Bargaining in the international system is governed by rules, which shape and constrain states’ bargaining behavior. However, these rules can be changed. When, why, and how do states bargain differently under different sets of rules? Drawing on original qualitative and quantitative evidence, this book demonstrates how the rules of the game influence the cooperative or coercive nature of the strategies adopted by all states in a negotiation. These effects influence each state's incentives regarding whether to play by the rules or to change them. Examining these incentives, as well as the conditions under which states can act on them, McKibben explains the wide variation in states' bargaining strategies. Several bargaining interactions are analyzed, including decision-making in the European Union, multilateral trade negotiations, climate change negotiations, and negotiations over the future status of Kosovo. This book provides a rich understanding of the nuances of states' behavior in international bargaining processes.

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STATE STRATEGIES IN INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING
PLAY BY THE RULES OR CHANGE THEM?

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STATE STRATEGIES IN INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING

PLAY BY THE RULES OR CHANGE THEM?

HEATHER ELKO MCKIBBEN

University of California, Davis
For my parents
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AOSIS</td>
<td>Alliance of Small Island States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAP</td>
<td>Bali Action Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>BASIC</td>
<td>Brazil, South Africa, India, and China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BATNA</td>
<td>best alternative to a negotiated agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Common Agricultural Policy (EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCS</td>
<td>carbon capture and storage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDM</td>
<td>Clean Development Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO$_2$</td>
<td>Carbon dioxide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>Conference of the Parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COREPER</td>
<td>Committee of Permanent Representatives (EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EIG</td>
<td>Environmental Integrity Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMS</td>
<td>European Monetary System</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EULEX</td>
<td>European Union Rule of Law Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>gross domestic product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNI</td>
<td>gross national income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNS</td>
<td>Group on Negotiations in Services (GATT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>intercontinental ballistic missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPR</td>
<td>intellectual property rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>international relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KP</td>
<td>Kyoto Protocol</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCA</td>
<td>long-term cooperative action</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>least developed country</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFN</td>
<td>most-favored nation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRV</td>
<td>measurement, reporting, and verification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
ABBREVIATIONS

NAMA  nationally appropriate mitigation action
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NG    negotiating group
PSC   Political and Security Committee (EU)
REACH Regulation, Evaluation, and Authorization of Chemicals
SBI   Subsidiary Body for Implementation
SBSTA Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological Advice
SLBM  submarine-launched ballistic missile
START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
TRIMs trade-related investment measures
TRIPs trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights
UN    United Nations
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNGA  United Nations General Assembly
UNMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNSC  United Nations Security Council
VER   voluntary export restraint
WTO   World Trade Organization