Introduction

Electoral Integration in Europe

At the turn of the 20th century politics in Bulgaria was dominated by a large liberal party representing the democratically oriented bourgeoisie and independent entrepreneurs who favoured constitutionalism, parliamentarism, and social policies while the main opposition was constituted by conservatives of the richer upper classes and clergy.[1] These elitarian parties ruled until World War I when the challenge coming from the parties of the "masses" – the socialist BRSDP and the agrarian BZNS – became majoritarian among the enfranchised male electorate, only to be in turn overtaken as soon as 1920 by the Bulgarian Communist Party. An unstable party system consisting of socialists, agrarians, and communists on the left and liberals and conservatives on the right managed to survive until 1931 – the last democratic election until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.

Such early party system development is typical of Europe and appears in classical accounts of political parties from Ostrogorski (1902), to Michels (1911), Duverger (1954), and Rokkan (1970), among many others.[2] In fact, it is the story of most European party systems whether of Britain and its early parliamentarism; of Germany, Italy, and Switzerland as they formed from the struggle for national unification; of Austria and Hungary and the other nations emerging from the break-up of multi-national empires in Central and Eastern

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[1] The liberals eventually split over the "national question", namely whether military action was needed to face the Russian Balkan policy, into various parties among which was the National Party willing to collaborate with the conservatives who favoured negotiations.

[2] The exhaustive 1999 compilation of Stein Rokkan's work is used throughout this volume unless specified otherwise. The date 1970 refers to the seminal collection of previous work *Citizens, Elections, Parties* (Bergen: Universitetforlaget). Ostrogorski's detailed analysis in the first volume focuses on the United Kingdom, long seen as a model of party system development. See also classical volumes by Neumann (1956), Epstein (1961), Dahl (1966), LaPalombara and Weiner (1966), and Sartori (1976).

Europe; or of the Nordic countries. Indeed, a contemporary commentator simply described the Bulgarian party system as "European".[3] The early opposition between liberals and conservatives during the periods of restricted suffrage, the rise of parties of mass mobilization with the extension of franchise to workers and peasants, the division of the left into socialists and communists after the Soviet Revolution of 1917, and even the breakdown of democracy under totalitarian ideologies in the 1930s are common features of electoral history during the constituent phases of European party systems. Such commonality persists in later phases of electoral development after World War II with the rise of Christian democracy and the welfare state,[4] the new politics of emancipatory values eventually leading to green parties, and the radical-right politics of anti-globalization and anti-immigration which have recently manifested in populist parties throughout the continent.[5]

These common patterns stand in stark contrast to the diversity of Europe – a territorially fragmented continent with a variety of institutional orders; separate and conflictual historical trajectories; a complex mosaic of languages, religions, ethnicities, and political cultures; as well as social and economic conditions ranging from modern and open urban centres to backward and secluded rural or mountain regions. Not only have some of these territories dominated others for centuries as in the case of the Habsburg, Ottoman, and Russian Empires or in the British Isles and Scandinavia, some of them achieved statehood centuries before others could reach independence or unification.[6] Which commonality exists between regions geographically, economically, and culturally as far apart as latifundia-dominated southern Italy and the old Hanseatic trading cities and the early industrializing North? How can the politics of a small, inward-looking, Alpine republic like Switzerland be based on similar state–church and left–right divisions as neighbouring colonial and maritime world power France? What makes, as it were, the party system of a "peripheral" south-eastern Balkan country like Bulgaria look so "European"?[7]

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[3] See Konstantin Irechek in his *Knyazhestvo Balgaria* (1899) quoted in Todorov (2010).

[4] After World War II the acceptance on the part of the Catholic Church of liberal institutions led to a general transformation of former conservative Catholic parties into broader Christian democratic parties (the label stressing the compatibility between Christian values and democratic institutions), often based on the Church's social doctrine. On Christian democracy see Irving (1979) and Kalyvas (1996).

[5] Social movements (feminism, environmentalism, civil rights) and populism can be seen as issued from the post-industrial revolution and the post-national phase. On the former see Inglehart (1977) and on the latter see Betz (1994), Kitschelt (1995), and Kriesi et al. (2008 and 2012).

[6] The different patterns of state formation in Europe are captured by Rokkan's conceptual map (1999). See also Tilly (1975), which includes Rokkan's chapter on state formation and nation-building, although most of it is confined to Western Europe.

[7] The terms *left* and *right* are defined later in this book. For the moment, suffice it to say that under restricted suffrage such terms were used to designate ideological differences between liberals/radicals and conservatives (as in *sinistra* and *destra* in the Italian liberal galaxy before World War I) or

The diversity of Europe's nations in terms of their geopolitics, cultures, and economies can hardly be overstated whether one contrasts the first Atlantic nation-states of the West to land-locked empires of the East, or early civilized Mediterranean peninsulas and their Middle Eastern and North African connections to the civilizations that emerged in the North. The first available literacy statistics show an abyss between Catholic and Protestant areas. Up to the present, radically different juridical traditions and political cultures persist among European countries, as do differences in citizens' attitudes – be it in regard to women's position in society or citizens' relationship to state authority. Past agrarian structures were based on different arrangements of land holding in North-Western Europe and Central-Eastern Europe, and the transformation from agrarian into industrial societies took place at different moments and paces, and with diverging forms. Not only have various European territories had different historical trajectories, but to a large extent they unfolded independent from one another and often in isolation.

Yet something unites this remarkable diversity. In spite of the cultural and socio-economic diversity, and in spite of the variety of historical paths, the democratic electoral struggle is astonishingly similar across Europe. The quest for equality and freedom, and for political and judicial institutions guaranteeing fundamental civil, political, and socio-economic equality and participation is strikingly alike – and parallel. More precisely, the *social divisions* and *cultural conflicts* over the degree of civil, political, and socio-economic equality and freedom are similar: Which civil rights, what degree of inclusion for political rights, how deep the correction of socio-economic inequalities and privileges through state intervention?[8] And what balance between equality and freedom? The fundamental conflicts over which societies divide since the philosophical and technological Enlightenment take forms that are surprisingly common in the most different possible contexts. Since the emergence of a free public sphere (Habermas, 1989) and the "invention" of representative government (Manin, 1997), socio-economic and cultural divisions structure in comparable ways European party systems with similar electoral behaviour on the part of European voters over a century and a half of competitive elections. A story of similarity, rather than diversity.

In spite of this common development, after the early contributions from pioneering political scientists pointing to a deterministic converging path towards mass democracy following the Anglo-Saxon model, often through the lens of the systemic-functionalist paradigm, scholarship turned to the analysis of divergence – first in the outcome of political regimes, second in the type of democracy after the inclusion in the analytical comparison of small countries.[9] Most

specific parties (as in the case of the Scandinavian *venstre* and *højre* or *høire*). With mass suffrage and industrialization, *left* becomes synonymous with socialism and republicanism.

[8] This follows Marshall's sequence of civil, political, and social rights (Marshall, 1964).

[9] On the first point see the analysis by Moore (1966) followed by Skocpol (1979) and work in the same line by Rogowski (1989), Luebbert (1991), and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006).

current comparative electoral studies seem to have lost interest in such general and long-term perspectives in favour of an often myopic focus on recent periods. As is argued later in this Introduction, this tendency magnifies "deviations" and "change", which, in a larger perspective, disappear as marginal detail.

However, even a cursory and superficial look at the broad trends of European political history reveals a great amount of commonality and simultaneity, starting with the revolutionary "waves" that wiped across Europe in 1789, 1830, 1848, and after World War I when general representation replaced estates, and parliamentary control was definitively imposed on the ruling elites of the past. This continues with the transformation of electoral politics from an exclusive liberal-conservative elitarian game to "mass and class politics" – with the struggle for universal suffrage and socialism – between the end of the 19th century and the aftermath of World War I, with social policies after World War II and the transformation of left–right in the wake of post-industrialism. No doubt there is variation across countries, as there is with the almost general breakdown of democracy in the 1920s–30s and the imposition of communist rule in Central and Eastern Europe after World War II.[10] Nonetheless, the scope of variation is not such as to dent – let alone discard – the commonality and simultaneity of trends which deserve more careful consideration.[11]

How homogeneous is the development of cleavages, party politics, and electoral behaviour across European countries? How parallel are the electoral waves? To what degree do political ideologies converge over time across different nations? What pattern of increasing similarity emerges across space between East and West and between North and South? And which countries make exception in this landscape? The present investigation paints the broad traits of the European party system, and the main commonalities and deviations from it – historically, comparatively, and quantitatively.

This is less of concern in the present study, which focuses on electoral politics and thus democratic regimes. On the second point see the analyses of Norway by Rokkan (1966), Austria by Lehmbruch (1967), Switzerland by Steiner (1974), Belgium by Lorwin (1966), and the Netherlands by Daalder (1966) and Lijphart (1968) – most of which were published in Dahl's volume *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies* (1966) and systematized in Lijphart's typology between Westminster and consociational democracies (1984).

[10] The divergence represented by the extreme-right challenge to democracy in inter-war Europe (Linz and Stepan, 1978 and Capoccia, 2005) appears only to a limited extend in electoral figures. As Capoccia shows (2005: 10), the peak of anti-system politics in terms of votes (including communists) is reached in Germany and Italy (above 60 per cent), Czechoslovakia and Finland (30 per cent), Belgium and France (20 per cent), while in the remaining countries it remained below 10 per cent.

[11] The Europe-wide nature of these patterns appears in the historical sequence of civil, political, and social rights in Marshall (1964), as well as in the sequence of thresholds of democratization in Rokkan (1999: 244–60). Similarly, Dahl (1971) distinguishes the liberalization and incorporation dimensions. Palmer (1959) speaks forcefully of the "age of democratic revolution", Hobsbawm (1973) of the "age of revolution", and Huntington (1991), Kurzman (1998) and Weyland (2014) of a "wave" of democratization. Indeed, the National Revolution in Rokkan's model is a juncture stressing similarity and simultaneity.

Commonality and simultaneity are the themes of this book. However, the question marks used in the previous paragraph illustrate immediately that a "theme" is not a research question, and that the study presented in this book is an *empirical* research whose goal is to *assess* the degree of commonality and simultaneity and – possibly – its increase over time in a process of convergence, or "Europeanization". Assessing whether Bulgaria and other countries have always been Europeanized (the term *always* meaning since the beginning of competitive parliamentary politics) or if they have become so over a temporal process is an empirical matter. Investigating such questions empirically – that is not simply formulating a "thesis", an "interpretation", or a "reading" of European electoral history – must be done quantitatively. The claim is not that such research questions have never been asked.[12] The claim is that a quantitative investigation of aspects that so far have been left to interpretation, qualitative typologies, and historical accounts has been missing.

This book is not an account of common parallel patterns. It is an analysis based on a range of different operational indicators tailored to quantify dimensions of "Europeanization" – both across space and over time. While many aspects look familiar in the following quantitative analysis – the "internal" nature of party systems under restricted suffrage, the entry of "external" mass parties with enfranchisement, the "freezing" of party systems with full enfranchisement and PR after World War I – a quantitative measurement of commonality versus "deviation" from the European pattern has never been carried out systematically. This is one of the contributions this book intends to make. Europeanization, in other words, is a variable.

These questions are impellent in our time with growing debates around a truly Europe-wide democracy at the level of the European Union (EU). Europe-wide party alignments, analogous attitudes and preferences among voters from different countries over common issues and problems, and uniform, simultaneous electoral change in different places (in favour or against given policies) provide an extraordinarily strong case for the possibility of supra-national representation. There is still a mismatch between national democratic control and supra-national decision making with a directly elected European Parliament (EP) whose powers and role – especially the control of the executive – remain limited. Responsiveness and accountability are diminished if voters are divided territorially along segmented electorates and reacting to "local", or even national, issues only. As is argued in the Conclusion, the Europe-wide nature of partisan alignments is a precondition for the enhancement of democratic representation in Europe.[13]

[12] For one, Stein Rokkan's model of party systems development is probably entirely devoted to this question.

[13] From Burke onwards writings on representation pointed to the negative effects on representation of institutions and socio-economic structures that territorially fragment electorates, including, among other things, small constituencies, majoritarian electoral systems, and territorial cleavages.

Methodologically, the analysis of Europeanization should therefore not be limited to recent periods, nor to the start of European integration proper in the 1950s. One of the claims this book makes is that Europe was "Europeanized" long before the EU. This claim can only be validated by an *empirical analysis starting roughly 150 years back*, that is (and allowing for differences between countries) since the transition to representative democracy, competitive elections, and the structuration of modern party systems – which often took place in concomitance with state formation and nation-building.[14] Temporally, the analysis covers the crucial steps of European electoral development, be it the introduction of universal suffrage and proportional representation (PR) or the technological transformation of communication and media systems. The analysis covers the whole of Europe (Western and Central-Eastern Europe, as well as Southern Europe and the Mediterranean islands), leaving aside only the most problematic cases of longitudinal data availability, namely Yugoslavia and most of its successor states.[15]

Theoretically, the investigation is based on the blueprint provided by the *theory of the "nationalization of politics"* and by the large amount of research carried out in the wake of macro-historical and comparative work.[16] This theory provides the main indicators on which the measurement of Europeanization is based (Chapters 3 and 4) and prepares the ground to develop complementary ones (Chapters 5, 6, and 7) in Part II. In particular, work on European nation-states in a historical perspective has shown that processes of homogenization of party support between different territorial units within countries – regions, provinces, constituencies – resulted in nationally integrated electorates. The decisive push for nationalization from the mid-19th century until the 1920s consisted of the territorial homogenization of electoral politics leading to the transition from territorial to functional politics in Europe's nation-states. This process – albeit to different degrees in different countries – characterizes all European countries. What the present investigation attempts is the transfer of *"nationalization"* to *"Europeanization"* and treating Europe as one large, possibly integrating (or already integrated), electorate and party system – in short,

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[14] These aspects are combined in Rokkan's concept of National Revolution (see Chapter 2), referring to the formation of a national citizenship with horizontal cross-local ties enhanced by linguistic homogenization (nation-building); parliamentarism; individual civil and voting rights as well as social rights (democratization); and the construction of a centralized and secular state (state formation).

[15] The analysis excludes Russia and Turkey on grounds of both the difficulty of carrying out long-term quantitative analysis and the internal contention of being part of Europe. Such exclusion does not imply that commonalities with these countries are absent, but in both cases one main dimension of contestation is the relationship to the "West".

[16] The literature on nationalization has taken off following two books: Caramani (2004) and Chhibber and Kollman (2004). None of the subsequent papers or books, however, takes a historical perspective. For references on nationalization work see Chapters 1 and 3. First adaptations of nationalization to Europeanization are provided in Caramani (2006; 2011a; 2012) and Camia and Caramani (2012).

"nationalization at the European level". This study on Europeanization may therefore be labelled a study of *nationalization processes at the Europe-wide level* or a *"European nationalization"*. The exact transfer of the theory, its conceptual categories and operationalization – as well as the development of new indicators – are described in Chapter 1.

The shift from nationalization to Europeanization is a logical step to take in the light of the formation of a new political system, something that recent interpretations have likened to phases of state formation and democratic structuration at the national level. Indeed, as reviewed in Chapter 1, a growing quantity of work on European integration takes a comparative politics approach.[17] The adaptation of nationalization to Europeanization follows this same model. Furthermore, the shift from nationalization to Europeanization is a logical step in the light of work on post-national and de-nationalizing politics. Too often this phrase has meant re-territorialization of politics at the national level. In fact, institutional and economic regionalization did not lead to significant regionalism in electoral politics. De-nationalization through the removal and unbundling of national boundaries must instead be interpreted as a process of "re-territorialization" at the European level. The question thus becomes whether supra-national integration leads to *territorial politics at a higher level*, namely over diverging national interests and identities within a new polity in Europe, and *whether such "territoriality" will be or has been removed in a process of Europeanization*. How strong is the territorial dimension at the European level? Has it become weaker (or stronger) in recent decades as a consequence of European integration, or does it follow previously initiated long-term processes of Europe-wide convergence?[18]

The adaptation of nationalization to the question of Europeanization faces the issue that, while the study of the former could be carried out on several political units – and thus allows for truly comparative analysis – the study of the latter relies on an "N = 1". There is only one such case. Nationalization varies across countries as well as over time. Europeanization, on the other hand, varies over time and the cross-country comparison must be addressed in terms of deviations from a general pattern. The Conclusion provides a macro-comparison between levels of Europeanization and levels

[17] This work adapts concepts and models from the work of Deutsch (1953), Hirschman (1970), and Rokkan mostly (see Chapter 1 in Caramani, 2004). The first attempt is Hix (1994) on the EP. Schmitter (2000) mentions the impact of cleavages of the past on new Europe-wide alignments, as do Marks and Wilson (2000) and Marks and Steenbergen (2002) on "cleavage residues". For a systematization of concepts and dimensions of the EU as a new integrating political system, see Bartolini (2005). Jérôme, Jérôme, and Lewis-Beck (2006) provide an analysis of Europe as "one nation".

[18] De-nationalization is here understood as globalization and post-nationalization (Zürn, 1998). One of the first formulations about the reappearance of the territorial dimension in Europe is Kohler-Koch (1998). For approaches based on territorial diversity caused by the enlargement to Central and East Europe, see Zielonka (2002).

of nationalization in nation-states (European ones but also the United States and India). Yet the perspective adopted in this work privileges commonality and simultaneity over differences across space and in timing. As mentioned, especially after Rokkan's powerful macro-sociological "fresco" of Europe, the focus has been on variation and deviation. The unity of European political development, its similarity, and parallel trends were moved, at best, to the background and, in most cases, disappeared totally. Every country became an exception until only exceptions were left and the picture became so cluttered that the broad traits of party systems disappeared.[19] Even the most general electoral phenomena – class politics and workers' mobilization through unions and parties after the Industrial Revolution – was analyzed in terms of variation.[20] Unlike classical sociologists and historians analyzing the general transformation of society in the 19th century, more recent scholars dropped generality and simultaneity from the picture.[21]

The present study intends to re-establish the balance between commonality and variation, between generality and deviation. Indeed, the main results of the various analyses that follow in this volume complement the ones stressed in past work by pointing to *commonality and simultaneity, similarity across space and convergence over time*. This sheds a different light on the development of party systems in Europe – a light indeed other than the one we are so used to. In this light, European electorates and party systems are homogeneous and have been so for a long time – namely since the very first decades after the democratic transition in the mid-19th century.

The argument of this book is that *Europe is Europeanized* and has been *Europeanized for a long time*, namely since the very beginning of parliamentary representative democracy and the birth of competitive elections. National party systems are similar in their format and convergence over time (*dimension of homogeneity*). They change simultaneously at critical junctures through Europe-wide swings (*dimension of uniformity*). They are homogenous horizontally but also vertically across the different levels of national and supra-national electoral arenas (*dimension of correspondence*). There is a great deal of similarity in the content of the programmes and policies among parties of the same family across different countries (*dimension of cohesion*). Finally, cabinet composition and their policy programmes are increasingly similar (*dimension of closure*).

[19] The cleavage model on which this is based is best found in Rokkan (1999: 284–92 and 320–39, which includes the famous essay by Lipset and Rokkan, 1967) and Flora (1999: 40–9). For a summary of Rokkan's work see also Caramani (2011b; 2014).

[20] This is the case of Bartolini's encompassing study of the class cleavage and the rise of socialism in Europe (2000).

[21] Besides the mentioned work on the revolutionary age of the 19th century, the very birth of sociology can be linked to that general transition: from agrarian to industrial economy, from rural community to urban society, from local to national identity and communication networks, from caste- to class-based social structures, and from autocratic to democratic political systems.

As will become clear, the picture is more nuanced than this. Yet the core finding is that Europe is Europeanized and that national electorates and party systems have surprisingly a great deal in common. Further, electorates and party systems were "Europeanized" long before the process of European integration started in the 1950s. The Europeanization of national electorates and party systems can also be placed before the technological revolution of communication and media after World War II. Hence the title of this Introduction: integration in Europe, not European integration, signalling that there was Europeanization *before* the EU even if this process did not come to a halt after 1945.

The research design on which this conclusion is based includes 30 countries over a period of time starting in the mid-19th century for those countries that were democratic at the time. This wealth of data assembled in a new data set allows for the quantitative measurement of Europeanization based on indicators relating to the *format of party systems* (and cabinet composition). The focus on morphology is justified by the necessity to look before and after major thresholds of democratization in the 19th century up to World War I. Analyzing periods since World War II, however, offers the possibility to use indicators relating to the *contents of party systems* and the ideological placement of parties and voters, preferences and attitudes, and policy programmes. The data set has therefore been complemented by different types of data in a multi-pronged strategy (sources are given in the single chapters and in Appendix 6):

- *Electoral data*: These data include the collection of *national elections* with a classification of each party into 25 families, and European elections from 1979, or later depending on the data of EU accession. These data are used for the indicators of *homogeneity* in Chapter 3, *uniformity* in Chapter 4, and *correspondence* in Chapter 5.[22]
- *Party manifesto data*: These data include the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) collection that has been linked to electoral data starting in 1945 and ending with the most recent data available in the online update of the CMP (at the moment of analysis). These data are used for the indicators of *cohesion* among party programmes within the same family ("elite" level) in Chapter 6 and of *closure* among cabinet partners in Chapter 7.
- *Survey data*: These data include various rounds of Eurobarometers for the period 1973–2000/2 and European Social Surveys for the period after 2002. These are used for the indicator of *cohesion* among electorates of parties belonging to the same party family in different countries ("mass" level) in Chapter 6.
- *Cabinet composition data*: These data include the ParlGov data on the executives and coalitions from 1945 until 2010 for all countries on the

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[22] The collection starts with the first competitive election for each country up to the most recent one by 2012 and includes for each election all parties receiving at least 1 per cent of the votes nationwide.

basis of which *cabinet composition* and *type of coalition* have been calcu-
lated. These data are used for the indicator of *closure* among executives in
Chapter 7.

This book distinguishes three groups of factors to explain electoral
Europeanization. First, *supra-national factors* (such as the outcomes of World
War II and the Cold War or European integration) that have a common and
similar impact on all national party systems and cause their convergence.
Second, *within-national factors* (such as democratization and the Industrial
Revolution or the rise of emancipative values), that is socio-economic and
political change taking place in most countries in a similar way and thus hav-
ing a similar impact on party systems. Third, *trans-national factors* (such as the
spread of fascism, the Soviet Revolution, the adoption of Western programmes
in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989, or the populist wave) whereby con-
vergence is caused by diffusion. Chapter 8 assesses the impact of each group
of factors on the different dimensions of Europeanization in a historical and
mass-electoral perspective.

As becomes clear in the chapters in Part II of this book, *left–right* and the
party families that make up most of this dimension (socialists, liberals, and
conservatives, as well as Christian democrats) play a crucial role in explain-
ing Europeanization. If one asks what creates the homogeneity of party sys-
tems and the uniformity of shifts over time, or if one wonders which traits
account for the correspondence between national and EP electoral levels, or if
one examines in what respect cabinet composition is similar, evidence invari-
ably points to *left–right as a feature of commonality in Europe*. This central
dimension of major social divisions and cultural conflicts over civil, political,
and socio-economic rights is the most important dimension across all national
systems as well as in the EP. At the same time, it is the most homogenous
dimension across countries and the one along which the largest simultaneous
waves of electoral change take place historically.

Brought about by supra-, within-, or trans-national factors, the conflict
over the (re-) distribution of resources and the nature of and participation
in the national polity quickly imposes itself in all European systems, making
them very similar. Left–right overwhelms and, soon after democratization, dis-
cards cultural factors such as ethnicity, language, and even religion, as well
as pre-industrial factors such as agrarian politics – precisely the factors that
genetic models based on cleavage structures identified as sources of diversity
in Europe. This study shows the irrelevance of these factors and points to left–
right as the dominant dimension everywhere, and thus as a *factor of similarity
and commonality*. Cultural and pre-industrial dimensions of party mobiliza-
tion are indeed factors of diversification in Europe. Quantitative measurement,
however, shows how marginal this differentiation turns out to be. None of
the "deviations" are quantitatively strong enough to alter the fundamental
similarity of Europe given by left–right. And even the deviations that can be