Introduction

In recent decades, non-traditional security (NTS) issues have moved from the periphery to the centre of the global security agenda. Problems such as transboundary pollution, epidemic diseases, transnational crime and terrorism, which are seen to have been intensified by economic globalisation, increasingly concern leading states (White House 2010; UK Government 2010; Australian Government PMC 2013), international organisations (UN 2004; EU 2003; NATO 2010), non-governmental groups and ordinary citizens. The latest United States (US) National Security Strategy proclaims: 'globalization has . . . intensified the dangers we face – from international terrorism and the spread of deadly technologies, to economic upheavals and a changing climate' (White House 2010: i). Similarly, the United Nations (UN) High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change announced a 'new security consensus':

> The United Nations was created in 1945 above all else 'to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war'. . . . [But] the biggest security threats we face now, and in the decades ahead, go far beyond States waging aggressive war. They extend to poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation; war and violence within States; the spread and possible use of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons; terrorism; and transnational organized crime. The threats are from non-State actors as well as States, and to human security as well as State security (UN 2004: 1).

The identification of these transnational issues as 'security threats' suggests a certain logic to dealing with them. As the Copenhagen School approach to security studies argues, traditionally, to 'securitise' an issue means identifying it as a threat to some cherished referent object, raising it to the top of, or even above, the political agenda and mobilising extraordinary measures and resources to combat the problem (Buzan et al. 1998). Yet, in practice, NTS issues are addressed through a baffling variety of means which often do not resemble emergency measures and are frequently ineffective. The clearest example is the

effort to tackle climate change. Despite increasingly apocalyptic projections of global warming trends and their implications for international security, action has been limited, uneven and heavily contested (Rothe 2011). Responses range from total inaction to market-based 'cap and trade' emissions reduction schemes, carbon taxes and many more. Meanwhile, the implementation and efficacy of each policy is challenged at every step from multiple directions. The discursive presentation of climate change as a security problem is widely accepted (McDonald 2013). What is contested, however, is what kind of a security threat climate change is and what needs to be done about it; that is, its governance. Similarly, a comparison of approaches towards counter-terrorism and natural disaster management in Europe and Southeast Asia found that, despite being designed to tackle identical threats, the governance systems adopted varied widely, with no sign of convergence in sight (Pennisi di Floristella 2013).

Why should security governance take such myriad forms and produce such divergent outcomes? The answer, in a nutshell, is that both the definition of security and the manner in which security problems are governed are highly contested. The existing literature on new security issues largely focuses on conflicts over the definition of security, but neglects almost entirely the matter of how and why NTS issues are actually governed. Whether one views the rise of NTS as reflecting real-world changes that generate new threats (Dupont 2001; Brown 2003a; Mittelman 2010), or as a socially constructed phenomenon reflecting the agency of security officials or rising societal concern (Buzan et al. 1998; Bigo 2002; CASE Collective 2006), security analysts explicitly or implicitly expect a response from states commensurate with the urgent and dangerous nature of security threats. Yet very little of this literature explores how security problems, once identified, are managed in practice or how the systems established to manage them actually operate. That is, they neglect security *governance* (cf. Krahmann 2003).

This book emerges from our dissatisfaction with this treatment of NTS and with the general neglect of security governance. As a small group of scholars pioneering the study of 'security governance' have emphasised (see Bevir and Hall 2014), there is a qualitative difference between NTS and 'traditional' interstate security, which appears to require novel forms of governance and associated forms of politics. The traditional concept of 'international security', which concerns military relationships between states and state survival, reinforced the

division of the world along the lines of territorial state boundaries. However, because NTS issues are typically viewed as transboundary in nature, they inherently problematise this division. Analysts and political leaders alike argue that sovereign state-based governance is no longer adequate and consequently demand new approaches capable of managing challenges that span state boundaries (e.g. Swain 2013). Accordingly, the questions of who will manage security, how and at what level are much more open-ended and contested than before. Thus, 'non-traditional' threats raise the possibility of 'non-traditional' forms of security governance (Bevir and Hall 2014: 17–26). Most security scholars overlook this because they treat NTS issues as just part of a growing 'laundry list' of states' security concerns and are disinterested in questions of governance.

Conversely, 'security governance' scholars observe that, particularly in the EU, as the identified range of threats and risks has widened, so have the actors and instruments tasked with managing them. Security policy formation and implementation are no longer the sole preserve of defence and foreign affairs ministries, nor are they constrained to the formal borders of sovereign states or multilateral organisations. Rather, to tackle complex problems that traverse such boundaries, power has been dispersed to other actors in the public and private sectors, and to levels above and below the nation-state (Krahmann 2003; Webber et al. 2004). Security is therefore pursued through 'multi-actor and multi-level forms of governance' (Schröder 2011: 34), involving 'administrative practices developed elsewhere in domestic and global governance, including markets, networks, joined-up or whole-of-government strategies and public-private partnerships, as well as old-fashioned, top-down rule by states and international organizations' (Bevir and Hall 2014: 26). These incisive observations – sadly ignored by most security scholars – characterise much of what is now done in the name of 'non-traditional security', as our wide-ranging case studies later demonstrate. However, the largely descriptive, 'pre-theoretical' literature on security governance provides no basis for explaining the wide diversity in security governance systems and outcomes (Christou et al. 2010: 342). It tends to focus on the EU, seeing it as a *sui generis* case, and thus concentrates on explaining why EU-like governance approaches do not emerge elsewhere. By contrast, we argue they *are* emerging elsewhere, even in the most unlikely places, demanding an explanation of their emergence and variety.

We therefore turn for guidance to theories of global governance, which have always sought to explain how transboundary challenges are managed. However, mirroring security studies' neglect of governance, these theories have generally neglected security issues. When NTS issues are considered, they are treated in a 'siloed' fashion. Scholars have, for example, considered global health governance and observed the securitisation of health, but they have not extended their insights into an account of security governance more generally. Instead, they often assume that what is happening in their 'silo' uniquely originates there, and is potentially colonising other silos. They claim, for example, that international security is becoming 'medicalized' (Elbe 2010a) or 'climatized' (Oels 2012), rather than seeing either health or the environment as just one of many areas susceptible to new, transboundary forms of security governance with many common features (Held and Young 2013).[1] More useful are general theoretical approaches – notably neo-Gramscian and poststructuralist theories – that identify, and seek to account for, these wider patterns and the emergence of multi-actor, multilevel governance systems.

We combine insights from these global governance theories with others from critical political geography and state theory to generate a novel theoretical framework for explaining how and why NTS issues are managed the way they are: the State Transformation Approach. In a nutshell, our argument is that, as security is becoming 'non-traditional', so too are states. Our approach focuses attention on how efforts to manage transboundary security threats do not simply involve empowering supranational organisations, but primarily seek to transform state apparatuses dealing with specific issue-areas and integrate them into multilevel, regional or global regulatory governance networks. For example, efforts to tackle the laundering of money associated with organised crime and terrorism do not involve the emergence of an authoritative international body that directly governs this issue-area, bypassing state institutions. Rather, states' domestic legal and regulatory arrangements are reorganised using international standards, and the responsible domestic institutions are networked into regional and global surveillance systems. These state apparatuses are thereby

[1] The *reductio ad absurdum* is a recent article proposing the 'rhinofication' of South African security as rhino poaching becomes securitised (Humphreys and Smith 2014).

rescaled – they no longer operate within a purely national setting, but are partly internationalised, imposing international disciplines on other parts of their states and societies, and networking with their counterparts across national boundaries. Rescaling may be driven, as in this example, by an international standard-setting organisation, but it could also be led by part of a formerly domestic state apparatus that has itself become transnationalised. For example, since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the Australian Federal Police (AFP), hitherto a domestic law enforcement agency, has become directly involved in the policing of states in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. This has, in turn, rescaled these states' police forces, as their priorities, procedures and laws have been amended to reflect the AFP's policy goals (Hameiri 2010: 117–45).

Because such changes in states' configurations and purposes reallocate power and resources, they are inherently contested, both during and after the transformation has occurred. The exact forms of NTS governance that emerge are an outcome of this contestation. The nub of this contestation is a struggle over the appropriate *scale* at which a problem should be governed. The claim that individual states cannot deal with problems like pandemic disease or transnational crime generates demands for new regional or global arrangements to tackle them. Although such demands may now appear commonsensical, just as what counts as 'security' is an inherently political and contested question (McDonald 2008), so too there is nothing natural or obvious about the level, or scale, at which an issue is governed. Different scales – local, provincial, national, regional, global and so on – privilege different interests and agendas; consequently, any attempt to shift governance from one scale to another typically elicits considerable political resistance. Reflecting their different material interests and ideologies, coalitions of socio-political forces form around different scalar arrangements and struggle to define governance approaches that best suit their preferences (Jones 2012; Hameiri 2013).

Conflicts are particularly likely to emerge around NTS governance because it typically affects economic interests directly. Problems like transboundary pollution, transnational crime, human trafficking and so on are frequently seen as being generated by rapid economic growth and intensifying interdependence, and thus as the 'dark side of globalization' (G8 1999; Smith 2001; see also Mittelman 2010). Furthermore, tackling these problems often directly affects the interests of

particular industries. Thus, for example, whilst national and international public health officials may seek to contain diseases like avian influenza by promoting regionalised surveillance and biosecurity measures, this may potentially involve radical changes to the way in which poultry is produced. This will likely elicit resistance from agricultural interests and potentially industry regulators who fear a loss of power and influence. These groups may thus organise to preserve a local scale of governance or deflect governance rescaling onto less powerful actors. The regimes that emerge to govern NTS issues, and the degree of rescaling involved, thus reflect the contingent outcome of political struggles. These conflicts will also shape how these new governance systems function in practice, since affected interests will likely seek to mould their operation to their own benefit. Thus, socio-political conflict – and the wider power relations and political economy context in which it is rooted – ultimately determines how NTS issues are governed.

With significant exceptions, global governance scholars largely neglect the crucial dimension of state transformation. Their debates too often focus on whether or not national authority is being superseded by international authority – a 'zero-sum game' view of states 'versus' international organisations. In contrast, through studying NTS, we observe that the transformation of the state is the main process through which global governance is emerging. Efforts to manage NTS issues are not, we suggest, the sole or even the main driver of state transformation. They are both an outcome and further facilitator of ongoing, contested processes of state transformation, driven by evolving social conflicts and epochal changes in the global political economy, often glossed as 'globalisation'. The most important of these changes is the emergence of disaggregated, 'regulatory' forms of statehood and related models of international governance, including regulatory regionalism and multilevel governance. The State Transformation Approach therefore deliberately eschews treating security as a special domain isolated from wider struggles over power and wealth. It instead situates NTS, and its governance, firmly within these historically evolving dynamics.

We apply the State Transformation Approach to three NTS issue-areas – transboundary pollution, pandemic disease and transnational crime – in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. Specifically, we consider efforts to tackle 'haze' pollution and climate change associated

with emissions from land and forest fires in Indonesia, measures to prevent and contain the spread of avian influenza (bird flu) in Thailand and Indonesia and the control of money laundering and terrorist financing in Myanmar and Vanuatu. We have selected predominantly Southeast Asian cases because they provide a 'hard' and rigorous test for our argument. The overwhelming majority of studies of Southeast Asian security cooperation emphasise regional states' persistent inability to collaborate effectively on NTS, particularly compared to more institutionalised groupings like the EU. This is frequently attributed to their attachment to 'non-interference' and 'Westphalian' sovereignty, which ostensibly impedes efforts to construct modes of governance appropriate for transboundary problems. Typically, Moon and Chun (2003: 107) assert that the 'naked pursuit of Westphalian sovereignty epitomize[s] the essence of Asian security' (cf. Jones 2012). Asia thus provides an extremely unlikely venue for the processes of state transformation and rescaling that we suggest are occurring. The existing literature on regional security generally neglects such processes, merely assuming they are not happening; it focuses virtually exclusively on formal, intergovernmental organisations and, observing their failure to acquire EU-like supranational powers, concludes that very little international security governance is actually occurring (e.g. Caballero-Anthony et al. 2006; Caballero-Anthony 2008; Caballero-Anthony and Cook 2013). The wider 'security governance' literature concurs that this region of 'Westphalian states' produces only '"weak" governance', if any at all (Kirchner 2007: 11–12; see also Weber 2011: 221; Breslin and Croft 2012: 11). Conversely, our case studies reveal that considerable rescaling efforts are underway – with varying degrees of success that are attributable not to an outdated attachment to sovereignty but rather to conflicts over the appropriate scale of governance. In fact, the invocation of national sovereignty forms part of these conflicts. Thus, we not only debunk the myth that Asia is somehow 'unique' but also use a general theoretical model, applied to Asian case studies, to shed light on a widespread phenomenon and generate insights of wider interest to students of International Relations (IR).

A narrow geographical focus is also necessary for practical reasons. First, it is needed to demonstrate how local socio-political conflicts shape the outcome of efforts to manage regional or global security challenges. Much of the comparative security cooperation literature focuses on intergovernmental dynamics and multilateral organisations,

neglecting to explore how, or even whether, international initiatives translate into local actions. Doing this requires extensive, in-depth fieldwork and comprehensive area expertise. Second, we found that security governance outcomes display such enormous variety that one cannot meaningfully generalise about any given region and then compare it to others. Our case study of avian influenza, for example, identifies variation not only across Southeast Asia but also within individual countries – which is explained by local socio-political conflicts. Identifying and accounting for this micro level variation cannot be achieved through wide-ranging, but superficial, interregional comparisons. Moreover, such an approach would assume that variation is explicable by regional-level differences – for example, that Asian states are 'Westphalian' whereas European ones are 'post-Westphalian' (Kirchner 2007). Our case studies clearly demonstrate that such crude generalisations are not helpful for understanding variations in security governance.

Instead, we compare outcomes within and across single countries and, to provide a modest degree of external comparison, we include a case study from the Southwest Pacific, Vanuatu, in chapter five on money laundering. This is useful not only to consider anti-money laundering governance in an offshore tax haven, but also to contrast outcomes in 'Westphalian' Southeast Asia to those in a region of supposedly 'weak' states. Southwest Pacific states are typically presented as the polar opposite of East Asian ones: they are 'quasi-states' (Jackson 1990), lacking real substance and being dominated, or even extensively controlled, by Australia in a form of 'patron–client regionalism' (Firth 2008). Vanuatu should thus be very amenable to externally driven state transformation. Nonetheless, as we shall see, local power struggles still condition security governance outcomes, demonstrating the importance of the social conflict foregrounded in the State Transformation Approach.

Outline of the book

Part one contains our theoretical investigation of NTS governance. In chapter one, we engage with the literature on security and global governance. Although security studies has become increasingly sophisticated and provides a useful perspective on how the security agenda has widened, we argue it nonetheless remains limited for our purposes due

to its relative neglect of governance. The security governance literature contains important empirical insights into the changing way in which non-traditional threats are managed. However, it lacks any articulated theoretical framework capable of explaining how new modes of governance are emerging and operating in practice. Studies of global governance, despite their own relative neglect of security issues, furnish some useful analytical insights for us, particularly neo-Gramscian and poststructuralist approaches. However, most theories remain limited by their inattention to the politics of state transformation that we recognise as an inherent part of efforts to govern transnational problems.

Chapter two combines relevant insights from existing IR literature with those from political geography, state theory and political economy to generate our framework for explaining NTS governance – the State Transformation Approach. Given the centrality of questions of scale to our perspective, we draw on critical political geography to begin analysing contestation over the level at which security problems should be understood and managed. To flesh out this contestation and pay due attention to the instruments and actors involved in rescaling efforts, we also use a particular branch of Marxist state theory – associated with the work of Nicos Poulantzas (1978) and Bob Jessop (2008) – and critical political economy literature. We argue that actual modes of security governance express the contingent outcomes of conflict between socio-political coalitions struggling to define the appropriate scale and instruments of governance in a given issue-area. These struggles are often rooted within, and always conditioned by, the broader context of the political economy and state–society relations.

Part two of the book applies this framework to our three case studies. Chapter three deals with the 'haze' problem in Southeast Asia, a recurring transboundary pollution event. Every year, thick smog from land and forest fires in Indonesia drifts into Singapore and Malaysia, causing serious public health problems and economic disruption, plus vast carbon dioxide emissions which contribute to climate change. We explore how a coalition of concerned actors – environment ministries, environmentalist non-governmental organisations (NGOs), international organisations and some international business groups – has promoted the rescaling of the governance of these fires, and land management more broadly, to the regional level. This has involved networking national and subnational institutions into regional and subregional

fire-fighting arrangements and attempts to empower a group of experts to influence the deployment of international fire-fighting teams. However, this rescaling has been resisted by local and national officials and powerful business interests involved in illegal land clearance using fire, who prefer a local scale of governance which enables them to continue business as usual. The outcome of struggles between these rival coalitions is a highly constrained system of subregional governance which, despite some rescaling of state apparatuses, largely fails to tackle this NTS threat.

Chapter four explores the governance of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 in Southeast Asia. H5N1, a zoonotic pathogen originating in poultry, was a major global security scare during the last decade, arousing fears of a worldwide pandemic that could kill up to 350 million people and profoundly disrupt the international economy (Davis 2005). This provoked frenzied efforts to construct internationalised systems of surveillance and control in outbreak countries, particularly Indonesia, which had the highest number of human deaths worldwide. As we demonstrate in studies of both Indonesia and Thailand, a considerable amount of rescaling of state apparatuses occurred. In Indonesia, international health agencies were networked into a new, multilevel governance system spanning local, provincial and national scales, into which international agencies were directly incorporated. In Thailand, international standards were rigorously enforced, resulting in a massive restructuring of the poultry industry, the source of the disease. However, in both cases, powerful forces linked with this industry determined the form and operation of rescaled governance institutions. In Thailand, the dominance of large, integrated, export-oriented conglomerates produced a system which further concentrated market power in their hands, practically eliminating the smallholder sector, while protecting the industry from detrimental international intervention. In Indonesia, the complex relations between large-scale, domestically oriented conglomerates and smaller-scale farmers produced a very different outcome. The commercial sector as a whole was protected, deflecting the rescaled governance institutions towards 'backyard' farmers. Accordingly, while H5N1 appears largely contained in Thailand, it remains a serious problem in Indonesia.

Chapter five considers efforts to tackle money laundering and the financing of terrorism. Money laundering is seen as inherently linked to the challenge of transnational crime and terrorism, and has therefore