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978-1-107-12418-9 - The Burdens of Proof: Discriminatory Power, Weight of Evidence, and Tenacity of Belief

Dale A. Nance

Index

[More information](#)

INDEX

- adjudication as practical
 - reasoning, 16–20
- adjudicative facts
 - distinguished from legislative facts, 2
 - ultimate facts, 1, 22
- admissibility rules, 203, 213, 215–27, 296
- adversarial duty and privilege, 192–3
- adversarial versus inquisitorial procedures
 - consideration of Keynesian weight, 303
 - international tribunals, 296
 - standard of discriminatory power, 27–9
 - taking of evidence, 186–8
- adverse inferences (spoliation), 198, 233, 236–43, 297
- allocation
 - burden of persuasion, 3
 - burden of producing specific evidence. *See* § 4.3
 - initial burden of production, 4
- analysis of evidence. *See* §§ 2.4 & 3.4
 - Bayesian vs. explanatory, 84–91
 - descriptive theories of, 93–5
 - graphical, 91–3
 - tools of informal reasoning, 140–7
- background information, 95–101
 - contestable non-case-specific*, 97
 - prior odds, 95–7
 - uncontested case-specific, 98
- Bayes's rule. *See* analysis of evidence; background information
- belief functions, 167–78
 - Bayesian versus non-Bayesian, 170
 - decision making, 170–8
 - evidential completeness, 168–70
- Bernoulli's theorem, 253
- best evidence principle, 196–200
- best explanation, inference to. *See* inference to the best explanation
- burden of persuasion
 - metaphor of weight, 7–8
 - models of. *See* discriminatory power
 - versus burden of production, 2
- burdens of proof
 - burden of producing specific evidence. *See* Chapter 4
 - persuasion versus production, 1
- complementarity and Keynesian weight (paradox of negation), 166–7
- completeness
 - evidential. *See* evidence
 - verbal, doctrine of, 196
- conditional relevance, 196
- confidence intervals, 254
- conjunction, paradox of, 74–8
- constitutional requirements, 12, 20–1, 215
- contextualism, 284–90
- corroboration rules, 214
- damages, proof of, 157
- decision theory
 - and discriminatory power. *See* § 2.2
 - and Keynesian weight, 120n48
- deontological constraints
 - standard of discriminatory power, 31–5
 - standard of Keynesian weight, 135
 - standard of discriminatory power, 69–72

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-12418-9 - The Burdens of Proof: Discriminatory Power, Weight of Evidence, and Tenacity of Belief

Dale A. Nance

Index

[More information](#)

328

INDEX

- descriptive, prescriptive, and interpretive theory, 11
- discovery
 - and relevance, 188–92
 - sanctions related to, 193–4
- discriminatory power. *See* Chapter 2
 - characterized as weight, 7–8
 - civil cases, standard for, 32–6, 40–2, 170–8
 - criminal cases, standard for, 36–40, 170–8
 - decision-theoretic model, 21–63
 - distinguished from Keynesian weight, 8, 157
 - inference to the best explanation, 79–84
 - relative plausibility theory, 73–9
 - using to regulate primary conduct, 64–73
- embarrassment costs, 273
- endowment effect (loss aversion), 35
- enforcement costs, 36, 39
- epistemic warrant
 - holistic theories of, 156–67
 - relation to probability. *See* probability
- equipoise, default rule for, 3, 24, 63, 255
- evidence
 - weight of. *See* weight of evidence
- evidence, nature and sources of
 - background information, 95–101
 - formally introduced, 22
- expected certainty, 266–7
- fact-finder, role of
 - bifurcation of court, 13
 - monitoring Keynesian weight. *See* § 4.2
 - practical versus theoretical reasoning, 18–20
 - probability assessments, 18–20, 27, 42–63
 - setting standard for discriminatory power, 40–2
 - use of background information. *See* § 2.5
 - use of categorical beliefs. *See* § 5.3
- finality. *See* promptness and finality
- free evaluation of evidence, 55–7
- gestalt holism and Keynesian weight, 161–5
- goals of adjudication
 - Keynesian weight's relation to. *See* § 3.8
- hearsay rule, 196, 233n150
- Holmesian “bad man” cynicism, 65–71, 192–3
- indifference, principle of, 47, 112
- inference to the best explanation, 79–88, 140–4
- informal reasoning, theories of. *See* § 3.4
 - as criteria of decision, 137–40
 - as inferential tools, 140–7
- inquisitorial procedures. *See* adversarial versus inquisitorial procedures
- international tribunals, 294–303
 - criminal courts, 294–5, 300–3
 - International Court of Justice, 295–300
- interpretive theory, 11
- jury as fact-finder. *See* fact-finder, role of
- juror credulity, 196–201
- jury notice, 97
- Keynesian weight
 - adequacy of. *See* § 3.3
 - articulated by Keynes, 111
 - belief functions, theory of. *See* § 3.7
 - chosen, not merely assessed, 115
 - comparative nature, 9, 113, 117–19
 - distinguished from discriminatory power, 8
 - effects on discriminatory power as limit, 137
 - epistemic risk, relation to, 123
 - gestalt holism, relation to, 161–5
 - goals of adjudication, relation to. *See* § 3.8
 - higher order probabilities, 120
 - informal reasoning, relation to. *See* § 3.4
 - international tribunals, evidence before. *See* § 6.2
 - need for a theory of, 9–11
 - practical optimization, 135

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-12418-9 - The Burdens of Proof: Discriminatory Power, Weight of Evidence, and Tenacity of Belief

Dale A. Nance

Index

[More information](#)

INDEX

329

- preferential versus strict standard, 132
 - quantification of. *See* § 3.5
 - quantitative versus qualitative changes in, 113
 - responsibility for. *See* Chapter 4
 - stakes, relation to, 135
 - synthetic holism, relation to, 158–61
 - tenacity of belief, relation to. *See* Chapter 5
 - traddoffs with discriminatory power, 156–8
 - value of increasing, 114–17, 264–7
- legislative facts, 2
- loss aversion (endowment effect), 35
- maximin decision rule, 60–3
- naked statistical evidence
 - civil context, 104–11, 206–9
 - criminal context, 125–9
- negation and Keynesian weight (complementarity), 166–7
- omission bias, 34, 161
- original recording rule, 196–9
- paradox of ideal evidence, 189n13
- paradoxes of probabilistic proof standards
 - conjunction of elements, 74–8
 - negation and complementarity, 166–7
- personal knowledge rule, 196
- practical optimization, 135
- practical reasoning
 - adjudication as, 16–20
- preferential versus strict standards, 132
- prescriptive, descriptive, and interpretive theory, 11
- prior odds and background information. *See* § 2.5
- probability. *See* § 2.2.2
 - causitive, 50–3
 - credal, 44
 - empirical, 43
 - epistemic, 43
 - epistemic warrant, relation to, 48–9, 54–5, 161–5
 - epistemological, 45
 - logical, 44
 - mathematical, 43
 - measurement of, 44–5
 - naive frequentism, 49–50
 - objectivity, aspects of, 47
 - past events, 45
 - positivistic error, 45
 - principle of indifference, 47
 - rationalist, 43
 - second-order uncertainty. *See* § 2.2.3
 - subjective, 44
- probative value, 96
- promptness and finality, 17, 121, 166, 261, 287
- relevance, 188–90
- reliability of expert testimony, 221–7
- resilience. *See* tenacity of belief
- risk avoidance, 123–4
- Second-order uncertainty. *See* § 2.2.3
 - confused with Keynesian weight, 120–2, 253–64
 - imprecision, 58–9
 - lower probabilities and equipoise, 62–3
 - maximin decision rule, 60–3
 - probabilities about probabilities, 59–60
- spoliation of evidence. *See* adverse inferences
- stability of verdicts. *See* § 5.2
- stakes of decision, 135
- standard of proof, 1
 - discriminatory power, relation to. *See* discriminatory power
 - Keynesian weight, requirements of. *See* Keynesian weight
- strict vs. preferential standards, 132
- Succession, Rule of, 112
- surprise, theory of, 290n94
- suspension of judgment. *See* promptness and finality
- synthetic holism and Keynesian weight, 158–61
- tenacity of belief, 11
 - categorical or gradational belief, 251
 - contextualism, 284–90

Cambridge University Press
978-1-107-12418-9 - The Burdens of Proof: Discriminatory Power, Weight of Evidence,
and Tenacity of Belief
Dale A. Nance
Index
[More information](#)

330	INDEX
tenacity of belief (<i>cont.</i>)	ultimate facts, 16, 22
knowledge and commitment,	uncontested case-specific facts, 98
280–2	
resilience of probability, relation to.	verdicts, nature and effect of, 16
<i>See</i> § 5.1	
security of judgments. <i>See</i> § 5.2	weight of evidence, diverse meanings
theoretical reasoning	of, 7–9, 11, 89, 111, 148–56, 168
fact-finding as, 18–20	Wells effect, 108–10