This is a fully revised edition of one of the most successful volumes in the Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought series. Incorporating extensive updates to the editorial apparatus, including the introduction, suggestions for further reading, and footnotes, this third edition of More’s *Utopia* has been comprehensively re-worked to take into account scholarship published since the second edition, in 2002. The vivid and engaging translation of the work itself by Robert M. Adams includes all the ancillary materials by More’s fellow humanists that, added to the book at his request, collectively constitute the first and best interpretive guide to *Utopia*. Unlike other teaching editions of *Utopia*, this edition keeps interpretive commentary – whether editorial annotations or the many pungent marginal glosses that are an especially attractive part of the humanist ancillary materials – on the page they illuminate instead of relegating them to end-notes, and provides students at all levels with a uniquely full and accessible experience of More’s perennially fascinating masterpiece.

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THOMAS MORE

Utopia

EDITED BY
GEORGE M. LOGAN

TRANSLATED BY
ROBERT M. ADAMS

Third Edition
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Preface

 Appearing by fortunate happenstance on the 500th anniversary of the initial publication of More's masterpiece, this third edition of the Cambridge Texts *Utopia* (first edition 1989) was undertaken to update the editorial apparatus – ‘Introduction’, ‘Suggestions for further reading’, footnotes – in the light of scholarship published since the appearance of the second edition (2002) and also in response to my more recent thoughts on the best way of presenting this endlessly provocative and enigmatic little work of sixteenth-century Latin humanism to twenty-first-century English readers. But while there are changes to the editorial appurtenances, the translations of the texts they support – that of *Utopia* itself and of the ancillary materials from the first four editions of the work (1516–18) – are unchanged from the 2002 edition. That edition incorporated the extensive changes to the Robert M. Adams translation that were made for the 1995 Latin–English edition of *Utopia* that I prepared with the late Professor Adams and, after failing health forced him to withdraw from the project, with Clarence H. Miller. Especially since the latter edition had become standard for most purposes, it seemed desirable to incorporate the reworked translation into the Cambridge Texts edition, and without further revisions.¹ For the same

¹ I did, though, make five small changes for the 2002 edition, which thus included a translation identical to that of the Latin–English edition except in the following places: p. 12: ‘man-eating’ to ‘people-eating’ (*populivoros*); p. 20: ‘cattle’ to ‘animals’ (cf. ‘other kinds of livestock’ two lines earlier); p. 26: ‘tripped over themselves to get on his side’ to ‘sided with him’ (*pedibus in eius ibant sententiam* – a common classical idiom); p. 110: ‘completely useless to’ to ‘not especially necessary for’ (*non ... magnopere necessarium*), restoring More’s litotes; p. 119 (middle): deleted extraneous comma after ‘rule’.

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reason, the present edition exactly reproduces the 2002 version of the translation.

In its original form, the Adams translation appeared in the Norton Critical Edition of *Utopia* that Adams published in 1975 (second edition 1992). I remain grateful to the late John Benedict, Vice President and Editor of W. W. Norton and Company, who secured the blessing of that estimable firm on the incorporation of a revised version of the translation into the Cambridge Texts edition. For that edition, Adams also made new translations of some of the ancillary letters and poems. I prepared the editorial materials, and Adams and I vetted each other's work.

The many 1995 revisions to the translation were almost all made for the sake of greater accuracy. Adams, who was a wonderful stylist, was sometimes inclined to sacrifice accuracy to grace; nor did he claim to be a Neo-Latin scholar. Many of the new renderings were suggested by Father Germain Marchadour, the paterfamilias of the international community of More students and admirers, who, with his usual generosity, at my request gave the 1989 edition a meticulous going-over; many other changes were suggested by Professor Miller, whose help and friendship, to 1995 and after, I cannot adequately acknowledge, any more than I can convey the depth of my admiration for his scholarship.

I also remain grateful, as I was in 1989, to Richard Tuck and Quentin Skinner, for their valuable comments on the first version of the introductory materials; Skinner also vetted the 1995 introductory materials. His own published work is responsible for much of what I know about the context of *Utopia* in the history of political thought; and he has, on various occasions dating back some thirty years, given me comments on my work that have been invaluable both professionally and personally. Elizabeth McCutcheon's review of the 1995 edition was responsible for the first of the five changes I made to the translation in 2002; and I owe this exemplary scholar and friend far more than that. In general, my greatest reward for working on More has been the profit and pleasure of his company and that of the More scholars whom I have been privileged to know.

I am also grateful to Richard Fisher, the Press's former Executive Director for Humanities and Social Sciences Publishing, with whom I worked comfortably for three decades, and to a succession of very capable editors for the 1989, 1995 and 2002 editions as well as the present one.

G. M. L.
Textual practices

(1) **Documentation.** The paraphernalia of documentation have been kept to a minimum. Publication data for most of the works cited in the footnotes are given in ‘Suggestions for further reading’; in the notes, these data are omitted. With the exceptions noted in ‘Suggestions for further reading’, all citations of classical works are to the editions of the Loeb Classical Library. Neither editors’ names nor publication data are given for these editions. References to the Bible are to the King James Version – except for the Apocrypha, where references are to the Vulgate.

(2) **Abbreviations.** CW = Yale Complete Works of St. Thomas More; CWE = Toronto Collected Works of Erasmus; CCTM = The Cambridge Companion to Thomas More.

(3) **Names.** Names of historical figures of More’s era are spelled as in Contemporaries of Erasmus: A Biographical Register of the Renaissance and Reformation. The sole exception is Pieter Gillis, for whom the familiar anglicised form, Peter Giles, is used.

(4) **Modernisation.** Whenever sixteenth-century English is quoted, spelling (sometimes also punctuation) is silently modernised.

(5) **Gendered language.** Where More uses nouns or pronouns that, in classical Latin, encompass not just males but human beings of either sex (for example, homo, puer and nemo), the translation employs similarly inclusive English equivalents. Gendered pronouns have also been avoided in passages where the Latin does not positively forbid one’s doing so and where More may plausibly be thought not to have intended
Textual practices

to restrict his reference to males. But *Utopia*—like all other Renaissance works, and despite the fact that one of its notable features is the nearly equal treatment that the Utopian republic accords to women and men, in education, work, and military training and service—is the product of a culture in which intellectual and political life were generally regarded as almost exclusively male domains; and it is not unlikely that the translation imposes gender-neutral language upon some passages where More had in mind only males.
Introduction

The word ‘utopia’ entered the world with the publication of More’s little book, in December 1516: it was coined by fusing the Greek adverb *ou* – ‘not’ – with the noun *topos* – ‘place’ – and giving the resulting compound a Latin ending. Within the book’s fiction, ‘Noplace’ is a newly discovered island somewhere in the New World. The meaning that ‘utopia’ has come to have as a common noun – a perfect society, or a literary account of one – seems authorised by the full title of the book, which is (translating from the Latin) ‘On the Best State of a Commonwealth and on the New Island of Utopia’. The same Hellenist readers who recognised the etymology of ‘Utopia’ would also have found this meaning suggested by the fact that the word puns on another Greek compound, *eutopia* – ‘happy’ or ‘fortunate’ place.

When we begin to read the book itself, though, the plausible supposition that *Utopia* is a utopia is rapidly called into question. First, the explorer whose account of the new island the book purports to record turns out to be named ‘Hythloday’ – another Greek compound, signifying ‘nonsense peddler’. Second, the introductory, scene-setting pages are followed not by an account of Utopia but by a lengthy debate on whether or not it is worthwhile for Hythloday to enter practical politics by joining a king’s council. Within this debate is another, recounted by Hythloday, on the problem of theft in More’s England. Apart from a comic postlude to the latter one, these two debates seem entirely serious, and they are powerfully written: but what are they doing in a book on the ideal commonwealth? And when, at the beginning of the second part (or
Introduction

‘Book’) of Utopia, we at last reach Hythloday’s account of the new island, it is still not clear that we’ve reached eutopia.

The commonwealth of Utopia turns out to be a highly attractive place in some ways, but a highly unattractive one in others. No one goes hungry there, no one is homeless. The commonwealth is strikingly egalitarian. On the other hand, personal freedom is restricted in ways large and small. The authorities maintain the population of households, cities and the country as a whole at optimal levels by transferring people between households, between cities and between Utopia and its colonies; and even those citizens who are not uprooted in this fashion must exchange houses by lot every ten years (though all the houses are essentially identical). There is no opportunity to pass even one’s leisure hours in unsanctioned activities: there are no locks on doors; ‘no wine-bars, or ale-houses, or brothels; no chances for corruption; no hiding places; no spots for secret meetings’ (p. 62). A citizen must get permission from the local magistrates to travel, and from spouse and father even to go for a walk in the country. In general, if Utopia anticipates the welfare democracies of our own time in many respects, the elaborate constraints imposed on its inhabitants also frequently put us in mind of modern totalitarian regimes. More’s own society was rigidly hierarchical and highly regulated, so Utopia may not have seemed, relatively speaking, as restrictive to him as it does to us. Still, it is difficult to believe that he would have regarded as ideal all the features of Utopia that we find unattractive. Moreover, every Utopian proper noun embodies the same kind of learned joke as ‘Utopia’ and ‘Hythloday’; and a few, at least, of the Utopian exploits and customs we are told about are hard to take seriously. Finally, at the end of the book More partly dissociates himself – or at least the character who goes by his name – from Utopia, saying that many of its laws and customs struck him as absurd, though there are many others that he would ‘wish rather than expect’ to see in Europe.

These observations suggest three fundamental questions about Utopia. First, why did More invent a flawed commonwealth? It is easy to understand why a writer might want to create a fictional account of an ideal commonwealth, or a satire of a bad one. But what could be the point of inventing a commonwealth that is partly good and partly bad? Second, what do the debates of Book 1 have to do with the account of Utopia in Book 11, and with the subject of the best condition of the commonwealth? Third, how are we to understand the fact that More represents
Introduction

himself as disapproving of much of what Hythloday says—and that, by peppering the book with jokes, he even seems to deny its seriousness? This introduction offers readers one set of possible answers to these questions. But doing so is secondary to its main purpose, which is to provide the necessary preliminaries for interpretation of Utopia, by setting More’s book in its contexts in his life, times and literary milieu, and in the history of Western political thought. In this process, the introduction provides the broad outlines, and the footnotes to the translation fill in details; in turn, these materials, together with the ‘Suggestions for further reading’, point the reader to a range of texts on which a fuller and deeper understanding of Utopia depends.

II

More was born in London, probably on 7 February 1478.¹ His father, John More, hoped his eldest son would follow him into the legal profession. For a few years, Thomas attended St Anthony’s School, in Threadneedle Street, learning the fundamentals of Latin grammar and composition.² At the age of about twelve, he was placed as a page in the household of Henry VII’s Lord Chancellor, John Morton. (Morton was also Archbishop of Canterbury and, from 1493, a cardinal.) This placement was ideally suited to exposing More to the ways of public life, and to securing him a powerful patron. After two years at Morton’s, and probably at his instigation, the precocious boy was sent to further his education at Oxford. Two years later, though, John More brought him back to London, to begin legal training in the Inns of Court. During his years at Oxford and as a law student, however (and reportedly to his father’s chagrin), More came increasingly under the influence of a group of literary scholars, central figures of the emerging tradition of Renaissance humanism in England. As modern studies have made clear, the term ‘humanism’, when applied to the Renaissance, is

¹See Thomas Mitjans, ‘The date of birth of Thomas More’, Moreana 47, no. 181–2 (2010), 109–28, and ‘Reviewing and correcting the article on the date of birth of Thomas More’, Moreana 49, no. 189–90 (2012), 251–62: together, these essays constitute an exhaustive study of the long-running controversy about More’s birthdate (the other possible dates are 6 February 1478 and 7 February 1477) consequent on a small inconsistency in the memorandum of it by his father.

²For compact and authoritative overviews of More’s education, see Caroline Barron, CCTM, pp. 8–16, and James McConica, CCTM, pp. 25–7.
Introduction

best used not to designate a particular philosophical position – for no single position is shared by all those Renaissance figures whom we are accustomed to regard as humanists – but to designate a particular scholarly orientation. ‘Humanism’ is a nineteenth-century coinage; but ‘humanist’ (like its cognates in other European languages) is found in the Renaissance itself, where it derived, first as Italian university-student slang, from studia humanitatis, a Ciceroan phrase that came to designate a family of disciplines comprising grammar, rhetoric, history, poetry and moral philosophy. 3 In the Renaissance as in the Middle Ages, Latin was the normal language of learning. Beginning in the fourteenth century, humanists like Petrarch attempted to revive the classical form of that language; by the early fifteenth century, they had undertaken a parallel attempt for classical Greek. More was well acquainted with the grammarian of humanistic Latin John Holt, and he studied Greek with the first Englishman to teach it, William Grocyn, and later with the eminent physician and scholar of medicine Thomas Linacre. He also fell strongly under the influence of John Colet. Like Grocyn and Linacre, Colet had studied in Italy, the homeland of humanist learning. After his return to England, in 1496, he gave several series of lectures at Oxford on the epistles of St Paul, lectures that constituted the earliest English application of some of the exegetical and historiographical techniques of Italian humanism; later, in London, he became Dean of St Paul’s Cathedral, and founded there the first of the humanist grammar schools in England. And, in 1499, More made the acquaintance of the great Dutch humanist Erasmus, who in that year first visited England.

Indeed, at this period More seems to have been as intent on the pursuit of literary scholarship as of the law. He may also seriously have considered becoming a priest. According to a biographical sketch of More that Erasmus wrote in 1519, for a time ‘he applied his whole mind to the pursuit of piety, with vigils and fasts and prayer and similar exercises preparing himself for the priesthood’ (CWE 7:21). In fact More seems to have tested his vocation not merely for the priesthood – a calling that, as Cardinal Morton’s example shows, need not have precluded a career in law (and politics) – but also for a life of religious withdrawal. The biography by his son-in-law William Roper says that at


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about this time More lived for four years with the Carthusians, the strictest of the monastic orders. Eventually More made his choices. By early 1505, he had closed the door to the priesthood and monasticism by marrying Joanna Colt, the daughter of a wealthy landowner; nor is there any sign, in the years following his marriage, that he thought of abandoning the law. Given the necessity of supporting a growing family – Joanna bore him four children before her death, in 1511, at twenty-three; shortly afterward, More married a middle-aged widow, Alice Middleton – he could in any case scarcely have afforded to entertain such thoughts.

In the decade following his first marriage, More rose rapidly in his profession. Roper reports that he was a member of the Parliament of 1504, and he represented the City of London in that of 1510. In the same year, he began to act as a city judge, having been appointed an Undersheriff of London. Increasingly he won assignments that drew on his literary and rhetorical as well as his legal skills. In March 1518, he entered Henry VIII’s council. His duties in this role spanned a broad range of activities, but his central employment, before he became Lord Chancellor, in 1529, was as secretary to the King. He also served frequently as the King’s orator. And after Henry decided to write against Martin Luther (in 1520), More acted as his literary adviser and editor.

In the earlier part of his professional life, More also managed to carry out a substantial amount of independent scholarship and writing. It is striking how precisely his works of this period conform to the five associated disciplines of the studia humanitatis. As grammarian (in the Renaissance understanding of the term), he translated (into Latin) many Greek poems, as well as four short prose works of the late-classical Greek ironist Lucian. As rhetorician, he wrote a declamation in reply to Lucian’s Tyrannicide. (The declamation was a standard rhetorical exercise, a speech on a paradoxical or otherwise ingenious topic, often

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involving the impersonation of some historical or mythical figure.) Erasmus reports a lost dialogue, evidently in the spirit of a declamation, defending the community of wives advocated in Plato’s *Republic*. Several of More’s longer, polemical letters of these years belong to the rhetorical genre of invective. As poet, he wrote, in addition to a few English poems, a large number of Latin epigrams. As historian, he practised the humanist genre of historical biography, in Latin and English versions of his unfinished *History of King Richard the Third* (a splendid, sardonic work that became the main source of Shakespeare’s play) and in his translation of a biography of the fifteenth-century Italian philosopher Pico della Mirandola. As moral and political philosopher, he wrote *Utopia*. The publication of *Utopia* came near the end of this phase of More’s literary career. Apart from four lengthy open letters in defence of Erasmus and humanist learning, for several years after 1516 he wrote little other than what was required of him in his profession; and when, in the 1520s, he resumed writing books – works opposing the Lutheran ‘heresy’, and a series of devotional works – they no longer fitted the humanist categories.

III

*Utopia* was conceived in the summer of 1515. In May of that year, More left England for Flanders, as a member of a royal trade commission. The negotiations conducted by this commission and its Flemish counterpart, at Bruges, were stalled and recessed by 21 July, but More did not return to England until 25 October. In the three months from late July to late October, he enjoyed a rare period of leisure; it was during this period that *Utopia* began to take shape.

At some point in the summer More visited Antwerp, where he met Peter Giles (Pieter Gillis), to whom Erasmus had recommended him. Giles (c. 1486–1533) was a man after More’s own heart. A humanist scholar and an intimate of Erasmus and his circle, he was also a man of practical affairs, chief clerk of the Antwerp court of justice and as such deeply involved in the business of that cosmopolitan shipping and commercial centre. Book 1 of *Utopia* opens with a brief account of the trade mission, which leads into an account of More’s acquaintance with Giles. At this point, the book glides from fact into fiction. After Mass one day, More says, he encountered Giles speaking with one Raphael
Hythloday, with whom, following introductions, they proceeded to have the conversation that is recorded in the bulk of *Utopia*. This fictional conversation is presumably a transformation and expansion of actual conversations between More and Giles. Be that as it may, More’s visit to Antwerp served to crystallise and fuse a range of concerns most of which had (on the evidence of his earlier writings) been in his mind for years.

We have no direct information as to when he began writing. In the biographical sketch referred to above, Erasmus reported that More wrote the second book of *Utopia* ‘earlier, when at leisure; at a later opportunity he added the first in the heat of the moment’ (*CWE* 7:24). As J. H. Hexter argues, if More wrote Book ii first, it seems probable that he initially regarded it as a complete work; presumably this version of *Utopia* was well in hand by the time he returned to England. Back in London, though, he found reason to add the dialogue of Book i and, finally, the letter to Giles that serves as the book’s preface; on 3 September, More sent the completed manuscript to Erasmus, who had evidently agreed to see to its publication, on the Continent.

Hexter points out that the first version of *Utopia* must have included not only the account of Utopia that now occupies all of Book ii except its last few pages but also an introduction something like the opening of the present Book i. Otherwise it would not be clear who is speaking in the monologue on Utopia, and under what circumstances. The second phase of composition is likely to have begun, then, not with the narrative account of the embassy to Bruges and the diversion to Antwerp but with the dialogue that now follows this introductory section. Indeed the precise point where More, as Hexter says, ‘opened a seam’ in the first version of *Utopia* to insert the dialogue can be identified with some confidence (see below, p. 13n.). After writing the dialogue, More must also have revised the conclusion of the work as a whole. In the final paragraph of Book ii, as Hexter points out, the narrator recalls that Hythloday ‘had reproached certain people who were afraid they might not appear knowing enough unless they found something to criticise in
Introduction

the ideas of others’. But Hythloday’s censures occur in the dialogue of Book 1 (pp. 14–15), so that this allusion to them must have been written later than the dialogue.

The fact that *Utopia* was composed in this odd sequence surely has implications for its interpretation. As with many other facts about the book, though, this one cuts two ways. On the one hand, it may suggest that More split open a complete, unified book to insert a dialogue that, though highly interesting, doesn’t really belong with the original material – that *Utopia* is really two books. Or it may suggest that More had second thoughts about the account of Utopia and saw a need to insert a new section that would be in effect an introduction to it. In any event, the dialogue affects our view of Utopia. For one thing, it gives us a much sharper sense of Hythloday, who is both our only source of information about the island commonwealth and its foremost enthusiast.

IV

More’s book benefited greatly both from his experience in law and politics and from his humanist learning. Although the social problems *Utopia* addresses are perennial, the particular formulations of them, and the data of recent and contemporary English and European life that the book deploys, reflect More’s personal and professional experience. But the intellectual paradigms that he brings to bear on the understanding of these problems, and the form and style of his book, derive primarily from his literary humanism.

The most obvious relation between *Utopia* and More’s humanist learning is that with Greek political philosophy. The first part of his book’s title – ‘On the Best State of a Commonwealth’ – serves to identify it as belonging to the most celebrated species of classical political writing: a tradition of works, inaugurated by Plato’s *Republic* and *Laws* and continued in one segment of Aristotle’s *Politics* (and subsequently in many other works), that embody their authors’ views on the form and rationale of the best conceivable polity. Plato’s and Aristotle’s discussions of the ideal commonwealth are, however, conducted purely by argumentation (whether sociable Platonic dialogue or austere Aristotelian treatise), whereas the Utopian portion – Book 11 – of More’s book consists of Hythloday’s fictional travelogue and in this respect is sometimes not as close to Plato and Aristotle as to the wildly and comically fictionalised
treatments of politics, political thought and political philosophy found in
some of the works of Lucian – whose great appeal to More became
evident a decade before the publication of Utopia, when his translations
from Lucian were printed (1506) together with some by Erasmus. More’s
decision to present his imaginary society in the form of a long speech by
a fictional personage turned out to be momentous: it is responsible both
for much of his book’s interest and for much of its enigmatic quality –
fictions are attractive but not prone to resolve into unambiguous mean-
ings – as well as for most of Utopia’s literary influence. The genre of
utopian fiction, which the book initiated, has its defining difference from
the philosophical dialogue or treatise on the ideal commonwealth pre-
cisely in that it offers a fictionised account of the imaginary polity as if
it actually existed.10

The debate that occupies almost all of Book 1 of Utopia also has
classical (and humanist) antecedents, and complex relationships to them.
For its form, the most obvious predecessors are the dialogues of Plato
and Cicero. But the differences between the formal characteristics of
More’s dialogue and those of these predecessors are as striking as the
similarities. This point has been well made by R. Bracht Branham, who
notes that the ‘defining philosophical and literary feature of Platonic
dialectic, the systematic process of refutation . . . conducted by Socrates,
is conspicuously absent’ from More’s dialogue. And while this is also
true of Cicero’s dialogues, their form, too, differs crucially from that of
Book 1 of Utopia, since the Ciceronian works ‘actually make little use of
the dialogue form per se’: ‘If Cicero had summarized and contrasted the
views of the prevailing philosophical schools in his own voice, little that
is essential would be lost. Cicero used the dialogue form skillfully but
externally as a way of introducing variety and personality into his work,
not because it is intrinsic to his meaning.’ Indeed, Branham argues, more
significant formal parallels with Book 1 of Utopia than those with Plato’s
or Cicero’s dialogues are found in some dialogues of Lucian. This is not
so much a matter of the wit and irony that characterises Lucian’s
writings and parts of More’s dialogue as of the fact that, in both, ‘instead
of Socratic interrogation we have a conversation, an exchange of views,
that is not used to familiarize us with a body of doctrine, as in Cicero, but

10 In a second letter on Utopia addressed to Giles – this one appearing in the back of the
second, 1517 edition of the work – More comments obliquely on the advantage of this way
of proceeding. See p. 115.
Introduction

to typify the divergence of two familiar but incompatible perspectives': like Lucian (specifically in ‘The Cynic’ and ‘Menippus’, both of which More had translated), More projects himself into his own dialogue, ‘as a character whose primary function is . . . to provide a commonsensical and pragmatic counterpoint to the views of . . . [an] idealist . . . who overtly dominates the conversation’.11

There are also precedents for the main topic of More’s dialogue, in humanist writings as well as in classical literature. Arguing about whether Hythloday should join a king’s council is a way of getting at the general, and much discussed, problem of ‘counsel’: the problem of ensuring that rulers receive – and take – appropriate advice. As Quentin Skinner observes, this problem could be approached either from the point of view of the ruler, in which case the focus is on ‘the importance of choosing good councillors and learning to distinguish between true and false friends’, or from the point of view of the prospective councillor, when the focus is on the question of whether a scholar should commit himself to practical politics.12 Viewed in the second perspective, it is an aspect of the ancient question of the relative merits of the active and contemplative lives.13 Since, as Skinner says, ‘humanists tended to see themselves essentially as political advisers’, counsel was the political topic that most intrigued them. More himself had special reason to be intrigued: he had been edging closer to full-time royal service. Joining Henry’s council (which, as noted above, More eventually did, in 1518) would be a step toward which his career as lawyer and diplomat led naturally; and yet contemplating this step may have prompted some anxiety in a man who was also imbued with the ideals of scholarly and religious detachment.14

11‘Utopian laughter: Lucian and Thomas More’, in Ralph Keen and Daniel Kinney, eds., Thomas More and the Classics (Moreana 23, no. 86, 1985), pp. 23–43; the above quotations are from p. 37. The fact that the authorship of ‘The Cynic’ is now disputed does not materially affect Branham’s argument.


13 Influential – and durably interesting – treatments of this issue are found in Plato (Republic vi. 496c–497b and Epistle vii) and Seneca (‘On Leisure’ and ‘On Tranquillity of Mind’, in Moral Essays), who make the case for non-involvement, and in one of Plutarch’s Moral Essays, ‘That a Philosopher Ought to Converse Especially with Men in Power’. Cicero sees merit in both courses (On Moral Obligation 1.xx.69–xxi.72, xliii.153–xliv.156).

14 The most authoritative account of More’s entry into royal service is that in Guy, Thomas More, pp. 46–58.
Although the topic of counsel is commonplace, More’s treatment of it is distinctive. This is also the case with his treatment (in the debate-within-a-debate referred to earlier) of the problem of theft, which expands into a general analysis of the condition of England. More’s handling of these matters differs from that of most other social or political writers of the period in what we may call its systemic or holistic approach. As Hexter puts it, More sees ‘in depth, in perspective, and in mutual relation problems which his contemporaries saw in the flat and as a disjointed series’ (CW 4:ci). He understands that the problem of counsel cannot be solved by sending a few wise men to court, because, in the existing structure of society, most of the people they would encounter there – including especially the rulers – are motivated by blinkered self-interest. Similarly, the problem of theft cannot be solved by punishing thieves, because theft stems primarily from poverty, which is in turn the product of a number of social factors. The polity as a whole is a complex network of reciprocally affecting parts.

The social analysis of Book i is also distinguished by its passionate intensity, its pervasive moral outrage at the status quo. The treatment of the problem of theft constitutes a scathing indictment of a system of ‘justice’ in which the poor are ‘driven to the awful necessity of stealing and then dying for it’ (p. 16). The root cause of this situation lies in the pride, sloth and greed of the upper classes. Noblemen live idly off others’ labour, and also ‘drag around with them a great train of idle servants’, who, when they are later dismissed, know no honest way of making a living. The practice of enclosure (fencing common land as pasturage for sheep)15 deprives farm labourers of their livelihood and sets them to wander and beg – or to steal and be hanged.

Although it is Hythloday who delivers this indictment, one can hardly doubt that it embodies More’s own views; and in fact More represents himself as concurring in Hythloday’s analysis (p. 29). In the debate on counsel, however, More portrays Hythloday and himself as taking opposite positions, with Hythloday opposing involvement and More favouring it. Both positions are powerfully argued, and they are never bridged: in the closing pages of Book i, the disputants simply drop the topic and go on to another – the desirability of abolishing private property – about which they also never reach agreement.

15See p. 19n.
These facts suggest an additional aspect of the relation between *Utopia* and its author’s character and experience, one that helps to explain More’s apparent dissociation of himself from Utopia: that the divergent personalities and views of his two main characters project his own persistent dividedness of mind. That ‘More’ closely resembles the author is clear. Yet it is equally clear that this cautious, practical lawyer and family man is More without his passion and vision – a More who could not have written *Utopia*, nor ever have chosen martyrdom. Fictitious Hythloday seems to be modelled to some extent on the corresponding figures in two of Plato’s political dialogues: the austere Stranger of the *Statesman* and the Old Athenian of the *Laws*, men whose detachment from practical affairs enables them to see and speak the truth. He also resembles Plato himself, though less as we know him from modern accounts than as the semi-legendary figure in the biography by Diogenes Laertius (c. third century CE), which was still current in More’s time and presented the philosopher as a great traveller who gained much of his political wisdom after the conclusion of his formal studies, by visiting polities in scattered parts of the Mediterranean world. Hythloday is also consanguineous both with Erasmus, who, though he wrote about politics, kept himself clear of practical involvement with it, and with the Florentine philosopher Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463–94), whose biography (by his nephew) More had translated, and who was to him a particularly intriguing exemplar of contemplative withdrawal from worldly business: the path that More had come close to taking, and that retained its allure to him throughout his life. But all this is as much as to say that Hythloday is to some extent More’s fantasy – partly wistful, partly critical – of what he himself might have been, had he made different choices a decade earlier; even as ‘More’ is his mildly depreciating representation of the practical man he had become.

More’s dividedness of mind is also related, via his humanist learning, to the seriocomic mode of *Utopia*. This is another respect in which

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Introduction

Lucian was a key model. Author of some eighty surviving prose pieces—mostly satirical, and including (in addition to dialogues) essays, declamations, fantastic tales and other forms—the Syria-born rhetorician was, in the Renaissance and its Neoclassical aftermath, highly regarded for the purity of his Greek style; and for this reason his works were frequently prescribed as texts for students of the language. But Lucian’s writings were also seminal in the development of a literary tradition of witty, ironic works that make serious points under the guise of play, often turning sustained mockery against orthodox thought and customary behaviour—against the disfigurement of human life by fatuity, superstition, hypocrisy and charlatanry.

Works of this kind were not to every taste. Lucian and his emulators were often regarded, and harshly denounced (as by Martin Luther), as nihilistic and pernicious scoffers. In the view of More and Erasmus, though, Lucian was a satirist of devastating effectiveness whose targets richly deserved striking, and his works provided (as also for Rabelais and Swift) invaluable models for pungent and wide-ranging social criticism. It is worth quoting at some length the fervid estimate contained in Erasmus’s prefatory letter to his translation of the dialogue Gallus (‘The Rooster’). No one else, he says, has equalled Lucian in satisfying the injunction of the Roman poet Horace that literature should combine instruction with delight:

he satirizes everything with inexpressible skill and grace, ridicules everything, and submits everything to the chastisement of his superb wit . . . Philosophers are a special butt, especially the Pythagoreans, the Platonists also because of the marvels they recount, and the Stoics because of their insufferable airs of superiority. He attacks some by deft stabs and cuts, others with any weapon that is handy; quite rightly, too, for what is more detestable or intolerable than rascality which publicly masquerades as virtue? . . . He likewise rails and laughs at the gods, and with no less freedom; for which he has been given the nickname of atheist, which naturally acquires positive credit because those who seek to attach it to him are irreligious and superstitious men . . . [B]y his mixture of fun and earnest, gaiety and accurate observation, he so effectively portrays the manners, emotions, and pursuits of men . . . that whether you look for pleasure or edification there is not a comedy, or a satire, that challenges comparison with his dialogues. (CW 2:116)

In the prefatory letter that More wrote to his translations in the 1506 volume, he, too, praises Lucian for so admirably having fulfilled the
Horatian injunction, and goes on to laud the Syrian’s rebukes of the ‘jugglery of magicians’, ‘the fruitless contentions of philosophers’, and ‘superstition, which obtrudes everywhere under the guise of religion’ (CW 3, Part 1:3–9).

At base, More’s attraction to Lucian was (like Erasmus’s) rooted in two deep affinities. More was a famously – even notoriously – witty man, but one whose wit was bound up with his most serious concerns: in the aperçu of his biographer John Guy, ‘More was most witty when least amused.’ A still more fundamental connection with Lucian lies in the proclivity of the divided, complex mind for ironic discourse, where aspects of a text suggest, under the surface meaning, its reversal or qualification – or both. The first major humanist work in the Lucianic tradition was Erasmus’s Praise of Folly (completed at More’s house, in 1509, and dedicated to him). This is a declamation of bewilderingly complex irony, in which Erasmus has Folly (supposed to be a goddess) praise folly – thus setting up a semantic hall of mirrors. The situation in Utopia is equally complex: a ‘nonsense peddler’ condemns Europe and praises Noplace; and his views – many of which are clearly not nonsense – are reported by a character who bears the author’s name, and who dissociates himself from most of them.

Turning now to the question of the relation between the two books of Utopia, it is evident, first, that an analysis of the evils of the existing society forms an appropriate prelude to a discussion of a possibly better one, and that the juxtaposition of Europe and Utopia throws sharply into relief what is distinctive about each. The resulting comparisons are the

17 In the second letter to Giles – itself an example of Lucianic ironic direction – More indicates that it was the desire to leaven instruction with delight that led him to choose a seriocomic mode for Utopia: below, p. 115.
18 See Anne Lake Prescott, CCTM, pp. 266–9.
19 The Public Career of Sir Thomas More, p. 23; quoted, in the same connection, by Baker-Smith, More’s Utopia, p. 25, and CCTM, p. 165 n. 1.
20 For detailed discussions of More’s relation to Lucian, see Baker-Smith: More’s ‘Utopia’, pp. 24–5, 30–42, 90, and CCTM, pp. 142–7. The passages of Utopia where More’s debt to Lucian is clearest are found on pp. 64–6 (and nn. 56 and 57) below; see also the reference to the Utopians’ fondness for Lucian, on p. 80. The fanciful, Greek-derived names for people and places are another Lucianic feature (Baker-Smith, CCTM, pp. 143–4).
burden of the peroration of Book ii, in which Hythloday eloquently sums up what we have seen about Europe and Utopia and argues, very powerfully, the superiority of the latter. But Book i also prepares us for Book ii in another way, which becomes apparent if we consider the structure of Hythloday’s arguments in the former book.

The discussion of theft opens with the question of why this problem persists, despite the constant execution of thieves – ‘with as many as twenty at a time being hanged on a single gallows’ (p. 16). Hythloday’s response begins with, and is organised by, the contention that executing thieves is neither moral nor practical: ‘The penalty is too harsh in itself, yet it isn’t an effective deterrent. Simple theft is not so great a crime that it ought to cost a man his head, yet no punishment however severe can restrain those from robbery who have no other way to make a living.’ Correspondingly, he argues that the milder punishment he recommends is both just and expedient.

As More’s contemporaries would have recognised, this strategy of argument originates in rhetorical theory. Rhetoric (like logic) provided lists of subject-matter categories, called ‘topics’, of proven utility in constructing arguments. Since the subject of Hythloday’s remarks is the advisability or inadvisability of particular policies, his speeches belong to the ‘deliberative’ genre, the oratory of persuasion and dissuasion. (Deliberative is one of the three great genera of classical rhetoric, along with the demonstrative genre – the oratory of praise or blame – and the judicial, the oratory of the law court.) The central topics of deliberative oratory are honestas and utilitas – honour and expediency.21 The deliberative orator normally argues that a particular course of action is advisable on the ground that it is honourable, or on the ground that it is expedient – or argues that it is inadvisable, as being either dishonourable or inexpedient. Naturally, the strongest cases are made when it can be shown that considerations of honour and expediency point in the same direction.

This turns out to be the nature of Hythloday’s argument not only on the problem of theft but on all the questions he addresses. To ‘More’ and Giles he argues that joining a king’s council would be neither honourable nor useful, since kings employ councillors only to tell them how best to accomplish dishonourable and destructive ends. In the two narratives of

21 See, for example, Cicero, On Invention ii.i.156–8; Quintilian, The Education of the Orator iii.viii.1–3, 22–5.

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imaginary privy council meetings that he uses as examples (pp. 29–36), he portrays himself as arguing that the supposedly expedient courses recommended by the other councillors are both immoral and self-defeating. When ‘More’, at the climax of the debate on counsel (pp. 36–9), argues for an ‘indirect’, temporising approach, in which the councillor, knowing that he cannot turn all to good, will at least try to make things as little bad as possible, Hythloday responds that such a strategy is neither practical nor consistent with Christian morality. Indeed, we get the strong impression that he would say that the moral and the expedient never truly conflict, that correct analysis will always show that a dishonourable course is also inexpedient. This position links him with the ancient Stoics, for whom the identity of the moral and the expedient is a key doctrine.

Evidently the question of the relation of the moral and the expedient interested More deeply, as it did other humanists. The claim that the two are identical was a standard theme of early humanist political thought, which is permeated by Stoicism; but in the fifteenth century some Italian humanists began to assert that honestas is not always aligned with utilitas. In 1513, Machiavelli produced, in The Prince, the most famous of all statements of this position. When More wrote, he could not have known Machiavelli’s book (though written in 1513, it wasn’t published until 1532), but he certainly knew the tradition of thought that it crystallised.

It is also evident that the question of the relation of honestas and utilitas is linked with the subject of the best state of the commonwealth. If the moral and the expedient – the practical – are ultimately identical, then it is theoretically possible to design a viable commonwealth that would always act morally. But if the moral and the expedient cannot be fully reconciled, then this ideal could never be achieved, even in theory.

That More recognised the importance of this issue to the theory of the ideal commonwealth seems clear from what follows the exchange about the indirect approach to counsel. The question of the validity of this approach is not resolved – presumably because More was of two minds about it. In his fiction, though, the question is left unresolved because it is
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sidetracked by Hythloday’s sudden confession that he thinks the abolition of private property offers the only route to social justice. ‘More’ disputes this claim, not on the ground that communism is unjust, but on the basis of arguments (derived from Aristotle’s critique of the Republic, in Book 11 of his Politics) that it is impractical. A commonwealth cannot be stable, prosperous and happy without private property and the inequality that goes with it. Hythloday counters that More would think differently if he had seen Utopia: for that commonwealth embodies the equality that More thinks impractical, and yet is uniquely happy and well governed, with institutions that are both ‘wise and sacred’ (p. 39).

This, then, is the context that More provided for the account of the Utopian republic: a dispute about the degree of compatibility of the moral and the expedient in political life, and, in particular, about the question of whether the ideal of equality is compatible with stability and prosperity. This context suggests that the account of Utopia may be – whatever else it may be – an attempt to answer this fundamental question about the best condition of the commonwealth: is it possible, even theoretically, for a commonwealth to be both moral and expedient?23

VI

If Book 1 of Utopia is affiliated with deliberative oratory, Book 11 has an equally clear connection with the demonstrative or epideictic genre, the oratory of praise or blame. Whatever More’s readers (or More himself) might think of Utopia, for Hythloday it is ‘that commonwealth which I consider not only the best but indeed the only one that can rightfully claim that name’ (p. 109). Praise of a city or country was a recognised subgenre of demonstrative oratory, and a perusal of the discussions of this subgenre in classical textbooks of rhetoric suggests that these discussions

23I note in passing that these considerations suggest a solution to the much-discussed problem of why More made Utopia non-Christian. More and all his contemporaries – including Machiavelli – believed that moral, and Christian, behaviour was advisable on religious grounds. One of the liveliest questions in early sixteenth-century political thought, though, is that raised in Book 1 of Utopia: how far, in political life, is this kind of behaviour advisable on purely prudential grounds? Evidently More realised that an answer to this question could be obtained by thinking through the question of how a society pursuing perfect expediency through purely rational calculations would conduct itself.
may have contributed something to both the substance and the organisation of Hythloday’s long speech.²⁴

If the selection and ordering of topics in the account of Utopia to some extent reflect the dicta of rhetorical theory, though, the structure of the commonwealth itself certainly derives from political theory. First, More took many of the institutional arrangements of Utopia from the discussions of the ideal commonwealth by Plato and Aristotle, and from idealised accounts of historical polities and their lawgivers by such authors as Tacitus and, especially, Plutarch. These appropriations range from small (but often striking) items such as the Utopians' custom of having wives stand ‘shoulder to shoulder’ (p. 94) with their husbands in battle, which seems to have been inspired or authorised by a passage in Plato’s Republic (v. 466c–e), to fundamental features of Utopian life such as the restrictions on property and privacy, the institution of communal dining, and the heavy use, in the inculcation of desirable behaviour, of what we would call positive and negative reinforcement.

Second, the structure into which the borrowed institutions were fitted appears to have been constructed by applying the method for designing an ideal commonwealth devised by Plato and Aristotle. In this method, creating a model of such a commonwealth is not simply a matter of piling together all the desirable features one can think of. On the contrary, the design premise is the principle of autarkia, self-sufficiency: the best commonwealth will be one that includes everything that is necessary to the happiness of its citizens, and nothing else. Starting from this economic premise, Plato developed, and Aristotle refined, a four-step procedure for constructing an ideal commonwealth.²⁵ First, one must determine what constitutes the happiest life for the individual. This is the central question of ethical theory, and, as Aristotle explains at the beginning of Book vii of the Politics, its answer constitutes the starting point of political theory. Second, from these conclusions about the best life, the theorist derives a list of the communal goals whose attainment will result in the happiness of the citizens. Third, it is necessary to construct a sort of checklist of the physical and institutional components

²⁴On the subgenre, see Quintilian iii.vii.26–7. There is another important treatment of it in the treatise on epideictic oratory by the Greek rhetorician Menander; for a summary of his treatise (which is not available in English translation), see Theodore C. Burgess, ‘Epideictic literature’, University of Chicago Studies in Classical Philology 3 (University of Chicago Press, 1902), pp. 89–261, at pp. 109–12.
²⁵See Plato, Republic ii.369b–372e; Aristotle, Politics vii.i–viii.
that the commonwealth must include in order to achieve self-sufficiency: a certain size of population will be required, and a certain kind and extent of territory; certain occupational functions will have to be performed; and so on. Finally, the theorist determines the particular form that each of these components should be given in order to assure that, collectively, they will constitute the best commonwealth. For More, most of these forms are (as I noted earlier) appropriated from Plato's and Aristotle's discussions of the ideal commonwealth and from idealised accounts of actual commonwealths of the ancient world.

Although there are many other true and illuminating things to say about Book ii of *Utopia*, it seems to me beyond dispute, and fundamental, that the book presents the results of a best-commonwealth exercise conducted according to the Greek rules. This fact is obscured by More's decision to present his results in the form of a speech in praise of a supposedly existing commonwealth — the decision, as it were, to invent the genre of the utopia instead of writing a work of political theory in one of the standard forms. This decision entailed eliding or disguising the various components of the dialectical substructure of his model. But once we recognise that Book ii of *Utopia* constitutes a best-commonwealth exercise, some otherwise mystifying aspects of the work begin to make sense. In particular, this recognition tells us how to take the lengthy account of Utopian moral philosophy (pp. 68–78); and it can suggest an answer to one of the key questions posed at the beginning of this introduction: why did More construct a commonwealth that includes some clearly undesirable features?

The passage on moral philosophy is in fact the cornerstone of the Utopian edifice: it constitutes the first step of the best-commonwealth exercise, the determination of the happiest life for the individual. The Utopian philosophers (who take it for granted that self-interest is the basic fact about human nature) maintain that pleasure is the key to happiness and thus the goal that every (sane) person pursues, but they conclude that the most pleasurable life is the life of virtue. This is also the conclusion of Plato and Aristotle (as, later, of Epicurus), but for them the virtuous life is that of contemplative leisure, made possible by the labour of slaves and artisans, whose happiness is not a concern of the commonwealth. By contrast, the Utopians argue that individual felicity is incompatible with special privilege, and think that the foremost pleasure ‘arises from practice of the virtues and consciousness of a good life’ (p. 77). Thus, though the Utopians are not Christians and their
arguments consider only self-interest, they conclude that the best life for
the individual is one lived in accordance with moral norms like those of
Christianity. Moreover, parallels between their arguments and passages
in other works by More confirm that he thought these arguments valid –
though many readers have found them convoluted and strained.

But even if we grant that, for each individual, morality is always
expedient, is this also true for the commonwealth as a whole? For the
most part, Utopia supports this view. If, as the Utopians conclude, one’s
happiness is incompatible with spoiling the happiness of others, then it
follows that the institutions of the commonwealth, whose goal is to
maximise the happiness of its citizens, must be structured so as to
implement the Golden Rule. And, indeed, the institutions and policies
of Utopia (many deriving as they do from previous treatments of the
ideal commonwealth) are on the whole much preferable to those of
European nations and are in many respects completely consistent with
Christian standards, as those are interpreted in the writings of More and
his associates.26

Yet some Utopian practices appear to be incompatible with these
standards, and to be justifiable only in terms of expediency. To take
the most disturbing examples, there is, first, the severe restriction of
personal freedom. In Book 1, Hythloday criticises repressive policies,
saying that a ruler who himself ‘enjoys a life of pleasure and self-
indulgence while all about him are grieving and groaning is acting like
a jailer, not a king’ (p. 35); and this attitude harmonises with many
passages in the writings of More and his humanist circle. The Utopians
themselves believe that ‘no kind of pleasure is forbidden, provided harm
does not come of it’ (p. 61). To be sure, More was not a man to
countenance laxity in himself or in others, and he regarded some activ-
ities as harmful that, to most of us nowadays, seem quite innocuous. But
the numerous proscriptions and rigid controls hedged round life in
Utopia include some that do not appear capable of being explained in
this fashion. Is taking an unsanctioned walk in the country (p. 61) really
such a pernicious act?

26 Some of the parallels are cited in footnotes to this edition; for exhaustive treatments of
them, see Edward Surtz’s Commentary in CW 4 and the two monographs by him listed in
‘Suggestions for further reading’, as well as another book included there, Robert
P. Adams’s The Better Part of Valor.

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Then there are the troubling aspects of Utopian foreign policy. For the most part, the Utopians are generous toward their neighbours. They distribute their surplus commodities among them ‘at moderate prices’, and they are always happy to provide them with skilful and honest administrators (pp. 62, 83). They detest war, and, whenever it cannot be avoided, are at pains to minimise its destructiveness. Yet it turns out that they will go to war for a good many reasons – including to obtain territory for colonisation, whenever the population of Utopia exceeds the optimal number. Furthermore, some of their military tactics are of very dubious morality. They offer rewards for the assassination of enemy leaders. They employ mercenaries to do as much of their fighting as possible – and the mercenaries they prefer are the savage Zapoletes (pp. 92–4), whose use is hard to reconcile with the aim of minimising war’s destructiveness. Moreover, despite their compassion for the common citizens of enemy nations, the Utopians enslave the prisoners taken in wars in which they have employed their own forces (p. 81).  

The explanation of these discrepancies between Utopian practices and More’s own ideals would seem to lie in his recognition of the fact that even in the best commonwealth there will always be conflicts between valid goals – a problem that is generally unrecognised (or at least unacknowledged) by theorists of the ideal commonwealth and writers of utopias. More’s awareness of the conflict of goals is first apparent in the section on moral philosophy. Utopian ethics is a paradoxical fusion of Stoicism and Epicureanism. One feature of Epicureanism that struck More is the so-called ‘hedonic calculus’, Epicurus’ rule that, in choosing among pleasures, one should always choose a greater pleasure over a lesser, and should reject any pleasure that will eventually result in pain: this rule is cited at three different points in the passage on moral philosophy. Evidently More thought similar principles should be applied to resolving conflicts between goals at the collective, political level; and it is possible to understand most of the unattractive features of Utopia in terms of such principles.

The pragmatic Aristotelian objections to communal property that ‘More’ recapitulates at the end of Book 1 clearly had real weight for his authorial double. If Utopia does not manifest the chaos that ‘More’ had

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Adams shows that many of the ‘antichivalric’ Utopian military practices are consonant with Stoic and Erasmian–humanist ideas (The Better Part of Valor, esp. pp. 152–4). But this argument cannot account for the particular practices mentioned here.

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