What motivates violence? How can good and compassionate people hurt and kill others or themselves? Why are people much more likely to kill or assault people they know well, rather than strangers? This provocative and radical book shows that people mostly commit violence because they genuinely feel that it is the morally right thing to do. In perpetrators’ minds, violence may be the morally necessary and proper way to regulate social relationships according to cultural precepts, precedents, and prototypes. These moral motivations apply equally to the violence of the heroes of the *Iliad*, to parents smacking their child, and to many modern murders and everyday acts of violence. *Virtuous Violence* presents a wide-ranging exploration of violence across different cultures and historical eras, demonstrating how people feel obligated to violently create, sustain, end, and honor social relationships in order to make them right, according to morally motivated cultural ideals.

*Virtuous Violence*

Alan Page Fiske is Professor in the Department of Anthropology at the University of California, Los Angeles, where he has also served as Director of the Behavior Evolution and Culture Center, and Director of the Culture, Brain, and Development Center. He has worked abroad for eight years as a Peace Corps Volunteer, World Health Organization consultant, and Peace Corps Country Director as well as conducting ethnographic fieldwork. He is widely known for his relational models theory, the only comprehensive, integrated theory of human sociality, which has been tested and applied in numerous studies by hundreds of researchers.

Tage Shakti Rai is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow with the Ford Center for Global Citizenship in the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University. He is known for developing relationship regulation theory, which argues that morality cannot be understood independently of sociality, and that diversity in moral judgments and behaviors is driven by patterns in the social relationships within which they occur.
“With its wealth of eye-opening ethnographic and historical comparisons and its contrarian but well-argued analyses, this book is a fascinating exploration of violence and a major contribution to our understanding of the human condition.”

Steven Pinker

“It’s so hard for us to think clearly about violence because acts of violence trigger such strong moral condemnation. Fiske and Rai strip the moralism out of our own minds and put it where it belongs – in the minds of the perpetrators, who usually think their acts are justified. This astonishing book offers a unified approach to understanding the most ghastly events, from street crime and honor killings through war crimes and genocide. This book is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand and ultimately reduce violence.”

Jonathan Haidt

NYU Stern School of Business and author of The Righteous Mind

“It’s not possible to have a clear understanding of the past, present or future of war, terrorism and torture without knowing the basic message of Virtuous Violence.”

Richard E. Nisbett

Distinguished University Professor, University of Michigan

“In our preferred world of liberal democracy, tolerance of diversity and distributive justice, violence – especially extreme forms of mass bloodshed – are generally considered pathological or evil expressions of human nature gone awry, or a collateral result of good intentions. Not so, argue Fiske and Rai, in this deeply reasoned and well-documented survey of violence, universally considered by its perpetrators to be mostly a matter of moral virtue. Virtuous Violence aims to explain the emotions and intentions that give rise to various kinds of human violence by understanding its generation in both our species-wide and culture-specific moral psychology, which is geared to regulate social life. Building on earlier ground-breaking work on the fundamental forms of social relationships in all cultures, the authors show that the most sustained and consequential forms of human violence – across history and cultures – result from beliefs that it is right and necessary to hurt and suffer harm, and to die and kill, to protect and foster those relationships. Through compelling analyses ranging from primeval forms of human sacrifice to contemporary torture, ancient wars to medieval jousts, contact sports to gang fights, violent revolutions to suicide terrorism and mass murder, Virtuous Violence lays bare the moral motives for murderous
passions, as a sort of evolutionary impetus to manage the interpersonal and intergroup interactions upon which societies depend, often aided by gods, spirits and abstract causes to which no creature but man is subject. Happily, however, the authors also show that violence isn’t always necessary to keep things in line, so that modern prescriptions for non-violence within and between societies increasingly have a chance, provided they are grounded in understanding social facts rather than in wishful thinking or pure reason.”

Scott Atran
Directeur de Recherche, Anthropologie, CNRS / Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris and author of In Gods We Trust and Talking to the Enemy

“A provocative tour through the (long) world history of violence. You won’t think about violence and its many manifestations – or read a newspaper – the same way again.”

Dov Cohen
Professor, University of Illinois

“We have all watched movies where violent actions occur as part and consequence of social relations, and where the art of the movie consists of letting the audience share exactly the same emotions and motives that make that violence inevitable and feel right. At the same time, the mainstream social psychological arguments rarely pick up on these motives. This book provides a powerful argument in favor of scientifically considering these causes of violence. It is a scientifically important book, which touches on many issues we are concerned about as citizens, and will surely attract much attention and discussion as well as hopefully influencing future work in the social and behavioral sciences on this topic.”

Thomas Schubert
University of Oslo

“The authors of this exciting book convincingly show that most individuals and groups engage in violence believing that what they do is right, moral and even obligatory. This well-written book shows the great challenge of preventing such righteous violence, and provides the knowledge base to engage with this challenge.”

Ervin Staub
Author of The Roots of Evil, The Psychology of Good and Evil and Overcoming Evil.
Virtuous Violence

Hurting and Killing to Create, Sustain, End, and Honor Social Relationships

The social-relational, moral motivational psychology, cultural anthropology and history of war, torture, genocide, animal and human sacrifice, obedience to gods, religious self-torture, homicide, robbery, intimate partner conflict, rape, suicide and self-harm, corporal and capital punishment, trial by ordeal and combat, policing, initiation, castration, fighting for status, contact sports and martial arts, honor, the Iliad and the Trojan War, injurious mortuary rites, and homicidal mourning

Alan Page Fiske and Tage Shakti Rai
To Gwendolyn, Colin, Zoé, Kai, Wyatt, and Benjamin:
may your lives be forever full of love and free of violence.

To Arjuna:
Julia and I will carry you in our hearts until you return.
CONTENTS

Figures and tables  page xiv
Foreword by Steven Pinker  xv
Warm thanks  xix
The point  xxi

1  Why are people violent?  1
   What we mean by “violence”  2
   Natural aversion to killing and hurting  3
   What we mean by “moral”  5
   Conflicting moralities and post-hoc justifications  7
   Pain and suffering are not intrinsically evil  10
   Forerunners of virtuous violence theory and how it goes beyond them  12
   Scope: what we are and are not discussing  15
   Illegitimate, immoral violence  15

2  Violence is morally motivated to regulate social relationships  17
   Fundamental ways of relating: the four elementary relational models  18
   Cultural implementations of universal models  21
   Constitutive phases  22
   Metarelational models  25

3  Defense, punishment, and vengeance  35
   Defense and punishment  35
   Vengeance  37
### Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The right and obligation of parents, police, kings, and gods to violently enforce their authority</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Corporal punishment of children</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Violence in the military</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Violent policing</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Violence by gods</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Explanations of accidents, misfortune, and suffering</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trial by ordeal and combat</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Metarelational aspects of authority-ranking violence</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Contests of violence: fighting for respect and solidarity</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Knighthood in medieval Europe</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gang and criminal cultures</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fighting among and alongside the gods</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sports</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fighting among youths</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Metarelational aspects of fighting for respect and solidarity</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Honor and shame</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guest–host relationship</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Honor killing</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Honor violence in the United States</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Honor among thieves</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How the metarelational honor model organized the violence of the Trojan War</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The motives of leaders and nations</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The moral motives that move soldiers to go to war</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Killing under orders</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Killing for your comrades</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extremist violence and terrorism</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Violence to obey, honor, and connect with the gods</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gods command violence</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sacrificing animals and humans to the gods</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Self-sacrifice to the gods</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>China</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>On relational morality: what are its boundaries, what guides it, and how is it computed?</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defining the moral space</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Distinguishing between moral and immoral relationship regulation</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What are the cultural preos delimiting violence?</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Going beyond the culturally prescribed limits to violence</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is morally motivated violence rational and deliberative or emotional and impulsive?</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>The prevailing wisdom</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Are most killers sadists and psychopaths?</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Are killers rational?</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Are killers impulsive?</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Are killers mistaken?</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Intimate partner violence</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intimate partner violence is widespread</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intimate partner violence is morally motivated to regulate relationships</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rape in war</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gang rape</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Making them one with us: initiation, clitoridectomy, infibulation, circumcision, and castration</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Initiation rites</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Circumcision and excision</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eunuch opportunities</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Torture</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Motives of leaders who order torture</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Motives of torturers</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Motives of the public that approves of the use of torture</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
15 Homicide: he had it coming 196
   How many homicides are morally motivated? 197
   Mass murder 202
   Homicides committed by the mentally ill 204
   Metarelational motives for homicide 205

16 Ethnic violence and genocide 206
   Violence against African-Americans in the US South 206
   Genocide 208
   Null attitudes and dehumanization in the perpetuation of mass violence 212

17 Self-harm and suicide 216
   Non-suicidal self-injury 217
   Suicide 218

18 Violent bereavement 223
   Why are people sometimes enraged by death? 238

19 Non-bodily violence: robbery 243
   Robbery for equality-matching vengeance 244
   Robbery for authority-ranking status 245

20 The specific form of violence for constituting each relational model 251
   Communal sharing violence: indexical consubstantial assimilation 253
   Authority-ranking violence: iconic physics of magnitudes and dimensions 254
   Equality-matching violence: concrete ostensive operations 255
   Market-pricing violence: arbitrary conventional symbolism 256

21 Why do people use violence to constitute their social relationships, rather than using some other medium? 258
   Criticality 260

22 Metarelational models that inhibit or provide alternatives to violence 269
xiii / Contents

23 How do we end violence? 276
Civil disobedience and hunger strikes 278
Urban gang homicide 282

24 Evolutionary, philosophical, legal, psychological, and research implications 287
Evolution 287
Philosophy 289
Law 292
Psychology 295
Research 297

The dénouement 301
What do we mean by “most” violence? 301
The need for general explanations 302

References 305
Index 343
The primary motivation for violence is to constitute a social relationship.

Figure 2.2 Relationships with others may motivate violence against a third party.

Figure 2.3 Indirect ties may potentiate multiparty violence, or inhibit violence.

Figure 2.4 Violence-enhancing metarelational models involving four to six relationships among four persons.

Figure 2.5 Violence to constitute the perpetrator’s relationship with another, and with a second or third party.

Figure 2.6 Violence to constitute multiple relationships simultaneously.

Figure 6.1 The core metarelational configuration at the root of the Trojan War.

Figure 6.2 The metarelational model connecting the key relationships in the Trojan War.

Figure 6.3 The “full” metarelational model of the Trojan War.

Figure 22.1 Violence-reducing metarelational models.

Table 10.1 Explanations for committing and not committing violence
FOREWORD

Moralization is the original sin of the behavioral sciences. Scientists of human nature – psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists, geneticists, neurobiologists – must be committed, as scientists, to describing the world as it is rather than as we wish it to be. But it’s irresistible to read our morals into reality and describe the world as if it strove to implement our values. Nowhere has this fallacy been more damaging than in the attempt to understand violence. The harder-headed the scientist, the more rigorous he or she claims to be, the more likely that the scientist will assume that violence is the result of a defective gene, a damaged brain, a psychopathology, a contagious public health problem, or a societal malfunction.

The book you are now holding presents a rare escape from this conceptual prison. It presents one of those rare hypotheses that is both flagrantly contrary to expert belief (at first sight yet another example of the tedious “everything-you-think-is-wrong” formula) and at the same time very likely to be true. Having myself tried to make sense of 10 thousand years of human violence, I came to a conclusion that is very similar to the one that Alan Fiske and Tage Rai present in this book: most perpetrators of violence are neither pathological nor self-interested but are convinced that what they are doing is in the service of a higher moral good. As I put it in introducing the section on “Morality” in The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined:

The world has far too much morality. If you added up all the homicides committed in pursuit of self-help justice, the casualties of
religious and revolutionary wars, the people executed for victimless
crimes and misdemeanors, and the targets of ideological
genocides, they would surely outnumber the fatalities from amoral
predation and conquest. The human moral sense can excuse any
atrocity in the minds of those who commit it, and it furnishes them
with motives for acts of violence that bring them no tangible benefit.
The torture of heretics and conversos, the burning of witches, the
imprisonment of homosexuals, and the honor killing of unchaste
sisters and daughters are just a few examples. The incalculable
suffering that has been visited on the world by people motivated by a
moral cause is enough to make one sympathize with the comedian
George Carlin when he said, “I think motivation is overrated.
You show me some lazy [bum] who’s lying around all day watching
game shows . . . and I’ll show you someone who’s not causing any
[freaking] trouble!”

(As George Carlin fans might guess, my brackets and
ellipses here conceal saltier wording in the original.)

Though I came to conclusions similar to those of Fiske and Rai, the
convergence is not completely accidental. I have long thought that Fiske’s
theory of relational models is the best – indeed the only – overarching
theory of social psychology. For starters, the theory acknowledges the
fundamental fact about human sociality, the first observation that the
proverbial Martian biologist would notice about our species: we don’t
act the same way to everyone, but have radically different kinds of
thoughts and feelings about people depending on the relationship that
holds between us. We have different thoughts and feelings about our
mothers and fathers than we do about our siblings, distant relatives,
spouses, lovers, friends, rivals, enemies, and strangers. Yet, if you read
the chapters on “social psychology” in the major textbooks, with their
discussions of generic processes like stereotyping, attribution, and atti-
dude formation, you would have no inkling that human beings treat each
other differently depending on the qualitative nature of the relationship
that binds them.

Relational models theory also tackles the paradox that social
behavior varies radically from one society to another, and from one
historical era to another, yet, throughout this variation, a few themes
seem to pop up again and again in different guises. People in all cultures
are obsessed with solidarity and warmth, with dominance and authority,
with fairness and equity, and with complex rules and formulas, albeit to
different extents and in different ways in different contexts. As with language, human relationships seem to conform to an abstract universal grammar that is instantiated in different ways in different cultures.

I like relational models theory for a third reason. Various subfields within evolutionary psychology have mapped out the distinct adaptive rationales of different kinds of social relationships. The inclusive-fitness calculus that selects for feelings of solidarity among kin is different from the hawk–dove game that results in dominance hierarchies, which is different yet again from the iterated prisoner’s dilemma that gives us the sense of fairness which polices reciprocal altruism. And all of these evolved strategies differ in turn from the cool cognitive calculations by which we reckon and regulate our lives by formal rules. Relational models subsumes them all under a comprehensive theory and, more interestingly, shows how the choice among them gives rise to the complexity and variation in human social life.

I’m not only a fan of relational models theory but also a user. As a psycholinguist, I had long puzzled over the mysterious rituals of euphemism and innuendo that govern everyday conversation: why it’s emotionally so much easier to say *Gee, officer, is there some way to settle the ticket here?* than *If I give you $50, will you let me drive away?* or why it eases feelings all around to ask *Would you like to come up and see my etchings?* rather than *Would you like to come up and have sex?* Fiske’s theory that violated expectations of communality, authority, or equality are emotionally awkward was the missing piece in the puzzle of why we are so likely to sidestep and shilly-shally rather than blurt out what we mean, and I gave it pride of place in my analysis of these phenomena in *The Stuff of Thought* and subsequent papers.

My analysis of innuendo relied on the observation by Fiske and his collaborators that when one person violates the relational model that currently governs his relationship with another person and the violation is unintentional or transient, the response of that person and of third parties is typically one of awkwardness or puzzlement. But when the violation is deliberate and ongoing, the reaction can be one of shock and outrage, and, as Fiske and Rai elaborate in this book, it often leads to violence. That’s why I found relational models theory so useful in solving a second problem, the role of the moral sense in violence, which was a major theme of *Better Angels*:
How can we make sense of this crazy angel – the part of human nature that would seem to have the strongest claim to be the source of our goodness, but that in practice can be more diabolical than our worst inner demon?

To understand the role of the moral sense in the decline of violence, we have to solve a number of psychological enigmas. One is how people in different times and cultures can be driven by goals that they experience as “moral” but that are unrecognizable to our own standards of morality. Another is why the moral sense does not, in general, push toward the reduction of suffering but so often increases it. A third is how the moral sense can be so compartmentalized: why upstanding citizens can beat their wives and children; why liberal democracies can practice slavery and colonial oppression; why Nazi Germany could treat animals with unequaled kindness... And the overriding puzzle, of course, is: What changed? What degree of freedom in the human moral sense has been engaged by the processes of history to drive violence downward?

Virtuous violence theory resolves these puzzles and more. With its wealth of eye-opening ethnographic and historical comparisons and its contrarian but well-argued analyses, this book is a fascinating exploration of violence and a major contribution to our understanding of the human condition.

Steven Pinker
WARM THANKS

Gabriel Rossman discussed nearly every chapter with us, providing novel suggestions, innumerable references, and cheerful support; his many contributions added new dimensions to the book, for which we thank him. For reading the entire manuscript and offering many wise and wonderful comments, we are extremely grateful to Maroussia Favre Carlen, Hans IJzerman, Steven Pinker, Linda Skitka, Diane Sunar, and Sven Waldzus. Clark McCauley and Thomas Schubert reviewed several chapters and offered suggestions that reshaped the whole book. We also greatly appreciate the perceptive comments on parts of the manuscript kindly contributed by Daniel Bartels, Vivian Bohl, Rodrigo Brito, Alan Ehrenhalt, Zoé Robin Fiske, Jeremy Ginges, Jesse Graham, Jon Haidt, Katharina Kugler, Brian Lucas, Francesco Orsi, Julia Ortony, Beate Seibt, Christopher Stephan, David Tannenbaum, Zsolt Unoka, and Adam Waytz. We also received many perspicacious perspectives on our basic conceptualization of violence from the audiences of colloquia Alan Page Fiske delivered at the University of Tartu, Würzburg University, Tilburg University, the University of Oslo, UCLA, the Rotterdam School of Management of Erasmus University, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, ISCTE-IUL (Lisbon), the Technical University of Munich, and the Sintra, Portugal, workshop on Embodiment and Relational Models. Following presentations by Fiske on our metarelational theorization of honor and the Iliad, we received many insightful comments from colloquium audiences at VU University, Amsterdam; the Max Planck
Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig; the University of Tartu; the University of Würzburg; Tilburg University; Erasmus University; UCLA; and participants in the Barcelona Workshop on Honor and Shame. Insights from audiences of colloquia Rai delivered to the Chicagoland Morality Researchers Group; the Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Moral Psychology Conference at Korea University, Seoul; the Research Centre for Human Values at the Chinese University of Hong Kong; and the Department of Psychology at the University of Iowa were also instrumental in refining our conceptualization of moral psychology and the implications of our theory of virtuous violence.

Participants in our seminar on moral motives for violence helped us develop our ideas and think about the data. Sheryl Fulgencio helped locate and review some of the hazing and initiation practices, Megan Mehany searched the literature on the corporal punishment of children in the contemporary United States, and Magaly Chavez reviewed much of the literature on female genital modification.

At Cambridge University Press, Rebecca Taylor, Carrie Parkinson, Hetty Marx, Joseph Garver, and Jonathan Ratcliffe magnificently transformed our work from manuscript to publication. Aras Karimi kindly created a beautifully intriguing design for the cover which unfortunately we could not use here.

In many respects this book is a conversation with all of these partners. Some sentences consist of our interpretations of ideas our colleagues contributed, while many passages and a few chapters are responses to points they raised. We look forward to continuing and widening this conversation.

Thank you, all!
How all occasions do inform against me
And spur my dull revenge! What is a man,
If his chief good and market of his time
Be but to sleep and feed? A beast, no more.
Sure he that made us with such large discourse,
Looking before and after, gave us not
That capability and godlike reason
To fust in us unus’d. Now, whether it be
Bestial oblivion, or some craven scruple
Of thinking too precisely on th’ event, –
A thought which, quarter’d, hath but one part wisdom
And ever three parts coward
Why yet I live to say ‘This thing’s to do,’
Sith I have cause, and will, and strength, and means
To do’t. Examples gross as earth exhort me.
Witness this army of such mass and charge,
Led by a delicate and tender prince,
Whose spirit, with divine ambition puff’d,
Makes mouths at the invisible event,
Exposing what is mortal and unsure
To all that fortune, death, and danger dare,
Even for an eggshell. Rightly to be great
Is not to stir without great argument,
But greatly to find quarrel in a straw
When honour’s at the stake. How stand I then,
That have a father kill’d, a mother stain’d,
Excitements of my reason and my blood,
And let all sleep, while to my shame I see
The imminent death of twenty thousand men
That for a fantasy and trick of fame
Go to their graves like beds, fight for a plot
Whereon the numbers cannot try the cause,
Which is not tomb enough and continent
To hide the slain? O, from this time forth,
My thoughts be bloody, or be nothing worth!

Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act IV, scene iv

Violence is often considered the antithesis of sociality – people think that violence is the expression of our animal nature, breaking through when learned cultural norms collapse. Violence is also considered to be the essence of evil: it is the prototype of immorality. But an examination of violent acts and practices across cultures and throughout history shows just the opposite. When people hurt or kill someone, they usually do so because they feel they ought to: they feel that it is morally right or even obligatory to be violent. Moreover, the motives for violence generally grow out of a relationship between the perpetrator and the victim, or their relationships with third parties. The perpetrator is violent to make the relationship right – to make the relationship what it ought to be according to his or her cultural implementations of universal relational moral principles. That is, most violence is morally motivated. Morality is about regulating social relationships, and violence is one way to regulate relationships. That’s our thesis.

Shakespeare expresses this in Hamlet’s soliloquy: Hamlet berates himself as a rationalizing coward for not yet having done his moral duty to kill his uncle Claudius (his father’s brother) to avenge Claudius’ murder of Hamlet’s father and Claudius’ “incestuous” marriage to Hamlet’s mother. Hamlet’s moral sentiments grow out of the links among several interlocking social relationships: his duty as a son, his father’s relationship to the brother who murdered his father to become king, his father’s marriage to Hamlet’s mother, and his mother’s marriage to the usurper Claudius. Hamlet experiences his moral motives to kill his uncle as shame because he has not performed his duty as a son. He compares himself to the soldiers who are ready to die merely for fame,
fighting over a prince’s claim to a bit of land. With growing anger, he concludes that his thoughts must be violent or they are worthless.

This book systematically develops Shakespeare’s point that violence is morally motivated by culturally informed variants of universal social-relational models. Our aims in this book are to establish beyond any doubt the ubiquity of virtuous violence, to reveal its moral motives, to show that people intend their violence to constitute four elementary forms of social relationships, and to illuminate the specific constitutive phases that people aim to realize through violence. We also show that much violence emerges from combinations of relationships, where specific configurations of relationships motivate moral violence that none of the component relationships would evoke on their own.

We do this for the most part ethnologically, by examining a great variety of violent practices in a great many cultures across the span of history. To explain human violence, it is essential to know about most of the kinds of violence people do – not just in one culture at one point in history, but everywhere, throughout history. While our primary goals are to understand the psychology and cultural meanings of violence, we also get invaluable perspective by comparing human violence with the violence other animals do, and we reach another level of understanding by considering the adaptive functions of violence. The pattern that emerges is clear, revealing something fundamental about violence, morality, and social relationships. At the same time, by comparing these diverse kinds of violence we illuminate each instance of violence. So we hope that this book and the theory we set forth in it will be interesting to all social scientists and humanists, as well as to anyone who wants to understand themselves and other humans.

Our theory of virtuous violence integrates aspects of many other theories of violence, and in doing so illuminates the nature of impulsivity, rationality, instrumentality, emotions, motives, and, above all, moral psychology and social relationships. While this book is a work of empirical science, toward the end we suggest that our characterization of the nature of the real world may have some profound implications for prescriptive morality and law.

Our goal in this book is to understand the motivations for violence: the emotions and intentions that give rise to violence. We want to explain why and when people are violent. So we have relatively little to say about the experience and consequences of fearing, expecting,
suffering, surviving, or remembering violence. Those are important topics, but not our topics.

A theory of perpetrators’ motives for engaging in violence must account for most of the violent practices that humans enact in every type of culture, in every historical period; the theory should make sense in comparative phylogenetic perspective, and there should be plausible evolutionary processes that would select not just for the propensity for violence but also for a propensity tuned to social systems and relational circumstances. Virtuous violence theory does all this. Our theory will certainly need to be refined and modified to fit future findings of studies specifically designed to explore the moral motives for violence. We simply hope that virtuous violence theory provides a solid framework to build on.

Readers may not find it absolutely necessary to read the whole book. Readers primarily interested in particular kinds of violence could get something worthwhile out of any of the topical chapters read by themselves, but then might find that they would develop a deeper understanding by reading some of the conceptual chapters (1, 2, 9, 10, and 20–4). Conversely, those with primarily theoretical orientations could read the conceptual chapters, browsing and sampling among the topical chapters. But the whole is more than the sum of the parts. It’s not pleasant to consider so many of the gruesome things that people have done or now do to others, nor is it agreeable to recognize that people who do violence usually feel they should do it or absolutely must do it. But our view is that we should consider all this carefully if we wish to understand ourselves, our species, our communities, and our cultures. Or if we are committed to reducing violence.

Chapter 1 lays the foundations for the book, stating the theory in the simplest terms, then explaining what we mean by “violence” and what we mean by “moral,” and then briefly comparing virtuous violence theory with previous approaches that address the morality of violence. Chapter 2 presents the analytic structure we will be employing throughout the book to understand the social-relational nature of violence: the four fundamental relational models, their essentially cultural implementation, their constitutive phases, and how they are linked into larger metarelational configurations. This completes the foundation and erects the framework of virtuous violence theory. Chapter 3 makes the crucial point that people often feel that it is right and necessary to use violence for defense, punishment, or retribution. Chapter 4 explores the moral motives for violent enforcement of legitimate authority, while Chapter 5
illuminates the moral motives for regulating relationships consisting of contests of violence such as jousts, martial and contact sports, or confrontations between gangs. Chapter 6 characterizes honor and shame as motives for violence in many cultures and subcultures, and we unpack the metarelational moral motives for violence that comprise the framework for the Trojan War and Homer’s account of the violent regulation of relationships among the ancient Greeks. Chapter 7 describes national leaders’ moral motives for going to war, and soldiers’ moral motives for killing and dying. Then in Chapter 8 we consider how humans violently constitute social relationships with gods and spirits, including human sacrifice and excruciating self-torture.

After showing that these six types of violent practices are morally motivated to constitute critical social relationships, we pause to explicate virtuous violence theory more precisely. Chapter 9 considers more deeply the links between moral and immoral motives for violence, showing that morality is not defined by forms of actions or their material consequences. Rather, morality is culturally defined by local precedents, prototypes, and precepts for implementing the four universal relational models (RMs). We also show that both impulsive and reflectively considered violence are mostly morally motivated. This allows us in Chapter 10 to show how virtuous violence theory either encompasses or complements previous theories that violence results from sadism, psychopathy, rational cost-benefit calculation, or, conversely, failures of rationality.

Then we tackle forms of violence that people may be loath to acknowledge could be morally motivated, but, in fact, often are: in Chapter 11, intimate partner violence; in Chapter 12, rape, including gang rape and rape in warfare. Chapter 13 demonstrates that moral motives to constitute critical relationships with or among their children drive people to perform violent initiation rites on boys, to excise or infibulate girls, and to castrate boys. We discover in Chapter 14 that moral motives drive the leaders who order torture and their minions who enact torture on victims, as well as the wider public who condone torture. Chapter 15 investigates the motives of killers; we see that most homicides are morally motivated and the killers’ peers and neighbors feel that they did exactly what they should have done. Even mass murderers and mentally ill killers typically kill because they genuinely feel that their victims deserve to die. Chapter 16 analyzes lynching and genocide, which sustain what the perpetrators and their reference groups perceive as legitimate, natural, and morally necessary relationships with their victims’ ethnic group or race.
When we look at suicide and non-suicidal self-injury in Chapter 17, we discover that violence against the self is also intended to rectify critical relationships: the person who hurts herself feels that violence makes the relationship right. Chapter 18 illuminates the final constitutive phase of violence. In quite a few cultures in diverse parts of the world, people mourn the deaths of loved ones by seriously injuring themselves or others, or by going out to kill some random innocent person – and then, eventually, by also killing the witch or sorcerer or manifest assailant whom they hold responsible for the death. Then we conclude our empirical ethnological and historical investigations by considering robbery in Chapter 19. Though robbers have obviously instrumental motives, it turns out that often they are highly morally motivated to regulate relationships with victims who don’t deserve what they have, or shouldn’t have flaunted what they had.

We conclude the book with five chapters of further theoretical explorations building on virtuous violence theory. In Chapter 20 we consider whether the way people hurt or kill is a function of the particular kind of relationship they are regulating. In Chapter 21 we ask when and why people constitute their relationships violently, rather than in any of the other ways that people usually constitute relationships. Throughout the book we will see that metarelational models commonly motivate violence: perpetrators are often motivated to hurt or kill a victim in order to constitute one or more relationships with third parties, or because of the dynamic moral implications that any relationship has for other relationships linked to it. Chapter 22 considers the converse: how metarelational models known as cross-cutting ties can blunt, reduce, or prevent violence. Chapter 23 addresses how people can often quite effectively resist illegitimate state violence through non-violent interventions by catalyzing common knowledge of the metarelational ramifications of violence and disapproval of it by third parties and the larger community. Finally, in Chapter 24, we ask how “natural” virtuous violence is and consider the ethical, legal, and psychological implications of virtuous violence theory. We go on to discuss several empirical lines of research that emerge once it is understood that violence is morally motivated to regulate relationships.

The book ends with a very brief coda reflecting on the nature of theory and the merits of inductively generating theory and broad explanations by observing and comparing the widest possible range of naturally occurring phenomena.