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On the morning of 5 November 1958, while a young man and woman were about to enter the Tunisian Embassy in the West German capital, Bonn, they came under fire from a speeding Mercedes. The woman escaped unharmed and disappeared from the scene, never to be located by the arriving police. Her companion, gravely injured in the attack, collapsed on the spot. He was identified as Améziane Aït Ahcène, an Egyptian lawyer who ostensibly worked for the Tunisian embassy. Améziane Aït Ahcène's true identity was in fact Algerian, and as the front pages of the major West German newspapers soon reported, he was the unaccredited representative of the *Gouvernement provisoire de la République algérienne* (GPRA) in Bonn. This government-in-exile had been created two months earlier by Algerian nationalists engaged, since 1 November 1954, in a brutal struggle for independence from France. With the victim identified as an allegedly senior member of the *Front de libération nationale* (FLN), the movement behind the GPRA, the gangster-style assassination attempt on Aït Ahcène led to extensive press speculation. Was his attempted murder related to the savage Algerian war? If that were the case – and this seemed to be the most likely explanation to most observers – then who was behind this attempt at public execution? Were the perpetrators rivals within the FLN, as the French authorities and media implied, or were they members of the *Mouvement national algérien* (MNA), the only remaining nationalist group challenging the FLN's claim to be the sole legitimate representative of the Algerian people? Did they perhaps belong to the group of European reactionaries, or *ultras*, who fought so bitterly for the preservation of *l'Algérie française*? Or were Arab diplomats in Bonn right to accuse the French secret services of carrying out the attack?¹

Whoever the perpetrators were, the assassination attempt on Améziane Aït Ahcène seemed to confirm rumours that had been circulating for

¹ For a graphic description of the event and the ensuing debate, see: 'Der Tod kommt mit der Post. Spiegel-Serie über Frankreichs "Rote Hand"', *Der Spiegel* 14/10 (2 March 1960), pp. 38–50.

months: namely, that the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) had become a refuge and operational base for Algerians seeking to evade the French authorities.² One West German newspaper had spoken as early as January 1958 of an ‘Algerian invasion’, and by February and March, national dailies such as the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ) and *Die Welt* had begun to draw attention not only to the plight of Algerian refugees in the Federal Republic but also to the increasingly brazen activities of the FLN there.³ In August, the French newspaper *Paris-Journal* alleged that the FLN had established its European headquarters in West Germany in order to camouflage ‘the principal organisms of Algerian terrorism in France’.⁴ Coming just one day after the FLN had launched the second front of its independence struggle through a series of terrorist attacks on police stations and petrol plants across France, the assertion caused a sensation. Ever more newspapers remarked on the influx of Algerians and the FLN’s mounting activity east of the Rhine, including foreign newspapers such as the Dutch *Maasbode*, the Swiss *St. Galler Tagblatt* and the *Luxemburger Wort*.⁵ By the time of the attempt on Aït Ahcène’s life, the steady stream of speculation had turned into a flood. The shooting prompted popular tabloids, such as Hamburg’s *Bild*, to wonder ‘whether the dirty war’ between France and the FLN had arrived in West Germany, while Bonn’s *Rheinischer Merkur* warned that if federal authorities failed to stem the surging tide of refugees and rebels entering the country, the FRG would soon face an ‘Algerian plague à la Paris and Marseille’. In other words, unless the government reacted quickly, the Algerian war of independence would spread across the French border into West Germany itself.⁶

² Unless specified otherwise, the term ‘Algerian’ is used throughout this study to denote Muslim Algerians, who were Arab or Berber. Their official status will be discussed further in Chapter 3.

³ ‘Algerische Invasion? Die Ausstrahlung des französisch-algerischen Konfliktes auf die Bundesrepublik’, *Rheinischer Merkur* (Bonn), 31 January 1958; ‘Algerier flüchten in die Bundesrepublik’, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ), 25 February 1958; ‘Wie steht es mit dem Asylrecht?’ *Die Welt* (Hamburg), 21 March 1958; ‘Algerier suchen in der Bundesrepublik Zuflucht’, *Neue Rhein Zeitung* (Essen), 1 March 1958.

⁴ ‘Les chefs FLN de France ont leur quartier général en Allemagne’, *Paris-Journal*, 26 August 1958.

⁵ ‘Die algerischen Nationalisten organisieren sich in West Deutschland. Bis jetzt 2,000 Flüchtlinge auf dem Bundesgebiet’, *St. Galler Tagblatt*, 23 September 1958; ‘Die algerischen Nationalisten organisieren sich in Bonn: Bundesregierung in einer peinlichen Situation’, *Luxemburger Wort*, 24 September 1958; the *Maasbode* article, dated 26 September 1958, is cited in: Dépêche no.804 de l’ambassade de France à La Haye, 1 October 1958, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (MAE), Paris, Mission de liaison pour les affaires algériennes (MLA)/2. See also: ‘Vom Regen in die Traufe des Asyls’, *Aachener Nachrichten*, 7 June 1958; ‘Algerische Flüchtlinge in der Bundesrepublik’, *FAZ*, 16 September 1958.

⁶ ‘Algerische Aktivität’, *Rheinischer Merkur*, 14 November 1958. The *Bild* is cited in: Télégramme no.2662/65 de l’ambassade de France à Bonn, 7 November 1958, MAE, MLA/2.

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In 1958, sinister scenarios such as those depicted by the *Bild* or *Rheinische Merkur* appeared all too real to the authorities in Paris and Bonn. After all, Aït Ahcène was neither the first nor the last Algerian – or German, for that matter – to fall prey to an assassination attempt in West Germany during Algeria's independence struggle. In fact, the attempted execution of Aït Ahcène constituted a seminal moment in a complex process that came to entwine the Franco-Algerian struggle with the Franco-German rapprochement within the wider context of the Cold War, decolonisation, and the FRG's efforts at moral and political rehabilitation. This book seeks to unravel that process and explain its meaning and consequences. At its heart are a series of pivotal relationships usually treated as discrete and unrelated. On the one hand is the Franco-Algerian relationship that manifested itself in an increasingly bitter struggle over the fate of colonial Algeria at a time of rapid decolonisation and rising Cold War tensions. On the other hand is the Franco-German relationship, which experienced an unprecedented rapprochement at the precise moment the French nation had to come to terms with the loss of its colonial empire in Algeria and elsewhere. Lastly, there is the relationship that the newly sovereign Bonn Republic sought to establish not just to its European and Atlantic partners but also to the emerging nations of what at that time was termed the Third World.⁷ By focusing on the intricate linkages between these relationships, this book will cast important fresh light on all three.

The passions and anxieties aroused by the Algerian war's spillover into the Bonn Republic, so manifest in the French and West German press in 1958, have received little attention from scholars working on West German foreign relations and security policy or on Algeria's decolonisation. This tendency is not altogether surprising. For decades, French politicians and historians perpetuated the myth of the Franco-Algerian struggle as an internal affair. In November 1954, Prime Minister Pierre Mendès-France famously stipulated, one 'does not compromise when it comes to defending the internal peace of the nation, the unity and the integrity of the Republic'. His interior minister, François Mitterrand, added that while the response to the FLN's insurrection would be fierce, France 'will avoid

⁷ Coined by French demographer Alfred Sauvy in 1952, the term 'Third World' was used to mark the distinct position of formerly colonised states in Africa, Asia and Latin America, which refused to side with the Western or Eastern blocs, representing a 'third force' in the Cold War. The Third World, or South, also connoted a global 'third estate', whose demographic and socio-economic realities and underdevelopment challenged both the capitalist and communist powers of the northern hemisphere. See: B.R. Tomlinson, 'What Is the Third World?' *Journal of Contemporary History* 38/2 (2003), pp. 309–311.

everything that could appear like a kind of state of war'. Every successive French cabinet adhered to this rhetorical formula, for constitutionally Algeria was part of France. Not even General Charles de Gaulle, the man who eventually conceded Algerian independence, strayed from the line that the 'events' in Algeria constituted a domestic emergency of purely French concern.⁸ In fact, only in 1999 did the French National Assembly pass a decree explicitly and officially referring to the hitherto unnamed 'events' of 1954 to 1962 as *la guerre d'Algérie*, thereby acknowledging that France had in fact waged war against the FLN.⁹ According to the official rhetoric, then, this last and most brutal chapter in the history of France's colonial disengagement should have concerned the Federal Republic no more or less than any other member of the international community.¹⁰

A similar logic can be observed in Algerian historiography and commemorative practices. Here, too, emphasis has rested predominantly on the war's internal dimension. According to historian Mohammed Harbi, a former high-ranking member of the FLN forced into exile in the early 1970s, the autocratic regime that emerged under President Houari Boumediène in 1965 deliberately constructed the myth of the year 1954 as a *tabula rasa*: it was then, with the foundation of the FLN, that Algerian nationalism was born as a united, homogenous movement leading a peasant revolution to victory and independence.¹¹ The state embarked on what historian Hassan Remaoun has called a 'policy of writing and

⁸ Citations from Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954–1962*, 4th edn (London, 2002), p. 98, and Benjamin Stora, *La gangrène et l'oubli. La mémoire de la guerre d'Algérie*, 2nd edn (Paris, 1998), pp. 15–16.

⁹ On French politics of commemoration of the Algerian war, see: Stora, *Gangrène*; Raphaëlle Branche, *La guerre d'Algérie: une histoire apaisée?* (Paris, 2005); Jo McCormack, *Collective Memory: France and the Algerian War* (Lanham MD, 2007); Mohammed Harbi and Benjamin Stora, 'La guerre d'Algérie: de la mémoire à l'Histoire', in *La guerre d'Algérie 1954–2004. La fin de l'amnésie* (eds.) Mohammed Harbi and Benjamin Stora (Paris, 2004), pp. 9–16; Christiane Kohser-Spohn and Frank Renken (eds.), *Trauma Algerienkrieg. Zur Geschichte und Aufarbeitung eines tabuisierten Konflikts* (Frankfurt/Main, 2005); Frank Renken, *Frankreich im Schatten des Algerienkrieges. Die Fünfte Republik und die Erinnerung an den letzten großen Kolonialkonflikt* (Göttingen, 2006); Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization. The Algerian War and the Remaking of France* (Ithaca NY; London, 2006).

¹⁰ Arnold Fraleigh, 'The Algerian Revolution as a Case Study in International Law', in *The International Law of Civil War* (ed.) Richard Falk (Baltimore ML, 1971), p. 191.

¹¹ Gilbert Meynier maintains that the word 'revolution' is theoretically a misnomer for the Algerian war. Notwithstanding the socialist turn that followed its resolution, the conflict produced neither a Marxist-type revolution nor any other fundamental transformation of socio-economic, political or cultural institutions. To Meynier, the term only applies in its Arabic form – *shar'ua*, which translates more precisely as 'revolt' or 'insurrection' – and only insofar as the war resulted in an overthrow of the colonial order. See his *Histoire intérieure du FLN, 1954–1962* (Paris, 2002), pp. 157–63; his essay in *Trauma Algerienkrieg*, pp. 153–73; or his 'Problématique historique de la nation algérienne', *NAQD. Revue d'études et de critique sociale* 14/15 (2001), p. 31.

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rewriting History'. On the one hand, this policy rightly sought to rectify 'the falsifications that were supposed to have been made by colonial history', for only by 'decolonising history' – as historian Mohamed Sahli wrote in 1965 – could Algerians recover their own voice in the production of historical knowledge.¹² On the other hand, the policy also pursued a political agenda, for it deliberately obscured the role of nationalist leaders other than those who rose to power and prominence post-independence. By favouring and indeed overstating the role played by the internal armed struggle of the *mujāhideen*, as the *Armée de libération nationale's* (ALN) combatants referred to themselves, this interpretation left little room for rival movements such as the MNA and other political parties like Ferhat Abbas's *Union démocratique du manifeste algérien* (UDMA) and Abd al-Hamid Ben Badis's *Association des 'ulamā musulmans algériens* (AUMA), or even the FLN's precursor, the *Parti du peuple algérien – Mouvement pour le triomphe des libertés démocratiques* (PPA-MTLD). It also left little room for the FLN's external organisation, especially the movement's diplomats or its metropolitan branch, the *Fédération de France*.¹³

The FLN's 'official history' of Algerian decolonisation, like its French counterpart, have been, and are being, challenged from multiple directions, of course, including the international dimension. Even when viewed from the perspective of what historian Matthew Connelly has called the 'foreign policy of national liberation', however, the connection between West Germany and the Algerian war does not become immediately apparent.¹⁴ When the FLN launched its insurrection on 1 November 1954, Germany was still a divided and militarily occupied country. The abrogation of the Occupation Statute on 5 May 1955 restored the Federal Republic's independence, yet it did so within the structural framework of Western integration. Ultimately, the country's sovereignty would remain constrained until the four wartime allies agreed on the terms of

¹² Mohamed Sahli, *Décoloniser l'histoire* (Paris, 1965).

¹³ Mohammed Harbi, 1954. *La guerre commence en Algérie* (Brussels, 1984), pp. 152–73; Hassan Remaoun, 'L'intervention institutionnelle et son impact sur la pratique historiographique en Algérie: la politique "d'Écriture et de Réécriture de l'histoire"', *Insaniyat. Revue algérienne d'anthropologie et de sciences sociales* 19/20 (2003), pp. 7–40, esp. p. 27. Refer also to Stora, *Gangrène*, parts II–IV, and to the contributions by Daho Djerbal, Hassan Remaoun, Guy Pervillé, Gilbert Meynier, Tayeb Chenntouf, Fouad Soufi and Werner Ruf in *Trauma Algerienkrieg*.

¹⁴ Matthew Connelly, 'Rethinking the Cold War and Decolonization: The Grant Strategy of the Algerian War of Independence', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 33/2 (2001), p. 223. On the FLN's foreign policy, see also Connelly's *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (Oxford, 2002); Slimane Chikh, *L'Algérie en armes ou le temps des certitudes* (Paris, 1981), part 4; Meynier, *Histoire*, part 6; Guy Pervillé, 'L'insertion internationale du FLN algérien', *Relations internationales* 31 (1982), pp. 373–86.

a final peace treaty.¹⁵ Reliant on the goodwill and protection of its western allies, including France, the Bonn government's ability to pursue an independent foreign policy remained limited.¹⁶ After the horrors wrought by the Nazi regime, the abrogation of the Occupation Statute did not result in the FRG's immediate and full return into the fold of the international community, nor did its remarkable, export-driven economic growth (the so-called *Wirtschaftswunder*) guarantee the country an automatic place among the great powers. Together with its eastern counterpart, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the country only became a voting member of the United Nations (UN) a full decade after Algeria's independence, once the Basic Treaty of 21 December 1972 permitted a normalisation of German–German relations. As such, the Federal Republic had no voice in the FLN's annual campaigns to gain the UN General Assembly's support for Algerian independence.¹⁷ Nor would it have been likely to endorse that cause, for the Bonn government made no secret of the importance it attached to Franco–German reconciliation. Between 1954 and 1962, the two neighbours moved from a 'hereditary enmity', stretching far beyond the Franco-Prussian war, towards what historian Ulrich Lappenküper has called an '*entente élémentaire*'.¹⁸ The emergent partnership, which culminated in the historic Elysée Treaty of Franco-German friendship of January 1963, evolved into the driving motor of European integration and formed the core of de Gaulle's 'grand design' for a French-led European third force between the two superpowers.¹⁹ Diplomatically, therefore, the FRG would have made an unlikely supporter of the FLN's cause.

¹⁵ Full sovereignty was not restored until the 'Two Plus Four Agreement', or Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany of 12 September 1990, one of the treaties enabling Germany's reunification. See: Ulrich Lappenküper, *Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949 bis 1990* (Munich, 2008).

¹⁶ Georges-Henri Soutou, *L'Alliance incertaine: les rapports politico-stratégiques franco-allemands, 1954–1996* (Paris, 1996), p. 22.

¹⁷ On FLN policy towards the UN, see: Martin Thomas, 'France Accused: French North Africa before the United Nations, 1952–1962', *Contemporary European History* 10/1 (2001), pp. 91–121; Maurice Vaisse, 'La guerre perdue à l'ONU?', in *La Guerre d'Algérie et les français* (ed.) Jean-Pierre Rioux (Paris, 1990), pp. 541–62; Hal V. Cartwright, 'Revolutionary Algeria and the UN: a study in agenda politics', PhD thesis (University of Maryland, 1974); Khalfá Mameri, *Les Nations Unies face à la question algérienne* (Alger, 1970); Mohamed Alwan, *Algeria before the United Nations* (New York, 1959).

¹⁸ On the role of Franco-German enmity in the construction of modern French and German nationalism, see: Michael Jeismann, *Das Vaterland der Feinde: Studien zum nationalen Feindbegriff und Selbstverständnis in Deutschland und Frankreich, 1792–1918* (Stuttgart, 1992).

¹⁹ Ulrich Lappenküper, *Die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen, 1949–1963. Von der ‚Erbfeindschaft‘ zur ‚Entente élémentaire‘*, Bd. 1–2 (Munich, 2001). Other important studies of Franco-German relations include: Eckart Conze, *Die gaullistische Herausforderung. Die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen in der amerikanischen Europapolitik 1958–1963* (Munich, 1995); Martin Koopmann, *Das schwierige*

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From a West German perspective, too, the Algerian war should have been of little consequence. Occupied and partitioned since the end of World War II, the two German states that emerged in 1949 were preoccupied by matters closer to home, whether economic reconstruction and political as well as moral rehabilitation, the attainment of full sovereignty and equality within the international community, or the questions of rearmament and national reunification. The Bonn Republic sought to accomplish these goals as well as security from Soviet-bloc aggression within the framework of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's *Westpolitik*, a policy that stipulated a close integration or binding (*Bindung*) with western Europe and the Atlantic alliance. During the early years of the Algerian war, this policy produced some momentous breakthroughs: the October 1954 Paris Accords paved the way for the termination of the Occupation Statute, granting the FRG membership in NATO and the Brussels Pact; the October 1956 Treaty of Luxemburg ended the French protectorate over Saarland; and the historic Treaties of Rome of March 1957 established the European Common Market and Atomic Energy Community (Euratom).²⁰ Although the early years of the Algerian war witnessed a consolidation of the Bonn Republic's position in the Western alliance, the later years of the conflict coincided with the second Berlin crisis of 1958 to 1962, one of the worst episodes of the European Cold War. This serious escalation of tensions between the two opposing power blocs, which saw the construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961, placed considerable strain on the Western alliance and threatened West Germany's very survival.²¹

Bündnis. Die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen und die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1958–1965 (Baden-Baden, 2000); Hermann Kusterer, *Der Kanzler und der General* (Stuttgart, 1995); Wilfried Loth and Robert Picht (eds.), *De Gaulle, Deutschland und Europa* (Opladen, 1991); Reiner Marcowitz, *Option für Paris? Unionsparteien, SPD und Charles de Gaulle 1958–1969* (Munich, 1996); Raymond Poidevin and Jacques Bariéty, *Les Relations franco-allemandes 1815–1975* (Paris, 1977); Gilbert Ziebura, *Die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen seit 1945: Mythen und Realitäten* (Pfullingen, 1970).

²⁰ The literature on West German foreign policy during the Adenauer era is vast. Some of the standard studies include: Wolfram F. Hanrieder, *Deutschland, Europa, Amerika. Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949–1994*, 2nd edn (Paderborn, 1995); Klaus Hildebrand, *Integration und Souveränität: die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1949–1982* (Bonn, 1991); Ludolf Herbst, *Option für den Westen: vom Marshallplan bis zum deutsch-französischen Vertrag* (München, 1989); Christian Hacke, *Weltmacht wider Willen: die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Stuttgart, 1988); Helga Haftendorn, *Sicherheit und Entspannung: zur Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1955–1982* (Baden-Baden, 1983); Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Die Ära Adenauer. Gründerjahre der Republik, 1949–1957* (Stuttgart, 1981); Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Die Ära Adenauer. Epochenwechsel, 1957–1963* (Stuttgart, 1983); Waldemar Besson, *Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik. Erfahrungen und Maßstäbe* (Munich, 1970); Arnulf Baring, *Außenpolitik in Adenauers Kanzlerdemokratie* (Munich, 1969).

²¹ On the Berlin crisis, see: John P. S. Gearson and Kori Schake (eds.), *The Berlin Wall Crisis: Perspectives on Cold War Alliances* (New York, 2002); Rolf Steininger, *Der Mauerbau. Die Westmächte und Adenauer in der Berlinkrise 1958–1963* (Munich, 2001); Marc Trachtenberg,

To most historians, the European Cold War and imperative of Western integration absorbed all of the Bonn government's energies, leaving little room for attention to faraway colonial conflicts. Having forcibly lost its colonies in Africa, Asia and the Pacific through the Treaty of Versailles of 1919, Germany was never directly involved in the process of decolonisation that gathered pace after World War II. After the defeat of the Third Reich, references to colonial revisionism and military expansionism disappeared from public discourse. If anything, the Bonn Republic's 'postcolonial, post-Nazi identity include[d] a repudiation or at least a forgetting of Germans' older imperial reach or [overseas] ambition', so much so that it became 'insular, even self-consciously provincial'.²² Forgotten was the genocidal violence inflicted during the Herero and Nama wars of 1904–1907 or the Maji-Maji war of 1905–1908, which were now overshadowed by the Holocaust. When the colonial past was invoked, a selective reinterpretation occurred and a legend was formed of Germans as 'benevolent colonisers' who built roads, railway lines and schools. This legend survived precisely because the German colonial period was cut short and Germans never experienced the 'empire strikes back' effects of anti-colonial nationalism and postcolonial migration.²³ According to the West German novelist Uwe Timm, the legend also persisted because, 'after the horrors of German fascism – Germans thought [or wanted to think] that in this area at least they had an edge on other peoples'.²⁴

By now, of course, that legend has been thoroughly debunked.²⁵ The cultural and political history of the short-lived German colonial empire has witnessed a dramatic revival in recent decades. So has the history of German encounters with colonialism and imperialism more

A Constructed Peace. The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963 (Princeton NJ, 1999), chs. 7–9; Ann Tusa, *The Last Division: A History of Berlin, 1945–1989* (Reading MA, 1997).

²² Lora Wildenthal, 'Notes on a History of "Imperial Turns" in Modern Germany', in *After the Imperial Turn* (ed.) Antoinette Burton (Durham NC, 2003), pp. 145, 144.

²³ Monika Albrecht, 'Postcolonialism and Migration into Germany's Colonial Past', *German Life and Letters* 65/3 (2012), pp. 363–77; Britta Schilling, *Postcolonial Germany: Memories of Empire in a Decolonized Nation* (Oxford, 2014), p. 5.

²⁴ In popular memory, the Third Reich's quest for *Lebensraum* in Eastern Europe was not associated with German overseas colonialism. Timm is cited in: Sara Friedrichsmeyer, Sara Lennox and Susanne Zantop (eds.), 'Introduction', in *The Imperialist Imagination: German Colonialism and its Legacy* (Ann Arbor, 1998), pp. 24–5; and in Uta G. Poiger, 'Imperialism and Empire in Twentieth-Century Germany', *History and Memory* 17/1–2 (2005), p. 124.

²⁵ In July 2015, the German government formally acknowledged that the repression exacted against the Herero and Nama constituted genocide and a war crime. See: 'Berlin nennt Herero-Massaker erstmals "Völkermord"', *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), 10 July 2015; 'Regierung bekennt sich zu Völkermord', ARD tagesschau.de, 10 July 2015 (www.tagesschau.de/inland/voelkermord-herero-103.html).

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generally, including those with other colonial empires. Much of the resultant scholarship focuses on the period before 1945.²⁶ Only recently have scholars started to interrogate the manner in which Germany's colonial past, or its encounters with other European colonialisms, continued to permeate East and West German political, literary and memory cultures post-1945. Scholars are therefore beginning to answer Uta Poiger's call for a deeper examination of how the legacy and persistence of empire helped shape the manner in which the two Germanys interacted with the non-European world.²⁷

Meanwhile, much of the literature on West German foreign and security policy continues to depict the process of decolonisation that gathered pace during the 1950s as a tangential and marginal issue.²⁸ For Adenauer,

²⁶ This is by no means a complete overview, but see: Eric Ames, Marcia Klotz and Lora Wildenthal (eds.), *Germany's Colonial Past* (Lincoln NE, 2005); Shelley Baranowski, *Nazi Empire: German Colonialism and Imperialism from Bismarck to Hitler* (Cambridge, 2011); Russell A. Berman, 'German Colonialism: Another Sonderweg?' *European Studies Journal* 16/2 (1999), pp. 25–36 (the article is part of a special issue edited by Marcia Klotz entitled *German Colonialism*); Ibid., *Enlightenment or Empire: Colonial Discourse in German Culture* (Lincoln NE, 1998); Sebastian Conrad, *Deutsche Kolonialgeschichte* (Munich, 2008); Pascal Grosse, *Kolonialismus, Eugenik und bürgerliche Gesellschaft in Deutschland, 1850–1914* (Frankfurt/Main, 2000); Isabel Hull, *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practice of War in Imperial Germany* (Ithaca NY, 2005); Volker Langbehn and Mohammed Salama (eds.), *German Colonialism: Race, the Holocaust, and Postwar Germany* (New York, 2011); Michael Perraudin and Jürgen Zimmerer (eds.), *German Colonialism and National Identity* (New York, 2011); Jared Poley, *Decolonization in Germany: Weimar Narratives of Colonial Loss and Foreign Occupation* (Bern, 2005); Felicity J. Rash, *German Images of the Self and the Other: Nationalist, Colonialist and Anti-Semitic Discourse, 1871–1918* (Basingstoke, 2012); Lora Wildenthal, *German Women for Empire, 1884–1945* (Durham NC, 2002); Susanne Zantop, *Colonial Fantasies: Conquest, Family, and Nation in Precolonial Germany, 1770–1870* (Durham NC, 1997); Jürgen Zimmerer, *Von Windhoek nach Auschwitz. Beiträge zum Verhältnis von Kolonialismus und Holocaust* (Münster, 2007). For good introductions and surveys of the existing literature, see: Edward R. Dickinson, 'The German Empire: An Empire?' *History Workshop Journal* 66 (2008), pp. 129–62; Robert Gerwarth and Stephan Malinowski, 'Hannah Arendt's Ghosts: Reflections on the Disputable Path from Windhoek to Auschwitz', *Central European History* 42/2 (2009), pp. 279–300; Philipp Ther, 'Imperial instead of National History: Positioning Modern German History on the Map of European Empires', in *Imperial Rule* (eds.) Alexei Miller and Alfred J. Rieber (Budapest, 2004), pp. 47–66.

²⁷ Poiger, 'Imperialism', pp. 117–43. See: Monika Albrecht, '*Europa ist nicht die Welt*': (Post) Kolonialismus in Literatur und Geschichte der westdeutschen Nachkriegszeit (Bielefeld, 2008); Dirk Götsche, *Remembering Africa: The Rediscovery of Colonialism in Contemporary German Literature* (Rochester NY; Woodbridge, 2013); Young-Sun Hong, *Cold War Germany, the Third World, and the Global Humanitarian Regime* (Cambridge, 2015); Sandra Maß, *Weisse Helden, schwarze Krieger. Zur Geschichte kolonialer Männlichkeit in Deutschland, 1918–1964* (Cologne, 2006); Schilling, *Postcolonial Germany*; Jason Verber, 'The Conundrum of Colonialism in Postwar Germany', PhD thesis (University of Iowa, 2010); Joachim Zeller, *Kolonialdenkmäler und Geschichtsbewusstsein. Eine Untersuchung der kolonialdeutschen Erinnerungskultur* (Berlin, 1999).

²⁸ It is worth pointing out some recent exceptions, which include: Verber, 'Conundrum', especially his ch. 2; Katrina M. Hagen, 'Internationalism in Cold War Germany', PhD thesis (University of Washington, 2008).

who remained the most important architect and arbiter of West German foreign relations until his retirement in October 1963, decolonisation only assumed significance in a Cold War context.²⁹ The end of European colonial rule turned Africa and Asia into an ‘insecurity factor’ in West German foreign and national security policy, one that at times came to jeopardise Bonn’s efforts to prevent the diplomatic recognition of the communist GDR and impede the legitimisation and institutionalisation of Germany’s post-war division.³⁰ This policy, known as the Hallstein doctrine, combined with the ideological prism of the Cold War, is essential to any examination of West German foreign policy in the context of decolonisation. Even so, most historians contend that Bonn’s ‘personal’ Cold War to isolate the GDR in the nascent Third World rarely assumed centre stage.³¹

Considering these historiographical tendencies, one can understand why scholars have overlooked the relationship between the Algerian war and West German foreign and security policy, including the Franco-German rapprochement. Yet when one reads through the files of French and German diplomacy or those of the security and intelligence services, a very different picture emerges, one that confirms the sinister scenarios that, by 1958, were being described in the press. In October of that year, for instance, the French *Service de documentation extérieure et de contre-espionnage* (SDECE), or foreign intelligence service, alerted the authorities to the fact that ‘Algerian terrorists were arriving in the Federal Republic in droves’.³² Five months later, another intelligence report concluded dramatically that

[a]lthough the federal government carries no responsibility for it, West Germany has become the theatre of manifold intrigues, where Soviet agents, neo-Nazis, FLN delegates and Arab diplomats mingle their tracks.³³

As will be seen, such conspiratorial statements were somewhat hyperbolic. Yet in the months and years that followed, French military and intelligence

²⁹ Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Adenauer: Der Staatsmann, 1952–1967* (Stuttgart, 1991), p. 316.

³⁰ Heinrich End, *Zweimal deutsche Außenpolitik. Internationale Dimensionen des innerdeutschen Konflikts 1949–72* (Cologne, 1973), p. 47.

³¹ The doctrine was named after State-Secretary Walter Hallstein, who became President of the European Commission in 1958. See: William G. Gray, *Germany’s Cold War. The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1949–1969* (Chapel Hill and London, 2003); Rüdiger Marco Booz, ‘Hallsteinzeit’ *Deutsche Außenpolitik 1955–1972* (Bonn, 1995); End, *Zweimal*; Ulf Engel and Hans-Georg Schleicher, *Die beiden deutschen Staaten in Afrika: Zwischen Konkurrenz und Koexistenz 1949–1990* (Hamburg, 1998); Werner Kilian, *Die Hallstein-Doktrin. Der diplomatische Krieg zwischen der BRD und der DDR 1955–1972* (Berlin, 2001).

³² Notice d’information no. 11836/IIB/SDECE, 14 October 1958, Service Historique de la Défense – Terre (SHD-T), Vincennes, 10T/262* (documents marked by an asterisk are accessible *sur dérogation*).

³³ Bulletin d’information, anon., March 1959, SHD-T, iH/1164/D (Dossier) 2.