Generations of realist scholars have cited Thucydides’ maxim, “the strong do what they will, and the weak suffer what they must,” as a founding principle of International Relations.1 The well-worn phrase emphasizes the importance of power as a constraint on the leaders of relatively weak states. Scholars of U.S.–Latin American relations have likewise referred to the mighty Athenians’ destruction of the Melians as a metaphor for hemispheric politics. At first blush, power seems to be a reasonable explanation for much of the history between the United States and Latin America, particularly for the predominantly small and weak nations that line the Caribbean. The evidence of power politics is so frequently cited that it will be familiar to most readers when distilled into evocative events and declarations: the Monroe Doctrine, the Roosevelt Corollary, the Platt Amendment, the coups of Guatemala 1954 and Chile 1973, the interventions at the Bay of Pigs, Santo Domingo, and Operation “Just Cause” of Panama.

Indeed, a focus on U.S. power defines the study of U.S.–Latin American relations. “Establishment” scholars argue the United States is on the whole a beneficial presence, while revisionist scholars argue that the northern colossus has harshly pursued its own narrow interests. Despite their differing conclusions, both schools have focused on U.S. power and decisions with comparatively little attention to the actions of Latin American leaders.2 Perhaps this is with good reason. The United States economy is more than 2.5 times larger

1 Following common usage, I use capitalized International Relations or IR to refer to the academic discipline and lowercase international relations to refer to relations between state (or nonstate) actors.

Latin America Confronts the United States

than the combined product of all of Latin America and the Caribbean. Even during a Latin American export boom, the United States exported about 60 percent more than the region as whole.3 Though U.S. policymakers have occasionally decried a surge in Venezuelan military spending, the United States’ armed forces outspend the rest of the hemisphere by a multiple of ten.4 This asymmetry is hardly a new feature of U.S.–Latin American relations; estimates of GDP ranging back to the eve of World War I indicate that the gap was even larger then.5 Furthermore, since the late nineteenth century the United States has deployed these awesome resources via numerous military interventions in countries that border the Caribbean.

In light of these disparities, there has been less attention to the foreign policies of Latin American countries. Given the United States’ overwhelming capabilities and its history of interventions, the ability of Latin American leaders to influence U.S. policy would seem negligible. However, a puzzle emerges. Despite these advantages, the United States has often failed to determine outcomes or control the course of events in the region that it supposedly dominates. Diplomatic historians, exploring recently opened archives throughout the region, have unearthed evidence that points to weaknesses in the dominant theoretical approaches. A focus on the United States is insufficient for understanding U.S.–Latin American relations. Far from being “puppets,” Latin American leaders have exhibited an independent streak – often challenging U.S. policies and creating space for autonomy. I extend this insight to ask how Latin American leaders define and pursue their priorities vis-à-vis the “colossus of the North.”

Likewise, much of IR theory continues to accord little agency to small states. Recent work has argued that “vulnerabilities rather than opportunities are the most striking consequence of smallness,” and that small states “lack real independence.”6 For decades, modified versions of realism were used explain the situations of smaller states, emphasizing systemic factors, an overwhelming need to focus on survival, and the constraints imposed by international

4 According to the SIPRI database, the United States spent $689.6 billion on its military in 2011, compared with $67.6 billion for all of Latin American and the Caribbean (figures in constant 2010 U.S. dollars). SIPRI Military Expenditures Database. Available online: www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex.
5 Though much debated, the most widely cited estimates come from Angus Maddison, The World Economy, vols. 1–2 (Academic Foundation, 2007), pp. 361, 509.
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structures. Meanwhile, critical scholars applied insights from dependency theory to foreign relations, arguing that insecurity is the defining feature of the “third world” in international relations. Both of these approaches offer narratives in which small states play little role. Even classic articles examining small-state influence excluded U.S.–Latin American relations on the assumption that U.S. relations with its Latin American and Caribbean neighbors are very different from those with Canada or small European states.

This book contributes to IR literatures on asymmetrical relations between great powers and weaker states and on weaker-state agency to argue that Latin America has exercised more influence in U.S.–Latin American relations than is usually acknowledged. Latin American leaders have been able to achieve substantial degrees of autonomy. Furthermore, they have at times influenced U.S. policy. Instead of implicitly treating Latin American states as passive “takers” of U.S. policy, this book demonstrates that Latin American states actively shaped the dynamics of their asymmetrical relations. Latin American leaders were also policymakers. The United States’ coercive capabilities were central to the structure of the relationships, but capabilities alone did not determine outcomes. Material asymmetry does not eliminate the possibility for influence by the weaker power.

This chapter turns briefly to scholarly treatments of U.S.–Latin American relations before arguing that we can better understand hemispheric relations by turning to work on the foreign policy power of small states and middle powers. This literature offers insights into U.S.–Latin American relations, but also has notable shortcomings. The conceptualizations of power and influence that are common to IR obscure the possibility of meaningful action from medium and small states like many of those that occupy Latin America. To really understand the relationship between U.S. and Latin American leaders, we must acknowledge the agency of both sides. This requires a broader conceptualization of power and a focus on actors and their strategies in asymmetrical contexts. That framework structures my empirical analyses of how Latin American leaders seek to influence U.S. foreign policy and whether they might succeed in doing so.

The Study of U.S.–Latin American Relations

Since World War II, a body of scholarship has grown around the study of U.S.–Latin American relations. This literature is thematically oriented, and not a subfield of any one discipline, which has created empirical richness, but has

limited theoretical conversation. Explicit theoretical frameworks remain relatively rare. Despite the diversity, three general “schools” can be distinguished.

The first grouping, to borrow Russell Crandall's term, is the “establishment” school. The school has three defining characteristics. First, its explanations of U.S. policy to Latin America center on the U.S. desire to exclude extraterritorial rivals from the hemisphere. Second, establishment authors argue that the United States is, on the whole, a beneficial presence. Third, the establishment school has focused on Latin American reactions to U.S. policy, but Latin American actions have not been a central object of study. These works see U.S. policy as imperfect but on the whole providing benefits for the region. Criticism is generally offered with the intention of drawing attention to or fixing a certain policy failure, as opposed to questioning the fundamental role of the United States in the hemisphere.

Robert A. Pastor described the “security thesis” as the central tenet of this school. The security thesis shares much with a realist vision of the world, as Gregory Weeks has noted. First advanced by Samuel Flagg Bemis, this thesis argues that the overriding goal of U.S. policy in Latin America has been to prevent any extra-hemispheric power from establishing a base within the hemisphere from which it could threaten the continental United States. The Monroe Doctrine made this clear even before the United States had the power to enforce its proclamations. After watching foreign creditors shell the harbors of debtor nations, Theodore Roosevelt articulated more extensive conditions under which the United States would intervene – and intervene the United States did during the next three decades. The Good Neighbor Policy tried to accomplish these same goals through partnership. During the Cold War, Washington at times abandoned nonintervention to prevent the emergence of threats. The United States seemed drawn into the region by crises

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10 Russell Crandall, The United States and Latin America after the Cold War (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
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in “an alternating cycle of fixation and inattention.” The Cuban Missile Crisis represented the ultimate nightmare of the security thesis – an existential threat ninety miles from U.S. shores.

The major tension in the establishment school reflects old debates about power and principle. Pastor argues that the United States has married the security thesis with an exceptional approach to world affairs – a “revolutionary vision.” Establishment authors argue that U.S.–Latin American relations have created mutual benefits in three categories: stability, economics and trade, and democracy. Interstate war has been infrequent in the Western Hemisphere. Since the War of the Pacific in 1879–1883, territorial conquest has been minor and rare. Peaceful settlement of disputes has been the norm, with the United States playing a direct role in the arbitration of numerous border conflicts. The region has been a leader in the creation of multilateral institutions, reflecting traditions of Bolivarianism and Pan-Americanism. The promotion of democracy has been a central element of U.S. policy dating to Woodrow Wilson’s emphasis on elections, though there is much debate about both the effectiveness and sincerity of the effort. According to Crandall, U.S. interventions have often helped spur democracy. Perhaps a more frequent critique in recent years – and at intervals since World War II – is that the United States should be doing more good in Latin America in place of its current nonpolicy of “neglect.”

Both of these central establishment claims lead to a focus on U.S. actions at the expense of Latin American actors. In the security thesis, the key concern is the U.S. perception of threats. Latin America is present as a space from which dangerous attacks could occur, not as an actor. Threatening actors are primarily nonhemispheric challengers, taking advantage of Latin America’s proximity to U.S. shores. The second claim paints Latin Americans primarily as recipients

19 This definition emerges from the Monroe Doctrine itself.
of benefits generated by U.S. power and principle. Latin Americans react to U.S. policies, but their actions are not the primary object of analysis.

A “revisionist synthesis” solidified during the 1980s and early 1990s. This school goes well beyond the acknowledgment of imperfections or aberrations in U.S. policy to reject its fundamental precepts. This synthesis draws upon the work of scholars like Walter LaFeber, who saw a union of U.S. business and government interests in a quest to economically dominate Latin America. LaFeber argued that U.S. geography allowed it to be isolationist, but “internal developments, as interpreted by American policymakers,” led the United States to imperial behaviors. In another classic work, The Open Veins of Latin America, Uruguayan scholar Eduardo Galeano traced how the land and people of the continent have been exploited in the production of basic commodities. The conclusions of these histories coincided in many respects with dependency theory, and these scholars have been variously termed “radical,” the “neodependency antithesis,” “counterconventional,” and “anti-imperialist.”

Mark Gilderhus’ term “revisionist” recognizes that the scholarship grew as a response to a then-dominant establishment view. By the early 1990s, revisionists so dominated work on U.S.–Latin American relations that even thoroughly establishment works recognized revisionist contributions in demonstrating the gap between public rhetoric and private interests in U.S. policy to Latin America. U.S. complicity with human rights violations in the Southern Cone and massive bloodshed in Central America during the 1970s and 1980s gave this criticism powerful contemporary resonance.

From its economic origins, the school evolved to incorporate other critical perspectives. Revisionists probed the prejudices of U.S. policymakers, examined U.S. cultural and economic interventions, and argued that Latin America was a “workshop” for the global American empire. Starting with Beneath the United States, Lars Schoultz has produced influential works that mine U.S.

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historical records to examine the impacts of U.S. policymakers’ racial biases. Schoultz’s work on U.S. relations with Cuba illustrates how U.S. policymakers’ beliefs in their own superiority and disregard for Cuban nationalism spanned decades, with deleterious effects. The revisionist synthesis has expanded to reflect new currents including “gender theory, ethnohistory, cultural studies, and business history to reexamine and offer fresh insights into what was once the most conventional of topics,” noted Thomas O’Brien. The seminal volume Close Encounters of Empire compiled these diverse approaches to illustrate how the subject of U.S.–Latin American relations can be explored beyond the realm of government action.

Despite the school’s breadth, U.S. interventions have remained a central theme. Greg Grandin has been the most visible recent scholar, starting with his scholarly work The Last Colonial Massacre, in which he argues that U.S. interventions in Guatemala and elsewhere were less about ending communism than about stamping out social democracy. His popular polemic, Empire’s Workshop, argued that George W. Bush’s worldwide display of unilateralism was a natural outgrowth of long-standing U.S. policies in Latin America.

Grandin’s work points to an area of frequent division that is useful for illustrating the difference between the establishment and revisionist approaches: the use of “empire,” “hegemon,” and “colonial” to describe the United States and its policies. In their use of these terms, establishment and revisionist scholars seem to be talking past one another more than talking to one another. Rather than starting with a clear definition of what an empire is, much of this work starts with the proclamation of the United States as an empire, with little attention to previous usage of the term. While the term “empire” might be a potent criticism of U.S. policies, it has less acknowledged, deleterious effects on our understanding of Latin America. The term treats U.S. relations with two

29 O’Brien, “Interventions, Conventional and Unconventional: Current Scholarship on Inter-American Relations.”
31 Grandin, Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism.
dozen Latin American states as relatively homogenous. The history of relations with Nicaragua has little in common with relations with Brazil, as Carlos Gustavo Poggio Teixeira recently argued. 33 “Empire” presents an exaggerated and unvariegated notion of U.S. power, under which the United States should be successful in getting its way more often than not. Traditionally “empire” had been used to describe a relationship of near-total political control of peripheral territory by a central power; peripheral states have no autonomy in foreign policy and very constrained freedom to set domestic policy. 34 To call the United States an empire in Latin America risks denying Latin Americans’ autonomy and agency.

Latin American Scholarship

While the relegation of Latin American actors to subordinate status could be the result of one-sided Northern scholars, the main currents of IR scholarship in Latin America have similarly denied a major autonomous role for Latin American states. Guided by the Economic Commission on Latin America and Brazil’s Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros, Latin American social scientists’ internationally minded scholarship was heavily economic in focus. Dependency theory grew out of these scholar–policymakers’ concerns about an unequal and worsening global distribution of production. These traditions inspired a focus on international structures and U.S. intervention. Foreign policy scholars who drew on dependency theory often treated Latin American leaders as U.S. lackeys who exploited their intermediate positions for personal gain. This critique was reinforced by a surge in authoritarianism during the late 1960s and 1970s. 35 These studies bred a concern with autonomy as a central concept in the study of Latin American IR – though autonomy has been discussed as a constant quest for enlightened elites rather than an (imperfect) reality. 16 In an influential critique, Carlos Escudé argued that the quest for

33 Carlos Gustavo Poggio Teixeira, Brazil, the United States, and the South American Subsystem: Regional Politics and the Absent Empire (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2012).
autonomy could undermine the quest for development, so leaders should ally themselves with the United States and derive benefits from the alliance.37

There has been much recent work on Brazilian foreign policy, in particular, which employs a more multinational perspective. Amado Luiz Cervo’s *História da política exterior do Brasil* is perhaps the foundational survey of Brazilian foreign policy.38 Cervo notes that North American theorists enjoy a privileged place in Brazilian IR.39 Recently, Carlos Poggio Teixeira argued that IR studies of U.S.–Latin American relations have failed because scholars have treated the whole of Latin America as one subordinated system. Instead, South America and North/Central America need to be approached as distinct subsystems. In South America the United States has been an “absent empire” largely because of Brazil’s presence as a status quo–seeking, middle power.40 Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira employs impressive multinational archival research in exploring the shifting relations and allegiances between the United States, Argentina, and Brazil from the 1864 War of the Triple Alliance until the middle of the first decade of the 2000s.41 In a rare, quantitative study of the foreign policy of a Latin American country, Octavio Amorim Neto attempted to weigh competing explanations for Brazil’s foreign policy orientation, arguing that Brazilian policy has become more independent from the United States.42

IR scholars in Mexico and Colombia are shaping a less U.S.-centric body of work in countries with deeper U.S. involvement. Mario Ojeda’s classic text presented Mexico as a “weak country” whose “relative independence” was limited by U.S. power and proximity. Within those conditions, however, Mexico took a stand that defended and advanced its interests where it could.43 With the end of the Cold War and the country’s greater integration with the United States and world market, Mexico’s foreign policy shifted dramatically. It has prioritized expanding trade and investment and adopted less rigid

37 Carlos Escudé, *Foreign Policy Theory in Menem’s Argentina* (Gainesville, Fla: University Press of Florida, 1997).
40 Teixeira, *Brazil, the United States, and the South American Subsystem*. For a different view, see Sean W. Burges, “Mistaking Brazil For a Middle Power,” *Journal of Iberian and Latin American Research* 19, no. 2 (2013).
interpretations of sovereignty and nonintervention. Pragmatism and bilateral cooperation guide Mexico’s foreign policy and have often led it away from high-profiled diplomatic stands. In addition, there has been great interest in Mexican IR regarding how international changes have affected Mexico’s democratization, liberalization, and foreign policy. Colombian scholars have understandably focused on the international dimensions of their country’s decades-long civil conflict. This has led to interest in the relationship between the domestic and international spheres in U.S.–Latin American relations and its effects on questions like military bases. As in work on Brazil, new scholarship from these two countries often reflects an appreciation for both constraints on and possibilities for independent foreign policies.

An Internationalist Approach

Authors in both the establishment school and revisionist synthesis concentrate on U.S. power and its effects on the region, though with very different emphases and interpretations. This led Max Paul Friedman to note that despite the diverse approaches in the literature, there was also one-sidedness: “Mononational research tends to produce mononational explanations and to ignore the role of players from countries other than those whose words are examined.” The previous literature on U.S.–Latin American relations had largely ignored Latin American actors for empirical and theoretical reasons. For one part, archival materials were scarce or difficult to obtain. Even when those sources were available they were often ignored because of a “theoretical model in which the United States was the actor and Latin America the dependent, defenseless object.”

In 2003, Friedman could point to several historians whose work demonstrated the value of multinational research. This trend has grown into an

46 See the contributions to Sandra Borda and Arlene B. Tickner, eds., Relaciones Internacionales y Política Exterior de Colombia (Bogotá, Colombia: Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Departamento de Ciencia Política-CESO, 2011); Alejandro Gaviria Uribe and Mejía Londoño, eds., Políticas Antidroga en Colombia: Éxitos, Fracasos y Extravíos (Bogotá, Colombia: Universidad de los Andes, 2011), pp. 205–234.
48 Friedman, “Retiring the Puppets, Bringing Latin America Back In: Recent Scholarship on United States–Latin American Relations,” p. 625.