Organized Violence after Civil War

Nearly half of all countries emerging from civil conflict relapse into war within a few years of signing a peace agreement. The postwar trajectories of armed groups vary from organizational cohesion to dissolution, demilitarization to remilitarization. In *Organized Violence after Civil War*, Daly analyzes evidence from thirty-seven militia groups in Colombia, demonstrating that the primary driving force behind these changes is the variation in recruitment patterns within, and between, the warring groups. She documents the transition from war to peace through interviews with militia commanders, combatants, and victims. Using rich ex-combatant survey data and geo-coded information on violence over fifty years of war, Daly explains the dynamics inside armed organizations and the strategic interactions among them. She also shows how the theory may be used beyond Colombia, both within the region of Latin America and across the rest of the world.

Sarah Zukerman Daly joined the University of Notre Dame faculty in 2013 as assistant professor in Political Science after receiving her Ph.D. in the subject from Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Her doctoral dissertation received the 2011 Lucian Pye Award for the Best Dissertation in Political Science from MIT. Her research interests lie in the fields of civil war, peace processes, international security, and ethnic politics with a regional focus on Latin America. Daly has served as a fellow in the Political Science Department and at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, and at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University.
Sarah Daly argues that organizational characteristics of armed groups in Colombia strongly affect whether they remilitarize after a peace agreement. Their extensive ties enable members of local groups to remilitarize, but members of non-local groups disperse and lose this capacity. Networks and geography are more important than access to weapons, which is almost universal. Daly's extraordinary fieldwork with extremely violent former group members provides convincing quantitative and qualitative support for this important argument. *Organized Violence after Civil War* is an extraordinary work of political science.

– Robert O. Keohane, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University

This study provides a novel and thoughtful explanation of an important question for societies emerging from warfare – why do some groups silence their guns after agreeing to peace, while others remilitarize and return to violence? The argument highlights the role of the geography of recruitment – whether militant groups recruit and deploy fighters locally or from farther afield. The theory put forth is both parsimonious and subtle, and the empirical evidence adduced for it from the case of paramilitary groups in Colombia is extremely impressive. This book is certainly a must-read for any scholar of Colombia or any scholar of paramilitaries, but it will also find an important audience among scholars interested in the complicated dynamics of civil conflict and the behavior of non-state actors as they navigate the often stormy seas of postconflict transition.

– Page Fortna, Columbia University

*Organized Violence after Civil War* explores why some – but not all – armed groups remilitarize after demobilization. Daly argues that the explanation lies in the geography of recruitment – whether the group recruited members from the locale where it was deployed – and in its strategic interaction with other groups after conflict's end. She shows that her theory accounts for why about half of Colombia's three dozen paramilitary groups remobilized, drawing on a wide range of data, from interviews with imprisoned leaders to surveys of demobilized combatants to unpublished government documents. This is an extraordinary achievement based on remarkable field research over several years.

– Elisabeth Jean Wood, Yale University

Civil wars have a strong tendency to recur, yet we know little about why. Drawing on a stunning array of data from extensive fieldwork in Colombia, Sarah Zukerman Daly shows that the geography of armed group recruitment explains why countries at peace slip back into violence. Groups that recruit locally remain cohesive after wars end whereas groups that recruit outside their own region wither away as their members depart. Regions comprised of locally based groups thus maintain a stable and peaceful balance of power, whereas regions where local groups neighbor non-local groups become unstable and prone to violence. Anyone seeking to understand the recurrence of violence after civil war should read this excellent book.

– Alexander B. Downes, George Washington University
Organized Violence after Civil War

The Geography of Recruitment in Latin America

SARAH ZUKERMAN DALY
University of Notre Dame, Indiana
For my family
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Acknowledgments

This book was born in the field. I went on a short trip to Colombia to understand the onset of insurgency and left instead struck by a puzzle of seemingly anarchic variation in the postwar trajectories of militia organizations. Imposing order on this variation has kept me fascinated for the years since. Diverse sources of mentorship, support, and friendship have facilitated this scholarly journey.

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Finally, to my husband, Bobby, my sons, Weston and Sebastian, and the rest of my family, for keeping wind to my back throughout this process. This book is dedicated to them.
Abbreviations

ACCU  Autodefensas Campesinas de Córdoba y Urabá (Peasant Self-Defense Forces of Córdoba and Urabá)
ACR   Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegración (Colombian Agency for Reintegration), previously called Alta Consejería para la Reintegración (High Council for Reintegration)
ANAPO Alianza Nacional Popular (National Popular Alliance)
ARENA Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (Nationalist Republican Alliance, El Salvador)
ASEDSUR Asociación de Desmovilizados de Urabá (Association of Demobilized of Urabá)
AUC   Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia)
BACRIM Bandas Criminales Emergentes (Emerging Criminal Gangs)
BCN   Bloque Cacique Nutibara (Cacique Nutibara Bloc)
CAD   Comités de Autodefensa y Desarrollo (Committees of Self-Defense and Development)
CDC   Comités de Defensa Civil (Civil Defense Committees)
CDF   Civil Defense Forces (Sierra Leone)
CEDE  El Centro de Estudios Sobre Desarrollo Económico (Center of Economic Development Studies)
CERAC Centro de Recursos Para el Análisis de Conflictos (Conflict Analysis Resource Center)
CIA   Central Intelligence Agency (United States)
CINEP/PPP Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular / Programa por la Paz (Center for Research and Popular Education / Peace Program)
CNRR  Comisión Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación (National Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation)
### Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
<th>Additional Information</th>
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<tr>
<td>CODHES</td>
<td>Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento</td>
<td>Consultancy for Human Rights and Displacement</td>
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<td>CRS</td>
<td>Corriente de Renovación Socialista (Socialist Renewal Current)</td>
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<td>CTI</td>
<td>Cuerpo Técnico de Investigación (Technical Investigation Unit)</td>
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<td>DANE</td>
<td>Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística</td>
<td>National Administrative Department of Statistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAS</td>
<td>Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (Administrative Department of Security)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration</td>
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<td>DEA</td>
<td>Drug Enforcement Administration (United States)</td>
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<td>DECAS</td>
<td>Defensa Civil Antisubversiva (Anti-subversive Civil Defense Forces)</td>
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<td>DIPOL</td>
<td>Dirección de Inteligencia Policial (Directorate of Police Intelligence)</td>
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<td>ELN</td>
<td>Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPL</td>
<td>Ejército Popular de Liberación (Popular Liberation Army)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERG</td>
<td>Ejército Revolucionario Guevarista (Guevarista Revolutionary Army)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERP</td>
<td>Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (Revolutionary People’s Army)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERPAC</td>
<td>Ejército Revolucionario Popular Antiterrorista Colombiano (Antiterrorist Popular Revolutionary Army of Colombia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FARC</td>
<td>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDN</td>
<td>Frente Democrático Nicaragüense (Nicaraguan Democratic Front)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIDH</td>
<td>Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme (International Federation for Human Rights)</td>
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<td>FIP</td>
<td>Fundación Ideas para la Paz (Ideas for Peace Foundation)</td>
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<td>FMLN</td>
<td>Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front, El Salvador)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FPSG</td>
<td>Resistance Front against GAM Separatists (Indonesia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambique Liberation Front)</td>
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<td>FSLN</td>
<td>Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (Sandinista National Liberation Front, Nicaragua)</td>
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<td>GAM</td>
<td>Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement, Indonesia)</td>
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<td>ICBF</td>
<td>Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar (Colombian Family Welfare Institute)</td>
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Abbreviations

ICG       International Crisis Group
ICTJ      International Center for Transitional Justice
IEPRI     Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales
           (Institute of Political Studies and International Relations)
IGAC      Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi (Agustín Codazzi
           Geographic Institute)
INPEC     Instituto Nacional Penitenciario y Carcelario (National
           Penitentiary and Prison Institute)
IOM       International Organization for Migration
IRA       Irish Republican Army
JAC       Juntas de Acción Comunal (Community Action
           Committees)
JAL       Juntas Administradora Locales (Local Administration
           Boards)
LRA       Lord’s Resistance Army (Uganda)
M-19      Movimiento 19 de Abril (19th of April Movement)
MAPP      Misión de Apoyo al Proceso de Paz (Mission to Support the
           Peace Process)
MAQL      Movimiento Armado Quintín Lame (Quintín Lame Armed
           Movement)
MAS       Muerte a Secuestradores (Death to Kidnappers)
MEVEC     Mecanismo de Verificación Conjunto de Bandas Criminales
           Emergentes (Joint Verification Mechanism for Emerging
           Criminal Gangs)
MILF      Moro Islamic Liberation Front (Philippines)
MILPAS    Milicias Populares Anti-Somocistas (and later on,
           Anti-Sandinistas) (Anti-Somoza / Anti-Sandinista Popular
           Militias) (Nicaragua)
MNLF      Moro National Liberation Front (Philippines)
MPLA      Movimiento Popular de Libertación de Angolaa (People’s
           Movement for the Liberation of Angola)
MRTA      Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento
           Revolucionario Tupac Amaru, Peru)
NBI       Necesidades Básicas Insatisfechas (unsatisfied basic needs)
NGO       Nongovernmental organization
NRM       National Resistance Movement (Uganda)
OEAS      Organización de los Estados Americanos (Organization of
           American States)
PAC       Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil (Civil Self-Defense Patrols,
           Guatemala)
PCP-SL    Partido Comunista de Perú–Sendero Luminoso (Communist
           Party of Peru–Shining Path)
PEPES     Perseguidos por Pablo Escobar (People Persecuted by Pablo
           Escobar)
### Abbreviations

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<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (Revolutionary Worker’s Party)</td>
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<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambican National Resistance)</td>
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<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAME</td>
<td>Sistema de Acompañamiento, Monitoreo, y Evaluación (System of Accompaniment, Monitoring and Evaluation)</td>
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<td>SENA</td>
<td>Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje (National Training Service)</td>
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<td>SIJJN</td>
<td>Policía Nacional de Colombia (Colombian National Police)</td>
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<td>SIMCI</td>
<td>Sistema Integrado de Monitoreo de Cultivos Ilícitos (Integrated Illicit Crops Monitoring System)</td>
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<td>SLA</td>
<td>Sierra Leone Army</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security-sector reform</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNITA</td>
<td>União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)</td>
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<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<td>UP</td>
<td>Uniión Patriótica (Patriotic Union)</td>
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<td>UPA</td>
<td>Uganda People’s Army</td>
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<td>URNG</td>
<td>Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity)</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>YATAMA</td>
<td>Yapti Tasba Masraka Nanih Aslatakanka (“Sons of Mother Earth,” Nicaragua)</td>
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