

## *Introduction: Taking the Democratic Dimensions of Anti-Nuclear Activism*

On 11 July 1974 at Wyhl on the Rhine, a village of some 2,000 inhabitants nestled just north of the renowned vineyards of the Kaiserstuhl Hills, citizens publicly mourned the passing of democracy. Late in the afternoon, as government officials concluded a licensing hearing on a nuclear power plant that the Badenwerk utility company intended to build outside the village, a funeral cortège entered the meeting hall. From their seats on the dais, officials looked on in disbelief as a group of citizens filed past bearing a black coffin marked “DEMOCRACY.” Back on the streets, these mourners paraded solemnly to the village mayor’s home, where they eulogized the deceased. Their observance of democracy’s demise had not been prompted by an authoritarian seizure of power, the suspension of free elections, or any obvious threat to the functions of parliament. Instead, they had been moved to act when officials excluded them from the bureaucratic and technical reactor licensing hearing by suddenly switching off the audience microphones.

Several weeks later, the Reverend Peter Bloch, himself active in the “citizens’ actions” that opposed the reactor project, sent an open letter to the local newspaper explaining what had happened. The pastor began by detailing the “exceptionally dedicated work and . . . substantial sacrifice of money and time” that underpinned the grassroots challenge to the reactor project. Bloch’s flock had gathered tens of thousands of petition signatures, patiently explained their concerns to local officials, and attended numerous hearings and public debates. After such widespread, popular engagement in the licensing process, officials’ sudden, unilateral decision to suspend debate at the 11 July hearing was an affront. Forebodingly, Bloch predicted that, “if the hearing that took place in Wyhl is allowed to serve as an example in our Federal Republic, wide circles of the population will lose their trust in the democratic order of our state.”<sup>1</sup> The mock funeral and

<sup>1</sup> Bloch, “Nicht gegen den Willen der Bevölkerung durchsetzen,” *Badische Zeitung*, 14 August 1974.

Bloch's letter evidenced reactor opponents' complicated relationship with democracy. Paradoxically, they showed their reverence for the democratic order at the same time as they voiced their distrust of long-revered, democratically elected officials.

Not least because of the capricious history of democracy in twentieth century central Europe, the idea that environmental concerns had motivated rural citizens to identify with the democratic system – and that officials' minor abuses of power threatened their trust in that same system – was surprising. After all, there had been no mock funeral in the Upper Rhine valley forty years earlier when democracy was suspended by the National Socialist regime. And though voter turnout was very high in the 1950s and 1960s, suggesting that local people accepted democracy after 1945, going to the polls did not mean that voters saw democratic participation as a means of defending their own interests. Instead, as Claudia Gatzka has recently shown, the practice of going out to vote evidenced West Germans' support for a “quiet, unified, celebratory, worthy,” democracy “that hardly accepted conflict.”<sup>2</sup> So why did plans to build a nuclear reactor motivate Rhenish people to think of the liberal democratic order as the appropriate forum for their conflict with the Badenwerk, and also to proclaim democracy itself as the best means of safeguarding their particular interests?

Though the anti-nuclear movement has been the subject of a great deal of research, this question has gone unanswered because it challenges the way we think about both democracy and environmental activism. In their zeal to classify and explain the social movements of the 1970s, social scientists consistently separated the material protests of workers demanding fair treatment and better social conditions from “post-material” environmental activism, which addressed only quality-of-life issues.<sup>3</sup> The labor movement has been hailed for its role in “forging democracy.”<sup>4</sup> Yet, looking only at the nominal aims of movements dedicated to stopping

<sup>2</sup> Claudia Gatzka, “Des Wahlvolks großer Auftritt. Wahlritual und demokratische Kultur in Italien und Westdeutschland nach 1945,” *Comparativ* 23, no. 1 (2013): 72.

<sup>3</sup> See, for example: Dieter Rucht, “Anti-Atomkraftbewegung” in Roland Roth and Dieter Rucht, eds., *Die Sozialen Bewegungen in Deutschland seit 1945. Ein Handbuch* (Frankfurt/New York: Campus, 2008). William Tucker's *Progress and Privilege* (Garden City, NY: Anchor/Doubleday, 1982) famously claims that environmentalism is a post-material concern of the well-to-do. Though Tucker's thesis has been refuted in various scholarly studies, the idea that “only people in rich countries are concerned about the environment” retains enormous traction, as discussed by Steven Brechin and Willett Kempton in “Global Environmentalism: A Challenge to the Postmaterialism Thesis” in *Social Science Quarterly* 75, no. 2 (June 1994): 245–269.

<sup>4</sup> Geoff Eley, *Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850–2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

nuclear reactors or saving particular neighborhoods from development justified the dismissal of “post-material,” “single issue” movements as selfish and apolitical; it is assumed that they could hardly have had to do with such basic matters as democratic inclusion. Thus, the democratic concerns of the protesters at Wyhl are rarely taken seriously because they were uttered in a rural village, had to do with the way a single nuclear reactor project would impact a handful of remote communities, and seemed far afield from the matters of high politics debated in parliament.

Despite the supposed divergence between democracy and environmental issues, protesters’ sustained engagement in arcane licensing processes, their frequent references to the highhandedness of public officials, and their criticisms of the stagnancy of civic debate all evidenced links between environmental concerns and democratic praxis. These links were made explicit after the July 1974 Wyhl hearing, when protesters mourned democracy’s loss and identified themselves as its unlikely defenders.<sup>5</sup> References to the state of democracy soon became commonplace amongst Rhenish activists. When they occupied the Wyhl construction site in 1975, protesters from Alsace, Baden, and Northwest Switzerland justified the direct action protest by denouncing the state government of Baden-Württemberg as a dictatorship comparable to the Nazi regime or East Germany’s socialist government.<sup>6</sup> In 1977, the Austrian journalist Robert Jungk coined the term “atomic state” to describe this connection between nuclear matters and a sort of creeping abuse of government authority, which limited democracy by asserting that citizens were not equipped to debate nuclear energy and thus unable to govern themselves in an age of high technology.<sup>7</sup> The open-ended, frequently transnational communities’ anti-nuclear activists organized through their protests, by contrast, embodied a sort of grassroots democracy dependent on individuals’ engagement for its very survival. The present study asserts, therefore, that concerns about democracy, which ran like a red thread through Rhine valley anti-reactor protests, enabled that locally rooted movement against nuclear energy to grow

<sup>5</sup> This process has clear parallels to the one Karrin Hanshew has proposed that Germans underwent as they moved to defend West German democracy after it proved itself reformable through its struggle with the Red Army Faction. Hanshew, *Terror and Democracy in West Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

<sup>6</sup> Frederic Mayer, “Ein Elsässer fühlt sich wie im dritten Reich” in Bernd Nössler and Margret de Witt, eds., *Wyhl. Kein Kernkraftwerk in Wyhl und auch sonst nirgends. Betroffene Bürger berichten* (Freiburg: Dreisam Verlag, 1976).

<sup>7</sup> Robert Jungk, *Der Atomstaat: vom Fortschritt in die Unmenschlichkeit* (Munich: Kindler, 1977).

across Western Europe and take on particular resonance in high politics within the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).

One explanation of the relationship between anti-nuclear protest and West German democracy – and its significance – can be found in the assessments of contemporary observers, who saw in environmental activism an enchanting alternative to previous protest movements. Though he initially dismissed anti-reactor protest as too distant from the post-oil shock reality to be taken seriously, the social movements expert Professor Theodor Ebert soon changed his tune, praising the protests against the Wyhl reactor as “the most significant explicitly nonviolent campaign since the founding of the Federal Republic.”<sup>8</sup> His ringing endorsement came despite the issues at stake, since he remained unsure that nuclear energy threatened rural communities’ futures or their inhabitants’ agricultural livelihoods. Ebert was focused instead on the movement’s form and the expansive coalition that participated in it; the same aspects of environmental protest were praised in France by Jean-Paul Sartre, who declared the movement against the expansion of the Larzac military base the “most beautiful struggle of our twentieth century.”<sup>9</sup> These endorsements of environmental protest depended on its position outside politics-as-usual: in effect, on its rejection of standard political praxis. Later analyses noted environmental activists’ affinity for flat organizational structures and participatory processes, reinforcing the perceived separation between hierarchical, formulaic liberal democracy and the beautiful, bottom-up cooperation of environmental activism.<sup>10</sup>

Such emphasis on environmental activism’s alternative forms implies a stark separation between participatory democracy and the liberal democratic, parliamentary systems by which Western European states were governed after 1945. To the extent that environmental protest is linked with liberal democracy at all, the relationship is typically described as a sort of feedback loop. After environmental protests “capture the attention of large publics and occupy prominent media spaces,” they go on to “alter the entire political discourse,” compelling “all the parties . . . to offer solutions

<sup>8</sup> Theodor Ebert, “Als Berliner in Wyhl: Friedensforschung und Konfliktberatung vor Ort,” *Gewaltfreie Aktion*, Nr. 23, 24, 25 (1975). Ebert’s journal *Gewaltfreie Aktion* focused closely on anti-nuclear protests as a potent form of nonviolent action during the mid and late 1970s.

<sup>9</sup> “Jean-Paul Sartre et les paysans du Larzac,” *Libération*, 28 October 1978.

<sup>10</sup> See, for example: Wolfgang Beer, *Lernen im Widerstand. Politisches Lernen und politische Sozialisation in Bürgerinitiativen* (Hamburg: Verlag Association, 1978); Barbara Epstein, *Political Protest and Cultural Revolution: Nonviolent Direct Action in the 1970s and 1980s* (Berkeley: California, 1991); and Michael Hughes, “Civil Disobedience in Transnational Perspective: American and West German Anti-Nuclear-Power Protesters,” *Historical Social Research* 39, no. 1 (2014): 236–253.

to these problems.”<sup>11</sup> But, scholars argue, such broad consensus actually limited the extent of environmentalism’s advance. Far from fundamentally transforming society – not to mention democracy – environmentalism has become yet another problem that could be addressed through technical solutions amenable to mainstream politics. As Michael Bess has shown, France became a “light green society” by the 1990s, where environmental rhetoric was widespread but any impetus for the sort of radical action necessary to solve deep-seated environmental problems was absent.<sup>12</sup> Even in the Federal Republic of Germany, whose newfound identity as “the greenest nation” has been explored by Frank Uekötter, the rapid march of environmental progress was best evident in technical solutions to particular problems, not fundamental changes to political practice, the social order, or democracy.<sup>13</sup>

Perhaps environmentalists’ influence on the fundamental framework of democracy, beyond the introduction of new topics to the platforms of political parties and the widespread acceptance of particular pieces of environmental legislation, is underestimated because it has proven hard to chart. The green parties founded across Western Europe in the 1970s and 1980s are the most frequently cited evidence of a bigger transformation of the political brought about by environmentalists.<sup>14</sup> But like the environmental themes they advocate, green parties are now widely considered purveyors of limited reformist projects, not advocates of fundamental systemic change.<sup>15</sup> In fact, though they were received apprehensively at first, green parties were quickly reconceived as minor additions to existing parliamentary systems, which continued apace.<sup>16</sup> That the West German state, for example, can be said to have “eventually managed to channel [the] new social movements back into regular politics through the foundation of a new [green] political party” suggests that in the FRG,

<sup>11</sup> Rob Burns and Wilfried van der Will, *Protest and Democracy in West Germany: Extra-Parliamentary Opposition and the Democratic Agenda* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1988), 15.

<sup>12</sup> Michael Bess, *The Light Green Society: Ecology and Technology in Modern France, 1960–2003* (Chicago: University of California Press, 2003).

<sup>13</sup> Frank Uekötter, *The Greenest Nation? A New History of German Environmentalism* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014).

<sup>14</sup> This is the approach taken, for example, in Andrei S. Markovits and Philip S. Gorski’s landmark study *The German Left: Red, Green, and Beyond* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

<sup>15</sup> See, for example: Joachim Jachnow, “What’s Become of the German Greens?” *New Left Review* 81 (May–June 2013).

<sup>16</sup> German politicians and the mainstream media, for example, raised alarmist warnings about the Greens during the 1980 and 1983 Bundestag campaigns. See Stephen Milder, “Petra Kelly and the Power of the Green Alternative in the United States,” in Frank Reichherzer, Jan Hansen, and Christian Helm, eds., *Making Sense of the Americas: How Protest Related to America in the 1980s and Beyond* (Frankfurt: Campus, 2015); See also: Chapter 6.

a well-entrenched parliamentary system absorbed a weak extra-parliamentary movement.<sup>17</sup> But this apparent absorption into “regular politics” in the early 1980s came nearly a decade after Rhenish reactor opponents declared their identification with democracy in 1974, and was itself a departure from the alternative, transnational approaches to politics that environmentalists deployed in the mid-1970s. Moreover, the idea that the state itself channeled protest movements back into parliament overlooks the agency of the activists themselves, many of whom were uninterested in helping build new political parties, and hoped instead to realize a hybrid form of participatory democracy that combined extra-parliamentary activism with allegiance to liberal democratic electoral processes and parliamentary rule.

Precisely because it seeks to measure anti-nuclear protest’s democratic impact, therefore, this book emphasizes the years surrounding Rhenish activists’ forceful declaration of their identification with democracy in 1974. In the mid-1970s, I argue, grassroots activists changed the course of democracy’s development in Western Europe. They forced open new debates, engaged new people in politics, and confronted elected officials with their inability to adequately address their concerns about nuclear energy within the liberal democratic order. Western Europe’s green parties, which sought to take up these activists’ mantle in the 1980s, aimed at institutionalizing this challenge by incorporating environmental concerns and the new forms of participation they inspired directly into the parliamentary framework of liberal democracy. It would be incorrect to propose that the Greens had little effect on West German democracy. But it is important not to overlook the achievements and the radical potential of 1970s activism – the point from which many “founding Greens” claimed to depart.<sup>18</sup> The turning point in democracy’s development that these activists caused – what I refer to in this book as the greening of democracy – came as they simultaneously identified with the liberal democratic order and engaged in extra-parliamentary activism. Environmental issues, which motivated this new wave of engagement, proved well-suited to the creation

<sup>17</sup> Konrad Jarausch, *After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans 1945–1995* trans. Brandon Hunziker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 178. In their classic study of the rise of the Greens, *The German Left: Red, Green and Beyond*, Andrei Markovits and Philip Gorski provide much evidence for Jarausch’s point by tracing the roots of the Greens from discontented SPD members to the student movement of the 1960s, through the New Social Movements of the 1970s. Markovits and Gorski, *The German Left* 30. The thesis is also supported in Paul Hockenos’s *Joschka Fischer and the Making of the Berlin Republic: An Alternative History of Postwar Germany* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

<sup>18</sup> The term “founding Greens” was coined by Silke Mende: “*Nicht rechts, nicht links, sondern vorn.*” *Eine Geschichte der Gründungsgrünen* (Munich: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2011), 6.

of links between liberal democratic institutions and extra-parliamentary action precisely because they seemed so distant from democracy matters. Over time, therefore, anti-nuclear activism itself changed the way its protagonists practiced democracy.

### Creating Political Environmentalism, Expanding Democratic Participation

*Greening Democracy* addresses the relationship between environmentalism and democracy in three specific ways in order to show the anti-nuclear movement's radical democratic potential and evaluate the ways it changed democratic praxis in West Germany. First, and most fundamentally, in showing how activists probed the perceived boundary between environmental affairs and high politics, this book challenges the notion that the protest movements of the 1970s were primarily significant as markers of the turn away from meaningful, "material" politics, or as evidence of the disintegration of the mass parties that shaped the mid-twentieth-century political order.<sup>19</sup> Second, by showing the myriad ways in which environmentalists thought beyond political, social, and even geographic boundaries, *Greening Democracy* considers what it means to "think globally and act locally," and questions national politics' absence from this oft-repeated environmentalists' mantra.<sup>20</sup> In so doing, it also emphasizes the importance of conceiving the mid-1970s as a time when new options opened in political activism and democratic praxis. Finally, by studying the larger goals of the broad coalitions built by citizens concerned with particular local environmental problems, like individual nuclear reactor projects, this book reassesses the nature of the social fracturing that is said to epitomize

<sup>19</sup> I am of course in conversation here with Ronald Inglehart, but also authors like Geoff Eley and Tony Judt, who have emphasized the breakdown of mass parties – particularly the mass parties of the working class – after 1968. See: Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977); Geoff Eley, *Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850–2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (New York: Penguin, 2005).

<sup>20</sup> Studies of the 1980s anti-nuclear weapons movement in Germany and the United States by Susanne Schregel and Byron Miller have shown the importance of scales of protest for activists' ability to recruit others to their cause. Michael Foley has made similar arguments for a range of American social movements in the 1970s and 1980s. Schregel, *Der Atomkrieg vor der Wohnungstür. Eine Politikgeschichte der neuen Friedensbewegung in der Bundesrepublik, 1970–1985* (Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 2011); Miller, *Geography and Social Movements: Comparing Anti-nuclear Activism in the Boston Area* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000); Foley, *Front Porch Politics: The Forgotten Heyday of American Activism in the 1970s and 1980s* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2013).

the final third of the twentieth century.<sup>21</sup> In contrast to the hypothesis that the breakdown of the social democratic Left diminished opportunities for meaningful progressive politics, the present study shows that the growing significance of localized and individualized approaches to democratic participation also had the potential to foster new, heterogeneous coalitions and thus to increase inclusion and participation.<sup>22</sup>

### Between Local Environmental Concerns and High Politics

The book begins with the first attempts to “nuclearize” the Upper Rhine in the late 1960s. A close look at protests in the Rhine valley reveals the ways in which grassroots activists developed a new, politicized sort of environmentalism in the 1970s: one capable of probing the boundaries of high politics. Government officials’ efforts to license the construction of a “pearl necklace” of reactors between Basel and Strasbourg motivated protests that crossed national borders and asserted the significance of individuals’ particular concerns for centralized decision-making processes, effectively challenging the limits of high politics. This story runs contrary to the common narrative of environmentalism’s sudden emergence around 1970, which focuses on the growing awareness of environmental problems by international organizations, evidenced in 1972 by the UN’s Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment as well as the publication of the Club of Rome’s *Limits to Growth*.<sup>23</sup> Instead, these grassroots anti-reactor protests built on farmers’ concerns about their crops, and inhabitants’ worries that unchecked nuclear development would cause them to be resettled from their homes in the Rhine valley to the hills of the Black Forest or the Vosges.<sup>24</sup> The protests were carried out by people who remembered well the devastation of the Second World War, and they

<sup>21</sup> Daniel Rodgers, *Age of Fracture* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). Tony Judt and Timothy Snyder suggest a similar trajectory for Western Europe in *Thinking the Twentieth Century* (New York: Penguin, 2012).

<sup>22</sup> On this point I am in agreement with Andrei Markovits, who has proposed the “politics of compassion” as a cypher for the ways in which the post-1968 Left has sought to expand inclusion in democracy – even without the framework for the mass social democratic party. See, for example: Markovits and Katherine N. Crosby, “Introduction,” in *From Property to Family: American Dog Rescue and the Discourse of Compassion* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2014), 1–34.

<sup>23</sup> Thus, the development of environmental awareness at the grassroots level developed along a different track than did the international consciousness of environmental issues described by Kai F. Hünemörder, *Die Frühgeschichte der deutschen Umweltpolitik (1950–1973)* (Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 2004).

<sup>24</sup> In Baden, the concerns were prompted by a 1972 editorial in the state-sponsored *Staatsanzeiger für Baden-Württemberg*, and were linked to local people’s evacuation to the Black Forest during the Second World War. In Alsace, the concerns were based on a plan by Etienne Juillard to create



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followed up on earlier efforts to protect local fisheries in the industrialized Rhine.<sup>25</sup> In this sense, these first anti-reactor protests might be said to follow on the work of pioneering nineteenth-century ecologists and even the local nature protection movements of the postwar “miracle years.”<sup>26</sup>

But there was something new about the environmentalism of the 1970s. Henri Jenn, the first self-proclaimed “ecologist” to run for the National Assembly in France, earned his stripes as an advocate of bird protection before his 1973 campaign. He differentiated between an old “green” ecology concerned with protecting birds and other animals, and a new “grey” environmentalism concerned with questions of pollution.<sup>27</sup> Though attempts to deal with air pollution, in particular, have a history that long predates the 1970s, many historians agree with Jenn that something significant changed in the ways Western Europeans thought about nature and environmental protection around 1970.<sup>28</sup> German historiography juxtaposes the term *Naturschutz*, or the protection of nature, with *Umweltschutz*, or the protection of the environment, to explain this shift.<sup>29</sup> The historian Michael Bess summed up this transformation by describing the emergence of environmentalism in France as the adoption of a “new vision of the human place within nature, a cultural transformation of nearly Copernican proportions.”<sup>30</sup>

This book proposes that grassroots anti-reactor activists themselves – in the very process of building their movement against nuclear energy – changed the meaning of environmentalism, rethinking not only the human place within nature but also nature’s place in politics. At the local

a “French Ruhr” on the Upper Rhine. Elisabeth Schulthess, *Solange l'insoumise: écologie, féminisme, non-violence*, (Barret-sur-Méouge: Y. Michel, 2004) 75. For more on these plans, see Chapter 1.

<sup>25</sup> Balthasar Ehret, “Fischerei am Oberrhein,” in *Wyhl* (see note 6).

<sup>26</sup> See, for example: Raymond Dominick, *The Environmental Movement in Germany: Prophets & Pioneers, 1871–1971* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992); Sandra Chaney, *Nature of the Miracle Years: Conservation in West Germany, 1945–1975* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008); Frank Uekötter, *Naturschutz im Aufbruch Eine Geschichte des Naturschutzes in Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1945–1980* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2004); Jonas Kaesler, “Ein vordringlich europäisches Problem? Industrielle Verschmutzung und die Entstehung saarländischer Umweltproteste im deutsch-französischen Grenzgebiet, 1957–1959,” in Birgit Metzger, Annette Lensing, and Olivier Hanse, eds., *Die Ökologie im linken und rechten Spektrum: Konvergenzen und Divergenzen zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich von 1970 bis heute* (Hamburg: Peter Lang, forthcoming).

<sup>27</sup> Henri Jenn, interview with author. Mulhouse, 21 March 2016.

<sup>28</sup> On histories of attempts to deal with pollution, particularly in German-speaking Central Europe, see: Frank Uekötter, *Umweltgeschichte im 19. Und 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007), 62–63.

<sup>29</sup> Thomas Lekan discusses the meanings of these terms in *Imagining the Nation in Nature: Nature Preservation and German Identity 1885–1945* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 257. Raymond Dominick describes the transformation from *Naturschutz* to *Umweltschutz* in *Prophets and Pioneers*, 138.

<sup>30</sup> Bess, *Light Green Society*, 61.

level, as Rev. Bloch explained in his letter to the *Badische Zeitung*, government officials' tactless responses to popular complaints altered citizens' relationships with the democratic system. The coalescence of personal interests and the democratic order shifted the protection of nature from a local issue to one that affected citizens regardless of their proximity to a particular environmental hazard. At the same time, deep-seated personal transformations, which occurred on account of the anti-reactor struggle and motivated vintners to adopt organic farming techniques and electricians to experiment with solar energy, prompted the turn to a seemingly post-materialist language that made the protection of nature not just a particular local problem but a geographically diffuse social issue. In so doing, the new environmentalism of the 1970s linked specific, local concerns with far-reaching high politics.<sup>31</sup>

### Between Global Thinking and Local Action

The motto “think globally, act locally” has been called the founding myth of the environmental movement.<sup>32</sup> Despite the importance of the emergence of green parties for our understanding of the environmental movement's development, it was no accident that this slogan failed to mention national politics. The path that West German anti-nuclear protesters took down the Rhine from Wyhl to Karlsruhe, where Die Grünen was founded in 1980, therefore, was not nearly as direct as the river's rectified course. Nor was René Dumont's landmark 1974 campaign for the French Presidency evidence that French ecologists thought solely in national terms. Instead, these events revealed the meanderings of anti-nuclear activists in grassroots, transnational, and regional politics. In fact, a whole host of different possibilities for future action opened up as grassroots anti-reactor protests garnered attention across Western Europe in the mid-1970s. Even as activists in parts of France and West Germany formed the insurgent “green” candidates' lists and parties that preceded the national green parties, Die Grünen and Les Verts, many anti-reactor activists remained reticent to formally enter electoral

<sup>31</sup> Chapter 2 considers in far more detail the ways that the growth of the environmental movement opened up the potential for new coalitions at the same time as it contributed to the fracturing of old ones. Susanne Schregel's excellent study of the 1980s peace movement shows, in fact, how the links between individualized local concerns and high politics established by anti-reactor activists in the 1970s were deployed by anti-missile activists in the 1980s. Schregel, *Der Atomkrieg vor der Wohnungstür*.

<sup>32</sup> Brendan Prendiville, *Environmental Politics in France* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 91–93.