

COST–BENEFIT ANALYSIS FOR PROJECT APPRAISAL

Written by two leading experts, this is a compact guide to the key tools and methods necessary to carry out cost–benefit analysis (CBA). The authors use modern economic tools to obtain general equilibrium cost–benefit rules that can be used to evaluate small projects, as well as large and even megaprojects. Intertemporal issues like discounting, the shadow price of capital, and the treatment of risk are covered, and a state-of-the-art summary of available methods for the valuation of unpriced commodities is also included. In addition, the book provides detailed expositions of the marginal cost of public goods (MCPF), the marginal excess burden of taxes (MEB), and second-best evaluation rules, and shows how these concepts are inter-related. The importance of undertaking due diligence in evaluations is highlighted. This is an excellent toolkit for graduate students learning about the principles of CBA, and is a useful guide for government officials and policy makers.

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Cambridge University Press
978-1-107-12102-7 - Cost–Benefit Analysis for Project Appraisal
Per-Olov Johansson and Bengt Kriström
Frontmatter
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CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

It furthers the University's mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of education, learning and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.org

Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107548220

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First published 2016

Printed in the United Kingdom by TJ International Ltd. Padstow Cornwall

A catalog record for this publication is available from the British Library

ISBN 978-1-107-12102-7 Hardback

ISBN 978-1-107-54822-0 Paperback

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Preface

The background to this manual is multifold. The authors publish on theoretical issues and teach graduate courses in cost–benefit analysis (CBA) and similar techniques, domestically as well as internationally. They have also been involved in a considerable number of empirical cost–benefit studies: forestry, labor market policies, plant relocations, alternative fuels for vehicles, river reregulation, and so on. In addition, the authors have been members of academic panels reviewing cost–benefit manuals produced by different national and international organizations and banks. Over time our interest in putting together our experiences on theoretical and empirical appraisals of CBA has evolved. In particular, tools are available to today’s cost–benefit practitioners that were unavailable a decade or so ago. The world is also different, with flexible exchange rates (for some, but not for others), deregulated capital markets, liberalized trade flows, and so on, in comparison to what it was a few decades ago when the classic cost–benefit manuals were written. In addition, environmental concerns and concerns for the sustainability of resource stocks play a much more central role today. These are some of the reasons for providing a compact manual for CBA drawing on recent research results. We believe that a manual of this kind could be useful for graduate students in economics and for those evaluating projects and policies at governments, international organizations, and consulting firms. In particular, the manual provides a very straightforward toolkit that should be useful to the practitioner, particularly since virtually every actual evaluation provides the appraiser with surprises and effects that are not covered by existing “cookbooks.”

We are grateful to Martin Hill for providing us with references to computable general equilibrium (CGE) studies that are of relevance for CBA, and to Ginés de Rus for providing suggestions with respect to the measurement of benefits in transport studies. Karl-Gustaf Löfgren read an earlier draft and provided many useful comments and suggestions. Thanks to Maria Hedvall for pointing out an embarrassing error in an earlier draft of the manuscript. Three anonymous referees

provided detailed comments and suggestions that were very helpful in revising the manuscript. We are also grateful to our editor at the CUP, Phil Good, for continuous support during the publication process. Thanks are also due to the *Journal of Benefit–Cost Analysis*, its Editor-in-Chief Scott Farrow, and the authors Lisa Robinson and James Hammitt for allowing us to reproduce some advice for cost–benefit practitioners from their article *Behavioral economics and the conduct of benefit–cost analysis: towards principles and standards*. Chandra Kiran B. Krishnamurthy not only read an earlier draft but also provided us with valuable comments and suggestions. We acknowledge financial support from the Swedish Energy Agency, Project 36619-1. The project financed the polishing of the language of the final version of the manuscript by Rachel Siegel at CambridgeEditors. Finally, any remaining errors and other flaws are our own responsibility.

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