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1 Introduction

Historically and culturally, Hyderabad represents certain traditions. It is always a rather dangerous thing to uproot deep historical and cultural forces. Or rather, it may not be difficult, but it is very difficult to replace them by something constructive and substantial.

Nehru to Patel, 19 October 1950

The princely state of Hyderabad did indeed represent certain venerable traditions to some in India. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first prime minister, for one, was an admirer of some aspects of Hyderabad. In spite of its flaws, the territory seemed to him to have given rise to an exemplary culture. Among the elite and in the court of the Nizam, Shia and Sunni, Hindu, Parsi and Muslim enjoyed the same food and entertainment, sartorial style and literary language. Noble families patronised dargahs and ashoorkhanas as well as temples; they both commemorated Muharram and celebrated Dussehra.[1] For their part, the Nizams had not only patronised Muslim institutions but also extended jagirs to temples and annual grants to churches. This was not just an elite culture, however. Subaltern groups, speaking multiple languages, lived side by side and often worshipped in the same spaces and celebrated the same festivals.[2] Dating at least from the sixteenth century and the reign of Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah, these cultural practices did indeed have deep historical roots. Historians have struggled to find a suitable vocabulary to characterise these practices and the meanings attached to them.[3] Nehru himself seemed to recognise the difficulty of accurately describing these practices, often preferring to speak simply of a 'shared culture' (mushtarakah kalchar) in Hyderabad.[4]

[1] Karen Leonard, 'Indo-Muslim Culture in Hyderabad: Old City Neighbourhoods in the 19th Century' in Alka Patel and Karen Leonard (eds.) *Indo-Muslim Cultures in Transition* (Leiden, Brill, 2012), pp.165–88; Karen Leonard, 'Hindu Temples in Hyderabad: State Patronage and Politics in South Asia', *South Asian History and Culture* 2:3 (2011), 352–73.

[2] Afsar Mohammad, *The Festival of Pirs: Popular Islam and Shared Devotion in South India* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013).

[3] Tony K. Stewart 'In Search of Equivalence: Conceiving Muslim-Hindu Encounter through Translation Theory', *History of Religions* 40:3 (2001), 262.

[4] Speech by Jawaharlal Nehru, *Siasat*, 1 November 1956, inside pages. All translations are my own, unless otherwise noted.

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The Prime Minister wished to cultivate something similar in the whole of India, as he sought to foster national harmony after the traumatic and divisive events of partition.

And yet, to others Hyderabad State was either a reactionary, feudal autocracy, or the home of a dangerous breed of Muslim chauvinism, or both. In this alternative depiction of Hyderabadi history and culture, a narrow Muslim elite had held all the reins of power and had used their position to exploit and terrorise the Hindu majority in the state. As such, the future of independent India depended upon dismantling the structures of injustice in Hyderabad.[5] These competing understandings of Hyderabad's past hinged upon different interpretations of the history of the state's Muslim communities. Had Muslims been productive participants in the creation of Hyderabad's collective life, or were they domineering and consummate outsiders whose difference could never be reconciled? In other words, did Muslims *belong* in Hyderabad? This debate pre-dated the police action, which forcibly integrated the princely state of Hyderabad into the Indian Union in September 1948. And it has frequently come to the centre of historiographical debates about Hyderabadi history since then.[6] The present book charts the ways in which the latter, more negative and exclusionary, interpretation of Muslim history in Hyderabad came to dominate how the Muslims of Hyderabad were governed after the integration of the state into the Indian Union. In turn, the chapters explore the ways in which groups of Muslims, their self-styled representatives and those advocating a shared national culture asserted Muslim belonging and negotiated a place for them, albeit often anxiously, within India in the first decade after Independence. In so doing, it uncovers the consequences that this had for understandings of secularism and democracy in early postcolonial India as a whole.

The idea of the Muslim minority

The view that the Muslims of Hyderabad had dominated the state's non-Muslim population was connected to constructions of the Muslim minority that had come to prevail within India as a whole in the decades before independence and partition. The religious marker 'Muslim' encompasses an enormous variety of people in South Asia. Dispersed across the subcontinent, and occupying the broadest range of occupations, these different communities

[5] Government of India, *White Paper on Hyderabad* (New Delhi, 1948), pp.2, 7.

[6] Others have noted the existence of conflicting interpretations of Hyderabadi history. Ashutosh Varshney, *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), pp.190–1; Mohammed Hyder, *October Coup: A Memoir of the Struggle for Hyderabad* (New Delhi: Roli Books, 2012).

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are, naturally, embedded in their particular social milieux.[7] Their lives are hewn by local and regional structures and processes, and for this reason their stories are often told in the form of regional or urban histories.[8] At the same time, these communities are not isolated from translocal currents and global impulses.[9] Indeed, the interplay between these different scales of identification has added depth and complexity to Muslim lives and to Muslim belonging in India.[10]

The history of the idea of the Muslim minority in India is the story of the problematisation of the Muslim presence on the subcontinent, in part through the abstraction of these different Muslim communities from their particular contexts. The process by which the twinned constructs of a Muslim minority and a Hindu majority came to dominate political discourse in India has its roots in the colonial period. To be sure, India was not without religious conflict before the advent of British rule, but disputes tended to be localised, subject to negotiation and interspersed with periods of accommodation or productive cooperation.[11] British rule marked a qualitative change in the nature of social representation as colonial practices of ethnography, enumeration and history writing tended to essentialise India's religious groups. Furthermore, British and European scholars tended to write into their histories the notion that Muslims were intruders in India whose presence had never quite been normalised.[12] Colonial institutions and policies, from personal law codes to quotas for government jobs, were then designed around these categories and assumptions. After the Revolt of 1857, the loyalty of Muslims in particular was called into question, as colonial officials worried that they were a 'chronic danger to

[7] Vinod K. Jairath, 'Introduction: Towards a Framework' in Vinod K. Jairath (ed.), *Frontiers of Embedded Muslim Communities in India* (New Delhi: Routledge, 2011), p.3.

[8] S.M. Abul Khader Fakhri, *Dravidian Sahibs and Brahmin Maulanas: The Politics of the Muslims of Tamil Nadu, 1930–1967* (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 2008); L.R.S. Lakshmi, *The Malabar Muslims; A Different Perspective* (New Delhi: Foundation Books, 2012); Ian Talbot, *Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement: The Growth of the Muslim League in North-West and North-East India, 1937–1947* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1988); David Gilmartin, *Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); Mushirul Hasan, *From Pluralism to Separatism: Qasbas in Colonial Awadh* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004); Neilesh Bose, *Recasting the Region: Language, Culture, and Islam in Colonial Bengal* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2014).

[9] Filippo Osella and Caroline Osella 'Islamism and Social Reform in Kerala, South India', *Modern Asian Studies* 42:2–3 (2008) 318.

[10] Ayesha Jalal, 'Negotiating Colonial Modernity and Cultural Difference: Indian Muslim Conceptions of Community and Nation, 1878–1914' in C.A. Bayly and Leila Tarazi Fawaz (eds.) *Modernity & Culture: From the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), pp.231–2.

[11] C.A. Bayly '"The Prehistory of Communalism": Religious Conflict in India 1700–1860', *Modern Asian Studies* 19:2 (1985); Cynthia Talbot, 'Inscribing the Other, Inscribing the Self: Hindu-Muslim Identities in Pre-Colonial India', *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 37:4 (1995).

[12] David Kopf, *British Orientalism and the Bengal Renaissance: The Dynamics of Indian Modernization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p.103.

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the British Power in India'.[13] Through these representational processes, the administrative construct of the Muslim minority came to signal a community with a shared set of political, economic and cultural interests, which were inimical to those of the 'Hindu majority', and, occasionally, to India itself. Founded on the notion that Muslims had always been exterior to the nation, the concept of the Muslim minority came to refer to a deterritorialised population with floating loyalties.

Indians were not passive bystanders to these developments. As they struggled to come to grips with their continuously changing position in colonial India, Muslim intellectuals attempted to give voice to their communities, direct their futures and refute allegations of disloyalty.[14] Muslim religious reformist movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries attempted to standardise the practices of different communities and assert the unity of India's Muslims, even as they competed against one another.[15] In the political life of British India, the idea of the Muslim minority was institutionalised with the introduction of separate electorates in 1909 and their confirmation in the Communal Award of 1932, and it gained a greater degree of popular salience with the ascent of the Muslim League in the 1940s.[16] This enclosed Muslims' political possibilities by presuming that Muslims were unable or unwilling to separate their religious interests from their political objectives, and that Islamic history and culture had no universal elements that might be applicable outside of Muslim communities. In other words, the idea of the Muslim minority separated collective political action by Muslims from the realm of national or secular politics. In so doing, it closed off the possibility of recognising alternative, Muslim imaginaries of the Indian nation that were in circulation.[17] Its apotheosis was the partition of the subcontinent and the creation of Pakistan as a homeland for South Asia's Muslims. Independent India inherited not only the administrative apparatus of the Raj, but its anxieties about Muslim loyalty, now with greater material palpability due to the creation of Pakistan as a potential alternative locus for the allegiances of Muslims.

[13] W.W. Hunter, *The Indian Musalmans* (London: Trübner and Company 3rd edn., 1976), p.10.

[14] For example, Ayesha Jalal, *Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian Islam since 1850* (London: Routledge, 2000).

[15] Nile Green, *Bombay Islam: The Religious Economy of the West Indian Ocean, 1840–1915* (Cambridge University Press, 2011), p.9.

[16] Joya Chatterji, *Bengal Divided: Hindu Communalism and Partition* (Cambridge University Press, 1994), ch.1; Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan* (Cambridge University Press, 1985).

[17] Aamir R. *Mufti, Enlightenment in the Colony: The Jewish Question and the Crisis of Postcolonial Culture* (Princeton University Press, 2007), pp.165–76. On the development of Urdu as a central aspect of one of these imaginaries, see Kavita Datla, *The Language of Secular Islam: Urdu Nationalism and Colonial India* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2012), pp.15–16.

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In turn, this trans-regional idea of the Muslim minority was produced in Hyderabad through official policies after the police action, and shaped the histories of the Muslim communities it purported to describe. The Muslims of Hyderabad who are the subject of this book comprised landed elites and rural smallholders, urban businessmen and educated government servants, impoverished refugee widows and well-connected Congressmen. Each was enmeshed in local relations of commerce, kinship, religious practice and political patronage, some of which were shared with Hyderabad's non-Muslim communities in ways that created what Jawaharlal Nehru and others lauded as a unique Hyderabadi culture.

While the political and administrative structures of much of northern British India increasingly reflected a constructed division between 'majority' and 'minority' religious communities,[18] twentieth-century Hyderabad's power structures were not organised on the same lines. Rather, by the middle of the twentieth century, the Nizam's state was a haphazard mix of modern bureaucratic administrative machinery, and remnants of systems of patronage and privilege that dated from before the colonial period. As such, two very narrow bands of multi-ethnic elites exercised outsized influence in the territory. Like the other Mughal successor states which had emerged in the eighteenth century, the Nizams of Hyderabad had relied on a mix of established nobility and newly minted elites to retain power. Thus, they not only appointed their own Hindu and Muslim nobility, but they also depended upon local samasthans, Hindu landed elites inherited from earlier dynasties, for military, fiscal and symbolic support.[19] In addition, the Nizam's Mughlai bureaucracy had included Muslims, but also some Parsis and Christians, as well as Hindu Kayasthas whose knowledge of Persian had been essential to the smooth functioning of government.[20] The Nizam resisted the growth of democratic politics in Hyderabad, preferring instead to retain a position from which he could play off various elites against one another.[21]

Even as political parties emerged in Hyderabad to call for the introduction of democracy, they did not always fall neatly into majority and minority political camps. The political spectrum contained an array of groups whose interests

[18] Madras was an important exception. Fakhri, *Dravidian Sahibs*, ch.2.
[19] Benjamin Cohen, *Kingship and Colonialism in India's Deccan: 1850–1948* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
[20] Karen Leonard, *Social History of an Indian Caste: the Kayasths of Hyderabad* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp.28, 31; John Roosa, The Quandary of the *Qaum*: Indian Nationalism in a Muslim State, Hyderabad 1850–1948 (Madison, University of Wisconsin PhD, 1998), pp.98–9.
[21] Margrit Pernau, *The Passing of Patrimonialism: Politics and Political Culture in Hyderabad, 1911–1948* (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 2000), for example, pp.208–13.

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were not always defined by religious affiliation. Several home-grown, moderate reformist political societies, such as the Hyderabad State Reforms Association, established in 1920, or the Society of Union and Progress (1928–31), were organised by educated, middle-class Hyderabadis of a mixed religious composition, who sought to preserve what they believed was Hyderabad's unique culture, while also calling for political reforms.[22] In addition, one of Hyderabad's two Dalit groups, the Depressed Classes Association, led by B.S. Venkat Rao, declared itself willing to work with the Seventh Nizam, Mir Osman Ali Khan, as he tried to introduce a belated scheme of constitutional reforms after the Second World War.[23] On the other end of the political spectrum, Hyderabad's communists were known for their secularism. During the course of 1944, a peasant uprising against landlords in Telangana, and, by extension, the Nizam's forces who supported them, had broken out. According to available accounts, the movement, which lasted until 1951, was a class struggle not overtly concerned with religious affiliations.[24] From loyalism and moderate reformism to outright revolution, Hyderabad's incipient politics had plenty of options for those inclined to organise their political life without reference to religion.

However, these manifestations of community and forms of political organisation were also weathered by some of the same currents that were battering British India. Over the course of the nineteenth century, Hyderabad, too, experienced its own Muslim revivalisms, with similar ambitions and effects to those in greater India.[25] Hindu revivalism in Hyderabad, as in the rest of India, not only worked towards creating a sense of unity among Hindus, but heightened their sense of difference from the Muslim minority.[26] In the two decades before the police action a number of parties rose to prominence which ignored the subtleties of the existing power structures and instead equated political loyalty with religious affiliation. Hindu nationalist parties, including the Arya Samaj, had begun to use the state's demographics to make a case against what they called 'Muslim domination' in the territory. In the 1941 census return, the state had a population of 16.34 million people, nearly 13 per cent of whom

[22] On the Hyderabad State Reforms Association, see Lucien D. Benichou, *From Autocracy to Integration: Political Developments in Hyderabad State 1938–1948* (Chennai: Orient Longman, 2000), pp.30–1; on the Society of Union and Progress see, M. Fazlur Rahman's contribution in Abul Kalam Azad Oriental Research Institute (ed.) *Ali Yavar Jung: Commemorative Volume* (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1983), pp.23–9.
[23] Roosa, 'Quandary of the *Qaum*', p.621.
[24] Inukonda Thirumali, *Against Dora and Nizam: People's Movement in Telangana* (New Delhi: Kanishka Publishers, 2003), p.7.
[25] Nile Green, 'Mystical Missionaries in Hyderabad State: Mu'in Allah Shah and His Sufi Reform Movement', *Indian Economic and Social History Review* 42:2 (2005), 45–70.
[26] Ian Copland, '"Communalism" in Princely India: The Case of Hyderabad, 1930–1940', *Modern Asian Studies* 22:4 (1988), 783–814.

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were Muslim.[27] Because the Nizam was a Muslim and his civil service, military and police were staffed by large numbers of Muslims, groups like the Arya Samaj argued that members of the minority as a whole had enjoyed undue privileges under the Nizam. This position failed to recognise the large stake that some Hindu groups had in commerce, banking, law and agriculture in Hyderabad.[28] It also ignored the significant numbers of poor and middle-class Muslims who were excluded from the existing structures of power. Conflating religious affiliation with political interest, Hindu nationalist parties demanded democratic change as a way of introducing Hindu rule in the state. On the other side, the Majlis-i Ittehadul Muslimin, established in 1928, called for both democratisation (with separate electorates for Muslims) and the preservation of what it called Muslim rule in the state. The Ittehad's ill-disciplined volunteer corps, the Razakars, took it upon themselves to persecute individuals, whether Hindu or Muslim, who opposed their vision of Hyderabad's future. These three layers, a mixed class of noble and administrative elites, a group of cosmopolitan politicians and a selection of communal parties, competed to define Hyderabad's past and determine its future.

Partition and the chaos before the incorporation of Hyderabad into the Union cast a shadow over the idea of religious community across the whole of South Asia. As a result of the violence that accompanied partition in the north of India, especially in Punjab and Bengal, the idea of the Muslim minority in postcolonial India emerged in a new form.[29] With a neighbouring state looming as a potential focal point for their allegiance, the loyalties of Muslims in India easily fell under suspicion.[30] And because the Muslim League had demanded the creation of Pakistan, organised Muslim politics were anathema in post-partition India. A related process affected the perception of Muslims in Hyderabad. As detailed in the next chapter, the eighteen months leading up to the invasion of the state in September 1948 were characterised by uncertainty, and increasingly histrionic bombast, and the voices of those who advocated a shared or composite cultural and political life were drowned out. The Nizam had declared that with the departure of the British he had a right to resume his independent status. To this end, the Nizam attempted to negotiate with India to retain as much autonomy as possible for

[27] Census of India 1941: *Volume XXI HEH The Nizam's Dominions (Hyderabad State)* (New Delhi: Government of India, 1945), pp.38, 219.
[28] Copland, 'Communalism in Princely India', 789.
[29] Gyanendra Pandey, *Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism and History in India* (Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp.132–4.
[30] William Gould, Taylor C. Sherman and Sarah Ansari, 'The Flux of the Matter: Loyalty, Corruption and the "Everyday State" in the Post-Partition Government Services of India and Pakistan', *Past & Present* 291:1 (2013), 247–53.

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Hyderabad.[31] The bluster of the chauvinist forces of the Majlis-i Ittehadul Muslimin, who declared that the Asaf Jahi flag would fly over the Red Fort in Delhi, and the thuggish behaviour of the Razakars easily created the impression that all Muslims had acted as oppressors against the state's Hindu population.[32] Of course, this was not the only way of understanding the Muslim presence in Hyderabad. But among many of those who trod the corridors of power in New Delhi this political rhetoric was mistakenly believed to be representative of the structures of power in the state. This book uncovers the ways in which Hyderabad's Muslim communities came to be enclosed, in government policies and in some spheres of popular discourse, by this conception of the Muslim minority. It reveals how this idea of the Muslim minority affected official policies from the rehabilitation of refugees and the repatriation of 'foreign' Muslims, to the redesign of government services and the approach to the question of what the official language ought to be in the territory. These radical changes were experienced by many of its inhabitants as an inqilab, a revolution in the sense of the world being turned upside down.

Anxieties of belonging and citizenship

Although some migrated,[33] many Muslims stayed and had to negotiate a place for themselves in this new environment. This process of negotiation can best be understood as a quest for belonging. The concept of belonging has taken hold as part of the more general move away from the term identity.[34] Its use is designed to shift the focus onto affective practices and onto the performative aspects of identity to signify the ways in which humans understand themselves, their politics and their own desires as these are produced in particular historical contexts.[35] In addition, belonging suggests an affective connection to a particular space, in a way that identity need not.[36] Moreover, whereas identities might be said to be forged against others, belonging is negotiated with others who share a space. When that space is the (nation-)state we might speak of belonging, minimally, as the assertion of a right to live in a given state. Whereas the use of the term nationalism, with its focus on patriotic sentiment, tends to close down the possibility of alternative emotional ties,

[31] For the latest forensic analysis of these negotiations, see Noorani, *Destruction of Hyderabad.*
[32] *White Paper on Hyderabad*, p.30.
[33] Karen Leonard, *Locating Home: India's Hyderabadis Abroad* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2007).
[34] Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005) ch.3.
[35] Vikki Bell, *Performativity and Belonging* (London: Sage Publications, 1999) pp.1–3.
[36] Mike Savage, Gaynor Bagnall, and Brian Longhurst, *Globalization and Belonging* (London: Sage Publications, 2005), pp.11–12.

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belonging allows for a range of affective relationships between people and the government of a territory. A person or a group might make a claim to belonging while simultaneously articulating an ambivalent, antagonistic or capricious attitude towards others or towards the government of that space. In turn, this allows us to study the ways in which multiple expressions of belonging can vie with one another.

In early postcolonial India there were many simultaneous, competing and overlapping notions of belonging in circulation. These understandings were often specific to certain spheres of activity. For example, debates over the shape of India's economy might bring to the fore a range of expressions of belonging, each of which underpinned a different set of prescriptions for government policy. Thus, homogenising, inclusivist notions of economic belonging, in which India was imagined as a single economic unit in which the movement of citizens for employment was essential for development, competed with more particularist, exclusivist understandings, in which India's expanse was regarded as a threat. Proponents of the latter view sought to carve out separate spaces of economic belonging within which competition between citizens could be reduced. Simultaneously, pluralist, inclusivist notions of linguistic belonging tended to view the nation as a single space in which all citizens ought to speak multiple languages. At the other end of this spectrum, those who regarded India's many languages as a source of irreconcilable conflict tended to articulate exclusivist notions of linguistic belonging. They, therefore, demanded the nation be subdivided into multiple spaces within each of which it would be the norm for citizens to speak only one language. These more particular, contextual forms of belonging were part of more general, normative debates about Indianness and about how individuals might belong in India.

Different individuals and groups of Muslims, therefore, could and did ascribe to multiple and varying forms of belonging. As such, the constructed division of the country into a permanent Muslim minority and 'non-Muslim' majority that operated in much of government policy in Hyderabad cannot be said to have achieved hegemony in the popular imagination at this time. This idea was subject to disruption and contestation both by Muslims and non-Muslims acting together and separately. Equally, the different Muslims in Hyderabad who are studied in this work did not have a singular or homogenous sense of belonging. This is in part due to their varying statuses within society: some were relatively privileged and politically engaged; others were among the most marginalised in India. Although Muslims did not have a single sense of belonging, the materials examined in the chapters below reveal that the different expressions of belonging that they articulated shared a strong sense of anxiety (andeshah). At various times this anxiety could reflect fear or distress (parishan), but also a lack of trust (be-e'timadi) in

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government.[37] These anxieties of belonging in turn shaped the claims that different Muslims made as citizens upon their government.

When it comes to questions concerning formal citizenship, it is now clear that the development of legal regimes of citizenship in India and Pakistan was caught up in the long process of partition.[38] Indeed, India's citizenship laws were only codified in 1955, leaving a significant interregnum in which many individuals were left in a precarious and ambiguous legal position.[39] Moreover, the forms of citizenship that eventually emerged were coloured by the experience of violence and migration. Several scholars have demonstrated that legal citizenship in South Asia was 'deeply imbricated in religion', to use Gopal's phrasing.[40] As India and Pakistan developed their laws in response to the migrations of partition, Chatterji has shown, they devised ever more restrictive forms of citizenship.[41] These more stringent rules which eventually emerged tended to make it harder for Muslims to claim Indian citizenship.

Any study of the ways in which people negotiate citizenship must recognise that citizenship is not just a legal status, but a set of practices. Indeed, Gopal has shown that marginalised individuals fighting for legal recognition as citizens do not necessarily acknowledge the difference between formal and substantive, or 'thin' and 'thick', citizenship which some scholars had proposed.[42] Equally, for the Muslims of Hyderabad, citizenship was not just a legal status, but involved the exercise of a variety of rights. Appeals for rehabilitation for the victims of violence, for employment in government services, for political representation or for the protection of one's language were all claims of citizenship.

Formal regimes of universal citizenship mask inequalities that shape how one claims and exercises citizenship rights.[43] Groups and individuals can be disadvantaged by race, religion, gender, class or any other marker of

[37] Moid has noted this fear of the government, M.A. Moid, 'Muslim Perceptions and Responses in Post-Police Action Hyderabad' in Jairath (ed.) *Frontiers*, p.224.

[38] Yasmin Khan, *The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), p.9.

[39] Anupama Roy, *Mapping Citizenship in India* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2010), ch.1.

[40] Jayal Niranja Gopal, *Citizenship and its Discontents: An Indian History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), p.61.

[41] Joya Chatterji, 'South Asian Histories of Citizenship, 1946–1970' *The Historical Journal* 55:4 (2012), 1049–71.

[42] Gopal, *Citizenship and Its Discontents*, p.84. The distinction between thin and thick citizenship was proposed by Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, 'Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory' in R. Beiner (ed.) *Theorizing Citizenship* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995).

[43] Iris Marion Young, 'Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship' in Beiner (ed.) *Theorizing Citizenship*, p.176; Nivedita Menon, 'State/Gender/Community: Citizenship in Contemporary India', *Economic and Political Weekly* 33:5 (1998), PE3–PE10.

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