Introduction

How can there be a history of emotions? In today's scientific world, psychologists and neuropsychologists generally consider human emotions to be universal and "hard-wired." Thus, for example, fear in all its manifestations today – as a facial grimace, as a bodily reaction, as a product of specific brain systems, or as a chemical process – is assumed to have been the same in the past.[1] Evolutionary psychologists Leda Cosmides and John Tooby claim that the human mind today has not changed since the Stone Age. "Our modern skulls house a stone age mind," is their curt summary.[2] How indeed can there be a history of emotions?

What are emotions?

Although many scientists today think of emotions as universal, biological, and invariable, this is not true of all. For example, some neuroscientists today think that emotions are as much products of top-down processing (in which case they depend on cognitive work) as of bottom-up (in which case they are connected to precognitive, automatic biological responses).[3] That view suggests that socialization affects emotions because it helps

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[1] For the facial expression of fear, the classic article, now the basis for thousands of studies, is Paul Ekman and Wallace V. Friesen, "Constants across Cultures in the Face and Emotion," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 17 (1971): 124–29. For bodily reactions in the autonomic nervous system, see Robert W. Levenson, "Blood, Sweat, and Fears: The Autonomic Architecture of Emotion," *Annales of the New York Academy of Sciences* 1000 (2003): 348–66. For the brain's role in fear, see M. C. Carvalho et al., "Participation of NK1 Receptors of the Amygdala on the Processing of Different Types of Fear," *Neurobiology of Learning and Memory* 102 (2013): 20–27, where the amygdala and related brain regions are involved in filtering and expressing fear. To be sure, these sorts of studies only rarely take up the past explicitly, but like all scientific experiments they are meant to describe unchanging laws.

[2] Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, "Evolutionary Psychology: A Primer" (1997), online at www.cep.ucsb.edu/primer.html.

[3] See, for example, Christine L. Larson et al., "The Interplay of Attention and Emotion: Top-Down Attention Modulates Amygdala Activation in Psychopathy," *Cognitive, Affective & Behavioral Neuroscience* 13/4 (2013): 757–70; Benjamin Otto et al.,

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determine what is – and what is not – relevant to one's goals and values, which are aspects of cognition.[4] On another front, a recent book by evolutionary biologist Marlene Zuk argues that change in whole populations can take place in a very short period of time under the right circumstances.[5] The "Stone Age" mind disappears if this is true. It is thus very unlikely that emotions are invariable.

But what are emotions? In 1981 researchers attempting to make sense of the welter of current definitions of emotions tried (to little effect) to find a common denominator.[6] Many experimental psychologists and neuropsychologists today cling to the series of photographed faces developed by Paul Ekman and said to represent the expression of the six universal basic emotions: anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise. But many other researchers are unconvinced, emphasizing the experiential nature of emotions, a characteristic entirely lacking in the posed faces of Ekman's photos.[7] Thomas Dixon has shown that the very category of "emotion" is relatively recent, tracing the ways in which a great variety of passions and sentiments were brought together under the practical but limited term "emotion."[8] Ute Frevert and her colleagues have demonstrated that notions about emotions – their location, their importance, their associations with gender, civility, and society – have been in constant flux since the eighteenth century.[9] This book will show that the same was true long before that.

"Functional Overlap of Top-Down Emotion Regulation and Generation: An fMRI Study Identifying Common Neural Substrates between Cognitive Reappraisal and Cognitively Generated Emotions," *Cognitive, Affective & Behavioral Neuroscience* 14/3 (2014): 923–38, "Everyday emotions likely consist of a blend of bottom-up processing of emotional stimuli and the top-down interpretation of self-relevant situations" (924).

[4] See *The Psychological Construction of Emotion*, ed. Lisa Feldman Barrett and James A. Russell (New York, 2015), and Jennifer Greenwood, "Wide Externalism and the Roles of Biology and Culture in Human Emotional Development," *Emotion Review* 4 (2012): 423–31.

[5] Marlene Zuk, *Paleofantasy: What Evolution Really Tells Us about Sex, Diet, and How We Live* (New York, 2013).

[6] Paul R. Kleinginna, Jr. and Anne M. Kleinginna, "A Categorized List of Emotion Definitions, with Suggestions for a Consensual Definition," *Motivation and Emotion* 5 (1981): 345–79.

[7] For the original article introducing the six, see Ekman and Friesen, "Constants across Cultures"; for illustrations of faces posed to show the basic emotions, see, for example, https://writersforensicsblog.wordpress.com/2013/08/19/facial-expressions-and-emotions. For emotions as "a domain of phenomena of feelings, behaviors, and bodily reactions," see Nico H. Frijda, "The Psychologists' Point of View," in *Handbook of Emotions*, ed. Michael Lewis, Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones, and Lisa Feldman Barrett, 3d ed. (New York, 2008), 68–87 at 69.

[8] Thomas Dixon, *From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category* (Cambridge, 2003).

[9] Ute Frevert et al., *Emotional Lexicons: Continuity and Change in the Vocabulary of Feeling 1700–2000* (Oxford, 2014).

It is only right that I state my own "definition," namely that there is a biological and universal human aptitude for feeling and expressing what we now call "emotions." But what those emotions are, what they are called, how they are evaluated and felt, and how they are expressed (or not) – all these are shaped by "emotional communities."

Emotional communities

Emotional communities are groups – usually but not always social groups – that have their own particular values, modes of feeling, and ways to express those feelings. Like "speech communities," they may be very close in practice to other emotional communities of their time, or they may be quite unique and marginal.[10] They are not "bounded entities." Indeed, the researcher may define them quite broadly – upper-class English society in the nineteenth century, for example – or rather narrowly, as I do in this book. More narrowly delineated communities allow the researcher to characterize in clearer fashion the emotional style of the group. Larger communities will contain variants and counterstyles – "emotional subcommunities" if you will.

Emotional communities are not always "emotional." They simply share important norms concerning the emotions that they value and deplore and the modes of expressing them. Thus the members of an emotional community will not necessarily express love or affection toward one another if that community values hostile, aggressive, or ambivalent interpersonal relations.

Any given society at any period of time will likely contain more than one emotional community. These are rarely entirely separate, and sometimes they overlap in important – even essential – ways. In Chapter 6, for example, one member of the Paston family, John II, member of a very quiet and undemonstrative emotional community, marveled at and enjoyed his stay at the Burgundian court, a far more dramatically expressive community. Nevertheless, I would not say that therefore John "joined" the Burgundian emotional community. Rather, *for him* the

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[10] For speech communities, see George Yule, *The Study of Language*, 4th ed. (Cambridge, 2010), 253: "A speech community is a group of people who share a set of norms and expectations regarding the use of language." For more on the notion of speech community, its uses and its limitations, see Peter L. Patrick, "The Speech Community," in *The Handbook of Language Variation and Change*, ed. J. K. Chambers, Peter Trudgill, and Natalie Schilling-Estes (Oxford, 2002), 573–98. For the classic exposition, see John Gumperz, "The Speech Community," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, ed. David Sills (Macmillan, 1968), 381–86, rpr. in *Language and Social Context: Selected Readings*, ed. Pier Paolo Giglioli (Harmondsworth, 1972), 219–31. I am grateful to Daniel L. Smail for suggesting this analogy to emotional communities.

court of Burgundy constituted what Mark Seymour has called an "emotional arena."[11] At the same time, because coexisting emotional communities must respond to the same or similar material, technological, and ideational conditions, they are usually recognizably related to one another, whether as variants of one another or as reactions to one another within a wider cultural framework. Thus, we will see in Chapter 4, for example, how a monastic community in England and a courtly one in southern France valued the same emotions even as they expressed their anxieties about those and other emotions very differently. In general, the historian may expect emotional communities from the same period and the same general culture to imitate, borrow from, or distance themselves from one another.

When studying a community's emotions, what should the historian look for? Because emotions are inchoate until they are given names, emotional vocabularies are exceptionally important for the ways in which people understand, express, and indeed "feel" their emotions. Consider that we often call music "emotional"; yet when we ask, "What emotion does it express?" we find we must use words. Often they seem inadequate no matter how nuanced: words cannot quite compass music's full emotional meaning. Neither do our emotion words. That's one of the reasons that William Reddy created the notion of "emotives," for one of its implications is that emotional expressions are only "drafts" of our attempts to express our feelings.[12]

Without question, emotions are made known also through tones of voice, gestures, grimaces, dancing, blanching, blushing, fainting, and bowing. Breaking into song may be a sign of emotion, as may whispering or declaiming. Historians have evidence for some of this. In the Roman world, certain feelings were accompanied by gestures so typical and characteristic as to be essentially codified.[13] Similarly, some gestures had well-known meanings in medieval visual sources, while others are only now being discovered by art historians.[14] Written sources tell us

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[11] Mark Seymour, "Emotional Arenas: From Provincial Circus to National Courtroom in Late Nineteenth-Century Italy," in *Emotional Styles – Concepts and Challenges*, ed. Benno Gammerl, *Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and Practice* 16 (2012): 177–97.

[12] William M. Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge, 2001). Yet, at the same time, because emotions are "cognitive habits" (*ibid.*, 32), they are generally expressed in habitual ways.

[13] Anthony Corbeill, *Nature Embodied: Gesture in Ancient Rome* (Princeton, 2004).

[14] The classics are Moshe Barasch, *Gestures of Despair in Medieval and Early Renaissance Art* (New York, 1976), and Jean-Claude Schmitt, *La raison des gestes dans l'Occident médiéval* (Paris, 1990). Johanna Scheel, *Das altniederländische Stifterbild. Emotionsstrategien des Sehens und der Selbsterkenntnis* (Berlin, 2014), takes up the many emotions that viewers

about some of these gestures, describing laughing and weeping for exam-
ple. Such descriptions bring us right back to words.

Thus, words are mainly what researchers must work with. When neuros-
cientists say that parts of our brain "light up" in fMRIs under the influence
of a particular emotion, they should explain that the subject already knows
which emotion is being tested (thus has the "word") and that the researcher
has set the criteria for the colors of their results (which in fact signify degrees
of oxygenation). Emotions have communicative functions, whether with
ourselves alone or with others. Such communications do not rely on oxyge-
nated brain cells. They must depend on social signals, chief among them
words. It is true that many psychologists see facial expressions as the chief
conveyers of emotional expression.[15] This view remains salient today even
though it has been powerfully challenged.[16] Even (against my own view)
were it true, it still relies on words: the only way scientists know if people
correctly read facial expressions is by seeing whether the subject can attach
the "right" emotion word to them.

Because we understand our "true feelings" via these words, however
inadequate they may be, I do not distinguish expressed feelings from "real
emotions" in any essential way. To be sure, I hope that both my readers
and I will imaginatively look for "that thing that's going on besides the
words," as Al Pacino has said of the actor's ideal.[17] But we should also
realize that, although we naturalize our own emotions – thinking that we
know how *we* "really" feel – in fact we must interpret even our own feelings
according to our own emotional community's norms and vocabularies.
Many historians of emotions accept, however, a distinction between
"real" and "expressed" emotions, preferring to speak of the "perfor-
mance" of emotions. They thereby (sometimes, perhaps, unintentionally)
distance themselves from the claim that these are the same as "felt"
emotions.[18] But "performed emotions" are also felt: this was already the

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could read into relatively static and "unemotional" donor images. Jacqueline Jung,
*Eloquent Bodies: Movement, Expression, and the Human Figure in Gothic Sculpture of the
Holy Roman Empire*, forthcoming, takes up the ambiguity of medieval emotional repre-
sentations. I am very grateful to Professor Jung for letting me see chapters of her book
prior to publication. See also the caption for Plate 6.2 below.

[15] See David Matsumoto, Dacher Keltner, Michelle N. Shiota, Maureen O'Sullivan, and
Mark Frank, "Facial Expressions of Emotion," in *Handbook of Emotions*, 211–34.

[16] See Ruth Leys, "How Did Fear Become a Scientific Object and What Kind of Object Is
It?" *Representations* 110 (2010): 66–104; Maria Gendron et al., "Perceptions of Emotion
from Facial Expressions are not Culturally Universal: Evidence from a Remote Culture,"
Emotion 14 (2014): 251–62.

[17] Quoted in John Lahr, "Caught in the Act: What Drives Al Pacino?" *New Yorker*,
September 15, 2014, 66.

[18] See Chapter 6, n. 29. Studies of the emotions involved in feuding sometimes fall into this
category; see Chapter 4, n. 190.

conclusion of Arlie Hochschild's 1983 study of the emotional training of airline flight attendants: the successful trainees internalized the emotional norms that they were told to perform. They learned to really mean the smiles they gave to rowdy passengers; they learned to suppress feelings of fatigue and irritation.[19]

Of course, it is true that sometimes people feign their feelings, and this is something that the historian (like the psychiatrist) needs to be alert to. The feigning itself tells us what the emotional norms must be. But what interests me even more than whether this or that particular emotion – expressed by this or that particular person – is a pretense is to know how sensitive particular emotional communities are to issues of "sincerity," since worries about true intent are themselves historically contingent.[20]

Because I see words as crucial to emotional life (and my view here is seconded by some neuropsychologists),[21] I spend a lot of time in this book discovering emotional vocabularies, which I usually present in tabular form. These tables, which present the emotion words alongside their (rough) English equivalents, have many purposes. They allow for cross-community comparisons; they suggest the relative importance of various emotions in particular communities; and they are meant to pre-sent starting points for other researchers.[22] Perhaps most important, they show that notions of what is "emotional" have changed over time.

This last point is rarely recognized, certainly not by psychologists today. Consider the opening words of an article by Gerald Clore and

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[19] Arlie Russell Hochschild, *The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling* (Berkeley, 1983). The new field of "emotion regulation" confirms such findings. See, for example, Shauna L. Clen, Douglas S. Mennin, and David M. Fresco, "Emotion Regulation Strategies," in *The Wiley Handbook of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy*, ed. Stefan G. Hofmann et al., 3 vols. (Oxford, 2014), 1:85–105.

[20] Monique Scheer, "Topographies of Emotion," in Frevert et al., *Emotional Lexicons*, 32–61 at 60 considers the bourgeoisie to have made sincerity normative "as a mark of distinction opposed to the [inauthentic] aristocracy." But we shall see that emotional communities long before the rise of the bourgeoisie also valued sincerity.

[21] See, for example, Maria Gendron et al., "Emotion Words Shape Emotion Percepts," *Emotion* 12 (2012): 314–25.

[22] This sort of thing has been done with modern emotions. Anna Wierzbicka, *Emotions across Languages and Cultures: Diversity and Universals* (Cambridge, 1999), 49 speaks of the "some fifty emotion concepts such as fear, pride, relief, and admiration, which constitute the core of the English emotion lexicon." James R. Averill, "A Semantic Atlas of Emotional Concepts," *JSAS Catalog of Selected Documents in Psychology* 5/330 (1975) (Ms. No. 1103), 35–53, provides a list of 558 English words "with emotional connotations." Rated highest on the Amherst unemotional–emotional scale is "furious," with "unconcerned" at the lowest end (see 55–64). For frequencies of emotion word use in English, see Philip Shaver et al., "Emotion Knowledge: Further Exploration of a Prototype Approach," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 52/6 (1987): 1061–86. For French emotion word frequencies, see Annie Piolat and Rachid Bannour, "Émotions et affects. Contribution de la psychologie cognitive," in *Le sujet des émotions au moyen âge*, ed. Piroska Nagy and Damien Boquet (Paris, 2008), 53–84.

Andrew Ortony: "Emotions are psychological states, but not all psycho-
logical states are emotional; for example, neither a state of exhaustion nor
a state of confusion is an emotion."[23] How do they know that exhaustion
and confusion are not emotions? Because those terms (and the concepts
behind them) are not considered emotions by "most people." They are
thinking of "most people" *today* who *speak English*. But in Chapter 1 we
see that Cicero considered *aerumna* (weariness) and *pigritia* (indolence,
sloth) to be emotions; and in Chapter 5 we learn that Thomas Aquinas
considered *segnities* (slowness, sluggishness, inactivity) to be an emotion.
As for "confusion," a frequent term for an "emotion" in both ancient and
medieval theories was *perturbatio*, meaning, quite precisely, "confusion."
By contrast with Clore and Ortony, I would not rule out *anything* as
possibly having affective valence – in short, as possibly being "an emo-
tion." It all depends on the culture and the emotional community. The
historian must be open to the unexpected.

This is one reason why I do not pay much attention to the careful
differentiation many modern psychologists make between "emotion" and
"affect." In point of fact, there is no consensus on the difference between
the two words today, nor was there in the past when, indeed, they were
from time to time considered synonyms.[24] Nor do I shy away from using
words like feeling, emotion, and even passion interchangeably. As we

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[23] Gerald L. Clore and Andrew Ortony, "The Semantics of the Affective Lexicon," in
Cognitive Science Perspectives on Emotion and Motivation, ed. Vernon Hamilton, Gordon
H. Bower, and Nico H. Frijda (Amsterdam, 1988), 367–96 at 367. Clore and Ortony
suggest (374) that if a word can be used with the same meaning in a phrase with "being"
as with "feeling" (e.g. being angry; feeling angry) then it is an emotion word. The whole
scheme thus belongs within the logic of the contemporary English language.

[24] Clore and Ortony, "Semantics," 373, say that affect is connected to "anything that is
valenced or is positive or negative in value," giving the example of preference for one sort
of ale over another as "affective." For them, emotions are a small subset of "affective
conditions." But Nancy L. Stein, Marc W. Hernandez, and Tom Trabasso, "Advances in
Modeling Emotion and Thought: The Importance of Developmental, Online, and
Multilevel Analyses," in *Handbook of Emotions*, 574–86 at 578, report that "in our
theory . . . emotional responses are distinct from automatic, affective, and physical
responses." Ruth Leys, "The Turn to Affect: A Critique," *Critical Inquiry* 37/3 (2011):
434–72 at 434 n. 2, argues that the distinction between affect and emotion "cannot be
sustained." But see also the response to Leys by William E. Connolly, "The Complexity
of Intention," *Critical Inquiry* 37 (2011): 791–98, and Ruth Leys, "Affect and Intention:
A Reply to William E. Connolly," *Critical Inquiry* 37 (2011): 799–805. I thank Wojtek
Jeziersky for references to the Leys/Connolly debate. Anne Schmidt, "Showing
Emotions, Reading Emotions," in Frevert et al., *Emotional Lexicons*, 62–90 at 67, says
that "until the late eighteenth century no strict distinction was made between [affects and
passions]," while, in the same collection of articles, Scheer, "Topographies of Emotion,"
54, notes that after 1970 German encyclopedias "almost always used synonymously" the
words affect and emotion, while in Chapter 4 below we shall see that Aelred of Rievaulx
used the word *affectus* sometimes as a sort of "drive" and at other times as the equivalent
of love.

shall see, different writers used these words variously in different periods, but all of these words formed what we might call the "penumbra" of what we more-or-less mean by the word emotion.[25]

Words alone, however, will not tell us very much about emotional life. I am therefore also interested in which words emotional communities emphasize – and how they do so. Finally I am interested in emotional sequences. Psychologists frequently speak of "emotion scripts," by which they mean the circumstances that give rise to one emotion and the actions and expressions that accompany it.[26] I mean something quite different by an emotional "sequence." I mean that emotions do not normally come in singletons. Rather, emotional episodes often consist in a variety of emotions and emotional gestures, one after another. I feel angry, then feel guilty for feeling angry, then begin to cry, and at last laugh at myself and feel foolish. (This is a purely imaginary and hypothetical sequence, of course.)

Sequences are important because they tell us how emotions are felt differently according to the company they keep. If I feel angry and then guilty, that is a very different *feeling* of anger than if I feel angry and then euphoric. The sequence reveals how an emotion is valued. Explicit statements do so, as well. When Aelred of Rievaulx says that curiosity is "desire of the eyes" and a very bad emotion indeed, then *his* feeling when he felt curious (or when he did not feel curious) must have been very different from that of Thomas Hobbes, for Hobbes praised curiosity.[27]

All of the points I have made so far depend on words in texts – consciously shaped written sources. Am I therefore simply dealing with rhetoric rather than with feeling? The answer is no. One cannot separate

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[25] See the articles in Frevert et al., *Emotional Lexicons*, which discuss the uses in modern encyclopedias in English, French, and German of "many individual words related to emotions . . . [such as] *affect, appetite, emotion, sensation, feeling, temper, passion, fervour, sensibility*, and *drive*." (Italics in the original.) On the eventual triumph of the word of emotion over all others, see Dixon, *From Passions to Emotions*; Otniel E. Dror, *Blush, Adrenaline, Excitement: Modernity and the Study of Emotions, 1860–1940* (Chicago, forthcoming).

[26] See, for example, Paula M. Niedenthal, "Emotion Concepts," in *Handbook of Emotions*, 593, Table 36.2, An Anger Script. There are five steps to this particular script: 1) a person is offended; 2) he or she (here I will use she) scowls at the offender; 3) she feels internal tension; 4) she desires retribution; 5) she strikes out and harms the offender. However, Stephen D. White, "The Politics of Anger," in *Anger's Past: The Social Uses of an Emotion in the Middle Ages*, ed. Barbara H. Rosenwein (Ithaca, NY, 1998), 127–52, uses the word "script" to refer to the ritual expressions of a variety of emotions in particular situations, in this case feuding. Sarah McNamer, *Affective Meditation and the Invention of Medieval Compassion* (Philadelphia, 2010), 12, takes the word "script" literally to describe the sequence of directives given in meditative texts.

[27] See below, Chapters 4 and 9, a point already cogently argued in Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park, *Wonders and the Order of Nature, 1150–1750* (New York, 2001), 304.

feeling from rhetoric, which is crucial for emotional expression. Put another way, emotional expression is always rhetorical to some degree. We don't speak emotion words alone; we embed them in constructed sentences. We don't say just the word "anger," for example. We say, "I am angry at him." That is the beginning of a speech, and we may well go on to say, "I am angry at him because he insulted me, and, because you are my friend, I hope you will join me in feeling angry at him." This is rhetoric: a statement designed to persuade. Small wonder that Aristotle embedded a long discussion of emotions in his book on rhetoric.

Nor should we dismiss the emotions that we find in texts as belonging to the boilerplate of particular genres and therefore meaningless from the point of view of "real feeling." Formal modern letters begin with "dear" as in "Dear Sir," but no one imagines that the Sir is "really" dear. Yet, desiccated as the emotion of that greeting may be, it nevertheless has a very different impact from the "Hi" that is the favorite opening of emails. "Hi" is cooler, breezier. Boilerplate has significance; it is used by different groups differently (I myself address people with "dear" in emails); and it can change over time. As a researcher of emotions, I actually welcome commonplaces, for they tell me precisely how people *think* they and others feel – or, at least, should feel.

All of these things – words, emphases, sequences, rhetoric, boilerplate – constitute the "emotional inheritances" that are available to contemporaries living at the same time and to new generations that come thereafter. Emotional communities adapt the traditions to their own needs. Sometimes, they produce new words and new sequences built on the older ones. That is what is meant by "generations of feeling": the constant availability and potentiality of older and coexisting emotional traditions. New traditions may be introduced: immigrants have always offered potent new norms wherever they settle, and today mass media such as movies and TV do similar work.[28]

Recent scientific work in the field of genetics suggests a metaphor for the variety, latency, potential, and interaction of emotional communities within any given society. While individual genes are unlikely to change quickly over time, nevertheless they *express* themselves differently depending on their environment.[29] These epigenetic changes, scholars

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[28] See, for example, Rachel Spronk, "Media and the Therapeutic Ethos of Romantic Love in Middle-Class Nairobi," in *Love in Africa*, ed. Jennifer Cole and Lynn M. Thomas (Chicago, 2009), 181–203.

[29] Scientists speak of GEIs: "gene-environment interactions." See Daniel E. Runcie et al., "Social Environment Influences the Relationship between Genotype and Gene Expression in Wild Baboons," *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences* 368/1618 (2013), online at dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2012.0345;

note, are rapid and rampant.[30] Further, even one single individual carries not one genome but several: this is known as gene mosaicism.[31] It means that while some genomes may express themselves at certain times, others remain latent but potent. At the same time, because they are part of the same body, they must interact.

Why this book?

The history of emotions has become so popular lately that some scholars have started to speak of an "emotional turn."[32] Websites and blogs devoted to the subject are proliferating.[33] Nevertheless, I see some problems. Many of the new studies are only about the political uses of emotions, as though the state, broadly speaking, is still the only important topic for historians.[34] William Reddy has even claimed that "politics is just a process of determining who must repress as illegitimate, who must foreground as valuable, the feelings that come up for them in given contexts and relationships." Those who make this determination constitute what Reddy terms "emotional

William H. Durham, *Coevolution: Genes, Culture, and Human Diversity* (Stanford, 1991). I'm grateful to Mark Seymour for suggesting a cell-based metaphor.

[30] See Eva Jablonka and Marion J. Lamb, *Evolution in Four Dimensions: Genetic, Epigenetic, Behavioral, and Symbolic Variation in the History of Life* (Cambridge, MA, 2005); Daniel L. Smail, "Neurohistory in Action: Hoarding in Human History," *Isis* 105 (2014): 110–22.

[31] See, for example, Alexej Abyzov et al., "Somatic Copy-Number Mosaicism in Human Skin Revealed by Induced Pluripotent Stem Cells," *Nature* 492/7429 (2012): 438–42.

[32] Nicole Eustace et al., "*AHR* Conversation: The Historical Study of Emotions," *American Historical Review* 117 (2012): 1487–1531 at 1487.

[33] See, for example, *Les émotions au Moyen Âge (EMMA)* (editors: Damien Boquet and Piroska Nagy), emma.hypotheses.org/; Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for the History of Emotions, www.historyofemotions.org.au/; Queen Mary Centre for the History of the Emotions publicizes lectures and conferences at www.qmul.ac.uk/emotions and hosts a History of Emotions Blog, emotionsblog.history.qmul.ac.uk ; H-Emotions, sponsored by H–Net Humanities and Social Sciences Online, networks.h-net.org/h-emotions; new in 2014 is *History of Emotions – Insights into Research* (editors: Margrit Pernau, Anja Laukötter) from the Max Planck Institute for Human Development, www.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/en/research/history-of-emotions.

[34] See, for example, François Foronda, *El espanto y el miedo. Golpismo, emociones políticas y constitucionalismo en la Edad Media* (Madrid, 2013); Laurent Smagghe, *Les Émotions du Prince. Émotion et discours politique dans l'espace bourguignon* (Paris, 2012); Régine Le Jan, "*Quem decet trinam observare regulam, terrorem scilicet et ordinationem atque amorem.* Entre crainte et amour du roi: les émotions politiques à l'époque carolingienne," in *Geschichtsverstellungen. Bilder, Texte und Begriffe aus dem Mittelalter. Festschrift für H.W. Goetz zu 65. Geburtstag*, ed. Steffen Patzold, Anja Rathmann-Lutz, and Volker Scior (Cologne, 2012), 392–411; Klaus Oschema, *Freundschaft und Nähe im spätmittelalterlichen Burgund. Studien zum Spannungsfeld von Emotion und Institution* (Cologne, 2006); Penelope Morris, Francesco Ricatti, and Mark Seymour, *Politica ed emozioni nella storia d'Italia dal 1848 ad oggi* (Rome, 2012).