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978-1-107-10912-4 - The “Conspiracy” of Free Trade: The Anglo-American Struggle Over Empire and Economic Globalization, 1846–1896

Marc-William Palen

Excerpt

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1 Globalizing ideologies

Economic nationalism and free-trade cosmopolitanism, c. 1846–1860

The opposite economical systems should be designated as those of the nationalistic and cosmopolitan schools. The nationalistic or protective-defensive school . . . conceives of political economy as applicable only to the political bodies known as nations . . . The cosmopolitan, or so-called free trade school, ignores the existence of nations . . . Cobden would gladly see all boundary lines wiped from the map, and regards nations as necessary evils.

John Hayes¹

The gospel of the modern “historical” and “scientific” school, put forward in Germany sixty years ago by Friedrich List, and preached by his disciples and successors ever since, has, they say, entirely superseded the ancient doctrine which they nickname “Smithsonianism,” and “cosmopolitan Free Trade.” . . . Friedrich List and his followers declare themselves to be the only worshippers at the shrine of true Free Trade, and that Richard Cobden’s clumsy foot had desecrated her temple, his sacrilegious hand had torn down her veil, and his profane tongue had uttered her mysteries to nations who had for long ages to live and labour before they could be ready for initiation . . . Round this dogma the Free Trade and Protectionist argument in all countries of the world . . . has centered.

Russell Rea²

On a January night in 1846, the triumphal stage was set within Manchester, England’s Free Trade Hall. Never before had so many come to take part in the assemblages of the ACLL (1838–1846), nor had they such reason. After seven years of ravenous agitation, the ACLL could nearly taste its long-sought “cheap loaf.” Sir Robert Peel’s Parliament stood on the verge of overturning the Corn Laws, Britain’s long-standing protective tariffs on foreign grain.

Public demand for the Manchester event was insatiable. Over 8,000 tickets had been purchased within the first hours of availability. More than 5,000 hopeful attendees would be turned away. The Free Trade Hall

¹ John L. Hayes, *Customs Duties on the Necessaries of Life, and their Relations to the National Industry* (Cambridge: John Wilson and Son, 1884), 36–37.

² Russell Rea, *Two Theories of Foreign Trade* (London: Henry Good & Son, 1905), 6–7.

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was filled to capacity, the mad rush at the doors overwhelming. Ladies wore their finest dresses, gentlemen their sharpest suits. The hall gleamed with garish magnificence. Crimson draperies hung upon the platform wall. Crimson panels covered the end walls. The ceiling was white scattered with crimson ornaments and octagonal crimson shields bordered with gold. The gallery balconies were decorated with ornate trelliswork. Over the central iron columns hung a shield, behind which sprung the robed female statue of the Caryatides. A spectator could easily imagine, wrote a *Manchester Times* reporter at the scene, “that the great leaders of the League movement, fresh from new and yet more successful campaigns than any which they have heretofore achieved, had been met by their grateful fellow-citizens to be honoured with a ‘TRIUMPH.’”³

At precisely half past seven, Richard Cobden, John Bright, and the other ACLL leaders entered the hall amid deafening cheers. Cobden, exuberant, was first to speak once the expectant crowd fell still. He observed that the free-trade feeling was spreading rapidly across the globe, especially to the United States: “There is one other quarter in which we have seen the progress of sound principles – I allude to America . . . I augur . . . that we are coming to the consummation of our labours.” Loud applause greeted his prophetic vision for Anglo-American free trade.⁴

About six months after this cosmopolitan celebration, a German gentleman – dark-haired, bespectacled, with a receding hairline counterbalanced by a rather heavy beard – arrived in London. He coincidentally witnessed the expiration of the Corn Laws in the Upper House. A few hours later, this same man found himself in the House of Commons to watch Sir Robert Peel’s ministry “receive its death-blow.” A voice suddenly came from behind the German: “Mr. Cobden wishes to make your acquaintance.” The man turned and Cobden, yet energetic at forty-two, with his unruly muttonchops, offered his hand. “Have you really come over to be converted?” asked Cobden. “Of course,” Friedrich List, the German-American protectionist theorist, wryly answered: “And to seek absolution for my sins.”⁵

Unbeknownst to either man, their chance meeting foreshadowed a worldwide ideological conflict over the future of economic globalization. Soon after meeting Cobden, List returned home. Suffering from severe depression, he had forebodingly mentioned to a friend in England just before returning to Germany: “I feel as if a mortal disease were in my frame

³ *Manchester Times*, January 17, 1846. ⁴ *Ibid.*⁵ Margaret E. Hirst, *Life of Friedrich List* (London: Smith, Elder, 1909), 100–102. See, also, W. O. Henderson, *Friedrich List: Economist and Visionary* (London: Frank Cass, 1985).

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and I must soon die." On the morning of November 30, 1846, List went out for a walk. He did not return. His body was found that night, blanketed with freshly fallen snow. He had shot himself.⁶ List's 1846 depression counterbalanced Cobden's euphoria. So too would Cobden's cosmopolitanism meet its match in List's legacy: the progressive advancement of economic nationalism that survived him in many parts of the globe.

Trade liberalization had certainly taken on an international cast at around this time. The major European powers began instituting freer trade throughout the mid-nineteenth century, picking up even more steam following the signing of the 1860 Cobden–Chevalier Treaty between Britain and France. In the United States, the modest 1846 Walker Tariff likewise appeared a promising start, as would further downward tariff revisions in 1857.⁷ As the pro-free-trade *New York Evening Post* observed on New Year's Eve 1846, "a great movement of civilized mankind" on behalf of free trade had begun.⁸ But US economic nationalists were skeptical, to put it mildly, of Cobdenism's promised panacea of free trade, prosperity, and peace. This looming ideological conflict between free-trade cosmopolitanism and economic nationalism was soon to play out on a global stage, but most controversially in the political arena of the United States.

Transatlantic radicals, subscribing to Richard Cobden's free-trade philosophy, were intimately involved not only with the fight to end the English Corn Laws and American protectionism, but also to abolish American slavery. For them, free men and free trade were far from disparate goals. Conversely, leading American economic nationalists viewed the free-trading plantation South and Free Trade England as respective enslavers of blacks and American manufacturers. These conflicting ideologies would play a critical role in reshaping the Republican party and Anglo-American relations for decades to come, as would rapid American westward expansion. The differences between Cobdenite cosmopolitans and Listian nationalists would, however, remain hidden beneath the Republican party's political surface until after the Civil War, as both ideological camps rallied to the party's antislavery banner.

⁶ Ibid., 105, 106–107.

⁷ The Walker Tariff included a fixed *ad valorem* duty of 30 percent, although a few exceptions were as low as 20 percent or as high as 40 percent. Duties on cotton goods and rail iron, for instance, were lowered from 70 percent (under the 1842 tariff) to 25 and 30 percent, respectively.

⁸ Anthony C. Howe, "From Pax Britannica to Pax Americana: Free Trade, Empire, and Globalisation, 1846–1948," *Bulletin of Asia-Pacific Studies* 13 (2003), 141–142; F. W. Taussig, *Free Trade, The Tariff and Reciprocity* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1924), 1–3; C. P. Kindleberger, "The Rise of Free Trade in Western Europe, 1820–1875," *Journal of Economic History* 35 (March 1975): 20–55; *New York Evening Post*, December 31, 1846.

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Globalizing economic nationalism and free trade

Friedrich List had come to distrust the cosmopolitanism of orthodox economics after engrossing himself in Alexander Hamilton’s economic philosophy contained in the *Report on the Subject of Manufactures* (1791) and Daniel Raymond’s *Thoughts on Political Economy* (1820). List observed how free traders had developed the “cosmopolitical idea of the absolute freedom of the commerce of the whole world.” List pointed out, however, that by focusing on the individual and the universal they had ignored the national.⁹

List believed that these prophets of economic cosmopolitanism were attempting to go about achieving their goals in the wrong order. “It assumes the existence of a universal union and a state of perpetual peace,” confounding effects with causes. The world as it existed disproved their cosmopolitan theories. A precipitous global turn to free trade would be “a universal subjection of the less advanced nations to the supremacy of the predominant manufacturing, commercial, and naval power” of Britain. The rest of the world first needed to catch up. This leveling of the playing field, List argued, could only be accomplished through political union, imperial expansion, and economic nationalist policies of internal improvements and infant industrial protectionism.¹⁰

Building upon Alexander Hamilton’s late-eighteenth-century theorizing, List argued that a country’s economic policies were dependent upon its stage of development, and that imperial expansion could provide much-needed security for industrializing powers like Germany and the United States. England, with a strong home market and a heavily concentrated population, could focus more on manufacturing finer products and on dumping excess goods in foreign markets. The less advanced United States of the 1820s–1840s instead needed a mixed economy of manufacturers and agrarians working side by side, brought ever closer through the publicly and privately subsidized construction of canals and railroads. According to List, Latin American nations were at an even lower developmental stage, still “uninstructed, indolent and not accustomed to many enjoyments”: a lack of “wants” that undercut the

⁹ Keith Tribe, “Natural Liberty & *Laissez Faire*: How Adam Smith Became a Free Trade Ideologue,” in *Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations: New Interdisciplinary Essays*, ed. by Stephen Copley and Kathryn Sutherland (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), 28, 38–39; Tribe, “Friedrich List and the Critique of ‘Cosmopolitical Economy,’” *Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies* 56 (March 1988): 17–36; Joseph Dorfman, *The Economic Mind in American Civilization, 1606–1865* (New York: A. M. Kelley, 1946), II, 577; William Notz, “Frederick List in America,” *American Economic Review* 16 (June 1926): 261–262; Friedrich List, *The National System of Political Economy*, trans. by Sampson S. Lloyd (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1904 [1885]), 97.

¹⁰ List, *The National System*, 102–103.

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Figure 1.1 Friedrich List (1789–1846)

cosmopolitan global free-trade vision. At their lower stage of development, these nations needed to focus on exchanging “precious metals and raw produce” for foreign manufactures, and would remain colonially dependent upon more developed manufacturing nations. As to the latter, List argued that America and a unified Germany needed imperial expansion. Aggressive American westward expansion was therefore becoming ever more necessary, with growing numbers of Americans passing “over the Mississippi, next the Rocky Mountains,” to “at last turn their faces to China instead of to England.” According to List, the German states had similarly progressed to the point that, upon unification, they would require the colonial acquisition of the Balkans, Central Europe, Denmark, and Holland (along with the latter’s colonies) to more firmly establish his German Zollverein.¹¹

¹¹ Friedrich List, “Letter IV,” July 18, 1827, and “Letter V,” July 19, 1827, in Hirst, *List*, 187–210; List, *The National System*, 28, 143, 327–328, 332, 342–344; Joseph Dorfman, *Economic Mind*, II, 575–584; Bernard Semmel, *The Liberal Ideal and the Demons of Empire: Theories of Imperialism from Adam Smith to Lenin* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 67–68; Jens-Uwe Guettel, *German Expansionism, Imperial Liberalism, and the United States, 1776–1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 63–64; Henryk Szlajfer, *Economic Nationalism and Globalization*, trans. by Maria Chmielewska-Szlajfer (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 56.

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List thereby enunciated an international system of developmental stages coupled with "infant industrial" protectionism, coercive economic exploitation, and imperial expansion that Anglo-American imperialists in decades to come would work to implement at the local and global level. In 1897, Johns Hopkins political economist Sidney Sherwood would label it "young imperialism," when national political union was coupled with "a tariff wall of fortification around the imperial boundaries." And Sherwood laid much of the credit for America's own "youthful" imperialism at the feet of none other than "the successor of Hamilton," Friedrich List, whose protectionist doctrine "is rightly regarded as American in its origin."¹² This Listian imperialism of "young" industrializing nations – the imperialism of economic nationalism – would become manifest within late-nineteenth-century America.

In contrast to the imperialism of economic nationalism, List argued that England was practicing what historians have since termed the "imperialism of free trade." The leading industrially advanced island-nation sought to "manufacture for the whole world . . . to keep the world and especially her colonies in a state of infancy and vassalage . . . English national economy is *predominant*; American national economy aspires only to become *independent*." List believed that it was unfair to let the English reap the world's wealth. "In order to allow freedom of trade to operate naturally," underdeveloped nations needed to first be lifted up through artificial measures so as to match England's own artificially elevated state of cultivation.¹³ List described one of the most "vulgar tricks of history" as "when one nation reaches the pinnacle of its development it should attempt to remove the ladder by which it had mounted in order to prevent others from following." He granted that universal free trade was the ultimate ideal, but first the world's infant industrial economies would need a combination of private and public investment, protectionism, and imperial expansion in order to catch up.¹⁴

List's protectionist prescription for the perceived pandemic of Victorian free-trade ideology found wide-ranging patients. Listian disciples spread and multiplied throughout the globe in subsequent decades.

¹² Sidney Sherwood, *Tendencies in American Economic Thought* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1897), 12, 16.

¹³ List, quoted in Tribe, "List and the Critique of 'Cosmopolitical Economy,'" 28; List, *The National System*, 106–107.

¹⁴ List quoted in Leonard Gomes, *The Economics and Ideology of Free Trade: A Historical Review* (Cheltenham, UK, and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2003), 78; Friedrich List, *Professor List's Speech Delivered at the Philadelphia Manufacturers' Dinner* (s.l.: s. n., 1827), 5; Dorfman, *Economic Mind*, II, 581. See, also, Christin Margerum Harlen, "A Reappraisal of Classical Economic Nationalism and Economic Liberalism," *International Studies Quarterly* 43 (December 1999): 733–744.

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List's desire for a German Zollverein, or customs union, would fall out of favor from the 1840s to the 1860s, but would be revived and fully implemented by the 1880s. List also became a source of inspiration for imperial protectionists in England, Australia, and Canada in the last decades of the nineteenth century.¹⁵ Likewise, Japanese economists “imbibed” List's economic elixir following various Japanese tours of Europe in the 1870s and the translation into Japanese of List's work in the 1880s.¹⁶ Russia's finance minister during the late-nineteenth century, S. Y. De Witte, would also look to List for inspiration when he reformed Russian finances and encouraged the construction of a trans-Siberian railway. Anglophobic French protectionists similarly leaned upon List's theories.¹⁷ His work in turn received an avid audience among late-nineteenth-century South Asian anticolonial nationalists, to whom American and German industrial ascendancy merely confirmed the value of List's work.¹⁸ His writings thus found a welcome global audience, especially among modernizers beyond Western Europe.

List's economic philosophy would germinate first within the antebellum United States, where it would flourish by century's end. Exiled from Germany in 1825, he had fled to the United States, and was indebted to the earlier protectionist principles of Alexander Hamilton, Daniel Raymond, and Mathew Carey, the famous Philadelphia publisher, former president of the Pennsylvania Society for the Promotion of Manufactures and the Mechanic Arts, and father of Henry Charles

¹⁵ See Chapters 6 and 8.

¹⁶ Mark Metzler, “The Cosmopolitanism of National Economics: Friedrich List in a Japanese Mirror,” in *Global History: Interactions between the Universal and the Local*, ed. by A. G. Hopkins (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Tessa Morris-Suzuki, *A History of Japanese Economic Thought* (London: Routledge, 1989), 50–55; Tamotsu Nishizawa, “The Emergence of the Economic Science in Japan and the Evolution of Textbooks 1860s–1930s,” in *The Economic Reader: Textbooks, Manuals, and the Dissemination of the Economic Sciences During the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries*, ed. by Massimo M. Augello and Marco E. L. Guidi (New York: Routledge, 2012).

¹⁷ Szalaijfer, *Economic Nationalism and Globalization*, 62; *The Current Encyclopedia* (Chicago, IL: Modern Research Society, 1901), 447; W. O. Henderson, “Friedrich List and the French Protectionists,” *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft* 138 (1982): 262–275; David Todd, *L'identité Économique de la France: Libre Échange et Protectionnisme, 1814–1851* (Paris: Grasset, 2008), chap. 13. On French protectionism, see Michael Stephen Smith, *Tariff Reform in France, 1860–1900: The Politics of Economic Interest* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980).

¹⁸ Bruce Tiebout McCully, *English Education and the Origins of Indian Nationalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940), 270; Manu Goswami, *Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 215, 216, 337; Metzler, “Cosmopolitanism of National Economics,” 104–105; P. K. Gopalakrishnan, *Development of Economic Ideas in India, 1880–1950* (New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1959), chap. 3.

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Carey (1793–1879). List would become a key player in the development of nineteenth-century Philadelphian protectionist thought.¹⁹ By the end of the century, his influence would culminate in the creation of “the German-American school of economics.”²⁰

List became a leading defender of the American System of economic nationalism. It was fair to say, observed the editors of Boston’s news organ the *Protectionist* in 1919, “that List the economist was ‘made in America.’” In the fall of 1825, the Marquis de Lafayette introduced his friend List first to Mathew Carey and then to Henry Clay. After making a good first impression, List thereafter frequently gave protectionist speeches at conventions organized by Clay’s friends. In the early decades of the century, Clay himself would become an arch-proponent of the “American System” of internal improvements and protectionism and would come to see free trade as but a new way for Great Britain to recolonize the United States through commercial domination.²¹

List exerted a great deal of influence not only on Clay’s American System but also on Pennsylvania’s progressive economic nationalist philosophy. In 1826, List became a newspaper editor in Pennsylvania, where he gained national recognition for his defense of the American System. He took part in the development of coal and railways in the area, and became a propagandist for the Pennsylvania Society of Manufactures. His letters to its vice president, Charles Ingersoll, were published in the United States as *Outlines of American Political Economy* (1827). List’s published letters were then distributed to American congressmen later that year, influencing the 1828 tariff debate, and were at hand to be read by Mathew Carey’s young and intellectually hungry son, Henry. Some scholars have even speculated that the timing of List’s protectionist publications and the 1828 passage of the “Tariff of Abominations” was more than coincidental.²²

¹⁹ Hirst, *List*, 113–117; Kenneth V. Lundberg, “Daniel Raymond, Early American Economist” (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin Madison, 1953), 16; Tribe, “Natural Liberty & *Laissez Faire*,” 37–38; H. Parker Willis, “Friedrich List: Grundlinien einer Politischen Ökonomie und Andere Beiträge der Amerikanischen Zeit, 1825–1832,” *American Economic Review* 22 (December 1932), 700.

²⁰ Robert Ellis Thompson, *Social Science and National Economy* (Philadelphia, PA: Porter and Coates, 1875), 132; Luigi Cossa, *An Introduction to the Study of Political Economy*, trans. by Louis Dyer (London: Macmillan, 1893), 477.

²¹ Roland Ringwalt, “Friedrich List’s American Years,” *Protectionist* 31 (October 1919): 372; Henry Clay, *The Papers of Henry Clay*, ed. by James F. Hopkins, 4 vols. (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1959–), IV, 629; Maurice Glen Baxter, *Henry Clay and the American System* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1995), 199, 200; James Barret Swain, ed., *The Life and Speeches of Henry Clay* (New York: Greeley & M’Elraith, Tribune Office, 1843), II, 24.

²² Friedrich List, *Outlines of American Political Economy* (Philadelphia, PA: Samuel Parker, 1827); Gomes, *Economics and Ideology*, 73; Notz, “List in America,” 248, 255–256.

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After List's death in 1846, Henry Carey would take up List's forward-looking approach to the American System. Carey would become Pennsylvania's "Ajax of protectionism," a man well known for his imposing height, penetrating gaze, propensity for obscenities, and intellectual intimidation.²³ In his younger days, Carey had been a devout disciple of Adam Smith. Like List, Carey came to consider free trade an ultimate ideal for any country, but only after the proper implementation of economic nationalist policies – even England, he suggested, had jumped too far ahead when it abolished the Corn Laws.²⁴

Carey began enunciating his progressive Listian nationalist creed by the late 1840s, noting that "war is an evil, and so are tariffs for protection," but "both *may* be necessary, and both *are* sometimes necessary." He had expressed similar sentiments to abolitionist senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts in 1847: "Nobody *can* admire free trade more than I do . . . I never in my life was more surprised than to find myself brought round to be a protectionist. It is all wrong – as much so as any other sort of war – but it is a necessary act of self defence." A temporary period of protectionism was needed, he suggested, and then the world might obtain free trade and peace.²⁵

Carey's opposition to free-trade cosmopolitanism echoed List's. Carey thought that the country's vast expanse of available lands and a protective tariff were the twin panaceas to solve American economic ills. Protectionism was a cure-all that would increase morality and diversify labor productivity, invigorate the southern economy, and someday free the slaves. Like List, Carey also believed that the protective tariff remained essential only so long as American industries remained in

²³ William Elder, *The Memoir of Henry C. Carey* (Philadelphia, PA: Henry Carey Baird & Co., 1880), 32–35. Elder, while working for the Treasury Department, succinctly enunciated the Listian argument when he urged the imperial acquisition of new markets in the "tropical regions" for Western farm surpluses, in *How the Western States Can Become the Imperial Power in the Union* (Philadelphia, PA: Ringwalt & Brown, 1865), 18.

²⁴ On List's influence upon Carey, see, also, Thompson, *Social Science and National Economy*, 132; Sherwood, *American Economic Thought*, 14, 16, 22; Hirst, *List*, 118–122; Ernest Teilhac, *Pioneers of American Economic Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, trans. by E. A. J. Johnson (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1936), 79–80; Mark Thornton and Robert B. Ekelund, *Tariffs, Blockades, and Inflation* (Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 2004), 16–17; William J. Bernstein, *A Splendid Exchange: How Trade Shaped the World* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2008), 320–321; Szalaijfer, *Economic Nationalism and Globalization*, 55; Andrew Dawson, "Reassessing Henry Carey (1793–1879): The Problems of Writing Political Economy in Nineteenth-Century America," *Journal of American Studies* 34 (December 2000), 479; Frank A. Fetter, "The Early History of Political Economy in the United States," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 87 (July 14, 1943): 55–56.

²⁵ Henry C. Carey, *The Past, the Present, and the Future* (Philadelphia, PA: Carey & Hart, 1848), 302; Carey to Sumner, November 20, 1847, microfilm, reel 5, Charles Sumner Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.

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infancy. In proper Listian fashion, by the 1870s Carey would even tout restrictive trade reciprocity – a key US component of the imperialism of economic nationalism – alongside protective tariffs to aid in US regional economic integration.²⁶

Carey saw the South's domestic slavery as but one manifestation of human bondage; the southern cotton growers themselves, with no home market to speak of, were slaves to the global cotton market. He expressed his dismay to Charles Sumner that antislavery men could simultaneously claim to be free traders. For Carey, free trade meant economic subservience to England. Britain wanted the people of the world to "have but one market in which to sell their produce, and one in which to buy their cloth linen – paying what she pleases for the one and charging what she pleases for the other. This is precisely what the planter desires his negro to do." Carey felt that free trade and southern slavery were therefore two sides of the same coin: "The one is just as much slavery as the other."²⁷ He believed that slavery and premature free trade were interconnected, an antislavery line of argument that postbellum American protectionists would continue to utilize. He thus came to view the British Empire's advocacy of free trade not only as an impediment to American maturation, but an evil – a threat to America's home industries and economic freedom.

Carey found a sympathetic national outlet for his Anglophobic brand of progressive economic nationalism. From around 1850 to 1857, he became the economic consultant of Horace Greeley, the editor of the widely disseminated *New York Tribune*.²⁸ Carey was now able to promote his Listian nationalist ideology as an editorial writer for Philadelphia's *North American* and the popular *Tribune*.²⁹ In recognition of his newfound

²⁶ Henry C. Carey, *Principles of Social Science*, 3 vols. (Philadelphia, PA: J. B. Lippincott, 1858), I, 28–31; III, 440–445, esp. 442; Sidney Fine, *Laissez Faire and the General-Welfare State: A Study in American Thought, 1865–1901* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956), 16–17; A. D. H. Kaplan, *Henry Charles Carey: A Study in American Economic Thought* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1931), 30; Arnold W. Green, *Henry Charles Carey: Nineteenth-Century Sociologist* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951), 137, 140–141; Stephen Meardon, "Reciprocity and Henry C. Carey's Traverses on 'the Road to Perfect Freedom of Trade,'" *Journal of the History of Economic Thought* 33 (September 2011): 307–333.

²⁷ Carey to Sumner, November 20, 1847, microfilm, reel 5, Sumner Papers.

²⁸ On Greeley's mixture of radicalism and conservatism, see Adam-Max Tuchinsky, *Horace Greeley's New-York Tribune: Civil War-Era Socialism and the Crisis of Free Labor* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009).

²⁹ Paul K. Conkin, *Prophets of Prosperity: America's First Political Economists* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), xi; Elwyn B. Robinson, "The *North American*: Advocate of Protection," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 64 (July 1940): 346; Nathan A. Baily, "Henry Carey's 'American System'" (MA Thesis, Columbia University, 1941); Jeter A. Isley, *Horace Greeley and the Republican Party, 1853–1861: A Study of the New York Tribune* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1947), 59.