Introduction

Chris L. Firestone, Nathan A. Jacobs, and James H. Joiner

What room, if any, does Kant’s philosophy leave for theology? Having denied the proofs for the existence of God, is rational belief in God possible? Within a Kantian framework, can the idea of God ever rise above an empty postulate meant to stabilize practical reason? Can Kant’s God ever reveal himself, act on the world by miracle, or extend moral assistance (grace) to moral agents? If so, can a rational agent ever know that God has done so? Or must such possibilities, if they are possibilities, remain of no practical value to rational beings? Does revealed religion or historical faith offer anything to rational agents that cannot be found within the limits of reason alone?

Well into the twentieth century, the most common portraits of Kant answer the preceding questions in a manner bordering on, if not outright accepting, nonrealism. In such portrayals, the “all-crushing Kant,” as Moses Mendelssohn dubs him, destroyed traditional metaphysics and thus shut the doors to dogmatic theology with his *Critique of Pure Reason*. Yet, after undermining the proofs for God and all traditional uses of the idea, Kant finds certain instabilities in reason—particularly in practical reason—as his philosophical program develops. He thus postulates God and immortality to stabilize reason’s moral commitments, but these postulates are far from dogmatic confidence that such postulates exist, and after the postulates have done their job in support of practical reason, they are best forgotten. The most pessimistic renderings of this portrait go so far as naming Kant’s deity “Lampe’s God,” in honor of Kant’s manservant and in dishonor of Kant’s God, as if Kant introduced God only to settle the mind of Lampe, who was troubled by the demise of God in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

A shift began in Kant studies with the publication of Allen Wood’s *Kant’s Moral Religion* (1971) and Michel Despland’s *Kant on History and

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Religion (1973). These works marked the beginning of a revisitation of Kant’s philosophy of religion, which offered a more robust interpretation of Kantian theology. Wood argues that Kant’s practical philosophy leads toward an absurdum practicum that only religion – and specifically divine grace and forgiveness – can resolve. As for Despland, he writes, “The whole thrust of my interpretation leads to one conclusion: The superiority of moral theism is to be found not in the purely moral but in religious considerations as well. . . . Its merit lies in the fact that it gives meaning to faith which makes of faith an act which is both rational and religious.”

Such interpretations found far more in Kant than a disposable deity whose only use is to prop up reason when it reaches the end of its own means. And these readings opened the floodgates to a host of interpreters, each arguing in a unique way that theology plays an integral role in Kant’s philosophy. Such readers include Ronald M. Green, Ann L. Loades, Stephen R. Palmquist, Bernard Reardon, Adina Davidovich, John E. Hare, and Elizabeth Cameron Galbraith, to name a few.

The steady production of more theologically and religiously robust readings of Kant by no means marked a consensus in the field, however. Instead, it marked the beginning of a divide in Kant studies, which Chris L. Firestone and Stephen R. Palmquist in 2006 termed the divide between “theologically affirmative” and “traditional” interpreters of Kant. Firestone and Palmquist brought this divide into sharp relief in their volume, Kant and the New Philosophy of Religion (KNPR), making the case – with the help of Despland, Hare, Green, Stevenson, et al. – that the traditional reading of Kant constitutes a “unified minority report” on how

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3 E.g., Wood, Kant’s Moral Religion, pp. 25–26; 147; 151–62.
4 Despland, Kant on History and Religion, p. 145.
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best to interpret Kant’s philosophy of religion. Yet, this minority report,
the editors (with the chorus of contributors) insisted, represents neither the
majority in the field of Kant studies nor the most accurate reading of Kant
on religion and theology. The editors’ division between affirmative and
traditional readings is somewhat artificial and subject to criticism for
its lack of clarity on what precisely constitutes theological affirmation.

Nonetheless, it brought awareness to the growing divide between
those who see Kant’s theology as empty and those who do not, as well
as awareness that the tide had turned in favor of the latter.

Following on the heels of KNPR, Chris L. Firestone and Nathan A. Jacobs
(both contributors to KNPR) revisited Kant’s main but often-neglected text
on religion, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, in their 2008
volume, In Defense of Kant’s Religion (IDKR). IDKR highlighted the history
of interpretation of Religion, underscoring the numerous “conundrums”
that emerge from the text and how frequently it is read as an unjustifiable turn to
Christianity in Kant’s twilight years. Firestone and Jacobs, by contrast,
attempted a problem-driven reading of the text in which they allowed the
conundrums that emerge throughout their exposition to determine their
hermeneutic journey, only taking paths that resolved whatever conundrum
was at hand. The results were unexpected, as they led to a portrait of Kant
as one who believes in a unified human nature, a divine-human archetype
of perfect humanity, and even something like a Church under God
and this archetype. As Nicholas Wolterstorff, well-known critic of Kant’s
philosophy of religion, remarked on the results,

What emerges is a Kant very different from the one we thought we knew,
more metaphysical, more willing to engage in speculative theology, less
dissmissive of actual religion... We won’t all immediately jump on the

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7 Post-1970 traditional interpreters identified include K. Ward, The Development of Kant’s View of
Ethics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972); P. Byrne, “Kant’s Moral Proof of the Existence of God,”
Scottish Journal of Theology, 32 (1979), 333; P. Byrne, The Moral Interpretation of Religion (Grand
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans’ Publishing Company, 1998); Y. Yovel, Kant and the Philosophy of History
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986); D. Cuppett, “Kant and the Negative Theology,” in
B. Hebblethwaite and S. Sutherland (eds.), The Philosophical Frontiers of Christian Theology: Essays
Presented to D. M. MacKinnon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); and D. Savage,
“Kant’s Rejection of Divine Revelation and His Theory of Radical Evil,” in P. J. Rossi and M. W.
Wreen (eds.), Kant’s Philosophy of Religion Reconsidered (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,

8 Palmquist himself has begun to criticize the very distinction he helped establish. See S. R. Palmquist,
“To Tell the Truth on Kant and Christianity: Will the Real Affirmative Interpreter Please Stand up?,”

9 C. L. Firestone and N. A. Jacobs, In Defense of Kant’s Religion (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 2008).
bandwagon; the Kant that emerges is too strange. We will wonder whether there’s not some other way of reading the text, not yet thought up, that preserves the profundity and dissolves the conundrums while making Kant less strange. Until that other way emerges – I am not at all confident that it ever will – this interpretation has the merit not only of dissolving most if not all the conundrums but of offering us the best close, deep, and intellectually imaginative reading of the text that we have.10

Wolterstorff’s prediction proved accurate. IDKR did in fact deliver a “jolt” to Kant studies,11 drawing a great deal of attention. In 2010, the Society of Christian Philosophers dedicated their session of the American Academy of Religion to an “Authors Meet Critics” panel in which a number of prominent Kant scholars engaged IDKR and provided the authors with an opportunity to respond. The proceedings were later published in a symposium edition of Faith and Philosophy.12 But as Wolterstorff also predicted, the jolt did not result in a host of authors jumping on the bandwagon, as it were. Instead, it led to a new flood of publications focused on Kant’s Religion, which sought to revisit the text in their own way with the help of a Kant who is less strange.

In the years since 2008, we have seen similar quantity and quality of books as from the entire period between 1970 and 2008, ranging from volumes on Kant and theology to new collections on Kant’s philosophy of religion.13 Yet, the most noteworthy trend has been the increasing interest in Kant’s once-neglected Religion text. The most notable contributions in this vein include the respective monographs of James DiCenso, Kant, Religion, and Politics (2011), and of Lawrence Pasternack, Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (2013), which were followed by Gordon Michalson’s edited collection on Religion in 2014.14 We have also seen a trio of the first ever self-proclaimed commentaries on Religion in

11 Ibid.
12 Contributors to the special symposium included Andrew Chignell, Pamela Sue Anderson, George di Giovanni, Stephen R. Palmquist, and Gordon E. Michalson, Jr., with replies from Chris L. Firestone and Nathan A. Jacobs, respectively. See Faith and Philosophy, 29 (2012), 144–228.
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English, coming from DiCenso (2012), Pasternack (2013), and Palmquist (2014), respectively. Noticeably absent from the post-2008 trajectory, however, are analytic and constructive voices. To explain, following the revival of philosophy of religion with figures such as Basil Mitchell, Alvin Plantinga, and Nicholas Wolterstorff, there emerged an entire generation of philosophers engaged in analytic philosophical theology, whose ranks included such notable scholars as Richard Swinburne, Brian Leftow, Michael Rea, Oliver Crisp, Tom Flint, and William Abraham. Although analytic philosophers and theologians are not known for their interest in Kant, one finds a surprising degree of analytic engagement with Kant’s philosophy of religion in the 1980s and 1990s. The most notably consistent voice was that of Philip Quinn, but substantial contributions from Nicholas Wolterstorff and Alvin Plantinga also appear during this time. Yet, analytic engagement of Kant dies down considerably at the turn of the millennium.

Although the assessment of Kant offered by such figures was rarely positive, these analytic contributions were of unquestionable benefit to the field of Kant studies. The work of Quinn and Wolterstorff in particular offered a sober, outside perspective on challenges of coherence facing Kant’s philosophy of religion generally and Kant’s Religion specifically. The conundrums identified by these authors played a crucial role in systematically identifying the problems in Kant’s Religion that needed to be overcome by any adequate reading of the text, an overcoming that became the primary task of IDKR and has since set the stage for work on...


96 For a complete survey of the movement, see W. Abraham, Analytic Theology: A Bibliography (Dallas, TX: Highland Loch Press, 2012).


Kant and the Question of Theology continues the momentum of the new wave of scholarship on Kant’s philosophy of religion, while inviting back into the conversation analytic and constructive voices from philosophers outside Kant studies proper. This volume thus contains careful analysis of Kant’s own texts by major voices within the field of Kant studies, thus perpetuating the growing scholarship on Kant’s philosophy of religion. Yet, it also adds to the discussion contributions from those outside the field in the spirit of Quinn, Wolterstorff, et al., from the 1980s and 1990s. These contributions bring once again to the discussion a sober, outside perspective on the viability of and challenges to Kant’s philosophy of religion as the current literature is coming to understand it.

To facilitate the discussion of Kant and the question of theology, contributions are organized under three headings, Kant and God, Kant and Religion, and Kant and Redemption. Part I, Kant and God, opens with a contribution from James J. DiCenso, who takes on the task of providing the textual basis in the Kantian corpus for understanding Kant’s use of supersensible concepts in the critical philosophy, focusing on the concept of God. After underscoring the limits of speculative reason to sensible experience, DiCenso demonstrates the regulative and practical use of transcendental ideas in Kant’s system. Although such supersensible ideas are restricted by the boundaries set by speculative reason, they nonetheless are significant for establishing the rational procedures guiding our investigations and setting the stage for the practical application of free action in the world. Through human autonomy, rational ideas become the principles that serve as guidelines for ethical activity. It is this practical cognition of the principles of the moral law that leads to the postulation of certain supersensible concepts, such as the concept of God. Thus, through practical reason, supersensible concepts are guided and circumscribed by the moral law and its practical ends.

Springboarding from a careful reading of Kant’s *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim* (1784), Pablo Muchnik sees in Kant’s philosophy of history a distinctive theodicy. The birth of God, as an idea that mirrors the development of human reason, naturally entails the birth of evil, which is seen fundamentally as an “unsocial sociability,” where human nature is internally fractured by its associative and dissociative tendencies. Paradoxically, human development and realization of the universal moral law and supreme social good produces the concomitant emergence of radical evil. Muchnik argues that this theodicy, framed...
within the therapeutic aims of practical reason, is most closely aligned with
the aims of Kant’s *Religion* and his practical moral proofs.

James H. Joiner, in Chapter 3, offers a critical examination of the role of
the *summum bonum* in Kant’s moral argument for God’s existence as a
justifiable postulate of practical reason. Joiner seeks to identify Kant’s
conception of the *summum bonum* within his broader corpus, unraveling
the notions of happiness and virtue and their relationship with respect to
the highest good. This Kantian doctrine and its purported theological
implications are then considered in relation to the grounding of practical
reason itself and Kant’s anthropology in light of his view of radical evil. It is
in these areas that Joiner suggests important internal tensions to the
Kantian project emerge.

In the final chapter on Kant and God, David Bradshaw considers Kant’s
arguments against the possibility of acquiring theological knowledge
through experience. Kant contends that the transcendental idea of the
highest being could never be adequately conveyed through any empirical
discovery, and thus no miracle or revelation can ever be known to originate
from God. Bradshaw seeks to reconceive and broaden how we think of
experiences of God in light of paradigmatic examples provided through the
literature most normative for all western monotheistic traditions, namely
the Old Testament. Further, Bradshaw attempts to undercut Kant’s
rationalist conceptions of the divine as entailing a priori criteria through
which any such experiences must pass. Instead, Bradshaw recasts the
nature of concept formation for notions of divine infinity and goodness
in a developmental way that is rooted in religious experience and more
analogous to the coming to know of any person, all of which provides an
alternative to the Kantian strictures.

Turning in Part II to Kant and Religion, we begin with a contribution
from Lawrence Pasternack. In the 1787 Preface to the *Critique of Pure
Reason*, Kant writes that among the goals of his critical project is to
determine the “limits to knowledge” in order to “make room for faith”
(Bxxx). Although this comment has long been treated as an empty brom-
ide, recent “affirmative” interpretations of Kant’s philosophy of religion
have come to take it more seriously. In this chapter, Pasternack explores
the relationship between the Pure Rational Faith that dominates Kant’s
discussions of the topic and how Historical Faith is employed in his
religious writings of the 1790s. Pasternack argues that the relationship
between these modes of faith have central relevance to theology, for nearly
all traditional religious doctrines fall within the latter rather than the
former mode of faith.
What is the proper relationship between Kantian philosophy and Christian theology? In Chapter 6, Leslie Stevenson attempts to shed light on some of the ambivalent elements in Kant’s corpus regarding Christian thought. Addressing areas such as the nature of God, morality, revelation, salvation, incarnation, and atonement, he provides what he takes to be Kant’s understanding of Christianity’s central dogmas. Successive consideration of different elements and permutations of each tradition leads Stevenson to conclude that claims of incompatibility or continuity fail to appreciate the complexities of each.

Chapter 7 looks at whether Kant’s philosophical project is an aid or detriment to robust forms of traditional Christian theology. William J. Abraham offers a reading of Religion with a focus on Kant’s account of divine agency and action. Abraham focuses on Kantian portrayals of the traditional theological doctrines of original sin, salvation, incarnation, atonement, and Scripture to assess what his philosophical commitments allow. A generous reading of Kant allows for the possibility of divine revelation as a supplement to reason, even if it cannot serve as an item of knowledge. A pessimistic reading, however, suggests that practical reason provides the strictures within which all doctrines must be held and through which they must be understood. On this reading, the Christian tradition is systematically stripped. What is left behind is a moralistic, therapeutic theism. This pessimistic reading, suggests Abraham, is the better account of Kant’s project and its implications.

In Chapter 8, Nathan A. Jacobs engages Kant’s assessment of divine revelation. The first part examines Kant’s contention that although revelation cannot be rejected as impossible, it cannot be recognized if it occurs. Kant wants to leave open the ontic window to the possibility of revelation, while shutting the epistemic window to its recognition. However, by investigating divine revelation as understood in early Christianity by the Eastern Church fathers, Jacobs suggests that revelation as understood by Kant is so different from that of these early Christians that his arguments are irrelevant to their view. Further, Jacobs contends that if revelation is what these Eastern Christians describe, then Kant’s critique of the possibility of recognizing revelation is unsuccessful. By leaving open the ontic window, Kant must leave open the epistemic window as well.

As we arrive at Part III, Kant and Redemption, Jacqueline Mariña sets the stage for the essays to follow with a discussion of Augustine’s and Irenaeus’s respective accounts of human evil. She argues for the advantages of the developmental (viz., Irenaean) account when making sense of Kant’s texts on radical evil. Mariña shows that Kant indeed held such a view in
both the Lectures and in the Conjectural Beginnings and makes the case that he never abandoned the developmental model in Religion. Reading Kant’s Religion through an “Irenaean” lens, she argues, reframes the locus of the debate, illumines multiple elements of the text that previously remained obscure, and demonstrates why Kant had good reason to claim that we all begin in a condition of radical evil but must nevertheless assume responsibility for this condition.

In Chapter 10, Keith Yandell uses analytic considerations to apply the brakes to Mariña-styled interpretations of Kant. He raises what he takes to be a logically prior question, *Do Kantian ethics entail the required cognitive conditions for divine forgiveness of moral guilt?* Yandell addresses this question in light of overarching considerations stemming from the critical philosophy. Conversion of rational agents from the evil to the good maxim does not undo moral culpability for past and ongoing actions that fail to accord with the good maxim. Considering a view of justice as purely remunerative, Yandell suggests that attempts to provide a Kantian explanation for a gracious forgiveness run at odds with the content of Kant’s ethics. This, Yandell argues, leaves Kant without any adequate theory of atonement.

Thomas H. McCall, in Chapter 11, picks up an analytic critique of Kant where Yandell leaves off, namely in the much contested second Book of Religion. Specifically, he looks at Kant’s criticisms of the traditional doctrine of incarnation and his alternative proposal of a rational archetype. McCall outlines a criticism that Kant levels against the traditional view of the incarnation, namely that any incarnation of an incorruptible, divine ideal would disqualify the incarnation subject from serving as a moral exemplar for corruptible human persons. He considers several routes of response that present themselves to proponents of the historical incarnation, even considering possible amendments to the traditional doctrine. McCall concludes that Kant cannot be considered a friend of traditional Christology. Yet, he poses no genuine threat to it either.

In Chapter 12, Chris L. Firestone capitalizes on recent developments in Kant interpretation to develop a method of philosophical and theological disputation, leading to increasingly better forms of rational religious faith. He shows how, in practical reason’s ceaseless need to avoid the *absurdum practicum*, this method has been applied to the doctrine of the bodily resurrection of the dead, which is determined also to be a necessary doctrine of rational religious faith. Then, turning specifically to Book Two of Kant’s Religion, Firestone shows that this expansion of rational religious faith also requires that Kant’s prototype of perfect humanity must
also be thought of as embodied in a resurrected state if this prototype is indeed a picture of the highest good.

In the end, *Kant and the Question of Theology* builds on an existing body of scholarship, opens new discussions with a variety of theological stakeholders, and thereby anticipates a new, cross-disciplinary wave of research in Kant studies and contemporary philosophical theology. By broadening the scope of the conversation on Kant with particular reference to the possibility and desirability of doing theology in either consonance or conversation with Kant, we hope to build tangible bridges between analytic and continental divides as well as philosophical and theological divides. In so doing, our goal is to help pave the way for a rich, fruitful, and irenic debate about theology in a post-Kantian era.