding Kant's views, much less for an adequate appraisal of Kant's relation to Leibniz. The worry might, in any case, have been (and likely continues to be for some) that the few and, at best, modest dividends yielded would hardly justify the time spent mastering the often obscure and frequently voluminous works of Kant's contemporaries.

Recent decades, however, have seen a rapid increase in the publication of English-language studies that show this concern to be thoroughly misplaced. Of course, any attempt to understand Kant within his proximate intellectual context owes, at the very least, a spiritual debt to Lewis White Beck's masterly *Early German Philosophy: Kant and His Predecessors* (1969), which thoroughly situated Kant's philosophy within the entire compass of pre- and early Modern German thought. Its undeniable importance notwithstanding, Beck's vision of German philosophy, particularly in the eighteenth century, as developing in a gradual teleological arc towards Kant's thought, where Kant discerned clearly and distinctly that which was grasped only obscurely or confusedly by his predecessors, ultimately meant that it served as a jumping-off point (albeit an indispensable one) for subsequent studies that sought to investigate Kant's engagement with his contemporaries with a more charitable eye. Following Beck, Manfred Kuehn's *Scottish Common Sense in Germany, 1768–1800* (1987) not only made the case for Kant's thorough engagement with Scottish critics of Hume, but also drew new attention to the complexity and distinctiveness of the German intellectual context in the second half of the eighteenth century. In his subsequent *Kant: A Biography* (2001), Kuehn likewise explored the distinctive intellectual context of Königsberg in an effort to determine the extent to which the various traditions represented there – particularly Wolffianism, Pietism and Aristotelianism – impacted his thinking.

With the case for the general importance of contemporary German thought for understanding Kant having been made, the door was opened for more focused examinations of the relevance of these thinkers to specific topics in Kant's philosophy. After the publication of important studies that acknowledged the utility of this tradition for understanding the major

W. H. Walsh, who likewise dismisses Wolff and Baumgarten as 'second-rate thinkers' (*Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics*, p. 177). Nor is this attitude absent from the most recent secondary literature on Kant, as is evidenced in Waxman's *Kant's Anatomy of the Intelligent Mind* (see pp. 66–9), and it (or an even more radical version thereof) arguably finds a new basis in Graham Bird's rejection of 'traditionalist', as opposed to 'revolutionary', readings of Kant (see the introduction to his *The Revolutionary Kant*).

arguments of Kant's first *Critique*,[7] the first decade and a half of this millennium has seen the publication of a number of English-language monographs that have explored Kant's engagement with the German tradition with respect to his pre-Critical works, his anthropology, his metaphysics of causation, his account of the cognitive subject, his philosophy of biology and his criticism of rational psychology, as well as an English translation of a number of key works from this tradition.[8] This late boom in scholarship serves as a welcome supplement to the substantial German-language scholarship in this area, which has likewise seen renewed interest, particularly from the second half of the last century onward,[9] and to these can be added a number of recent studies (in a variety of languages) that have considered aspects of this tradition without an exclusive (or even primary) focus on its relevance for Kant's thought.[10]

The present volume represents an attempt to advance and extend the interest in Kant's various intellectual relationships with his contemporaries. For the sake of the detailed discussions to follow, it will be useful to introduce these figures (though a number have been mentioned already)

[7] In particular, Hatfield's *The Natural and the Normative* (1990); Friedman's *Kant and the Exact Sciences* (1992); Laywine, *Kant's Early Metaphysics* (1993); Tonelli's *Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason' within the Tradition of Modern Logic* (1994); and Longuenesse's *Kant and the Capacity to Judge* (2001) (a translation of her *Kant et le pouvoir de juger* [1996]).

[8] In order: Schönfeld, *The Philosophy of the Young Kant* (2000); Zammito, *Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology* (2002); Watkins, *Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality* (2005); Kitcher, *Kant's Thinker* (2011); Mensch, *Kant's Organicism: Epigenesis and the Development of Critical Philosophy* (2013); Dyck, *Kant and Rational Psychology* (2014); and Watkins, *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: Background Source Materials* (2009).

[9] Here, of course, one might cite Ernst Cassirer's *Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie*, vol. 2 (1907) and Max Wundt's *Die deutsche Schulphilosophie im Zeitalter der Aufklärung* (1945). Among the texts from the latter half of the last century that might be listed here are the numerous contributions of Giorgio Tonelli (including 'Elementi metodologici e metafisici in Kant' [1959], 'Der Streit über die mathematische Methode' [1959] and 'Der historische Ursprung der kantischen Termini "Analytik" und "Dialektik"' [1962]); Norbert Hinske (e.g., *Ich handle mit Vernunft. Moses Mendelssohn und die europäische Aufklärung*, ed. Hinske [1981], *Kant und die Aufklärung*, ed. Hinske [1992], *Kant und sein Jahrhundert*, eds. Hinske and Cesa [1993]); Wolfgang Carl's *Der schweigende Kant* (1989); Klemme's *Kants Philosophie des Subjekts* (1996); Schwaiger's *Kategorische und andere Imperative* (1999); Heßbrüggen-Walter's *Die Seele und ihre Vermögen* (2004); Wunderlich's *Kant und die Bewußtseinstheorien des 18. Jahrhunderts* (2005); and Sturm's *Kant und die Wissenschaften vom Menschen* (2009).

[10] Among the most recent are: Beiser, *Diotima's Children: German Aesthetic Rationalism from Leibniz to Lessing* (2009); Thiel, *The Early Modern Subject* (2011); Buchenau, *The Founding of Aesthetics in the German Enlightenment* (2013); Guyer, *A History of Modern Aesthetics, Volume I: The Eighteenth Century* (2014); Rumore, *Materia cogitans. L'Aufklärung di fronte al materialismo* (2013); and the forthcoming *Oxford Handbook of Eighteenth Century German Philosophy*, eds. Beiser and Look. A couple of reference works devoted to this period have also recently been published: *The Bloomsbury Dictionary of Eighteenth Century German Philosophers*, ed. Kuehn and Klemme (new edition, 2015); and *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. Die Philosophie des 18. Jahrhunderts*, vol. 5, eds. Holzhey and Mudroch (2014).

and to briefly account for their connection, direct or otherwise, with Kant's thought. To this end, we might distinguish, broadly, between three groups of contemporaries in terms of their relation to Kant: (1) those who supplied the antecedent background to his thought and its early development (i.e., his immediate *predecessors*); (2) those scholars and academics with whom Kant directly interacted, particularly in his Critical period and, in a number of cases, regarded as the natural audience of his publications (i.e., his *peers*); and (3) those who, either as actual students or merely as intellectual heirs, adopted Kant's thought and undertook to transmit but also to transform it (i.e., his earliest *successors*).

In the first group, Kant's predecessors, belong those German thinkers who contributed to shaping the intellectual context that framed Kant's philosophical (and religious) education and his early publications. Foremost among these is Christian Wolff (1679–1754), the founder of a philosophical system based on broadly Leibnizian foundations, which dominated German intellectual life for the first half of the eighteenth century. While Kant appreciated the spirit of rigour and systematicity that Wolff introduced into German philosophy, and offered praise for his general logic and his project of a universal practical philosophy, he was also clear on the defects of the Wolffian philosophy, which frequently served as a foil for the development of his own views.[11] Wolff's primary intellectual (and indeed political) opposition was supplied by Pietism, a theological movement that gained considerable influence in Prussia, the members of which saw to Wolff's exile in 1723 (though he would return in 1740 at the invitation of Frederick II).[12] While the original Halle Pietists were not primarily philosophers, and the relevance of the movement for the development of Kant's thought (as he was educated in a Pietist institution) has been disputed,[13] a number of later thinkers of distinction and importance for Kant were connected with their movement. Among these are: Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714–62), a Leibnizian thinker and founder of the discipline of aesthetics, whose texts formed the basis for Kant's lectures in metaphysics and ethics and who was himself educated in the famous Pietist orphanage in Halle; Christian August Crusius (1715–75), an important influence upon Kant (and his occasional target), who incorporated a number of core Pietistic concerns in a sophisticated

[11] For these claims, see Bxxxvi and LV, 24:796, respectively.
[12] For an account, see Beck, *Early German Philosophy*, pp. 256–61, though a rather more detailed account is provided by Zeller, 'Wolffs Vertreibung aus Halle'.
[13] See, in particular, Kuehn, *Kant*, pp. 36–41, especially pp. 39–40.

way into his philosophical system; and Martin Knutzen (1713–51), a well-known professor (and one of Kant's teachers) at the University of Königsberg, who wove Pietistic commitments into a broader Wolffian metaphysical framework.

The second and undoubtedly most populous group, that of Kant's peers, consists in those of his contemporaries with whom he either had direct contact (in person or through correspondence) or whose work and reputation Kant was familiar with, such that they likely constitute part of the intended audience for his philosophical works. Kant's engagement with the members of this group takes various forms. In some, and indeed the most important cases, they exert a direct and positive influence on his thinking. Particularly significant here are: Johann Heinrich Lambert (1728–77), a polymath and author of two influential philosophical works, with whom Kant corresponded on topics of central importance for his developing thought (and to whom it appears Kant had originally intended to dedicate the first *Critique*[14]); Moses Mendelssohn (1729–86), the leading figure of the Jewish Enlightenment and author of (among other texts) highly influential treatments of metaphysics, aesthetics and political philosophy; and Johann Nikolaus Tetens (1736–1807), whose principal philosophical work (*Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre Entwicklung* [1777]) reportedly lay open on Kant's desk as he laboured on the first *Critique*.[15]

Others among Kant's peers may not have exerted such a profound influence on his mature philosophical work, but Kant was certainly aware of their contributions in specific areas, and his own philosophical positions frequently relate and respond to theirs in various ways. Among the many that might be mentioned here, we might note: Leonhard Euler (1707–83), the famous Swiss mathematician, a high-profile member of the Prussian Royal Academy of Sciences and a leading critic of the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy; Georg Friedrich Meier (1718–77), a loyal expositor of Baumgarten's philosophy and an original thinker in his own right, whose logic textbook Kant used (thoroughly, by one account[16]); Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752–1840), an anthropologist and generation theorist whose work informed Kant's aims in the third *Critique*;[17] and

[14] For the draft dedication to Lambert, see R 5024 (18:64).

[15] This report is contained in Hamann's letter to Herder from 17 May 1779 (see Johann Georg Hamann, *Briefwechsel,* vol. 4, p. 81).

[16] See the passage related in Kuehn, *Kant*, p. 358.

[17] Kant admits this in his letter to Blumenbach of 5 August 1790 (Corr, 11:184–5), though for discussion of its significance, see Mensch's contribution to this volume.

Ernst Platner (1744–1818), a 'philosophical doctor' and author of one of the first textbooks in anthropology. Lastly within this group of peers are to be numbered Kant's earliest critics, among the most active of whom were: Johann Georg Hamann (1730–88), a part of Kant's social circle in Königsberg and a highly original if abstruse thinker in his own right, and author of the first 'metacritique' of Kant's Critical philosophy; Christian Garve (1742–98) a philosopher and translator held in high regard by many, including Kant himself,[18] who, along with the eclectic philosopher Johann Georg Heinrich Feder (1740–1821),[19] authored the first (and since notorious) review of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*; and Johann August Eberhard (1739–1809), an ardent defender of Leibniz and one of Kant's most active critics, and among the few to whom Kant offered a detailed (if polemical) response.

The final group of Kant's contemporaries to be considered are his early successors, a group that includes his own students and disciples as well as his closest intellectual heirs. Among the former belong Marcus Herz (1747–1803), Kant's student, chosen respondent to his Inaugural Dissertation, and a sounding-board throughout his philosophical career, who published a number of philosophical works, including an important exposition of Kant's Dissertation; as well as the thinker who was undoubtedly Kant's most famous student, Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803), who made signal contributions to aesthetics, philosophy of language and history, and who, despite (or maybe because of) his remaining a devotee of Kant's pre-Critical thought, was an important opponent of the Critical philosophy. Among those successors who did not study directly under Kant are some of the most important figures in post-Kantian German philosophy. These include Karl Leonhard Reinhold (1757–1823), who made important early contributions to the Critical philosophy and held the first chair in Kantian philosophy, but who came to view that project as radically incomplete; Salomon Maimon (1753–1800), a Lithuanian Jew who was unable to attend Kant's lectures but whose subtle criticism of

[18] See the letter to Herz of 24 November 1776 (Corr, 10:198) and the letter to Garve of 7 August 1783: '*Garve, Mendelssohn* and *Tetens* are the only men I know through whose cooperation this subject could have been brought to a successful conclusion before too long, even though centuries before this one has not seen it done' (Corr, 10:341).

[19] It should be noted that while 'eclecticism' was employed as a derogatory term by Neo-Kantians and later historians, there were of course thinkers who used it in a positive sense, as Feder does when, for instance, he refers to his 'irenic-eclectic method of teaching [*irenisch-eclectische Lehrart*]' (see *J. G. H. Feder's Leben, Natur und Grundsätze*, p. 80). On this one might also consult Zimmerli, 'Schwere Rüstung', pp. 58–71; Albrecht, *Eklektik*; as well as Bacin's contribution to this volume.

transcendental philosophy earned Kant's admiration,[20] and who developed an original, sceptical philosophical perspective in subsequent works; and finally, Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814), one of the major figures in post-Kantian idealism, whose first book was published anonymously with Kant's assistance (and with Kant himself mistaken by many as the author). These, then, are many of the primary figures who formed Kant's intellectual atmosphere, and whose distinguished and often foundational contributions to all areas of philosophical interest ensured that, far from being isolated from the wider intellectual world through his immersion in this context, Kant was rather offered a window on, and a platform for engaging with, some of the most important developments in a variety of areas of philosophical inquiry in the eighteenth century.

II

This volume has a number of aims, the foremost among which is to build on and significantly extend the recent research mentioned in the preceding section in documenting how tightly intertwined Kant's philosophy is with the philosophical efforts of his eighteenth-century contemporaries. Since no single volume, or even pair of volumes, could claim to cover the unsurpassed scope of Kant's Critical philosophy, or indeed do justice to the richness of German thought in this period, the contributions to this volume will focus on a handful of topics in Kant's theoretical and practical philosophy, including issues in logic, metaphysics, epistemology, the history and philosophy of science, and ethics and moral psychology. In this way, we hope to supplement the existing literature on the relationship of Kant's thought to the recognized major figures of early modern philosophy, which includes two recently published volumes devoted to this topic.[21] Given this, it is decidedly *not* our intention to argue for the displacement of all but the German context when considering the development, reception, interpretation or evaluation of Kant's thought, but merely to begin to fill out a large and largely missing part of the existing picture. In addition, it is also an important aim of the volume to reflect the international character of the scholarship on, and interest in, this topic. For this reason, nearly half of the contributions are from scholars based outside of North America and the United Kingdom, with the intention that the

[20] This is evident, for instance, in Kant's letter to Herz of 26 May 1789; see especially Corr, 11:48–9.
[21] *Kant and the Early Moderns*, eds. Garber and Longuenesse (2008); *The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy,* ed. Guyer (2006).

present volume should bring deserved attention to the work of a number of Kant scholars and scholars of the German Enlightenment who do not publish primarily in English.

Each of the following chapters serves to cast light on aspects of Kant's complex relationship with his German contemporaries. Beginning with the first two chapters, which concern the topic of logic, the authors consider Kant's historically less well-received contributions to modern logic, namely his foundation of a transcendental logic and his dismissal of mathematical methods from general logic, and both contend that key misapprehensions concerning each can be addressed by locating his discussions in a more appropriate context. In Chapter 1, Brian A. Chance argues for an important, if largely overlooked, role for Wolff's empirical psychology in Kant's organization of the topics of transcendental logic. In particular, he contends that Kant makes use of a Wolffian conception of purity that is to be distinguished from its better-known connection to apriority in structuring the key divisions in his transcendental logic. In Chapter 2, Huaping Lu-Adler situates Kant's use of circle notation, a usage he likely borrows from Euler, within the context of the active eighteenth-century debate regarding Leibniz's ambitious project of framing a logical calculus. Yet, as she argues, Kant's use of the circle notation departs from the proof-theoretic use that Euler puts it to; rather, for Kant, this notation is employed simply to display the logical form of concepts, the extensions of which are taken to contain objects in general, and where this departure from Euler offers a more satisfying philosophical explanation of the diminished utility of this notation for Kant's mathematics and logic.

Turning to Kant's relationship to his peers and successors on traditional metaphysical issues in Part II, the three chapters show that in spite of some crucial differences, there are nonetheless important continuities between Kant and his contemporaries concerning the account of the knowledge of the self and its unity, the nature of our confidence in the soul's immortality and the division of the faculties. In Chapter 3, Udo Thiel offers a comparison of Tetens's views on the self and its unity with those of Kant. According to Thiel, Tetens attempts to blend broadly 'rationalist' and 'empiricist' approaches in maintaining our knowledge of the self's unity, and while Tetens deploys various notions of and arguments for the unity of the self that find analogues in Kant's later treatment, Thiel notes that an important difference between the two remains inasmuch as Tetens infers from the (merely logical) unity of the self to the substantiality of the soul. In Chapter 4, Corey W. Dyck argues that while Meier is commonly