1 Introduction

There are lots of introductions to feminism, and many of them begin by pointing out that there are lots of introductions to feminism. Then they normally say how the present book is special and different. So I will now try to do that.

Much contemporary feminist political philosophy belongs squarely within a liberal framework. Students unfailingly learn about John Stuart Mill, sometimes with almost the idea that he was feminism’s founding father. They learn about ‘gender justice’, and about the attitudes that liberals should take towards the family, if they are to be good feminists as well as good liberals. They are asked to consider whether the liberal commitment to an attitude of ‘tolerance’ towards cultural minorities is compatible or incompatible with the liberal feminist commitment to women’s autonomy and equality. They also consider whether the liberal commitment to ‘freedom of speech’ is compatible with feminist critiques of pornography.

I don’t want to ignore these familiar debates and questions, but I do aim to provide a different and more distanced take on them, asking about the presuppositions and hidden implications of the way in which these debates and questions are selected, set up and presented. I also want to pay attention to some of the many facets of feminism that are neglected by the standard treatments. For example, I devote a larger portion of the space than is usual, for an introductory text, to the relationship between socialist or Marxist ideas and feminist ones. I also include a chapter dealing with anarchism and ‘anarcha-feminism’. If Marxism and socialism are side-lined in mainstream political philosophy, including mainstream feminism, anarchism is often virtually invisible – perhaps because it is thought too obviously stupid or impractical to deserve serious consideration.¹ This can only be ‘obvious’, however, if

¹ As Carol Ehrlich (1977, p. 4) points out: ‘Anarchist feminism could provide a meaningful theoretical framework, but all too many feminists have either never heard of it, or else dismiss it as the ladies’ auxiliary of male bomb-throwers.’
anarchism is grossly misrepresented (hence, anarchism is grossly misrepresented). I hope to make a small gesture against this misrepresentation and neglect. But perhaps the most important respect in which my discussion differs from the mainstream liberal approach to feminism (and to political philosophy in general) is in the much heavier emphasis I'll place on practice: on the actions and activism that make up a crucial part of what feminism is and has been. Feminism is not just a body of theory. Just as socialism was for Marx, it is a real movement to abolish the present state of things.

I should also say something about what this book is not. First, while I hope that the book will give some sense of the diversity and vastness of feminist theory and practice, it is not complete or comprehensive (and in no way intended to be so). There will inevitably be many things that I could or should have talked about (or talked about more), and only some of them will be apparent to me. I have, for example, said relatively little about lesbian and queer feminisms. I have tried to pay heed to the racial dimensions of oppression and to be attentive to the critiques which black feminists have made against a theory and practice in which white women have been dominant. But it is probably only because I am a white woman that I have had to make such a conscious effort – otherwise, it would be difficult not to notice these things – and I would be very surprised if the attempt were to be a complete success. The best response to that is not self-flagellation or hand-wringing, however, but just to see it as an affirmation of the importance of black feminist critiques, and of the need for real social transformation that goes beyond the reform of our ways of theorising.

Second, this book is offered neither as an expert guide nor as a guide to the experts: I make no particular claim to expertise, and in fact, that concept often seems to me a dangerously unsuitable one to apply to politics. As should already be apparent, however, this book is an opinionated introduction. It may be more usual, in introductory texts, to affect a position of ‘neutrality’ – a position which I don’t believe to be either possible or desirable. Instead, I have tried simply to write down what I think is relevant, important and true – which I take to be the basic obligation of any writer. I will speak my mind here, and spare readers the usual assurances that they are free to make up their own. Such assurances are bad form, when you think about it. They manage to embody not only the kind of devious appeasement strategy that is often the recourse of subordinates, but to conjure at the same time something of the commanding tone of the patriarch. If I were to marry a man, it wouldn’t
be a man who assured me that I would be let out of the house whenever I wished.

This book does not represent my settled thoughts. My views on many of the questions and issues covered are still in flux, and even from one day to the next I find myself seeing them in different and contrasting lights. As a result, I cannot expect to agree in the future with everything I have said here. My hope for the book is not that, anyway, but instead that its underlying torn-ness and suspension of ultimate verdict may be in some way instructive.

A final point. This book is not just about women – a reflection of the important fact that feminism is not just about women. Not that it would be such a terrible thing – with women making up over half the population – if a book or even a movement were to be ‘just’ about them. But all the same, feminism done properly cannot only be about women; and it cannot only be about women for the very simple reason that women are human. For that reason alone, a book about feminism must keep coming back, again and again, to matters and concepts such as class, race, power, ‘critical theory’, ‘false consciousness’ – things which are not just ‘women’s issues’, but issues for the people that women as well as other kinds of human being are.

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2 As the American activist and scholar Angela Davis puts it, ‘feminism is not only about women, nor only about gender. It is a broader methodology that can enable us to better conceptualize and fight for progressive change’ (2008, p. 25).
2 Feminist theory, feminist practice

There are two main ways of interpreting the question, ‘What is feminism?’ The first is to interpret it as asking what the general flavour of the thing is – what is its content? What is it about? What does it stand for? But another, equally important, question to ask is the question of what sort of thing feminism is, in a more basic sense. All sorts of objects can have ‘content’, or be ‘about’ something – books, films, utterances, gestures. What kind of thing is feminism?

A likely answer to this is that feminism is a form of theory: the theory which identifies and opposes what it calls sexism, misogyny or patriarchy. But feminism is not just a matter of words; it is also a way of living and struggling against the status quo. This aspect is often treated as secondary, in the order of meanings offered in dictionary entries for the word ‘feminism’, and also in terms of where political philosophers tend to place emphasis – feminism may be acknowledged to have a practical aspect, but the focus of philosophers is on feminist theory (with practice regarded as primarily a matter of the application of theoretical insights). Against this, some feminists have chosen to emphasise feminism as a practical struggle. bell hooks, for example, has defined it as ‘a movement to end sexism and sexist oppression’ and as a ‘liberation movement’. This book sides with hooks in mounting some resistance to the dominant approach, and emphasising the practical side of feminism. But in order to see more clearly what it even means to take sides on the issue of ‘theory versus practice’, it’s useful to say something more about the notions of theory and practice, and about the relationship between them.

1 This is the (intentionally lower-case) pen-name used by the writer Gloria Jean Watkins.
Theory and practice are not two cleanly separate types of feminism, or alternative forms that feminism can take: the protest and the treatise. To expound a theory is also an action, and sometimes an important political intervention – as we'll see, the insight that to say something is to do something has been an extremely important one for some feminists. The radical feminist Andrea Dworkin asserts the self-conscious status of her own writing, her theory, as practice with unmistakable force in the opening lines of her first book, Woman Hating:

This book is an action, a political action where revolution is the goal. It has no other purpose. It is not cerebral wisdom, or academic horseshit, or ideas carved in granite or destined for immortality. It is part of a process and its context is change. It is part of a planetary movement to restructure community forms and human consciousness so that people have power over their own lives, participate fully in community, live in dignity and freedom.3

Equally, to do something – e.g. to go on strike or to chain oneself to the railings – is not just a dumb physical action; it is also to say something, to make a statement or even an argument. As lawyer and feminist theorist Catharine MacKinnon puts it: 'Speech acts. Acts speak.'4

In that case, it’s not clear that it makes much sense to see theory and practice as two separate classes of thing – or to see ‘theory’ as a simple and neatly demarcated subclass of ‘practice’ – where one is dominant over the other. Yet, to dispense altogether with the distinction between theory and practice would be neither good theory nor good practice. Instead, I suggest, the best way to conceive of that distinction is as a distinction between two aspects or ways of looking, which are both always simultaneously present and available: to look at something as a piece of theory is to look at it with an eye to, for example, its (propositional) content, its argument, scope and presuppositions; to look at the same thing as a piece of practice, perhaps, is to pay more attention to its origin, context, functions or effects.

Of course, the question then immediately arises as to what makes it appropriate or correct to look at something ‘as practice’ rather than ‘as theory’: and it is a question with no short or simple answer. One generally valid thing to say about that, however, is that what is an appropriate way to look at something, an appropriate choice of focus or approach, must depend on our purposes.

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And it is clear that a central purpose of feminism is that of opposing the system of patriarchy – which means emancipating and improving the lives of women. The ultimate answerability of feminist theory to this objective suggests one powerful reason to keep the practical aspect of feminism firmly in sight.\(^5\)

Having said something about the form, let us now say some more about the content. There is no single, coherent, positive doctrine called feminism. If feminism is to be defined at all, I would suggest, it is better defined negatively, in terms of what it opposes – in this respect, feminism is comparable to anti-racism, more akin to anti-capitalism than to socialism. Feminism has two basic components.\(^6\) First, it recognises or posits a fact: the fact of patriarchy. Second, it opposes the state of affairs represented by that fact.

‘Patriarchy’ names a system in which men rule or have power over or oppress women, deriving benefit from doing so, at women’s expense. Feminists believe that this system exists, and not as something minor or peripheral or as a hangover from an earlier age, but as central, woven into the fabric of social reality. They may disagree about the nature of patriarchy – what is power? What is the benefit that men derive from their collective power over women? – but they all agree that it is real.\(^7\)

It is worth pointing out straight away that in asserting patriarchy as a fact, feminists are not committed to the claim that it is only women who suffer under that system. Noting the ways in which men suffer is in no way an objection to this basic feminist assertion, but points to something of which most feminists are perfectly aware and which many explicitly acknowledge. In this respect, feminism runs parallel to another much-misunderstood body of thought and practice: Marxism. At least for Marx himself, it is simply not

\(^5\) Of course, most feminists would say that the practical aspect of feminism is important. (Mere) sayings are easy. The real question is what we then do, where that question includes not just the matter of whether we turn up to protests, but also the matter of what further things we say. I cannot make this book turn up to a protest, but I can try to make sure it doesn’t just state the importance of talking about feminism as practice and then forget to talk about feminism as practice.

\(^6\) Taken on its most general level of understanding, that is. There are many and varied ‘feminisms’, as we are told at the start of virtually every general introductory article or book on the subject.

\(^7\) This is a political claim on my part. There are, of course, people who label themselves ‘feminists’ but do not believe that patriarchy exists (any longer). They can call themselves what they like, but we do not have to follow suit.
the case that the proletariat are the only ones to suffer under capitalism (for example, to suffer from alienation). From a Marxist point of view, whilst at one level the capitalist clearly benefits from the exploitation of the worker, there is an equally important sense in which the capitalist, too, would be better off in a classless society where human beings would no longer be estranged from one another and would be better able to develop the creative powers that are essential to who and what they are. Marxists can say this whilst simultaneously holding that there is something fundamentally and systematically different about the situations of capitalist and worker.

Any plausible feminist position will say something analogous about the situation of men and women under patriarchy, although it is perhaps helpful to distinguish a stronger and weaker version of the thesis. At the very least, any tenable feminism must make room for the vulnerability and humanity of men, even whilst it regards them as the dominant or oppressor class. It is a short step from this to the recognition that patriarchy is one of the things that might be a cause of suffering for men – the stock example here is the pressure to be conventionally ‘masculine’ and to suppress emotion. Call this recognition the weaker thesis. But acknowledging patriarchy as one source of men’s suffering is not yet to claim that men are overall ‘worse off’ under patriarchy, or that patriarchy is ‘bad for’ men. Lots of things which are beneficial for a person or group will also have some downsides for that person or group – e.g. the side-effects of an effective medication, or the higher vulnerability of white people to sunburn – and yet we can still say that people benefit in general from being members of certain groups, and are disadvantaged by the membership of others.

So, to say that men not only suffer some of the downsides of patriarchy, but are actually worse off because of it, would be to make a stronger claim. The stronger claim, in turn, admits of two main readings; and it makes sense for a feminist to commit to one reading, whilst disowning the other. To say that men are worse off under patriarchy raises the question: worse off relative to what? What feminists must deny is that men are worse off – or even equally badly off – relative to women under patriarchy. To think this would be to abandon the core feminist commitment to the idea of a fact of patriarchy: in what sense is something patriarchy, if it damages men more than women, or...

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8 See ‘Estranged labour’, in Marx’s Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts (1967 [1844]).
damages men and women equally? In what sense is something feminism, if what it analyses and opposes is analysed and opposed as a system that is not damaging to women in particular? The feminist philosopher Marilyn Frye puts the point by reserving the concept of oppression (i.e. patriarchal or ‘phallist’ oppression) to apply exclusively to the situation of women: ‘When the stresses and frustrations of being a man are cited as evidence that oppressors are oppressed by their oppressing, the word “oppression” is being stretched to meaninglessness.’

It is worth noting, however, that this does not exclude a second reading of the stronger claim, which restores the parallel with Marxist theory noted above: women are worse off under patriarchy, relative to men; but we may also say that both men and women are worse off under patriarchy, relative to the hypothetical inhabitants of a post-patriarchal world.

Feminists, I’ve noted, are further united by their opposition to the system of patriarchy. The nature of this opposition, like the characterisation of patriarchy, will take different forms depending on the sort of feminist we are talking about. Many feminists have used various moral notions to criticise patriarchy, describing it in terms of ‘wrongness’ or ‘injustice’. Others have sought to avoid ‘moralising’ language, some aspiring to fight patriarchy through ruthlessly factual analysis of the mechanisms through which it functions, and of the legal and other resources at hand to combat it.

Those feminists

9 One rejoinder to this might run along lines analogous to the idea of the ‘white man’s burden’: there is a fact of patriarchy in the sense that men do run the world, but they do not run it in such a way as to benefit themselves relative to women (at least once you factor in the burdens and costs of leadership). I’ve characterised ‘patriarchy’ above in such a way as to preclude this – by building into the definition of ‘patriarchy’ that it is something which serves men’s interests and undermines women’s – but if we were to adopt a more minimal definition couched only in terms of who rules (or leads, has power, etc.), my point would still hold: adopting this version of the stronger thesis might not amount to a denial of the fact of patriarchy, on this understanding of the term ‘patriarchy’, but it still amounts to a denial of a core feminist commitment, i.e. a commitment to opposing patriarchy on the grounds of what it does to women. (In my chosen layout, it was not specified that the feminist opposition to patriarchy had to be on these grounds – as opposed to, for example, being motivated by the need to alleviate the terrible pressures of leadership that the system places on men; but this should be taken as implicit.)


11 This is the stance taken most notably by Catharine MacKinnon. Without positively denying that women’s oppression is wrong – and certainly without judging it to be ‘right’ – MacKinnon deliberately avoids presenting her thesis as a moral one. She
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see their opposition as being stronger rather than weaker for the adoption of this stance and strategy. Once again, then, there is a constant amid the differences: if it doesn’t oppose patriarchy, it’s not feminism.

There are a number of common ways in which feminism, as just characterised, might be misconstrued, or unfairly dismissed, or both. I will try now to pre-empt two of them.

2.1 Prophylactics

2.1.1 Descriptive and normative: against a gulf

I’ve described a ‘core’ of feminism, composed of two main elements: recognition of patriarchy; opposition to patriarchy. In the language currently popular in analytic philosophy, the first element would be classed as ‘descriptive’ (it says something about what the world is like, namely that it is characterised by the system of patriarchy), and the second element would be classed as ‘normative’ (it seems to make a claim about how the world should be, i.e. that patriarchy should not obtain). This distinction can be a helpful one, so long as we don’t mistake its status. For a start, I already noted above that the ‘normative’ core component of feminism need not necessarily take the form of a commitment to a moral ‘should’-claim, e.g. a claim that patriarchy is ‘wrong’, or ‘unjust’, or ‘should not’ exist, or ‘should’ be swept away. A plain commitment to resistance might be what is at issue. We can call such a commitment ‘normative’ if we like, but it would be an unusual use of that term: norma is a rule or standard; and in the context of contemporary analytic ethics and political philosophy, ‘normativity’ is implicitly understood as being a matter of holding actual or possible practices up against certain rules, standards, or principles, and judging them accordingly. Whether or not that is the right way to think about patriarchy, it should be recognised that it is not an approach that all feminists share. So whilst there is a useful distinction to be drawn between, on the one hand, identifying or analysing patriarchy, and, on the other, opposing it, we shouldn’t allow the ubiquitous vocabulary of ‘normativity’ to push us into a premature narrowing of possibilities as to

says, in the Preface to Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (1989, p. xii): ‘This book is also not a moral tract. It is not about right and wrong or what I think is good or bad to think or do. It is about what is, the meaning of what is, and the way what is, is enforced.’
what opposition might mean or what forms it might take. The importance of this will become clearer.

Another mistake to guard against is the idea that there is a simple dichotomy between ‘descriptive’ and ‘normative’ – i.e. the idea that this distinction delineates two cleanly separate and non-overlapping classes of claims, statements or theories. Take a disagreement between someone who says that women now enjoy ‘equality’, and someone who denies this. This will most likely not be a straightforward disagreement over empirical matters of fact such as how much women earn, relative to men, for the same work (significantly less, it turns out). The claim that women enjoy ‘equality’ with men may have the form of a descriptive claim, but it will always turn out to carry normative content. To say that there is equality between men and women is not to say that all things are distributed equally between them (what could that even mean? What about the possession of breasts or penises?). It is to say that they are equal in the ways in which it is right or just that they should be equal: if you think that it is enough that all professions be formally open (where possible) to both men and women, then you may say that ‘equality’ has (with one or two exceptions) been achieved, even though the women in a given profession will tend to earn less than the men in that same profession; if you don’t think this formal equality of opportunity is enough, then you are likely to reject that ‘description’. When people say that women and men are equal nowadays, what this means is that they do not think that women and men should be equal in the ways in which they are still not equal (or, perhaps, that they don’t much care either way).

So, many ‘descriptive’ statements might also be seen to have a normative dimension: they do describe the world, but they describe the world in a way that can only be fully appreciated if one sees them as containing an implicit evaluation of the world, or at least a supportive or oppositional reaction to it. It’s worth noting that throughout feminism’s history, resistance to feminist ideas has very often presented itself in an at least superficially descriptive form: it would be argued, for example, not that women are innately inferior and deserve their subordinated position – although of course that was often enough argued as well – but that the status quo in fact already displayed a relationship of harmony, reciprocity or even equality between the sexes.\(^\text{12}\)

\(^\text{12}\) The nineteenth-century feminist and economist Charlotte Perkins Gilman was concerned to attack such apologetics for the status quo, arguing vociferously against