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Introduction

It was an afternoon like any other at the airport in Tashkent, one of the largest cities in the Soviet Union and the capital of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic. The morning return flights on Aeroflot Il'iushin IL-18s to Bukhara and Samarkand had long left, and at one of the gates there idled a FinnAir DC-8, refueling on a stopover from Bangkok to Helsinki. A connection from Novosibirsk, in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, descended onto the bromegrass-lined runway; its passengers disembarked from the plane. Inside the terminal, servers dished out Uzbek *plov* at the cafeteria, but even that couldn't shake the stale monotony of a Soviet airport: the same tired buffets that could be found everywhere from Riga to Vladivistok and the same metallic coffee found, if less commonly, from Kiev to Kazan.[1] At once expansive and insular, the Soviet Union could feel more like a world than a country. And yet if one looked closely, even at airports like Tashkent's, hints of a world beyond beckoned.

Among the passengers on the Novosibirsk flight was Viktor Samoĭlenko, a journalist who had won accolades for his reporting from the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the world's youngest socialist state and the Soviet Union's neighbor to the south. Samoĭlenko was no stranger to the airport layovers, the endless trips across Soviet Eurasia. Yet here in Tashkent Samoĭlenko recognized something new. "They say," he wrote, "that the Tashkent Airport, in spite of its resemblance to every other Soviet airport, leaves a stronger, longer-lasting impression on you than others. Here, like nowhere else," Samoĭlenko noticed the peculiarities of his fellow Soviet citizens. "I met with young Heroes of the Soviet Union. And it was clear to everyone: they had won the Gold Star 'there' in fulfillment of their international duty."[2] Samoĭlenko found his

[1] Author Interview, Iuriĭ Sal'nikov, Volgograd, Russian Federation, November 4, 2012.
[2] Viktor Samoĭlenko, *Kak otkryvaesh' stranu: Afganistan glazami ochevidstev* (Novosibirsk: Knizhnoe Izdatel'stvo, 1986), 11.

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More information

gate, which was still disgorging passengers: "people who had spent some time 'there' – Soviet specialists returning from their trips, as well as children whose parents had died at the hands of the enemy." The boarding call for his flight rang out. It was time to return "there" – to Afghanistan.

Samoĭlenko was not alone. Waiting in line, he spoke with a Belarusian Party worker who shared his life story. The Soviet state had evacuated him from Nazi killing squads to Tashkent, the Belarusian explained, where an Uzbek family, the Alimjanovs, raised him. For much of his childhood, he had assumed that his biological parents had perished, and he soon took on the last name of his Uzbek parents. But his biological mother had survived. After fifteen years of searching, she found him in Uzbekistan. The Komsomol worker considered reclaiming his original Belarusian surname, yet he retained the Uzbek surname in honor of "those to whom I had an unpaid debt."[3] Alimjanov, wrote Samoĭlenko, embodied the virtues his own generation had drawn from the past, such as when Soviet families took in refugees from the Spanish Civil War: "the Soviet person as a patriot and internationalist."

Samoĭlenko, Alimjanov, and a piebald procession of "geologists, construction workers, and agronomists" boarded the plane in groups by profession. A gregarious and numerate engineer seated next to Samoĭlenko explained what awaited them in Afghanistan. "Now imagine," he said. "We're flying to a country that only recently was the 127th country in the world by level of education, 119th by level of health care, and 108th by national income per head – not only that, but the average life expectancy for an Afghan man is only forty years."[4] As the plane took off and headed south, the journalist Samoĭlenko awaited a familiar ritual. Whenever he had flown abroad before on Aeroflot flights, there came "a moment when they announce that the foreign heavens have begun."[5] He and the other passengers looked out their windows: they were approaching the Amu-Darya River, the southern border of the USSR. The light for the PA system turned on. Samoĭlenko perked his ears. The PA system rang out: "Afghanistan!"

The plane had entered the airspace of a country at the heart of Central Asia, bordered to its north by the Soviet Union, to its west by Iran, and to its east and south by Pakistan. As the plane flew over the country's northern marches, inhabited by Turkic- and Persian-speakers, the Hindu Kush loomed. Until Soviet engineers built a tunnel piercing the mountains in 1964, the range had divided not only the watershed of the Amu-Darya River from that of the Indus, but also Afghanistan itself. The Il'iushin crested a low point and descended toward Kabul, the capital, located in the densely populated east of the country. Eastward still lay the Safed Koh range, straddling the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan and intersected by the Kabul River, a tributary of the Indus. Further south, along an American-built ring road, lay the

[3] Ibid., 12.
[4] Ibid., 14.
[5] Ibid., 15.

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More information

FIGURE 1. Cold War Central Asia, c.1947–91 with countries, regions, and Soviet SSRs noted. The colonial-era Durand Line, marked on the map as a dotted line, formed the *de facto* border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, but Kabul never recognized the line as a legitimate international boundary.
Source: Author Map.

orchards and plantations of the Helmand watershed, dominated by the country's second-largest city, Qandahar. Together, these eastern and southern borderlands constituted the homelands of the Pashtun people, speakers of Pashto, an Indo-Iranian language. Informed guesses placed them at seven or eight million people, making them a plurality of Afghanistan's population. More Pashtuns, however, lived outside of Afghanistan than in it, most in neighboring Pakistan. Apart from the Pashtuns, a mix of Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazara, Qizilbash, and other ethnicities populated Afghanistan. Little wonder, then, that some saw Afghanistan as "an anthropologist's dream."[6]

[6] Louis Dupree, Untitled Book Manuscript, 45. Louis Dupree Papers, Box 5, Peabody Natural History Museum Special Collections, Harvard University.

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Excerpt
More information

Afghanistan had been a monarchy since 1747 and independent from the British since 1919. Since 1929, the same lineage of Mohammadzai Durrani Pashtuns, a subtribe from southern Afghanistan, had ruled the country. The new Shah (King) was assassinated after only three years on the throne, but his son, Mohammad Zahir Shah (no relation to the Shah of Iran), reigned for thirty-nine years, during which time both his regents, Prime Ministers, and he himself remained content to keep society at arm's length. Modernization remained limited. The state asked little of the people; the people, little of the state. It seemed shrewd, for against the regional background of imperial collapse, revolution, world wars, and Partition, Afghanistan experienced fifty years of peace. And rather than throwing itself in with Washington or Moscow, cautious Kabul lured foreign experts to oversee development projects and reform the state. And even when Zahir Shah's cousin and former Prime Minister, Mohammad Daoud Khan, overthrew the monarchy in the summer of 1973, Afghanistan remained an island of relative stability in a tumultuous Cold War world.

That soon changed. On the evening of April 27, 1978, a group of Afghan Communists, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), overthrew and murdered Daoud and declared Afghanistan a Democratic Republic, making it one of the world's two Muslim-majority communist states (South Yemen was the first) and one of several socialist countries in the Third World. But in contrast to their monarchical predecessors, PDPA élites, many of them Ghilzai Pashtuns from eastern Afghanistan, imposed radical and violent change on the countryside. Civil war threatened a country that lay directly on the southern border of the USSR, and Afghan Communists exacerbated the crisis by murdering one another. The Soviet Union, which had played no role in inciting the so-called April Revolution, intervened militarily, first on December 24, 1979, with commandos to assassinate and replace PDPA leadership and, shortly thereafter, with tens of thousands of soldiers to occupy the country. The intervention led to disaster: of the perhaps fifteen million souls inhabiting Afghanistan in 1979, one third would become refugees outside the country, while another third would end up wounded or internally displaced. Over a million Afghans would be killed. Parallel to this carnage, however, thousands of Soviet nation-builders – the men and women on Samoĭlenko's flight – and tens of thousands of Afghan Communists would seek to turn Afghanistan into a test site for the construction of socialism at the scale of the nation-state.

But these nation-builders had enemies. Hundreds of thousands of rebels operating from the other side of the Durand Line, the colonial-era boundary dividing Afghanistan from Pakistan, conducted attacks against the Afghan communist state and Soviet occupying forces. Supported by the Pakistani intelligence services and billions of dollars in American military aid, these Afghan warriors – *mujāhidin* – formed a formidable enemy in what was to become one of the defining conflicts of the Cold War. Yet also operating among the *mujāhidin* were NGOs, led by European humanitarians who believed that the future was neither socialism, nor the nation-state, but rather the overcoming of

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Excerpt
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both through transnational morality. Emanating from a disenchanted European Left, this project of humanitarian postterritoriality collided with "real existing socialism" in a space on the planet where colonial cartography allowed them to overlap. No mere Cold War theater between the Soviet Union and its enemies, Afghanistan had become a battleground for debates about the relationship of the global Left to the Third World nation-state. Once among empires, once within borders, Afghanistan had become a battleground between two very different visions of Third World sovereignty – Soviet-style territorial authoritarianism on the one hand, and poststate humanitarianism on the other. The battle between these two projects, both enmeshed in a trans-regional civil war, would reveal Afghanistan's role not as "the graveyard of empires," but rather as the graveyard of the Third World nation-state.

How this happened is the story of men like Samoĭlenko and his colleagues on board that flight to Kabul. It is the story of the American and West German state-makers who preceded them and of the European humanitarians who opposed them. It is the story of the Afghans who became interlocutors to all of the above. It is the story of the struggle between a territorial order of states and a transnational order of human beings – a story at once entangled in the Cold War while also in some ways above it. It is, in short, the story of this book. Before telling that story, however, it bears situating it in its historiographical context and dwelling on how to write the history of a country whose present very much begins with the interaction of global projects described and analyzed in what follows.

In Search of Modern Afghanistan

"Compared to its neighboring countries," writes historian Nile Green, "Afghanistan remains something of a blank spot on the historiographical map. Falling between Middle Eastern, South Asian, and Central Asian fields of expertise, it is in many respects the last great unclaimed territory of historical studies, not so much competed over as ignored by scholars."[7] Institutes for the study of "East Asia," the "Middle East," or "South Asia" abound, but there exist few centers for the study of Central Asia, much less Afghanistan itself. "Despite a rich burst of scholarship in the 1960s," continues Green, "and the efforts of a small but distinguished cadre of scholars since then, Afghan history has neither truly developed as a historical field in its own right nor [has it] been successfully absorbed into the study of any of its adjacent regions."

How did this happen? The continuities between Persia, Afghanistan, and the southern realms of Russian Turkestan were obvious to Russian and British imperialists, not to mention people who actually lived in the region. During the 1950s and 1960s, however, old imperial boundaries conspired with

[7] Nile Green, "Introduction," Roundtable on "The Future of Afghan History," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 45 (2013), 127.

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Excerpt
More information

Cold War optics to render the study of Afghanistan homeless. The Iron Curtain bracketed not just "Eastern Europe" from "Western Europe," but also Soviet Eurasia from the rest of the Turko-Persianate world, both politically and epistemologically.[8] If Soviet academic institutions distinguished between "Middle Asia" (the Uzbek, Tajik, Turkmen, and Kyrgyz SSRs) and the "Middle East" (Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan), American "Soviet Studies" grouped the entire Soviet Union together, fragmenting possible approaches to Eurasian history. Worse, academic centers typically located Iran in an Arab-dominated "Middle East" and Pakistan in "South Asia." Younger scholars trained in these paradigms. An elder generation of Orientologists retired just as learned critiques of English and French attitudes toward the Arab World discredited Orientology writ large. Much of what was no longer taught was forgotten.

How, then, to overcome the schematic categories that the Cold War imposed? Clearly, we need to do more than simply knit together a patchwork quilt of nationalist histories. The problems with this approach are especially visible in the case of Afghanistan, where, explains Afghan-American historian Shah Mahmoud Hanifi, there is a perpetual confusion about what was meant by the term "Afghan," particularly in relation to the terms "Pathan" or "Pashtun."[9] More fundamentally, Afghan national history is rendered murkier by the shifts in the meanings of the word "Afghanistan" itself between 1747 and 1893. Further, these confusions were often distilled by colonial authors like Mountstuart Elphinstone to cement a view of Afghanistan as an unchanging unit of geographic analysis, run from Kabul under Pashtun state domination, and yet also somehow threatened by Pashtun tribes.[10] Rather than merely placing this colonially-inflected Afghan national story alongside its Iranian, Pakistani, or (post-)Soviet counterparts, we need to pursue a transregional analysis, understanding how such nationalist narratives were themselves the product of sustained, and often violent, material, military, and epistemological intercourse with empire.[11]

Doing so demands grappling with the Cold War historiographical traditions that continue to govern the production of expert knowledge. American scholarship on Afghanistan, writes Hanifi, remained "fully nested within Cold War politics and U.S. intelligence gathering."[12] Donald Wilber, an OSS veteran who completed a PhD in Persian architectural history before directing the 1953

[8] Timothy D. Snyder, Remarks at Memorial Event to Tony Judt, March 23, 2012, King's College, Cambridge, United Kingdom.

[9] Shah Mahmoud Hanifi, "Quandaries of the Afghan Nation," in *Under the Drones: Modern Lives in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Borderlands*, eds. Robert Crews and Shahzad Bashir (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 86.

[10] Ibid., 87–8.

[11] Christine Noelle-Karimi, "Maps and Spaces," Roundtable on "The Future of Afghan History," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 45 (2013), 142. One promising work in this direction (although appearing after this book went into print) is Robert Crews, *Afghan Modern: The History of a Global Nation* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015).

[12] Hanifi, 96.

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Excerpt
More information

Anglo-American coup against Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, wrote the first serious area studies-inflected work on Afghanistan in 1962.[13] Yet it was Louis Dupree, a veteran and trained archaeologist, who dominated American studies of Afghanistan during the Cold War.[14] Living in Kabul from 1959 to 1978 and based in Peshawar from 1978 to 1983, Dupree embodied the disinterested American capable of interpreting "inward looking" or "xenophobic" peoples to outsiders.[15] The "enthusiasm" and "passion" of these scholars, however, masks the weak institutionalization of the study of Afghanistan and an absence of sustained critical engagement with concepts like "Afghan" and "Afghanistan."

It would be wrong to conclude from Hanifi's reflection, however, that Americans dominated the literature on Afghanistan in the twentieth century. Instead, it was *Soviet* scholars who pursued the richest lines of inquiry. And yet, our appreciation for the Soviet scholarly legacy remains weak. Why? One reason is the rise of tendentious approaches to Russian history enabled by Cold War xenophobia. As Anatol Lieven explains, scholars like Richard Pipes stressed "deep continuities running through and even largely determining the course of Russian history from the Middle Ages through the Tsarist empire and to the Soviet Union to the post-Soviet present."[16] Others downplayed Russian internal despotism and to play up a Russian external expansionism, seeing "Russians and Russian culture as deeply, perennially and primordially imperialist, aggressive and expansionist." Excellent work by Jerry Hough, Francis Fukuyama, and Andrezj Korbonski aside, the Cold War view of Russia as fundamentally paranoid discouraged serious engagement with the Soviet Union's own production of area studies knowledge, much less the intersection of ideas and policy.

Writing on Soviet-Afghan relations presents its own special challenges. Anglophone writings often reach back upon an older British tradition of writing about Afghanistan as a "graveyard of empires," as if the context of imperial war had not changed since the 1880s, or if the near-total extermination of the Afghan people by three percent of total Soviet Armed Forces constituted a noble victory.[17] But these Anglophone views have also informed Afghan

[13] Donald Wilber, *Afghanistan: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture* (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1962).

[14] Dupree's magnum opus was *Afghanistan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).

[15] According to Shah Mahmoud Hanifi, when his father (a graduate of élite secondary institutions in Afghanistan and then studying in the United States) met Louis Dupree for the first time in the mid-1950s, the first question that Dupree asked him was whether the Afghan Ministry of Defense had its own intelligence agency – an odd opening from a man whose primary training was in archaeology. The Soviet Union, it bears recalling, would have only just begun training the Afghan Army when Dupree asked his question. Personal Communication, Shah Mahmoud Hanifi, April 4, 2014.

[16] Anatol Lieven, *Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 5.

[17] The phrase "graveyard of empires" is usually attributed to twentieth-century Afghan intellectual Mahmud Tarzi.

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Excerpt
More information

historical framings. Afghan-American historian Mohammad Hassan Kakar describes Russians as "latecomers to the fold of civilization" and members of a politically backwards civilization.[18] Kakar contends that "godless Communists" sought to "ruthlessly suppress" Afghans just as "the Russians" had done to "Muslim Bukhara." Former Council of Ministers Chairman Muhammad Hassan Sharq also connects the Soviet invasion to a demonic logic of Russian expansion.[19] Ironically, a view of Afghans as fanatical Muslims that was "diligently cultivated and craftily deployed by the British in India" has been recycled by former Afghan Communists in order to stress their native authority.[20] Outlawed for much of the twentieth century, Afghan historiography remains captive to the categories of colonial and Cold War knowledge originally designed to dominate it.

This scholarly inheritance presents problems and opportunities for the historian who wishes to write on Afghanistan's twentieth century, particularly the years between 1929 and 1978. Traditionally, writes Nile Green, those brackets – the collapse of the Amanullah regime and the overthrow of the Musahibans – have enthralled scholars to the exclusion of unpacking the decades in between. Yet this mode of processing history "is a classic model of nationalist analysis: Afghans built the nation, non-Afghans destroyed it. What we lose sight of is both the multiplicity of voices drowned in the clarion call of the nation and the larger sequence of transnational dynamics through the entire twentieth century."[21] As a result, any "processual glue" that would link together the apparently national moment of the early twentieth century with the global moment of the 1970s is lost, leaving historians "with a narrow set of agents and analyses." If *space* constitutes the first dimension in which one must relocate Afghanistan, then the alleged globality or nonglobality of its history at different points in the twentieth century is the second.

In Search of Global History

But what would it mean to write a global history of Afghanistan, or indeed of any country? "How," as one scholar asks, "should the history of global flows and connections be conceptualized when it encompasses potentially nothing less than 'the world,' since all-inclusiveness is obviously not an option?"[22] Any answer to this question must disentangle a global scale from that of diplomatic

[18] M. Hassan Kakar, *Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979–1982* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 125–6.
[19] Muhammad Hassan Sharq, *The Bare-Foot in Coarse Clothes* (Peshawar: Area Study Centre of University of Peshawar, 2000).
[20] Hanifi, 95.
[21] Nile Green, "Locating Afghan History," Roundtable on "The Future of Afghan History," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 45 (2013), 132.
[22] Vanessa Ogle, "Whose Time Is It? The Pluralization of Time and the Global Condition, 1870s-1940s," *American Historical Review* 188(5) (December 2013), 1377.

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More information

exchange, or, in the case of the twentieth century, the Cold War. Traditionally, historians took for granted that scrupulous study of the diplomatic record could reveal "the secret stratagems of monarchs and statesmen" and uncover "the pattern of the past which explained the present."[23] By the early 1980s, however, diplomatic history was embattled.[24] "The history of international relations," wrote one scholar, "cannot, alas, be counted among the pioneering fields of the discipline during the 1970s."[25]

Fortunately, both new sources and methodological innovations enabled scholars to respond to these charges. An imperial turn in many national historiographies, including that of the United States, prompted historians to investigate exchange beyond just the political or diplomatic plane. Exploiting the archives of businesses, NGOs, and universities and making use of postcolonial theory, historians of international relations have made theirs a field that now studies not just war but also cotton, community development, or suburbs as legitimate research subjects.[26] Two and a half decades after the opening of Eastern Bloc, Chinese, Yugoslav, and other national archives, scholars have turned Cold War history into a thriving discipline with journals, institutes, and debates of its own.[27]

Sometimes, however, an insistence that "the most fundamental issue is the question of war and peace" can lead to an over-emphasis on writing history from the point of view of a National Security Adviser – or a Politburo member.[28] Obviously, exchanges between Foreign Ministries, or between

[23] Roger Bullen, "What Is Diplomatic History?" in *What Is History Today?*, ed. Juliet Gardiner (London: Macmillan Education, 1988), 135.

[24] Charles S. Maier, "Marking Time: Contemporary Historical Writing in the United States," in *The Past Before Us: Contemporary Historical Writing in the United States* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), 355–387; Alexander de Conde, "What's Wrong With American Diplomatic History?" *Newsletter of the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations* 1 (May 1970); David S. Patterson, "What's Wrong (And Right) with American Diplomatic History? A Diagnosis and a Prescription," SHAFR *Newsletter* 9 (September 1978), 1–14.

[25] Maier, "Marking Time," 355. For a reflection by Maier on the state of the field decades later, see "Return to Rome: Half a Century of American Historiography in Light of the 1955 Congress for International Historical Studies," in *La storiografia tra passato e futuro (Il X Congreso Internazionale di Scienze Storiche (Roma 1955) cinquant'anni dopo* (Rome: 2008), 189–211).

[26] Sven Beckert, *Empire of Cotton: A Global History* (New York: Knopf, 2014); Daniel Immerwahr, *Thinking Small: The United States and the Lure of Community Development* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015); Andrew Friedman, *Covert Capital: Landscapes of Denial and the Making of U.S. Empire in the Suburbs of Northern Virginia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013).

[27] Consider, for example, the works in the University of North Carolina Press's New Cold War History Series, or the work of that Series' editor, Odd Arne Westad's *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

[28] Mark Trachtenberg, "What's the Problem? A Research Agenda for Diplomatic History," H-Diplo State of the Field Essay, October 10, 2014; Mario del Pero, "Tra lunghe paci i guerre fredde. La storiografia di John Lewis Gaddis" (2005); Tony Judt, "A Story Still to Be Told," *New York Review of Books*, March 23, 2006.

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Excerpt
More information

Presidents and General Secretaries, were fundamental, since "policymakers could effect the most fundamental changes in how people lived and worked." But so, too, could the real or perceived threat of overpopulation, smallpox, or global warming.[29] The most compelling works reject divisions between structural change and diplomatic exchange, exploring how "the changing forms of the transnational itself" interact with the story culled from state archives.[30] They stress how the bipolar conflict was necessarily embedded in a developing global condition with roots dating to the 1870s, but which changed dramatically in the 1970s.[31] While global history itself now constitutes a field of its own, the global turn has itself irreversibly affected every national historiographic field, not least that of Russia and the Soviet Union.[32]

Humanitarian Invasion builds upon this conversation by placing the history of development in Afghanistan in the context of global transformations in the concept of sovereignty. More specifically, this book argues that Afghanistan's tumultuous Cold War experience is best understood through the lens of global debates about the rights and responsibilities associated with postcolonial sovereignty. Far from an obscure location fundamentally distant from global processes, Afghanistan and its twentieth-century journey from British protectorate to international protectorate – by way of independence and Soviet

[29] Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), x; Nick Cullather, *The* Hungry World: America's Cold War Battle Against Poverty in Asia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010); Matthew Connelly, *Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008); Erez Manela, "A Pox on Your Narrative: Writing Disease Control into Cold War History," *Diplomatic History* 34(2) (April 2010), 299–323.

[30] Sven Beckert, "Das Reich der Baumwolle: Eine globale Geschichte," in *Das Kaiserreich transnational: Deutschland in der Welt 1870–1914*, eds. Sebastian Conrad and Jürgen Osterhammel (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004), 301; C.A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914* (Malden: Blackwell, 2004); Jürgen Osterhammel, *Die Verwandlung der Welt. Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2009); Stefan Link, "Transnational Fordism: Ford Motor Company, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union in the Interwar Years" (PhD Dissertation, Harvard University, 2012); Heidi Tworek, "Magic Connections: German News Agencies and Global News Networks, 1905–45," (PhD Dissertation, Harvard University, 2012); Vanessa Ogle, *The Global Transformation of Time, 1879–1950* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015); Mira Siegelberg, *Statelessness: An International History, 1921–1961* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, forthcoming).

[31] Michael Geyer and Charles Bright, "World History in a Global Age," *The American Historical Review* 100(4) (October 1995), 1034–60; Charles Maier, "Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era," *American Historical Review* 105(3), 807–31; Geyer and Bright, "Where in the World is America? The History of the United States in the Global Age," in *Rethinking American History in a Global Age*, ed. Thomas Bender (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 63–100.

[32] See (although focused more explicitly on Soviet-Third World exchanges than any global condition) David Engerman, "The Second World's Third World," *Kritika* 12(1) (Winter 2011), 183–211; for one example from the field of American history, see *Rethinking American History in a Global Age*, ed. Thomas Bender (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).

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