Introduction

Today, Bavaria is an internationally renowned travel destination, but this was not always the case. In fact, it was once overshadowed by other German destinations like the Rhineland and the Black Forest, conveniently situated along the meandering route of the aristocratic Grand Tour. It was the rise of the commercial tourism industry during the nineteenth century that first brought large numbers of visitors to the Kingdom of the Wittelsbachs. The region's appeal was truly multifaceted; from the rolling hills of the Franconian highlands to the snow-capped peaks of the Alps, from the medieval walls of former Imperial Free Cities to the galleries and beer halls of Munich, Bavaria had no shortage of sights worth seeing.

I first travelled to Bavaria not as a tourist or a historian, but as a high-school exchange student. Living in Munich for close to a year, I developed a passion for its history, culture, and cuisine, and found myself enamored with the so-called village of millions. Like a good urbanite, I was also drawn to the landscape outside the city, visiting various locales in the Alps and their foothills. I quickly realized that there was something remarkable about Upper Bavaria; it was so quintessentially German and yet so distinct from the other parts of the country that I toured that year. Furthermore, the people seemed proud of this otherness, and were eager to identify themselves as Bavarians first, and Germans second. Years later, as a graduate student at Emory University, I decided to examine Bavarian identity in more detail by considering how the region sold itself to domestic and foreign tourists.

In his influential book *The Tourist: A New Theory of the Leisure Class*, sociologist Dean MacCannell writes: "Entire cities and regions, decades

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and cultures have become aware of themselves as tourist attractions."[1] Tourism led to a massive remapping of Bavaria, raising the profile of some locations while rendering others invisible, but did it make Bavarians self-aware? Did tourism facilitate the creation of a distinctly Bavarian form of "Germanness"? These were my initial research questions, but the archive held more than a few surprises. I searched in vain for clues to the construction of a Bavarian regional identity, but what I ultimately uncovered was a complex relationship between the promises of tourism and the turbulent experience of modernity in central Europe. During the latter half of the nineteenth century, Germany quickly evolved from an assemblage of predominantly agrarian states into an industrial and military superpower. How did a growing tourism industry respond to industrialization, war, revolution, and widespread feelings of displacement and anomie? How did Germans decide to market their dynamic and volatile homeland to visitors from home and abroad? How did this constructed image reflect changing conceptions of nature, history, and modernity? These are the larger questions that the present work addresses, and the answers shed light on much more than Bavarian regional identity.

This is a book about leisure travel during a period of unprecedented transformations and dislocations. While travel has been a component of the human experience since ancient times, tourism is a distinctly modern phenomenon. As a cultural practice and a profitable business, tourism was pioneered by the nineteenth-century middle classes, who dedicated their limited free time to meaningful leisure activities. Although extended hikes and trips into the countryside were often sold as temporary flights from modern civilization, this was never simple escapism.[2] Modern leisure travel provided distance from the contemporary world, but it also provided perspective. In fact, tourism became an important feature of modern life itself; it was a form of therapy that allowed men and women to experiment with alternative possibilities. In a post-traditional world rendered unrecognizable by industrialization, urbanization, and the rise of the nation-state, the tourism industry promised to reconcile civilization and its discontents, anchoring contemporary urban society in the natural environment and a common past.

In Bavaria, the tourism industry consistently promoted an image of what I refer to as *grounded modernity*, a romanticized version of the

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[1] Dean MacCannell, *The Tourist: A New Theory of the Leisure Class* (New York: Schocken Books, 1976), 16.

[2] For more on tourism as escapism, see Ursula A.J. Becher, *Geschichte des modernen Lebenstils. Essen-Wohnen-Freizeit-Reisen* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1990), 197–198, 204–205.

present that reconciled tradition with progress, consistency with change, and nature with technology and science. This alternative vision provided the traveler with a taste of stability and a glimpse of authenticity, and it helped to make the modern world more comprehensible by linking impersonal and abstract ideas, like national identity, with familiar experiences and concrete sights. In an era of rapid and unprecedented change, grounded modernity produced the illusion of continuity. Though the two concepts may sound similar, "grounded modernity" is distinct from the discourse of "reactionary modernism" analyzed by historian Jeffrey Herf. The latter was limited to interwar intellectuals like Ernst Jünger and Martin Heidegger, who reconciled antimodern tendencies with technological modernization.[3] The language of grounded modernity, in contrast, was much more flexible, marketable, and widespread, and it was recognizable as early as the nineteenth century. Simultaneously nostalgic and progressive, it celebrated technology alongside several other aspects of modernity, including city planning, mass culture, and popular political movements.

While acknowledging the achievements of contemporary times, grounded modernity also glorified distance from everyday tedium. This was something that the Bavarian tourism industry ensured. Excursions into nature and vacations in health resorts provided visitors with a break from their hectic, dirty, and stressful urban existence. Trips to cities themselves provided access to historical milestones, in addition to granting new insight into the modern nation-state, defined by industrial progress and political triumph. In other words, tourism was always in the shadow of the present, even when it was seemingly fixated on the natural environment and the past. It could ground the individual traveler in search of meaning and perspective, but it also had the potential to ground the entire nation and the current political regime. The region of Bavaria offers numerous case studies that showcase how both visitors and the visited coped with modern life, and thus, paved the way for the future.

Bavaria, Modernity, and Tourism

By focusing on Bavaria, this book contributes to a growing body of scholarship that has employed the subnational "region" as a category of historical analysis. Decades ago, historians tended to dismiss the region as an anachronistic holdover from pre-modern times. Historians of Germany

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[3] Jeffrey Herf, *Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

in particular rarely questioned nation-building as their "central theme," and according to James Sheehan, "even fewer questioned the role of the *nation* as the basic conceptual unit within which historical problems were to be defined."[4] Regions did not register as worthwhile topics, and when they did garner attention, it was only as sites of backwardness, or as bulwarks against modernization and the creation of a unified nation-state.[5] In recent decades, a new generation of historians has reversed this trend.[6] In the case of continental Europe, scholars have emancipated the region from the analytical framework of modernization theory, demonstrating that regional particularities are not always reactionary and antimodern, just as regionalism and nationalism are not always mutually exclusive.[7] These scholars have proven that regionalism is a worthwhile category of historical analysis, in addition to demonstrating that the paths of regionalism and the German *Heimat* movement in particular "do not always lead away from modernity, but rather to its very core."[8]

My work engages with this literature, but it does not concentrate on a uniform Bavarian identity as a "mediator" or "metaphor" for national identity. Instead, it deconstructs the notion of Bavarian regionalism by recasting the former kingdom and *Freistaat* as a region of localities. Divided by religion, culture, and history, Bavaria was a political and economic unit that only began to acquire its present shape in the early nineteenth century. Local tourism associations reflected these divisions by concentrating on a single town or city, or by promoting a smaller region

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4 James J. Sheehan, "What is German History? Reflections on the Role of the Nation in German History and Historiography," *The Journal of Modern History* 53, no. 1 (March 1981): 2.

5 James Retallack, "Introduction: Locating Saxony in the Landscape of German Regional History," in *Saxony in German History: Culture, Society, and Politics, 1830–1933*, ed. James Retallack (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 18–19; David Blackbourn and James Retallack, "Introduction," in *Localism, Landscape, and the Ambiguities of Place: German-Speaking Central Europe, 1860–1930*, ed. David Blackbourn and James Retallack (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 15–17.

6 Celia Applegate, "A Europe of Regions," AHR Forum: "Bringing Regionalism back to History," *American Historical Review* 104, no. 4 (October 1999): 1164. See also Eric Storm, "Regionalism in History, 1890–1945: The Cultural Approach," *European History Quarterly* 33, no.2 (2003): 251–265.

7 Caroline Ford, *Creating the Nation in Provincial France: Religion and Political Identity in Brittany* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Celia Applegate, *A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Alon Confino, *The Nation as a Local Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany, and National Memory, 1871–1918* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997).

8 Thomas Kühne, "Imagined Regions: The Construction of Traditional, Democratic, and Other Identities," in *Saxony in German History*, 51.

like "Northern Bavaria" or "Munich and the Bavarian Highlands." Consequently, this study does not focus on a single, Bavarian identity because that is rarely what the tourism industry chose to sell. In fact, it was not until the latter half of the twentieth century that tourist publications frequently presented the larger region of Bavaria as a collective tourist destination. Even then, the only thing "Bavarian" about many of these tourist destinations was their location.

This region of localities began as a duchy north of the Alps in the sixth century C.E. In 1180, Holy Roman Emperor Friedrich Barbarossa deposed the presiding Duke of Bavaria, and awarded the duchy to the Wittelsbach family, who ruled uninterrupted until 1918.[9] However, it was not until the Napoleonic Wars that Bavaria began to acquire its modern appearance, incorporating portions of largely Protestant Swabia and Franconia, including the cities of Augsburg and Nuremberg. With the support of Emperor Napoleon, Bavaria was also transformed into a kingdom, and on January 1, 1806, Duke Maximilian IV Josef became Maximilian I, King of Bavaria.[10] The region grew tremendously during this period, and its population nearly tripled, rising from 1.25 million in 1794, to 3.68 million in 1817.[11] The reign of Ludwig I (1825–1848) witnessed further growth, and was marked by the king's enthusiastic patronage of the arts, the gradual industrialization of Bavaria, and the construction of the first German railway between Nuremberg and Fürth in 1835.[12] In the midst of the 1848 revolutions, Ludwig I was succeeded by his son, Maximilian II, who became a patron of German intellectuals like Leopold von Ranke and Justus von Liebig.[13] After his death in 1864, the crown passed to eighteen-year-old Ludwig II. Later immortalized as the "Mad King" of Bavaria, he ruled for twenty-two years, a period during which central Europe experienced sweeping transformations.[14] During that time, Bavaria's ill-fated involvement in the 1866 Austro-Prussian

[9] For a helpful survey of Bavarian history, see Andreas Kraus, *Geschichte Bayerns: Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart*, 3rd edn. (Munich: Beck, 2004).

[10] Manfred Treml, "Königreich Bayern (1806–1918)," in *Geschichte des modernen Bayern: Königreich und Freistaat*, ed. Manfred Treml, 3rd edn. (Munich: Bayerische Landeszentrale für Politische Bildungsarbeit, 2006), 19–26.

[11] W.R. Lee, *Population Growth, Economic Development and Social Change in Bavaria, 1750–1850* (New York: Arno Press, 1977), 12.

[12] See Golo Mann, *Ludwig I. von Bayern* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1999).

[13] See Martin Schäfer, *Maximillian II.: König von Bayern* (Munich: W. Heyne, 1989).

[14] See Christopher McIntosh, *Ludwig II of Bavaria: The Swan King* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1997).

FIGURE 1. Map of Bavaria with popular tourist destinations.

War on the side of the Austrian Empire and its reluctant alliance with Prussia in 1870 led to its incorporation into the German Empire after the defeat of Napoleon III's France.[15] Although the kingdom's sovereignty had been compromised, the Bavarian state continued to forge its own path, developing a separate system of taxation and even pursuing its own foreign policy.[16]

In spite of its special political status, Bavaria had a trajectory similar to those of other German regions, sharing the experiences of demographic

[15] For more on Ludwig II and the origins of the *Kaiserreich*, see Christof Botzenhart, *Die Regierungstätigkeit König Ludwig II. von Bayern: "ein Schattenkönig ohne Macht will ich nicht sein"* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2004), 185–196.

[16] Allan Mitchell, "A Real Foreign Country: Bavarian Particularism in Imperial Germany, 1870–1918," *Francia* 7 (1979): 587–596.

growth, industrialization, war, and revolution. Nevertheless, some Ger-
man historians have dismissed Bavaria as a provincial anomaly within the
larger story of the modern nation-state. Others have been preoccupied
with the growth of a Bavarian particularism that complicated the devel-
opment of a broader German nationalism. Those who have taken Bavaria
more seriously have analyzed how the Bavarian state promoted a sepa-
rate identity throughout the nineteenth century, with tactics including the
official codification of regional history, the promotion of a Wittelsbach
cult of monarchy, and the display of regional costumes at royal events.[17]
All of these efforts were designed to create allegiance to the dynasty
and state, despite the fact that Bavaria was itself divided into older,
regional units like Swabia and Franconia. At the same time, the devel-
opment of a national infrastructure in the form of railways, postal ser-
vice, legal statutes, and education also contributed to a broader regional
consciousness in Bavaria.[18] This regional consciousness often coexisted
with German patriotism. For example, the German imperial cult and the
Bavarian cult of monarchy often overlapped and mutually reinforced one
another in the same state-sponsored public spectacle in post-unification
Bavaria.[19] Meanwhile, history lessons in Bavarian elementary school
classrooms minimized Prussia's role in the German Empire while glorify-
ing Bavarian contributions to both medieval and recent German history.[20]
Though often absent from tourist propaganda, Bavarian particularism did
exist within more official discourses, and was ultimately consistent with
German nationalism.

Bavaria might have been officially part of the larger German nation-
state, but certain features did distinguish it from other regions. Historian
Abigail Green has emphasized the exceptional nature of Bavaria, arguing
that the state's size, political significance, and predominantly Catholic
population made it "atypical and far less representative of the Third

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[17] Norbert Joseph Mayr, "Particularism in Bavaria: State Policy and the Public Sentiment,
1806–1906." Ph. D. diss., University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1988, 96–187;
Regina Bendix, "Moral Integrity in Costumed Identity: Negotiating 'National Costume'
in 19th Century Bavaria," *The Journal of American Folklore* 111, no. 440 (Spring 1998):
133–145.

[18] Siegfried Weichlein, *Nation und Region: Integrationsprozesse in Bismarckreich*
(Düsseldorf: Droste, 2004).

[19] Werner K. Blessing, "The Cult of Monarchy, Political Loyalty, and the Workers' Move-
ment in Imperial Germany," *Journal of Contemporary History* 13, no. 2 (April 1978):
357–375.

[20] Katharine D. Kennedy, "Regionalism and Nationalism in South German History
Lessons, 1871–1914," *German Studies Review* 12, no. 1 (February 1989): 11–33.

Germany" than Hanover, Saxony, or Württemberg.[21] Others have main-
tained that the region had "the strongest separate 'national' identifica-
tion" in Germany, and that the differences between Bavarians, Swabians,
and Franconians quickly faded away.[22] Historian Ute Planert has cast
doubt upon such assumptions by arguing that Franconia's incorporation
into the Bavarian state at the beginning of the nineteenth century actually
produced a new Franconian identity that defined itself in opposition to
the Catholic south.[23] My research builds upon this work by indicating
that the notion of a uniform Bavarian identity is a historical myth that
prevents us from appreciating the complexity of the Bavarian case. Fur-
thermore, the tendency to brand Bavaria as exceptional has prevented us
from considering its similarities with other German regions like Prussia
and Baden, which were also internally divided, but lacked comparable
reputations of regional particularism. In many regards, Bavaria was both
exceptional and exemplary, and that is why it grants such valuable insight
into the larger topics of collective identity and modernity.

Before proceeding further, it may be helpful to turn our attention to the
latter concept. In his 1863 essay, "The Painter of Modern Life," art critic
Charles Baudelaire used the term "modernity" to refer to "the transient,
the fleeting, the contingent," an "indefinable something" that all artists
should capture in their work. However, his subsequent assertion that
every artistic epoch had its own "form of modernity" obscured the truly
unique features of Baudelaire's day and age.[24] For many Europeans, the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries represented an age of progress and
divergence, defined by rationalization, industrialization, urbanization,
"denaturalization," ongoing secularization, and the rise of the nation-
state.[25] Collectively defined as modernization, these processes destroyed
traditional relationships and networks, and uprooted large portions of

[21] Abigail Green, *Fatherlands: State-Building and Nationhood in Nineteenth Century Ger-
    many* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 10.
[22] Bendix, "Moral Integrity in Costumed Identity," 142–143; Mayr, "Particularism in
    Bavaria," 10.
[23] Ute Planert, "From Collaboration to Resistance: Politics, Experience, and Memory of
    the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in Southern Germany," *Central European His-
    tory* 39, no. 4 (December 2006): 689, 692. For more on the challenge of constructing a
    united Bavarian identity, see Manfred Hanisch, *"Für Furst und Vaterland": Legitima-
    tionsstiftung in Bayern zwischen Revolution von 1848 und deutscher Einheit* (Munich:
    R. Oldenbourg, 1991).
[24] Charles Baudelaire, "The Painter of Modern Life," in *Selected Writings on Art and
    Literature*, trans. P.E. Charvet (New York: Penguin Books, 1992), 402–403.
[25] C.A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914* (Malden, MA: Blackwell,
    2004), 11. For more on "denaturalization," see Wolfgang Schivelbusch, *The Railway*

society both literally and figuratively.[26] In 1848's "Communist Mani-festo," Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels described the modern age as follows: "Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted distur-bance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation dis-tinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones . . . All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned . . . "[27] This is modernity: the post-traditional condition wrought by modernization that began to define parts of Europe over the course of the long nineteenth century. Things had changed, and there was a widespread perception of living in a drasti-cally altered world that was both inspiring and horrifying.[28] In the midst of such violent change and iconoclasm, some individuals sought more grounded and meaningful experiences. Their subjective visions became varieties of modernism: any attempt to deal with the disorienting experi-ence of modernity by experimenting with alternative possibilities.[29]

Although historians continue to disagree about the nature of Ger-man modernity, with some still insisting on a "special path" of mod-ernization, most agree that the late nineteenth century witnessed major breakthroughs and extraordinary complications.[30] In a matter of decades, Germany evolved from a loose alliance of agrarian states into a pre-dominantly urban and industrial superpower.[31] *Gemeinschaft* gave way to *Gesellschaft*, or a "society in which every kind of social or political identity was suddenly disrupted and replaced by the anonymity and face-lessness of modern life."[32] For many Germans, modernity represented a mixed bag of progress and loss, promise and despair. Still, they did

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Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space in the Nineteenth Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 1–15.

[26] Marshall Berman, *All That Is Solid Melts Into Air: The Experience of Modernity* (New York: Penguin Books, 1988), 17.

[27] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, "The Communist Manifesto," in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. Robert Tucker (New York: Norton, 1972), 338.

[28] Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World*, 10–11.

[29] Berman, *All That Is Solid Melts Into Air*, 5, 16.

[30] For more on the *Sonderweg* debate, see Jürgen Kocka, "German History Before Hitler: The Debate about the German Sonderweg," *Journal of Contemporary History* 23, no. 1 (January 1988): 3–16; Chris Lorenz, "Beyond Good and Evil? The German Empire of 1871 and Modern German Historiography," *Journal of Contemporary History* 30, no. 4 (October 1995): 729–765; William Hagen, "Master Narratives beyond Postmodernity: Germany's 'Separate Path' in Historiographical-Philosophical Light," *German Studies Review* 30, no. 1 (February 2007): 1–32.

[31] See Brett Fairbairn, "Economic and Social Developments," in *Imperial Germany, 1871–1918*, ed. James Retallack (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 61–82.

[32] Thomas W. Kniesche and Stephen Brockmann, "Introduction: Weimar Today," in *Dancing on the Volcano: Essays on the Culture of the Weimar Republic*, ed. Thomas

not think exclusively in terms of "modern" versus "antimodern," or "new" versus "old." Instead, they developed "blends and amalgams that are specific to particular times and social systems and must be thoroughly studied in their own right."[33] Thomas Lekan identifies one such amalgam in his work on German landscape preservation, in which he argues that middle-class environmentalists worked toward an "alternative modernity" by seeking "a harmonious balance between industrial technology and the natural environment in the countryside." For example, some environmental activists insisted that paper mills, mines, and even railways had become naturalized elements of the landscape, just as cities could remain connected to the past through the conservation of green spaces and medieval architecture.[34] More recently, Andrew Denning has examined the history of skiing in order to elucidate the concept of "Alpine modernism," an ideology that balanced neo-romantic "back to nature" impulses with a celebration of the more modern attributes of the new sport, including its rationality and its velocity. "By harmonizing modernity with the timeless Alps," Denning argues, "skiers generated a modern vision of paradise."[35] My research confirms that tourism served a similar function by allowing Germans (and foreigners) to temporarily inhabit a better version of modernity. Again, it was not an escape from the modern world, but rather a means of experimenting with alternative possibilities. However, like modernity in general, this experience was also ephemeral or "fleeting."

Scholars have not always been willing to acknowledge the broader significance of tourism, and it was once commonplace to dismiss tourism as an exercise in conformity, mediocrity, and superficiality.[36] Departing

W. Kniesche and Stephen Brockmann (Columbia, SC: Camden, 1994), 7. See also Ferdinand Tönnies, *Community and Society*, trans. Charles P. Loomis (New York: Dover Publications, 2002).

33 Adelheid von Saldern, *The Challenges of Modernity: German Social and Cultural Studies, 1890–1960*, trans. Bruce Little (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 3.

34 Thomas Lekan, *Imagining the Nation in Nature: Landscape Preservation and German Identity, 1885–1945* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 63–67. See also Thomas Rohkrämer, *Eine andere Moderne? Zivilisationskritik, Natur und Technik in Deutschland, 1880–1930* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1999).

35 Andrew Denning, "Alpine Modern: Central European Skiing and the Vernacularization of Cultural Modernism, 1900–1939," *Central European History* 46, no. 4 (December 2013): 871. See also Denning, *Skiing into Modernity: A Cultural and Environmental History* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2015).

36 See Paul Fussell, *The Norton Book of Travel,* ed. Paul Fussell (New York: Norton, 1987), 649.