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Religion and Violence, War and Peace

In the winter of 1562, France was on the brink of civil war. An official attempt to reconcile theological differences between representatives of the established French Church and the recently organized Reformed churches had failed in the autumn of 1561. Then, rather than fostering peace as it was intended to do, the Edict of Saint-Germain (January 1562), which granted limited legality to Reformed Protestant worship, had produced even greater uncertainty about government policy and further polarization between the religious factions. What many regard as the first shots of civil war were fired on March 1, when troops raised by the Catholic partisan, Charles, duke of Guise, attacked unarmed Reformed worshipers near the town of Vassy. A month later, a national Reformed Synod, which included lay and clerical representatives, responded to the "massacre" at Vassy by proclaiming Louis, prince of Condé, the protector of all Protestant churches in the kingdom, thus linking their churches with mobilization for war.

Meanwhile, Reformed partisans began executing plans to seize power in towns throughout France. In Rouen, for example, on the night of April 15, a group of armed Huguenots – as the French Reformed Protestants came to be called during the civil wars – took over the Hôtel de Ville and the city gates and began securing their political and military domination of the city. In early May, in a wave of iconoclasm, zealous Huguenots physically destroyed the sacred symbols – altars, baptismal fonts, statues, pews – associated with Catholic worship in the city's churches and precipitated a significant Catholic exodus from Rouen.[1]

In the southern city of Toulouse, however, an attempted coup by Huguenot partisans failed miserably. The local Huguenot coalition could count on

[1] For a general introduction to the religious wars in France, see Arlette Jouanna, et al., *Histoire et dictionaire des Guerres de Religion* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1998) and Mack P. Holt, *The French Wars of Religion, 1562–1629*, New Approaches to European History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); for Rouen, see Philip Benedict, *Rouen during the Wars of Religion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

considerable support within the municipal administration, which had always been keen to defend local political self-regulation, but was staunchly opposed by the judges of the sovereign royal court – the *parlement* – which only registered the January Edict of Saint-Germain under royal order and actively worked to undermine its provisions. In early April 1562, Toulouse first experienced serious sectarian violence when Catholics, celebrating the feast of Saint-Salvador, disrupted a Protestant funeral; in the melee that ensued, a number of Huguenots were killed or wounded. Still, local mediation produced a truce that lasted until the leaders of the newly organized Reformed congregation decided, amid gathering evidence of civil war elsewhere, to take immediate, preemptive action on the night of May 11. Having already smuggled arms and men into the city, the Protestant forces occupied the Hôtel de Ville and several colleges of the city's university and quickly assembled barricades to fortify those parts of the city where they were strongest. Although momentarily surprised, the much larger Roman Catholic coalition, organized earlier in the year by means of a *syndicat*, was nevertheless ready to meet the challenge of Protestant insurrection. Following four days of very destructive urban warfare, a truce was arranged on May 16, which amounted to a capitulation by the Huguenots' forces. The Protestants, who had suffered heavy casualties, were granted limited safe conduct in order to leave the city by the evening of the seventeenth, but amid the chaos of the Protestant exodus, the truce broke down, and many more Protestants were killed by vengeful Catholics outside the city's gates. By the time the dust had settled, perhaps as many as 4,000 people, or nearly ten percent of the city's population, had died.[2]

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By all accounts, the long series of civil wars that began in France in the late winter and spring of 1562 can be considered religious wars – indeed, they were among Europe's most violent and destructive – and even this brief sketch highlights some of the dynamics that we might expect to find in the run-up to religious war in Reformation and post-Reformation Europe: that is, apparently irreconcilable theological differences, widespread politicization of religious controversies, popular mobilization and collective action on behalf of religious causes, political brokerage that connects popular religious movements with military specialists, and so on. Not all of Europe's religious wars were as violent and destructive as the civil wars in France; yet considered together, they reveal a great deal about the political dynamics that lead recurrently to religious war.

[2] On the events in Toulouse and their immediate aftermath, see Mark Greengrass, "The Anatomy of a Religious Riot in Toulouse in May 1562," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 34 (1983): 367–91, and Joan Davies, "Persecution and Protestantism: Toulouse, 1562–1575," *The Historical Journal* 22 (1979): 31–51.

Although it may be relatively easy to sketch how a complex series of religious wars began, it is rather more difficult to suggest how they ended. In the short term, the French civil war that began in early 1562 was ended by the Peace of Amboise on March 19, 1563, with the accompanying Edict of Amboise spelling out more precisely than the original Edict of Saint-Germain had done the limited toleration that would be granted to Protestant worship within the kingdom of France. Yet civil war broke out again briefly in September 1567, with the Peace and Edict of Longjumeau of March 23, 1568, reiterating more precisely still the terms of the Edict of Amboise. And so it went through a series of seven starts and stops between 1562 and 1580, with most of the intervals of war and peace lasting two years or less. Beginning in 1585, however, a much longer round of war ended thirteen years later on April 30, 1598, with the Peace and Edict of Nantes, by far the most complex of all the peace settlements, which many scholars regard as the end of the French civil and religious wars.[3] Still, an intermittent war started again in the 1620s following the assassination of King Henry IV, and ended finally on June 16, 1629, with the Peace and Edict of Alais. The Edict of Alais reaffirmed the terms of the religious settlement but revised the security arrangements of the Edict of Nantes.[4]

So precisely when and how did the French civil and religious wars actually end? In some sense, the answer is that the religious conflicts were never really settled because, from the 1630s onward, the royal government of France continued to encroach on the liberties it had guaranteed to French Protestants until, by the Edict of Fontainebleau in October 1685, King Louis XIV formally revoked the Edict of Nantes. This official revocation of the terms of France's most enduring peace settlement precipitated not only a massive exodus of Protestants from France but eventually a new civil war in 1702 to eliminate militarily the continued challenge of the Protestant "Camisards" in the south of France; this War of the Camisards, which may in some sense be considered the last of the French wars of religion, ended indecisively with no formal settlement in 1706. Despite the eventual failure of all of France's peace settlements, even this brief sketch highlights one of the principal dynamics that led recurrently toward peace in early modern Europe: negotiated political settlements that made peace possible, though not necessarily durable. Not all of Europe's religious wars proved to be as difficult to settle as the French wars, but considered together, their varied settlements reveal a great deal about the political dynamics that have recurrently led away from religious violence and war toward more or less durable patterns of peace.

[3] See the very useful table in Philip Benedict, "Settlements: France," in *Visions, Programs and Outcomes*, vol. 2 of *Handbook of European History, 1400–1600*, ed. Thomas A. Brady, Heiko A. Oberman, and James D. Tracy (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995), 436–8; see also Table 5.1 in this volume.

[4] See Holt, *French Wars*, which includes this seventeenth-century extension of the Wars of Religion.

In the chapters that follow, I will use comparative historical analysis to explore the dynamic mechanisms and historical processes that account for religious violence and war in order to explore, by extension, those mechanisms and processes that account for religious peace. Understanding religious war and religious peace is a tall order, of course, but the history of early modern Europe provides a very solid foundation on which to build this kind of comparative analysis for the simple reasons that the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are generally well documented, and the historical literature on a broad range of cases allows us to see not only how Europe's religious wars began, but also how they ended, or in some cases, kept on beginning and ending. As I see it, the intellectual and moral challenge that the resurgent phenomenon of religious war presents us with in our own time is to connect beginnings of religious wars with possible endings – that is, to imagine how a world engulfed in religious conflict and war might once again find peace and what that peace might look like.

UNDERSTANDING RELIGIOUS WAR

How will we recognize and account for religious war when we see it? It is tempting, perhaps even conventional, to identify religious war in terms of the motives and intentions of the combatants. By this criterion, the series of European Crusades to conquer the Holy Land from the Muslim "infidels" who ruled it are likely to enjoy pride of place as Europe's most obvious and sensational religious wars.[5] And by extension today, some commentators are inclined, using this criterion, to identify ours as a new age of religious war, given the obvious religious motives of radical Islamic groups (among many others) that have, in various places around the globe, declared a holy war on the evil forces of Western modernization and secularism.[6] By this criterion, too, historians often suggest that Europe's age of religious wars only ended when economic competition replaced religious competition as the principal motive for war toward the end of the seventeenth century.[7]

[5] There is an enormous literature on the history of the Crusades, but see especially the work of Norman Housley, who links the religious warfare of the later Crusades with the early modern wars of religion in *Religious Warfare in Europe, 1400–1536* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

[6] See, for example, Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), and Andrew Sullivan, "This Is Religious War," *The New York Times Magazine*, 7 October 2001. Cf. Mohammed Ayoob, *The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008).

[7] See, for example, T. K. Rabb, *The Struggle for Stability in Early Modern Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975); Richard S. Dunn, *The Age of Religious Wars, 1559–1715*, The Norton History of Modern Europe (New York: Norton, 1979); and Mark Konnert, *Early Modern Europe: The Age of Religious War, 1559–1715* (Peterborough, Ont., Canada; Orchard Park, NY, USA: Broadview Press, 2006).

There are obvious and perhaps insurmountable difficulties, however, in determining the real or essential motives of the multiple historical actors who account for the kind of warfare that swept France in the second half of the sixteenth century. Where will we get reliable evidence of motives and intentions? Which actors' motives and intentions count? How will we know whether stated intentions represent real motives? Which, in a complex mixture of motives, might we consider the most significant or decisive? Because these questions are so difficult to answer, the individual, cognitive dimensions of religious conflict and violence are unlikely to serve as a reliable guide for either contemporary or historical analysis.[8] In any case, we know from a broad range of historical research, especially on the nature of violent conflict and revolution, that the intentions of particular actors are notoriously unreliable predictors of outcomes in complex political processes.

Since violent religious conflict is, at bottom, a relational problem, not simply a cognitive problem, we will be much better served, I believe, to highlight as our point of departure the more readily visible and verifiable social and relational dimensions of religious war. For our present purposes, we can regard as *religious* any warfare or ongoing conflict in which (1) the forces in conflict *identify their enemies* in terms of religious beliefs, practices, or affiliations; (2) mobilization for the conflict invokes broader networks of support and solidarity based on *religious identities*.[9] These simple criteria highlight the ways in which contentious political actors use their religious identities and affiliations to mark both their political oppositions and their political alignments.[10] Despite their being more specific and demanding in the sense that they require us to attend to the interactions of multiple combatants, these criteria are nevertheless capacious enough to include not only the medieval Crusades, but also a number of recent conflicts, both in Europe and beyond. Applying these criteria to early modern Europe, we can readily identify six distinct, yet interrelated, clusters of religious war (Table 1.1). At once familiar to scholars and clearly depressing to even the most casual observer, Table 1.1 suggests that there was religious war somewhere in Europe north of the Alps and the Pyrenees almost continuously for well over a century between 1529 and 1651.[11]

[8] Cf. Konrad Repgen, "What Is a 'Religious War'?" in *Politics and Society in Reformation Europe. Essays for Sir Geoffrey Elton on His Sixty-Fifth Birthday*, ed. E. I. Kouri and Tom Scott (London: Macmillan Press, 1987), 311–28. Repgen, too, rejects an inquiry into the motives of the protagonists; he focuses instead on public legitimations for war, which still privileges the cognitive activities of rulers and their agents and offers no practical guidance for understanding the political processes involved in either war making or peacemaking.

[9] Compare the more restrictive version of this definition in Wayne Te Brake, *Shaping History: Ordinary People in European Politics, 1500–1700* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998), 115.

[10] On the importance of attending to alignments as well as oppositions in the study of contentious politics, see Te Brake, *Shaping History*, 13–17.

[11] I should point out, however, that the list of wars in Table 1.1 is more inclusive than most accounts of Europe's religious wars in that it includes the less violent and destructive wars in

TABLE 1.1 *The principal clusters of religious war in early modern Europe*

War	Geographic Area	Inclusive Dates
Kappel wars	Swiss Confederation	1529–1531
Schmalkaldic wars	German-Roman Empire	1545–1555
Civil/religious wars	France	1562–1629
Eighty Years War	Low Countries	1568–1648
Thirty Years War	German-Roman Empire	1618–1648
Civil wars	British Isles	1638–1651

Altogether these relational criteria are useful for comparative historical research, because following Charles Tilly's approach to collective violence, they do not assume that religious wars are fundamentally different from other forms of lethal conflict and coordinated destruction. In his most recent work on the politics of collective violence, Tilly wrote that in lethal contests,

> at least two organized groups of specialists in coercion confront each other, each using harm to reduce or contain the others' capacity to inflict harm. War is the most general label for this class of coordinated destruction, but different variants go by the names of civil war, guerrilla, low-intensity conflict, and conquest.[12]

In addition to *lethal contests* or war, the other major forms of coordinated destruction that Tilly identifies are "*campaigns of annihilation* [in which category he includes genocide] when one contestant wields overwhelming force or the object of the attack is not an organization specialized in the deployment of coercive means," and "*conspiratorial terror* when a small but organized set of actors begins attacking vastly more powerful targets by clandestine means – assassinations, kidnappings, bombings, and the like."[13]

Situating and explaining the incidence of coordinated destruction within the larger framework of an integrated analysis of the politics of collective violence, Tilly emphasizes shades of variation rather than hard and fast boundaries among such heavily freighted concepts as war, genocide, and terror. Distinctions among these categories, he suggests, rest on the relative degree of

Switzerland and Germany prior to the French civil and religious wars, which often serve as the touchstone for definitions of religious war in Europe. The analytic value of the more inclusive approach I am adopting here should become evident in later chapters.

[12] Charles Tilly, *The Politics of Collective Violence*, Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 104.

[13] Tilly, *Collective Violence*, 104. It is important to distinguish Tilly's later work on collective violence from his earliest work, which identified often rigid historical typologies; cf. Charles Tilly, "Collective Violence in European Perspective," in *The History of Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1969).

inequality among the contestants, who prominently include incumbent governments as well as challengers to their authority. In general,

> [c]oordinated destruction occurs when well organized incumbents strike down resistance to their demands, when incumbents use force of arms to extend their jurisdictions, and when excluded parties organize on a sufficient scale to challenge incumbents' own armed force. These effects become stronger when the parties on either side of the boundary polarize – when cooperative arrangements and overlapping actors disappear – and/or when uncertainty about the other side's future actions increases on either or both sides.[14]

Tilly's relational approach to collective violence, in general, and war, in particular, shuns universal explanations of closely defined categorical phenomena; instead he underscores variable trajectories and historical contingency, and he focuses on the causal mechanisms and processes that help us to account for the complexity of specific historical developments, such as the incidence of religious war in Reformation and post-Reformation Europe.[15] With regard to France's descent into religious war in 1562, for instance, Tilly's work alerts us to the family resemblance among different sorts of coordinated destruction without requiring that we choose between terms such as "war" and "civil war," or even "low-intensity conflicts." What started out as a civil war in France in 1562 easily escalated into an interstate war in the coming years as both sides sought and received the help of external allies, but it also frequently settled locally or regionally into low-intensity conflicts, as was the case in Rouen, or even veered off into something like a campaign of annihilation in the case of Toulouse following the collapse of the Protestant cause in 1562. Nationally, however, we can safely say that France's violent religious conflicts remained in or near the realm of coordinated destruction, with notable interludes of relative peace following negotiated truces, for decades to come.[16]

UNDERSTANDING RELIGIOUS PEACE

How, in turn, will we recognize and account for religious peace when we see it? It is tempting, perhaps even conventional, to set a high standard for religious peace: real peace, we are often told, is much more than the simple absence of war; rather, it can only be predicated on reconciliation and/or justice. This high standard might even seem historically appropriate to early modern Europe inasmuch as many of those who actually drafted reasonably effective, but

[14] Tilly, *Collective Violence*, 105.

[15] For comparative historians, identifying and measuring broadly operative mechanisms can be critically important to the development of new and more precise understandings of the variations evident among recurrent phenomena. See Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), and Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, "Methods of Measuring Mechanisms of Contention," *Qualitative Sociology* 31, no. 4 (December 2008): 307–31.

[16] For a specification of the various French wars between 1562 and 1629 and the negotiated truces that ended them, see Table 5.1 and Chapters 5, 6, and 7 in this volume.

often messy, peace settlements saw their work as provisional – that is, as a temporary necessity, an unfortunate compromise, until such time as a purer ideal, religious reconciliation, could be achieved. Indeed, many of the participants in Europe's religious wars appear to have yearned for the restoration of an imagined religious unity and/or purity of an earlier day; whether that earlier day was the Latin Christendom of the Middle Ages or the prophetic and persecuted Church of Antiquity spoke volumes, of course, about the religious politics of the participant. By this standard, however, we would, in fact, find little evidence of religious peace in early modern Europe, or in any other time and place for that matter.

For our purposes, we will do well to adopt a more clearly relational standard. *Religious peace* may be identified with two conditions: (1) the more-or-less durable *absence of the coordinated destruction of religious war*, as defined earlier, and (2) the continued *presence of some form of religious coexistence*.[17] By this less exacting standard, we will not expect to see the absence of religious contention, as such, or even of episodic religious violence, as long it does not escalate to the level of coordinated destruction, conspiratorial terror, or campaigns of annihilation. Like the relational criteria for religious war, this simple standard for religious peace highlights the relational, as opposed to the cognitive, aspects of the historical problem. More fundamentally, it turns our attention toward the kinds of settlements that were actually produced and reproduced in early modern Europe – messy and fragile though they might be – and eventually laid the foundations of religious pluralism in the modern West. Thus the intellectual and moral challenge, as I see it, is to describe and account for the ways in which historical actors, despite their professed ideals of religious unity and purity, have learned to manage and ultimately to live with the kinds of religious differences that have recurrently served as the principal markers of political enmity and whose activation in specific settings recurrently set the stage for religious war.

So how did the clusters of religious war listed in Table 1.1 actually end? Table 1.2 offers a summary answer to this question. Now, in the minds of those who prosecute them, wars and other lethal contests are undoubtedly about winning and losing, and a survey of more than seventy civil wars worldwide between 1940 and 1992 indicates that approximately sixty percent ended in decisive military victories.[18] Yet, as Table 1.2 suggests, it is strikingly difficult to discern clear winners and losers at the end of Europe's religious wars. With the exception of the last case – the cluster of civil wars in the composite monarchy of England, Scotland, and Ireland – all of the most prominent wars of religion ended

[17] Cf. Penny Roberts, "The Languages of Peace during the French Religious Wars," *Cultural and Social History* 4, no. 3 (2007): 305: "Peace is more than simply the absence of war; it requires a process by which pacification can be maintained."

[18] See table A.1 in Barbara F. Walter, *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 169–70.

TABLE 1.2 *Europe's religious wars and their settlements*

Religious War	Military Outcome or Peace Settlement
Kappel wars (Switzerland) (1529, 1531)	National Peace [*Landfrieden*] of Kappel (1529), **Second National Peace of Kappel** (1531)
Schmalkaldic wars (Germany) (1545–1555, intermittently)	[Peace of Nürmberg (1532)], Augsburg Interim (1548), Treaty of Passau (1552), **Religious Peace [*Religionsfriede*] of Augsburg** (1555)
Civil/religious wars (France) (1562–1629, intermittently)	Separate edicts ended each of the nine wars; the most successful was the **Edict of Nantes** (1598), which was revoked by Louis XIV (1685)
Eighty Years War (Low Countries) (1568–1648)	The Pacification of Ghent (1576), Peace of Religion (1578), Twelve Year Truce (1609–1621), and the (first) Treaty of Münster, which was part of the **Peace of Westphalia** (1648)
Thirty Years War (Germany) (1618–1648)	The Treaty of Osnabrück and the (second) Treaty of Münster, which were part of the **Peace of Westphalia** (1648)
Civil wars (Scotland, Ireland, England) (1638–1651)	No formal settlement; war ended in England with the capture, trial, and execution of Charles I (1649); war ended in Ireland and Scotland with Oliver Cromwell's military campaigns (1649–1651); monarchy restored in 1660

with some form of political compromise that was expressed in the text of a truce, an edict, or a treaty.

Even in the exceptional cases, however, winning and losing was not as clear or as unambiguous as it might at first seem. In the civil wars in England, the rebellious New Model Army under the command of Oliver Cromwell won a decisive victory over the forces of King Charles I in 1648. Then, having executed the king, abolished the monarchy, and disestablished the Anglican Church in 1649, the revolutionary forces went on to crush both the Irish Confederates and the Scottish Covenanters in order to consolidate their power in all three of the kingdoms that constituted the composite British state. But military success by 1651 was followed, within just a few years, by political failure and gave way not only to a restoration of the monarchy in all three kingdoms, but the reestablishment of the Anglican Church.[19] Indeed, unambiguous winners and losers are hard to find in Europe's religious wars.

[19] See Martyn Bennett, *The Civil Wars in Britain and Ireland, 1638–1651* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997); Austin Woolrych, *Britain in Revolution, 1625–1660* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); and Allan I. Macinnes, *The British Revolution, 1629–1660*, British

If the bulk of the religious wars ended formally with some kind of negotiated settlement, it was certainly not without difficulty. Between the first shocks of the "Luther question" in 1517 and the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, many attempted settlements went wrong and gave way to renewed violence; still, in the process of trying and often failing, the forces in conflict were eventually able to strike a series of political compromises that made enduring peace possible. The first of these compromise settlements – the *Landfrieden* (National Peace) in Switzerland and the *Religionsfriede* (Religious Peace) of Augsburg in Germany – institutionalized a pattern of fragmented cultural sovereignty that mirrored the fragmentation and layering of political sovereignty in both the Swiss *Eidgenossenschaft* (Oath Confederation) and the German *Reich*. The French Edict of Nantes, by contrast, preserved the unitary political sovereignty of the French monarchy by recognizing legally what many in Latin Christendom at the time considered unthinkable: the coexistence of two separate and protected institutional churches, the Roman and the Reformed. Of the three treaties that constituted the Peace of Westphalia, only the Treaty of Osnabrück addressed specifically the religious differences that divided the empire; although much more elaborate as a whole, its provisions for the religious peace in Germany in many ways simply amplified or made adjustments to the earlier *Religionsfriede* of Augsburg, especially with regard to the question of religious sovereignty. However, it included as well an explicit guarantee of the individual's freedom of religious conscience, which legitimated religious diversity, not only among the constituent territories of the empire, but within them. By contrast, the conspicuous silence on religious matters in the First Treaty of Münster – by which both Spain and the Dutch Republic gave up on their long-standing goals of reuniting the seventeen Low Countries territories, both religiously and politically – validated without specification the religious diversity that had emerged as facts on the ground in the course of eight long decades of inconclusive military struggle.

Historians have traditionally glossed the pattern of territorial religious differentiation that was shaped by these settlements in starkly authoritarian terms – *cuius regio eius religio* (whose the rule, his the religion)[20] – and the

Studies Series (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

[20] This simple, thus memorable, epigram with its unambiguously authoritarian thrust has been a staple of Western civilization textbooks and undergraduate history education for more than a century, but I should note that it does not actually appear in any of the official documents relating directly to the religious wars or their negotiated settlements; it is rather a retrospective characterization, coined in the late sixteenth century by J. Stephani, an Evangelical canonist from Greifswald, in northern Germany. See Martin Heckel, *Staat und Kirche nach den Lehren der evangelischen Juristen Deutschlands in der ersten Hälfte des 17. Jahrhunderts*, Jus ecclesiasticum, vol. 6 (München: Claudius-Verlag, 1968); cf. Thomas A. Brady Jr., "Settlements: The Holy Roman Empire," in *Visions, Programs and Outcomes*, vol. 2 of *Handbook of European History, 1400–1600*, ed. Thomas A. Brady, Heiko A. Oberman, and James D. Tracy (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995), 352–3. *Cuius regio eius religio* gained common currency among historians only in