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Introduction

Ana Arjona, Nelson Kasfir, and Zachariah Mampilly

"Civil war" occupies many different places within the popular and academic imaginations: Confederate generals doing battle with Lincoln's army; Latin American revolutionaries waging war against right-wing dictators; African peasants fighting and dying in wars of profit, plunder, or liberation; European partisans warring over honor and nation; the Sunni Awakening transforming the Iraq war. The ubiquity of civil war, and its fundamental effects on the societies that experience it, suggests that it should be considered as much a part of the political landscape as the state system itself. At core, all civil wars are a battle for control between a government and its competitors over civilians and the territory upon which they reside. Investigating how such competitors interact with the populations they seek to control is elemental to our understanding of both the dynamics and consequences of civil war. This volume draws comparisons between a variety of recent and historical conflicts from around the globe in regards to a single dimension: the governance of civilians by armed groups.

When rebels secure territory, they must decide how they will interact with local residents. They can rob and rape them, they can recruit them, they can ignore them, or they can try to govern them – for better or worse. The choice a rebel group makes is always momentous for civilians. A surprisingly large number of rebel groups engage in some sort of governance, ranging from creating minimal regulation and informal taxation to forming popular assemblies, elaborate bureaucracies, schools, courts, and health clinics. Some also focus on organizing non-combatants for commercial pursuits. Civilians have their own interests and, although usually unarmed, often have unexpected influence over how they are governed. This book examines what rebels do when they decide to govern, why they do it, and how civilians respond.

Over the past decade, analysts have made important advances in furthering our understanding of civil war. Scholars have shed light on many aspects of

the relationship between rebels and civilians, including the mechanics of violence, recruitment, collaboration, and displacement.[1] Deploying a variety of methodological approaches and often braving difficult research environments, this scholarship moves us beyond broad generalizations and generic correlations to document and decipher the behavior of those engaging in protracted political violence. Many sacred cows have been slaughtered. Grand ideological explanations focusing on macro-level cleavages have been modified by approaches that emphasize the malleability of preferences. Broad economistic interpretations concentrating on the material interests of actors have been reworked with more nuanced conceptions of human rationality. New studies revealing complex motivations and incentives driving political behavior have replaced earlier work that sought to position either incumbents or insurgents as purely moral or entirely immoral actors.

Although this research has advanced our understanding of several features of civil war, many aspects of the impact of war on civilians remain to be explored. In particular, evidence of the relations of insurgents and civilian populations in war zones has been scarce. In this book, we endeavor to advance the study of violent rebellions by focusing on a dimension of insurgent behavior that is not solely defined by the deployment of military force: governance, or the administration of civilian affairs. Although we think of insurgencies as continuously violent, in reality war-making is simultaneously exhilarating and mundane as conflicts start and stop in a syncopated rhythm. Civilians caught within warzones face periods of brutal violence punctuated by prolonged moments of tense calm during which they struggle to regain some semblance of normalcy. Rebels play a central role in defining how civilians live their lives during wartime not only through violence, but equally through the development of structures and practices of rule.

Civil war is the common condition for rebel governance. Though definitions vary, scholars generally agree that a civil war involves a protracted armed conflict that takes place within a recognized sovereign state between parties subject to a common authority at the onset of fighting (Kalyvas 2006). Civil war differs from several cognate phenomena such as riots, ethnic conflict not involving the state, domestic terrorism, coups, genocide, and purely criminal activities, though each of these may relate to a civil war in specific ways. Combatants may espouse a variety of ideological agendas, including those with economic, religious, or ethnic overtones. They also may engage in profit-motivated actions. But civil war is political because it involves parties that disagree over some fundamentally *political* aspect of the state. While rebels, by definition, break the laws of the state, they differ from criminal bandits who violate rules solely for profit or revenge.

[1] There is a vast literature that covers this terrain: recent additions include Mamdani (2001); Petersen (2001); Wood (2003, 2009); Kalyvas (2006); Weinstein (2007); Downs (2008); Ibáñez and Vélez (2008); Steele (2010); Arjona and Kalyvas (2011); Balcells (2011); Parkinson (2013); Viterna (2013).

Civilian collaboration is often *the* central immediate concern for the warring sides in a civil war, as writers have long recognized (Mao 1963; Guevara 1968; Ahmad 1982; Laqueur 1976). Civilians present rebels with both opportunities and challenges. They are an essential source of food, supplies, information, and recruits. But civilians' ties to the incumbent regime put rebels in constant danger of betrayal. The determinants of civilian support for rebels have frequently been debated. Recent scholarly trends have replaced ideology or cultural values as explanatory factors with coercion and material incentives (Weinstein 2007; Wood 2010; Kocher et al. 2011). But rebels cannot fight wars effectively while holding a gun to the head of every civilian, nor have financial rewards alone proven sufficient for ensuring civilian compliance.

By creating systems of governance, rebels seek to win over local populations – or at least dissuade them from actively collaborating with incumbents. Such governance may deploy existing ideological or cultural beliefs that increase identification with the insurgent cause. It may also provide goods and services that improve civilians' lives. At the same time, developing a governance capacity may also threaten existing authority structures and turn civilians against the rebellion. Rebel governance can, therefore, be a crucial factor in shaping the civilian–insurgent relationship. Insurgents who develop effective and legitimate governance systems can reap rewards, while those that fail often weaken their capacity to achieve their larger strategic objectives.

By casting a critical lens on this neglected aspect of civil war, the emerging field of rebel governance seeks to understand rule by insurgents who provide public goods and regulate conduct in areas they hold.[2] Conceptualized broadly as the set of actions insurgents engage in to regulate the social, political, and economic life of non-combatants during war, the study of rebel governance opens multiple underexplored avenues in the rebel–civilian relationship.[3] A focus on governance allows scholars to analyze rebel–civilian relations with greater nuance, recognizing a larger set of interactions between the two. From insurgent taxation practices, provision of public goods, management of local economic affairs, and regulation of criminal activity to more symbolic expressions of power drawing on mythical or religious dimensions such as burial traditions, cleansing rituals, cultural ceremonies, and spiritual protection practices, contributors to this volume scrutinize many understudied facets of the rebel–civilian relationship.

A better understanding of rebel governance also promises to enlighten debates around several social processes related to civil war. Patterns of

[2] We use the term "rebel" or "insurgent governance." But many of this book's insights also apply to armed actors allied with the state or other violent militias, and to rebel groups competing with other rebels in states without any governments, such as Somalia after 1991.

[3] This definition builds on the work of Wickham-Crowley (1987); Branch and Mampilly (2005); Kasfir (2005); Weinstein (2007); Arjona (forthcoming); and Mampilly (2011).

violence, recruitment strategies, and sources of insurgent funding – prominent subjects in recent studies of civil war – are all affected by rebel governance in ways that are only now gaining attention (Arjona 2014; Mampilly 2011). Civilian governance organized by rebels affects processes of social transformation unleashed by violent conflict. The literature on the social conditions of civil war, developed mostly by anthropologists, suggests that war leads to profound societal changes at the local level (Lubkemann 2008; Nordstrom 1997). Violence has deep consequences for political mobilization, polarization of social identities, militarization of local authority, transformation of gender roles, and fragmentation of the local political economy (Wood 2008). The presence or absence of rebel governance is an integral aspect of these social processes. Understanding how the various manifestations of rebel governance relate to social disruptions caused by civil war will not only supply a deeper appreciation of how and why they occur, but also of their long-term legacies.

Lastly, the field of rebel governance promises to illuminate broader questions in the social sciences. Rebel leaders who establish relations with civilians demonstrate significant political creativity in developing vastly different approaches to governance. For scholars, their ingenuity opens a novel category of governments to comparative analysis. The differences in insurgent patterns of governance offer new insights into the various conditions that rebels face as well as into the differences between the practices of conventional regimes and those of non-state actors. Comprehending rebel governance can also enhance the study of other forms of non-state governance (Risse 2011). And a better understanding of the diverse modes of rebel rule promises to open new avenues in the study of state-building and its presumed relationship to war-making (Tilly 1992).

WHAT LIES AHEAD

Taken together, the chapters in this book raise numerous new questions about rebel governance and, more generally, about rebel and civilian behavior during wartime. What are the attributes of rebel governments? What role do factors such as natural resources and state capacity play in the emergence and consolidation of rebel governance? How does a group's ideology impact its ruling strategies? How do civilians respond to rebel governance? What role do different segments of society play in shaping the emergence, functioning, and decay of rebel governance systems?

The questions are diverse, and so are the disciplinary standpoints and methodological tools that the authors rely on to address them. Some take a purely theoretical approach; others offer hypotheses, illustrating their feasibility with field observations; still, others present rich empirical evidence that raises questions about existing theories and suggests new possible explanations. The book is also diverse in its geographical reach, bringing

together experts on conflicts in states varying greatly in their ethnic cleavages, terrains, economies, and political systems.

The cases of rebel governance they analyze are taken from four continents: Africa (Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, Liberia), Asia (India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka), Europe (Greece), and Latin America (Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Venezuela). They include different types of armed organizations, some sustaining insurgencies that persisted for several decades, such as those in Colombia, India, and Sri Lanka, and others that lasted only a few years, such as those in Congo (DRC), Cuba, and Venezuela. Some analyze secessionist movements, such as those in Côte d'Ivoire, India, Indonesia, and Sudan. Others investigate attempts to overthrow state governments, including those in Colombia, El Salvador, and Greece. A third type concerns rebel groups ruling territory independently while maintaining ambiguous relations with the state they appear to have rebelled against – for example, the Mai Mai in Congo (DRC).

Although each chapter strives to make an original contribution, our goal is to provide a coherent approach to the study of rebel governance. The chapters are organized around six basic questions. First, how should the "field" of rebel governance be conceptualized? Second, which factors lead to the formation and which to the decline of rebel governments? Third, what sorts of images and routines of existing states do rebel governments adopt? Fourth, how do fundamental principles embraced by insurgents – whether from political doctrine, cultural values, or both – influence their governance practices? Fifth, how do unarmed civilians shape rebel governance? And sixth, what kinds of rebel governance result when insurgents rely heavily on violence against civilians for predation or for ideological goals? These are far from the only important questions, but they help to lay the foundations for further study. The chapters discussed below begin to develop answers.

Defining the Field of Inquiry

If rebel governance of civilians is to be accepted as a distinct field of study, its concepts, definitions, and categories of behavior need to be specified. This is the subject of the first section of the book. Eventually, shared understandings among analysts will determine which notions facilitate inquiry, help build a knowledge base and generate testable hypotheses. In the opening chapter, Nelson Kasfir offers an overview of the domain of rebel governance – the production of government for civilians during the protracted violence and high levels of coercion produced by civil war. To incorporate the remarkable variation in rebel governance, he takes a broadly inclusive approach to the field's basic parameters.

According to Kasfir, the starting point for conceptualizing the field is deceptively simple: to create government, rebels must first secure populated territory – even if their control remains contested – under conditions of violence

or threat of violence emerging from civil war. Second, they must choose to engage with at least some of the civilians resident within this area. These are the basic scope conditions establishing the field's boundaries. Presumably, rebel leaders organize governments for civilians when they think it is in their interest. Yet, they must devote part of their resources for this purpose, despite often being militarily weaker when they initiate governance than the states against which they rebel. Why do they do it so frequently, yet so differently? Valid answers to these questions require classification and comparison.

To keep the classification of types of rebel governance as free from unintended assumptions as possible, Kasfir turns to the basic categories of politics, administration, and wealth. He asks in what ways, if at all, rebels involve civilians in making political decisions; forming administrative structures that supply them with public goods; and organizing civilians for the production of income for the benefit of rebels, civilians, or both. With these categories as starting points, it becomes possible to start comparing different patterns of rebel governance.

Identifying comparisons naturally raises the question of why they occur. The determination of causes is too complex a task for this chapter. As the field matures, future researchers will establish causal arguments. Kasfir limits himself to a more preliminary task. He examines rebellion, one of the field's basic concepts, to illustrate plausible causes. Taking rebellion as the entry point, he considers whether causes of rebel governance are exogenous or endogenous to civil war. He urges researchers to compare insurgents' pre-civil war doctrines for civilians with their motives that emerge during civil war. Beyond this, he suggests: first, that insurgents consciously or unconsciously carry into war values and ideas about governance that grow out of the cultural norms they absorbed before they rebelled; second, rebels often shape their governance to solve problems they encounter during their rebellion; third, civilians have values and ideas of their own that often cause rebels to modify their schemes of governance.

Conditions of Growth and Decline

The second section extends the discussion of causes by comparing how states and rebels respond to basic social expectations of local residents. It also considers when their expectations cause deterioration in either state or rebel governments. In most cases, decisions over whether and how to organize civilians are at least partly responses to immediate issues rather than plans carefully formulated in advance by the rebel command.

In Chapter 3, Timothy Wickham-Crowley analyzes the conditions that allow rebels to initiate and sustain local governments. He illustrates his propositions with detailed evidence from Latin American insurgencies. He makes three claims. First, rebel governments are likely to emerge in areas where state presence is weak. Second, political organizations that are recognized by the

state government and partly replace the state in areas where it is absent can either hamper or enhance rebel governments. For example, rural non-radical political parties such as the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana party in Peru and the Acción Democrática Party in Venezuela mobilized against rebellion. By comparison, communist political parties helped rebels take power in the Lara state of Venezuela and the so-called peasant republics of Colombia.

Wickham-Crowley's third claim is that state abuse or alienation of civilians often turns peasants into rebel supporters. In several countries, state violence – particularly counter-insurgent operations that involved large-scale victimization of the civilian population – enhanced support for rebel governments, as did the failure of state governments to attend local residents' basic needs for security and material well-being – for example, by ignoring land reform, especially when the government implemented it in other regions. On the other hand, he shows that the state can compete with a rebel government by providing public goods to win civilians back. For example, he points to the widespread success of civic campaigns launched by governments and military units in many Latin American countries, either when the threat of insurgencies was imminent or soon afterwards.

Wickham-Crowley also inquires into the collapse of rebel governments. He argues that state military action often trumps rebel cultivation of "hearts and minds." When state forces destroy rebel bases, they dismantle rebel administrations for civilians. In addition, macrosocial and political changes, such as the introduction of elections and political competition, can reduce rebels' influence over local populations. Not all causes of rebel decay result from state initiatives. Rebels can cause their own failures by violating their obligations as governors. In particular, Wickham-Crowley argues, a rebel government is likely to collapse if it fails to protect civilians from the state as their enemy; or, even worse, if it turns its own weapons against civilians, beyond punitive actions aimed at preserving public order. Finally, like states, rebels may sow the seeds of their own failure by pursuing policies that undermine peasants' material well-being.

Imitations of the State: Symbols and Diplomacy

The incumbent state provides a powerful model for rebels, even as they propose to overthrow it or break away. Two chapters explore aspects of this issue in the third section. Chapter 4 looks at how rebel groups use symbols, particularly those borrowed from states; Chapter 5 considers the use of international diplomacy by rebel governments, demonstrating that it is not the exclusive preserve of states.

Starting from the perspective that accounts of rebel governance that focus solely on public goods provision and regulation are inherently inadequate, Zachariah Mampilly explores the role that symbols play within rebel

governance. Symbolic processes, Mampilly shows, are common in rebellions – including the display of flags, the use of anthems and mottos, and the establishment of currencies. Why, Mampilly asks, do rebels devote resources and put effort into creating these symbols and popularizing their use? First, he argues, they do because they want the legitimacy these symbols bring to states. It is precisely because states have relied on such symbols that rebels find them so effective. Second, they do because symbols help ensure compliance of civilians and facilitate their identification with the rebel organization.

To articulate these answers, he first discusses the ways in which states use symbolic processes. When states can achieve compliance of citizens through symbols, they reduce the probability of resistance that coercion is likely to engender. By the same token, he argues that promoting identification of civilians with rebels through their governance boosts legitimacy, fosters civilian collaboration, and reduces the necessity to resort to coercion. Symbols carry messages, but rebel leaders confront different audiences, beginning with the differences between fighters and civilians. They must maintain backing from core supporters, attract new recruits, and avoid overly antagonizing potential opponents. They also try to reach their diaspora and transnational actors. Rebels need to craft messages accordingly. Insurgent leaders often take advantage of the "multivocality" of symbols that carry different meanings to different constituencies.

To illustrate the existence and effectiveness of symbols, Mampilly relies on evidence from different armed conflicts. He shows not only how widespread and varied are the symbolic actions that rebels use, but also how important they seem to rebels and, often, to civilians. Symbolic repertoires, Mampilly argues, offer a collective frame of reference between the insurgent government and non-combatants. Their sources include communal motifs, national signs, and ideologies. These are often expressed ambiguously to preserve unity. He notes how rebels frequently re-enact the state by using the same images as and similar rhetoric to state officials to reinforce behaviors that benefit the rebel group's agenda. By demonstrating the importance of symbols in rebel governance, Mampilly's analysis stresses the importance of reaching beyond the use of coercion and provision of public goods to analyze both non-combatant compliance with and support for rebel groups as well as the reduced necessity for insurgents to rely on violence.

Rebel diplomacy, as Bridget Coggins points out in Chapter 5, is an important, if frequently unrecognized, extension of rebel governance. Since rebels by definition do not possess sovereignty, analysis of rebel diplomacy requires relaxing the notion that diplomacy is restricted to strategic communication among sovereign states or the formal organizations states create. Coggins discusses the slim basis on which rebels can engage in formal diplomacy. In the past, international law made an exception for a few rebel organizations to participate formally by awarding them the status of

"belligerent" where hostilities became particularly severe and rebels controlled much of the state's territory. More recently, rebels have sometimes been formally obligated, usually as individuals, to treat civilians humanely, although recognition may have little practical effect in constraining rebel military tactics. More typically, however, rebel military victory is a necessary condition for rebels to engage in formal diplomacy.

Nevertheless, during civil war rebels frequently use diplomacy strategically to promote their objectives or gain specific benefits. In terms of approaches to rebel diplomacy, Coggins distinguishes between "warriors," where external communication is an extension of fighting, and "shopkeepers," where the objective is to seek joint advantage with their opponents. For example, rebels may use negotiations with the incumbent state to re-arm or gain territory, usually by disguising their purposes; or, they may participate in negotiations to reach an enduring agreement, usually by looking for a compromise that furthers their purposes. In either case, rebel diplomats must be careful that their proposals do not so far outrun civilian support that their authority is weakened. Coggins points out that rebels are likely to use shopkeeper diplomacy with third parties who hope to profit from economic activity in rebel-held territory, sometimes offering diplomatic recognition in return.

Coggins identifies several ways in which rebel diplomacy directly supports rebel governance of civilians. Rebel leaders send envoys, set up "embassies," and publicize their efforts in the media in friendly third party countries. Rebels try to reach audiences beyond the civilians living in territories they control. They direct their message to individuals living in other areas of the incumbent state or abroad – particularly appeals for support. They set up humanitarian organizations in other countries. They try to establish diplomatic contact with international organizations and invite them to send representatives into rebel territory. Also, they engage in economic transactions with foreign businesses, particularly involving access to natural resources. Lastly, rebels try to invite supportive third party states to mediate between them and the incumbent government.

Rebel Doctrines, Cultural Values, and Governance

The fourth section investigates how rebel doctrines and cultural values may affect patterns of rebel governance. Some groups may seek to shed vestiges of their past and create new identities unfettered by history. This is especially true for those that embrace transnational ideologies – often those who come from outside. Ernesto "Ché" Guevara is the classic example. Many Islamist fighters in Afghanistan and Iraq also came from elsewhere.[4] For these groups, doctrines

[4] The differences in practices of rebel governance adopted by home-grown as opposed to foreign rebel leaders are also worth studying.

that form the political identity of rebel groups often leave their organizational imprints on rebel governance.

Yet, civil war is marked by continuities as well as disruption. The values of the society in which the insurgents have spent their formative years also influence their designs of governance. Local societies have a history that does not disappear when an internal war breaks out. Most rebels are products of their own societies. No matter how much they want to generate change, their upbringing, education, and professional lives may influence their political identity. For these groups, governance routines may reflect pre-existing patterns of social and economic relations. As a result, rebel governance often mimics practices of the incumbent government, sometimes repeating behavior insurgents may have once condemned.

All three chapters in this section investigate the ways in which ideas affect rebel governance. In Chapter 6, Stathis Kalyvas compares the two primary rival rebel organizations that fought for control of Greece during World War II and after. Their political identities differed considerably – one was communist, the other conservative. Their patterns of governance also varied dramatically, even though they held similar amounts of territory and enjoyed about the same degree of security.

During the war, the communists created a new centralized hierarchical governmental structure based on small units in villages where they had military control. Highly motivated party members returned to their hometowns and villages to form these units. This structure of rebel governance over civilians was applied uniformly across communist-held territory. In contrast, conservative army officers governed villages they controlled by organizing prominent families based on their personal relationships rather than by forming new organizations. The communists relied heavily on their operational doctrine; the conservatives depended more on existing social values.

Their policies also differed, although both promoted nationalism and patriotism in response to foreign occupation. The communists created a relatively comprehensive governing system – expanding functions and appointing new officials – similar to communist structures elsewhere. They broke with social values by encouraging women and youth to participate in political and administrative activities and elections, although most decisions were tightly controlled from the top. The conservatives, on the other hand, continued existing routines and policies of local government. They permitted a greater degree of independent local decision-making. Their principles called for traditional engagement based on existing connections to regional notables. Thus, Kalyvas argues that differences in political identity – that is, in reliance on doctrine as opposed to dependence on values – cause variation in rebels' choice of governance arrangements for civilians.

Kalyvas also compares rebel governance by the communists when they could hold their own during World War II with their governing arrangements when