CHAPTER I

Love, literature, and philosophy

> Who am I? If this once I were to rely on a proverb, then perhaps everything would amount to knowing whom I 'haunt.' I must admit that this last word is misleading, tending to establish between certain beings and myself relations that are stranger, more inescapable, more disturbing than I intended. Such a word means much more than it says, makes me, still alive, play a ghostly part, evidently referring to what I must have ceased to be in order to be who I am.
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> – Breton, *Nadja* (1960 [1928]), 11[1]

Introducing ownness: personification and *Oikeiôsis* in Roman philosophy

In this chapter, I argue that there is a general association between women and dependency in Roman philosophy, and that this association comes to expression at the point where philosophical treatments of ownness intersect with the personification of abstract nouns. In the next chapter, I discuss the complex varieties of personification available for the expression of ownness and its relation to real women in Roman rhetorical theory. Here, as further introduction to the background necessary for the rest of the book, I define ownness, introduce the major players of the study, and provide examples of the kinds of personification to which their imagination of ownness gives rise. By including Lucretius, the famous, irreligious, individualist Epicurean, along with Cicero and Seneca, the ostensibly conservative "company men" of Roman philosophy, I suggest that the concept of ownness, associated in the specific form of *oikeiôsis* with Stoics and some Peripatetic philosophers, is a broader part of Roman philosophy than its usual identification with a single school suggests.

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[1] From Nadja by Andre Breton, translated by Richard Howard (Penguin Classics, 1999). © Librarie Gallimard, 1928. Translation © Grove Press 1960. First published in Great Britain with a new introduction in Penguin Books 1999. Reproduced by permission of Penguin Books Ltd.

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To illustrate this, I first consider specific instances of figurative language in Cicero and Augustine's descriptions of friendship. By comparing the classical and Christian philosophers, I demonstrate the ubiquity of the conceptualization of ownness in temporally and cultural distinct contexts. I next demonstrate the same thing through a discussion of figurative language in treatments of social cohesion in the main thinkers of the study. In the section immediately following this, however, I lay the groundwork for the substantive illustrations of the matter of ownness from Cicero to Augustine by defining Roman philosophy in terms of the intellectual historical idea of "eclecticism." For the purposes of understanding Roman philosophy as an autonomous discourse, I argue that "eclecticism" denotes not the production of philosophical gallimaufries of only doxographical interest. Rather, like the property of texts and other cultural phenomena that, in the Introduction, I described as deconstruction, "eclecticism" denotes a tendency to do philosophy in literary ways, juxtaposing terms and concepts in a way that resembles metaphor more than argument and keeps those modes distinct, even as it assimilates them.

"Eclecticism" and the deconstruction of ownness: criteria of Roman philosophy

In the dynamic relations of literary and philosophical interpretations set in motion by the individual text, I find the full significance of Roman philosophy of the classical period and the radical and even feminist promise of its primary authors: the poet Lucretius (*c.* 99 – *c.* 55 BCE), the politician and rhetorical theorist, Cicero (106–34 BCE), both writing at the end of the Roman Republic, and finally the politician and poet, Seneca the Younger (*c.* 4. BCE – 65 CE), writing near the beginning of the early Empire. In each instance, I will argue that, while Martha Nussbaum in particular has been right to maintain that ancient philosophy fundamentally stints the conditions of vulnerability, embodiment, and dependency ascribed to women and children, the form of stinting has not been neglect but denigration, misogyny, and contempt.[2] Thus, as we'll see in the next section, Cicero develops two models of passionate attachment: one model uses images of parental love and values reciprocity

[2] E.g., Nussbaum 2001 [1986], 5–7, esp. n. 10: "The Greek and Roman Stoics apparently had no interest in childhood, nor did they ever ask how early experiences shape the mature emotional life"; cf. 2001a, 6. See also Trapp 2007, 202 n. 83. On the evaluation of women in Roman culture, see, e.g., Richlin 1992a; Edwards 1993, 63–97; the essays in Hallett and Skinner 1997; see also Williams 2010, 125–59; Centlivres Challet 2013, 59–113.

and difference, based in the corporeal condition of parturition and being
born, while the other is based on the image, in a notion that Aristotle
first memorably articulates, that each good man (*sic*) sees, in the other,
of himself.[3] In a paean to the founder of the school, one Greek Stoic
made the virtue of Aristotelian self-sufficiency that such self-reflecting
other-regard envisions expressly virile: "You founded *self-sufficiency*
[ἔκτισας αὐτάρκειαν], dismissing vainglorious riches/ reverend Zeno
with your hoary glower!/ for you discovered *a male theory* [ἄρσενα γὰρ
λόγον εὗρες]."[4] As often, Latin, whose word for "excellence" is simply
"masculinity," intensifies Greek assertions of this kind: "Virtue [*virtus*] is
derived from the word 'man' [*vir*]."[5]

As a result of more than just etymology, however, women in Roman
philosophy prove, if not absolutely incapable of true friendship, then at
least extraordinarily under-qualified. More often than not, writes Cicero
with a diminutive of denigration, the object of their affections is not the
abstract quality of the male other, let alone the other at all, but rather
the protection of their own vulnerability: "And so it happens that little
ladies [*mulierculae*] seek out the protections of friendships more than
men do [*amicitiarum praesidia quaerant quam viri*]."[6] Affection based on
dependency is thus rendered simply feminine. With this relegation of vul-
nerability and affection based on the body, as suggested by the original
reference to procreation, Cicero and company offer a gender-differential
division of affective and representational labor in which women, necessary
but frequently contemptible – necessary but in need themselves – become
a kind of local, often literally domestic, constitutive outside.[7]

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[3] Cic. *Amic*. 27. At *Eth. Nic*. 8.12: 1161b17, with Belfiore 2001, and 8.9: 1159a27–33 on maternal love,
with Blundell 1990, 228f. On non-virtuous friendship, or "friendship by resemblance," see *Eth. Nic*.
8.3–4: 1156a6–1157b4, with Price 1989, 103–61, esp. 131, 145–8; cf. Graver 2007, 175, Williams 2012,
48f., cf. 21, and Trapp 2007, 145.

[4] Zenodotus, *Anth. Pal*. 7.117=Diog. Laer. 7.30.3–5. Cf. Cic. *Fin*. 1.34–6, with Sen. *Vit. beat*. 7.13, cf.
Sen. *Ep*. 36.3; 66.21, 49; Cic. *Nat. D*. 1.110b.

[5] *Tusc*. 4.33, cf. Eisenhut 1973, 41–3, also *Fam*. 14.14.1 with L'Hoir 1992, 34 where note too *Att*. 10.8a.1,
Barton 2001, 128, also Altman 2009, 407 n. 2 on McDonnell 2006, 162, *pace* Späth 2010, 170f.; see
also *Fam*. 14.7.2 in Treggiari 2007, 203 nn. 51, 53, cf. Gordon 2012, 114–18, Williams 2012, 230; also
Quint. *Inst* 5.11.10.

[6] Cic. *Amic*. 46, with Williams 2012, 25f., 54–60, 65–70, 93–6. Cf. Plut. 143b3–10, where note *oikeion*,
with Hallett 1984a, 62f., 80f., cf. Nérandau 1984, 342–8, Trapp 2007, 160f. On the related "devalori-
zation of infancy," see Nérandau 1984, 15f., 37f., 70f.

[7] On the term, see Butler 1993, 39, with Bianchi 2014, 6. On the division of symbolic labor, see
above, Introduction, n. 41. For additional examples of dependency and friendship, see Pl. *Lys*. 215ab
with Pangle 2001, cf. *Men*. 247e; Arist. *Eth. Nic*. 1.7: 1097b8–16, 8.1: 1155a5–23, 9.9: 1169b2–22 with
Nussbaum 2001 [1986], 343–72, Trapp 2007, 145, 151f.; Lucr. 5.222–34 with Nussbaum 1994, 254–59,
cf. 190f., also 5.1012–13 with Nugent 1994, 202, cf. Banateau 2001, 48f., Konstan 2003; *Fin*. 3.21, 55,
70 with Wright 1991, 183; cf. Cic. *Sen*. 4, *Amic*. 7, 30, *Tusc*. 5.36–42, with Powell 1995a; Sen. *Ep*. 9

On the other side of this arrangement, certain forms of affection, associated with pleasure and protection from hardship, are the kind that women provide. Though elsewhere willing to accord women a literal place in philosophy – he addresses works from exile to both his mother and the eminent daughter of the historian Cremutius Cordus[8] – Seneca writes (*Prov.* 2.5):

> Non uides quanto aliter patres, aliter matres indulgeant? illi excitari iubent liberos ad studia obeunda mature, feriatis quoque diebus non patiuntur esse otiosos, et sudorem illis et interdum lacrimas excutiunt; at matres fouere in sinu, continere in umbra uolunt, numquam contristari, numquam flere, numquam laborare.

> Don't you see how different the indulgence of fathers and mothers is? The men order their children to stir themselves to undergoing ambitious pursuits when the time is right, don't suffer their idling on holidays, and shake the sweat from them, and sometimes tears; mothers, on the other hand, want to hold them in their laps, keep them in the shade, want them never to experience grief, never to weep, and never toil.

This is the considered opinion of the Roman who owed his career to a powerful woman and warmly acknowledges, as we'll soon see, the philosophical significance of his wife's doting.[9] Not so, evidently, in the abstract.[10] In the abstract, she – mother, daughter, wife – is devoted to pampering what needs to be toughened up.[11] At the same time, as we see when Seneca addresses his actual mother, Helvia, he may also express a recognition of the limitation of the stereotypes that he adopts, maybe even a – disavowed – longing to transcend them: "Where are the conversations," Seneca imagines his mother asking in his exile, "of which I never got enough? Where are the intellectual pursuits in which I participated more happily than a woman and with the closeness more of a friend [*familiarius*] than a mother?"[12] The comparatives mingle piety and progressivism, the recognition and validation of traditional roles and the desire to transcend them, on the part of the son on the part of the woman;

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with Schönegg 1999, 33–9, Reydams-Schils 2005, 51f., Trapp 2007, 155; cf. Lesses 1993. More generally: Annas 1993, 39–42, 223–6; Gill 2006, 89–93, Graver 2007, 167–71, 182–5; additional bibliography at Powell 1990, 5; cf. Lévy 1992a, 429f., 432.

[8] Cf. Gordon 2012, 85–7, with more below, in Chapter 5.

[9] On his career, see Griffin 1976, 62–6. On the behavior of elite women, see Hemelrijk 1999, 10f.

[10] Cf. Manning 1973.

[11] On stereotypes and reality, see Saller 1997, 25, Herzfeld 2005, 45f., 53–60, cf. Wray 2001, 55–63; feminist is Miller 1999, 40–2.

[12] *Helv.* 15.1; cf. *Marc.* 16, with Langlands 2004, 123–5, cf. Hemelrijk 1999, 40f. On *familiarius*, see Williams 2012, 42f., 93–6, 170f., 174–85; also *Ep.* 47.1, with Trapp 2007, 208.

"she," for her part, feels happiness in the prospect of intimacy to the extent that it exceeds her traditional "familial" role.[13]

In the same Stoic, an instance of ambiguity expresses a similar ambivalence and suggests the extent to which Romans were sometimes willing to admit that the figural evasion of specificity pertained to actual women. At the beginning of one of the later *Moral Epistles*, Seneca recounts that, in response to his young wife Paulina, he has left the city for the country for the sake of his health (*Ep.* 104.2):

> Hoc ego Paulinae meae dixi, quae mihi valetudinem mean commendat. Nam cum sciam spiritum illius in meo verti, incipio, ut illi consulam, mihi consulere. Et cum me fortiorem senectus ad multa reddiderit, hoc beneficium aetatis amitto; venit enim mihi in mentem in hoc sene et adulescentem esse cui parcitur. Itaque quoniam ego ab illa non impetro ut me fortius amet, <a me> inpetrat illa ut me diligentius amem.

> I said this to my Paulina, when she was endearing my health to me. For when I know that her breath is involved in mine, I begin to take thought for myself in order to take thought for her. And although old age has made me braver in the face of many things, I give up this one asset of maturity, because I realize that inside of this old man is also a youth who is spared. So it happens that, because I can't get her to love me more bravely, she gets me to love myself more affectionately.

The passage signposts itself as relating to ownness in several ways, not least with the "oikeiotic" language that I will discuss below: first, in the name of Paulina's action, *commendatio*, which we'll see ascribed to feminine personifications in Roman social theory; second, the exchange of love frankly bypasses the more typical Roman and Stoic aim of bravery (*fortitudo*); third, after starting with the ownness-word *commendat*, the passage ends with an other Latin ownness-word *diligentius*, while the relation to the feminine other ends, in the man, in a passionate attachment to himself (*me … amem*). Additionally instructive is the combination (possibly gnomic) of *senex* and *adulescens* with the mysterious referent of the latter: who is this youth inside the elder Seneca the Younger? *Adulescens* is, technically, common in gender, so while "the youth inside this old man" may be some younger version of Seneca, it may be Paulina, who was considerably younger than her husband and far more likely to be described as "spared" in Seneca's perspective.[14]

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[13] Cf. *familiares* at Cic. *Amic.* 2.

[14] Bourgery 1936, 91; on Seneca's *adulescens*, see Harich 1994, 356f. with background in Hemelrijk 1999, 31–6, 52f., cf. *Ep.* 70.1 with Ker 2009a, 153f., also August *Conf.* 9.4.29.

Far from presenting ownness within a problematic of egoism and altru-
ism, Seneca uses an apparent evasion in figurative language to demon-
strate, not that one can sacrifice oneself for another, but that one can
preserve oneself for another, and that it is precisely others who keep one
in life.[15] Because of the social conditions of Roman marriage, this hap-
pens through the introjection of an acceptably vulnerable subject: Paulina
adulescens bears the burden of the self-sufficient male's own past and con-
tinued vulnerability in a strange but literally familiar division of labor.[16]
The result of this strange division is that it becomes philosophically safe
and psychologically accurate to say that there is a twenty-year old girl
inside the elder Seneca the Younger.[17] That a distinguishing factor such
as gender might *not* matter in the strictest understanding of the old
Stoic underscores, in view of Seneca's careful rhetorical presentation, the
radicalism that the Roman Stoic would, in a movement whose unity is
deconstruction, both maintain and erase. Difference is necessary to feel
ownness, even as ownness aims to erase difference.

In terms of the usual approach to Roman philosophy, I propose con-
sidering the site of deconstruction that these texts provide as a form of
"eclecticism," a characteristic of these texts thought to distinguish them
from their Greek models.[18] This is not unrelated to metaphor and the dif-
ference between literature and philosophy to the extent that metaphor is
by definition both disjunctive and connective. Likewise, affirming and
denying likeness with the implicit assertion that this is *like* that because it
is *not* that,[19] the language of eclecticism is metaphoric: it asserts and denies
eclecticism in its implicit assertion of identity and difference. Put another
way, eclecticism is a *figurative* mode of philosophy: it depends on a back-
ground from which it varies in a *felt* dialectic of proper and improper,
appropriation and defamiliarization.[20]

Thus, for instance, the very concept of *oikeiôsis* is thought to be orig-
inally Stoic. And yet, as we'll see, by the time we get to Cicero, most of

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[15] See also *Ep.* 78.2, with Ker 2009a, 175f.; cf. Cic. *Att.* 3.3, *QFr* 1.3.3, 6, *Dom.* 96, 98, with Treggiari
2007, 56–7, also Cic. *Fam.* 11.20.1.

[16] Harich 1994, 356 n. 5 describes Seneca's attitude as *officium* (cf. Pociña 2003, 336); for a more gener-
ous view of Roman marriage, see Treggiari 1991, 232f., 236f., 241–53; for further bibliography on
Seneca and women, Ker 2009a, 93 n. 21.

[17] Cf. Reydams-Schils 2005, 30–2, also see Graver 2007, 274–82; cf. Inwood 1985, 182f.

[18] Dillon and Long 1988a, Lévy 1992a, 70–4, 337–7, 345f., 369–72, Trapp 2007, 13–18.

[19] Aristotle: "this is that (person)" ([*t/h*]*outos ekeino*[*s*]): *Rh.* 3.10: 1410b19, *Poet.* 4: 1448b15–17, with
Halliwell 2002, 177–91; more generally, Lyotard 2011, 6. See Foucault 1970, 67–71 through Judovitz
1988, 40f.

[20] Cf. Silk 2003, 122–32, 147.

the philosophical schools claimed that some form of this concept originated with them.[21] In Plato's *Symposium*, for example, while vetting various explanations for love and desire, Diotima says: "I don't suppose that each person cherishes that which belongs to himself, unless someone calls the good one's own [*oikeion*] … and the bad the alien [*allotrion*]."[22] In what will become the most "Platonic" part of Plato's *Symposium*, the elaboration of the theory of Platonic Ideas, in the form of a kind of negation of a negation ("I don't suppose … unless … "), Diotima introduces *oikeiôsis*. What adjustments to the theory of "Platonism," such as it is or will become, suffice to make the concept of "one's own" that will issue in Stoic *oikeiôsis* officially, originally "Platonic?" At what precise point, in other words, does a variation in phrasing in a context of philosophical elaboration constitute an innovation, and an innovation a foundation? This is especially pressing when, as here, the concept is doubly negated, not *not* that of the "original" philosopher.[23]

As I'll discuss below, the idea that one naturally knows his or her "own" even appears in the Epicurean – or at any rate, Lucretian – account of the constitutions of self and society. With that observation, it will turn out that the "Stoic" idea of "ownness" is somehow "like" the Epicurean one, except that, like a metaphor, it is also *not* like it, but rather a marker of what the different accounts all share in spite of their differences; it is thus both like and unlike, own and other. As a term, the concept takes on a figurative quality, in excess of its content, asserted in like terms, in unlike systems – exactly the dynamic ascribed to metaphor in ancient literary criticism (Demetr. *Eloc.* 86f., trans. Innes, modified):

> Custom is the teacher of all things, especially metaphors; making a metaphor of everything, it escapes notice through its making metaphors so safely … The metaphors are so inspired that they seem like the authoritative words … Custom has made some metaphors so well that we no longer want the originals, but the metaphor remains and holds the place of the original.

[21] Cf. Sedley 1989, 97–103, 118f.; 2005, 131f.; Lévy 1992a, 95f.

[22] 206e5–7, cf. 192d2, 192c1, 197d1 where note also *allotriotêtos*; cf. *Lys.* 221d1–222a4, with Bordt 1998, 141f., and Glidden 1981, Gonzalez 2000, cf. Pohlenz 1940, 38, Pembroke 1971, 141 n. 8 with Diog. Laert. 7.85 with LS, Vol. II, 343; also Hierocles, *Elements* 1.34; Lévy 1992a, 383, with Pl. *Charm.* 163cd; also Radice 2000, 101–3; on the *Republic* (N.B. 5: 463b10-e2, 464c5-e3, cf. 433e12–13, e.g.), see Brennan 2005a, 159–63.

[23] Cf. Burnyeat 1982, 7f., 13 on *whatever* philosophical artifact (italics mine): "This … is nothing but a last *etiolated* remnant of our *ordinary* assumptions … left over when these have been whittled down to a series of distinct momentary occurences. Plato's dialectical construction is not *seriously* concerned with … " For the deconstruction of the "etiolation" that arises when the "seriousness" of the philosopher's recourse to ordinary language features in the literary, see Derrida 1972, 326 on Austin 1975, 21, with further documentation and discussion in Dressler 2012, 167–9.

Replace "custom" with "philosophical practice" and "metaphor" with "new philosophical concept," and the theory of "eclecticism" is complete: "Philosophical practice has made some new philosophical concepts so well that we no longer want the original (Platonic, Aristotelian), but the new (Stoic) philosophical concept holds its place."[24] This happens when "old" or "stolen" terms and concepts enter a new system, including the "system" of eclecticism, and, on entry, derive their novelty or originality not from their definition in themselves but from the background that, again on entry, or recombination, they renovate and authorize.[25]

The tropic character of eclecticism is the source of a productive evasion in Roman philosophy, leaving unanswerable two questions that usually concern the history of ideas. First: is the appearance of a given theory or philosopheme a matter of *substitution*? In other words, did someone *trade* the Stoic conception of feeling and loving one's own *for* the Peripatetic one, which is similar, but also different, since it "changes" the concept with the suggestion that ownness sets in after birth, so that the "eclectic" Piso, in Book 5 of Cicero's *On Ends*, renders *oikeiôsis* "originally" Peripatetic, and the Stoics thieves? Second: was there *ever* an "original" form of *oikeiôsis* such that, on reception, or "use" (Demetrius' *sunêtheia*, Lat. *consuetudo*), this philosopheme eventually became a norm, and in the tendentious progress of philosophical debate, one now feels *only* the deviations when ownness is claimed, for instance, as *exclusively* Stoic or Peripatetic property? By evading these two questions, "eclecticism" describes the dynamic of variation that intellectual history shares with the history of language: both exhibit a figurative quality that makes the determination of the "original" ground dependent on the figure and ultimately indistinct from it except as a felt "move," a "deviation" (*tropos*, "turn") on the level of thought, as much as a substitution (Aristotle's "this is that").[26]

The "eclectic" Roman philosopher thus does not pick and choose between preexisting philosophical positions, as the etymology of the word "eclectic" suggests. Rather, eclecticism constitutes "preexisting" philosophical positions in the establishment of "new" positions, confounding the history of ideas as a deconstructive mode *par excellence* even as it

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[24] Cf. Lévy 1992a, 386.

[25] This applies, *a fortiori*, to more "proper" systems of philosophy, such as Stoicism, *pace* the position of *Fin.* 4.78.

[26] See n. 19 above; cf. *mutuare* at Quint. *Inst.* 8.6.1.

enables it.[27] In terms of originality, the eclectic organization of philosophy differs from other forms primarily by the signposts of its movements that it provides: "Archesilaus," "Carneades," "Antiochus."[28] Eclecticism describes, more specifically than the usual attribution of "pragmatism," the constant series of variations whose cumulative effect forms the ground against which any philosophical utterance forms the figure.[29]

With this reconstruction of the dynamic of eclecticism, I claim that there *is* something called Roman philosophy, and that it is not *just* something Latin speakers did less well than the Greeks. Building on the criteria implied by Michael Trapp, I define the Roman philosophers of the classical period, Lucretius, Cicero, and Seneca, by five criteria: (1) "eclecticism" of the kind just described, (2) self-conscious "Latinization" of the kind that Trapp suggests was a feature of those Roman philosophers who did not work in Greek, (3) a *structural* privileging of ethics (and eventually religion), affirmed even when the philosophers elaborate other branches of philosophy (physics and logic, but also rhetoric, aesthetics, and doxography), (4) self-identification of philosophical activity as the negative term in the binary of active and contemplative, that is, political and intellectual (and later religious) life;[30] finally (5), in the matter in which Roman philosophy most intersects with the rest of Roman culture both in the classical period and in later Christianity, it is committed to *gender dimorphism* as the fundamental background of ethical and aesthetic evaluation, of "Latinization" (so, e.g., virtue from *vir*, "man"), and so on.

Of course, there are in Roman philosophy itself authors who wrote in Greek, such as the philosophers extant after early Imperial, specifically Neronian Seneca: the slave Epictetus (50s – 135 CE), the emperor Marcus Aurelius (121–180 CE), to say nothing of lesser known figures

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[27] See Lévy 1992a, 374; Baraz 2012, 19–21; more generally, Trapp 2007, 113f. See also, *pace* Inwood 2005, 13 on "primary" and "secondary" philosophy, Derrida 1974, 24 (italics mine): "The movements of deconstruction [read: eclecticism] do not destroy structures from the outside … Operating necessarily from the inside, borrowing all the strategic and economic resources of subversion from the old structure, borrowing them structurally, that is to say without being able to isolate their elements and atoms, the enterprise of deconstruction *always in a certain way falls prey to its own work.*" That Roman "eclectics" are deconstructive in this way explains the modern tendency to depend on them to reconstruct the "originals" even as it misprizes them.

[28] Lévy 1992a, 76–96.

[29] Cf. Lévy 1996b, 8; Trapp 2007, 10–13, 16f.

[30] On theory and practice, see Trapp 2007, 3–5, with 6–13 on the structural "dominance" of ethics; cf. Lévy 1992a, 337f., Inwood 2005, 14. For "Latinization," see Trapp 2007, xiii, 123f., cf. Inwood 2005, 22. In my belief in "Roman philosophy," I support Reydams-Schils 2005, against the minimalist line taken by Inwood 2005, 88, 92f., and the paradoxes of Morford 2002, 5–14: "Epictetus is included as a Roman philosopher because of his Roman citizenship," but "Plutarch … is definitely not a Roman philosopher" (11).

such as Musonius Rufus of the late first century CE and Hierocles the
Stoic of the early second century. Nevertheless, I consider Roman Stoics
such as Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius less than non-Stoics, and even
non-philosophers, such as the Christian poet Prudentius (*c.* 348–405 CE)
and even non-Romans like the early modern philosopher René Descartes
(1596–1650 CE). I do so on the assumption that it is possible to speak
of "Latin culture," maybe even where Greek is spoken alongside Latin,
maybe even *because* Greek is spoken alongside Latin,[31] such that it is not a
coincidence that the word *person* derives from the Latin word *persona*, and
that the *form* of its meaning and function prove more important than its
content, and may even have affected the Greek equivalent *prosôpon*.[32]

Figurations of ambivalent affection: Cicero and Augustine on friendship

As an example of the above, I proceed to a comparison of the theoretical
reflections on friendship, as a species of attachment, in the work of Cicero
and Augustine (354–430 CE). In discussing particular friendships in osten-
sibly different ways, the classical and Christian authors each reveal their
commitment, as *men*, to the disavowal of dependency and the assertion of
self-sufficiency.[33] At the same time, the form and value of their commit-
ment becomes visible not exclusively on the level of argument or explicit
claim, but rather in the "literary" matter of diction, choice of examples,
connotation, and "eclecticism." In the contradiction between these modes
of discourse and the context to which they refer, Cicero and Augustine
reveal the extent to which even their ambivalence about embodiment,
dependency, and vulnerability is itself ambivalent. In this profound
ambivalence, combined with the strength of their commitments to mas-
culinism, is the space of play that deconstruction opens for the feminine.

   Beginning the second book of his *Confessions*, Augustine describes the
passage in his life that he laments was filled with "abject lust." Experienced
once in infancy (see Chapter 2 below), he sees it again in his misguided
straining after friendship as a young adult (*Conf.* 2.2.2):

> Et quid erat, quod me delectebat, nisi amare et amari? sed non tenebatur
> modus ab animo usque ad animum, quatenus est luminosus limes amici-
> tiae, sed exhalabantur nebulae de limosa concupiscentia carnis … ut non
> discerneretur serenitas dilectionis a caligine libidinis.

[31] See Farrell 2001, 1–27, also Cameron 1977, 6, 22, 24–6, 29f., with Brown 1961.
[32] See Chapter 2.
[33] See Derrida 1997, 179–82.