

Autocracy and Redistribution

The Politics of Land Reform

When and why do countries redistribute land to the landless? What political purposes does land reform serve, and what place does it have in today's world? A long-standing literature that dates back to Aristotle and is echoed in important recent works holds that redistribution should be both more prevalent and more targeted at the poor under democracy. Yet comprehensive historical data to test this claim has been lacking. This book shows that land redistribution – the most consequential form of redistribution in the developing world – occurs more often under dictatorship than democracy. It offers a novel theory of land reform and develops a typology of land reform policies. Michael Albertus leverages original data from around the world dating back to 1900 to extensively test this theory using statistical analysis and case studies of key countries, such as Egypt, Peru, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. These findings call for rethinking much of the common wisdom about redistribution and political regimes.

Michael Albertus is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. His research interests include redistribution, political regime transitions and regime stability, politics under dictatorship, clientelism, and conflict. Albertus's most recent work has been published in journals such as the *British Journal of Political Science*, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *Comparative Political Studies*, *Economics & Politics*, and *Comparative Politics*. He has also conducted extensive field research throughout Latin America.



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