Introduction

Journalism, democratic culture, and creative reconstruction

Jeffrey C. Alexander

For most members of the civil sphere, and even for members of its institutional elites, the news is the only source of firsthand experience they will ever have about the vast majority of their follow citizens, about their motives for acting the way they do, the kinds of relationships they form, and the nature of the institutions they create. Journalistic judgments thus possess an outsized power to affect the shape-shifting currents of contemporary social life, from people's movements to legal investigations, foreign policy, public opinion, and affairs of state. The reputation of news media – their ability to represent the public to itself – depends on the belief by their audiences that they are truly reporting on the social world, not making stuff up, that they are describing news factually rather than representing it aesthetically or morally.[1]

[1] Whether journalistic news platforms are more or less differentiated – independent – from political parties and their ideologies, or for that matter from religious, ethnic, economic, or racial groups, is an empirical question that has been intensely debated over the course of three decades of historical and comparative sociology (Schudson 1978; Alexander 1981; Chalaby 1996; Hallin and Mancini 2004, 2012; P. K. Jones 2013; Mancini 2013). What has gone relatively unnoticed in this debate, however, and what actually is crucial for any sociological understanding of the institution of journalism, is the factual *self*-presentation of journalists as independent, whatever the actual nature of their boundary connections. Such putative autonomy allows news media to present themselves as third-party alternatives vis-a-vis partisan struggles between openly ideological parties and their depictions of social reality. For example, in a 2013 editorial *The New York Times* (2013) weighed in on the controversy surrounding the murder of America's ambassador to Libya. Conservatives alleged that a Hillary Clinton-led conspiracy had occluded public understanding of the "Benghazi affair." Headlined "The Facts About Benghazi," the *Times* claimed its own investigation had disproved such conspiracy claims: "An exhaustive investigation by The Times goes a long way toward resolving any nagging doubts about what precipitated the attack on the United States mission in Benghazi, Libya, last year that killed Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three other Americans." As grounds for confidence that its journalists had discovered "the facts," the *Times*' editorial referenced its reporter's marshaling of evidence,

Conceptualizing news media in this manner provides a dramatically different perspective on the contemporary "crisis in journalism." Most social commentators, and journalists themselves, understand this crisis in economic and technological terms – as the challenge to the economic viability of newspapers triggered by the digital revolution in publishing and news distribution. Many leading journalistic institutions in the West have experienced great economic upheaval, cutting staff and undergoing deep, often radical, reorganization – in efforts to meet the digital challenge. Rather than seeing technological and economic changes as the primary causes of current anxieties, however, I wish to draw attention to the role played by the cultural commitments of journalism itself. Linking these professional ethics to the democratic aspirations of the broader societies in which journalists ply their craft, I will suggest that the new technologies can be, and are being, shaped to sustain value commitments, not only undermine them.

Recent technological change and the economic upheaval it has produced are coded by social meanings. It is this cultural framework that has transformed material innovation into social crisis – for the profession, the market, and for society at large. But cultural codes not only trigger sharp anxiety about technological and economic changes; they also provide pathways to control them, so that the democratic practices of independent journalism, rather than being destroyed, can be sustained in new forms.

THE FRAGILITY OF AUTONOMY

Democratic societies depend on the interpretive independence of mass media. Situated between hierarchical powers and citizen-audiences, journalism can speak truth to power. Supplying cultural codes and narrative frameworks that make contingent events meaningful, news reports create a mediated distance that allows readers to engage society more critically. The ability to sustain mediation depends on professional independence. To some significant degree, journalists regulate themselves, via formal and informal professional organizations that have autonomy vis-à-vis state and market. Organizing their own work conditions and their own criteria for creating and projecting news, journalists evoke such professional ethics as transparency, independence, responsibility, balance, and accuracy.

his logic, his commitment to reasonable stands of proof, and the probing quality of his interviews, implicitly linking these fact-finding methods to the integrity of paper and reporters: "The report, by David Kirkpatrick, The Times's Cairo bureau chief, and his team turned up no evidence that Al Qaeda or another international terrorist group had any role in the assault, as Republicans have insisted without proof for more than a year. [Republican Representative Mike] Rogers, the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee who has called Benghazi a 'preplanned, organized terrorist event,' said his panel's findings [were] based on an examination of 4,000 classified cables. If Mr. Rogers has evidence of a direct Al Qaeda role, he should make it public. Otherwise, The Times's investigation, including extensive interviews with Libyans in Benghazi who had direct knowledge of the attack, stands as the authoritative narrative."

These professional ethics significantly overlap with the broader discourse of democracy, the set of beliefs that sustain an independent civil sphere (Alexander 2006). Journalism is a critical element of the institutional-cum-cultural world of elections, parliaments, laws, social movements, and publicity that creates the conditions for democracy. Just as the independence of the civil public sphere is continuously threatened by incursions of markets, states, and ethnic, and religious organization, so is the autonomy of journalism itself. Journalistic boundaries are often fraught and always permeable. The interpretive independence of journalism is never assured. An ongoing accomplishment, partial and incomplete, the profession and its social supporters must engage in continuous struggle for it to be sustained.

Authoritarian leaders go to great lengths to prevent the interpretive independence of journalists (Arango 2014, Buckley and Mullany 2014, Forsythe and Buckley 2014, Mullany 2014, Shear 2014). What is less widely understood is that such independence is also highly fraught inside democratic societies themselves (Schudson 1978, Alexander 1981). Efforts to sustain professional autonomy in the democratic societies of the West and East have often been markedly successful. Yet such efforts also cause journalists to experience their institutional independence as fragile and threatened. Even as they successfully defend their professional ethics, journalists experience them as vulnerable to subversion in the face of technological and economic change. Independent journalists and the social groups who support them often feel as if they are losing the struggle for autonomy.

Because social change is endemic in modern societies, it is hardly surprising that the history of journalism has been marked by continuous eruptions of crisis. Just as current anxieties have been triggered by computerization and digital news, so were earlier crises of journalism linked to technological shifts that demanded new forms of economic organization (Breese, this volume). Radio and television were feared as objective threats that would undermine print journalism's capacity for independence and critical evaluation. Neither actually did so. Neither did the transition from network to cable news in the United States, nor the transformation of the public service TV model in Europe that created overwhelming anxiety about privatization in the 1980s (Luengo and Sanz 2012; Larsen, this volume and Larsen 2016).

Examining the upheavals created by television and cable reveals how the deep meaning structures of journalism construed new technology and economic organization as dire threats to journalistic integrity, anxieties that, paradoxically, actually helped maintain the independence of journalism in new organizational forms. Case studies of contemporary newspapers in crisis – from the New Orleans *Times Picayune* (Luengo, this volume) and other metropolitan American dailies to papers in Norway (Steen-Johnson et al. and Larsen this volume), Norway (Larsen, this volume), Germany (Revers, this volume), Spain (Luengo 2014), France (Oputo 2014), and Britain (Schlesinger and Doyle 2015) – illuminate how the same combustible combination of enduring

cultural structures and rapidly shifting technological and economic change is at work today, and how new platforms of journalistic work are being forged and engaged. Critical jeremiads against the profane, putatively anti-democratic effects of technology and economy should be seen less as accurate depictions than as spirited rallying cries to protect the sacred, and still robust, ethics of independent journalism.

While European newspapers do not always share American journalism's ethic of liberal neutrality, journalists on both sides of the Atlantic emphatically embrace a professional identity of interpretive and institutional independence (n. 1.) The digital-cum-economic challenge to these values has triggered crises in both European and American journalism, creating extraordinary organizational upheaval and economic strain. Tens of thousands of individual careers have been disrupted, and the profession's most venerable institutions are being severely tested (Minder and Carvajal 2014, Ramirez 2014). But this economic crisis needs to be understood, not only in terms of Schumpeterian creative destruction, but also as the culturally informed *re*construction of new organizational forms. What are the institutional arrangements that, under the conditions of digital reproduction, can allow the cultural commitments of democratic journalism to be sustained? If networked news productions are making efforts to adapt professional journalism to the digital age, while maintaining journalistic civil values, are there parallel adaptations from the digital side? Is the anti-professional ideology of "citizen journalism" also being reconsidered, shifting the balance between news blogs and professional news writing in the new world of journalism emerging today?

I begin by reconsidering the theoretical underpinnings of scholarly writings about digital technology and journalism. Against reductionism, I argue for journalism's independent cultural power. This theoretical corrective allows empirical studies to be framed differently, the causes and consequences of the contemporary crisis to be approached with more clarity, and the ongoing, if often submerged, processes of institutional repair to receive the attention they deserve.

THE PROBLEM OF REDUCTION

In a recent essay in the Times Literary Review, Nicholas Lemann (2013) wrote the "situation in journalism is changing so rapidly that it is difficult to get a sure sense of what is going on," adding, "while there is an endless series of panel discussions and blog posts where there are plenty of confident assumptions," there is "not much reliable data." In the last ten years, an enormous amount of scholarship has been devoted to the crisis in journalism, a profusion of empirical studies about its causes, current condition, near term consequences, and long-term effects. The problem isn't a dearth of data but its reliability. Empirical investigators have produced drastically divergent findings. It is the striking incommensurability among this plethora of studies that prevents observers from being able to get any sure sense about the crisis of journalism today.

The problem with current scholarship is theoretical. Empirical analysis rests upon theoretical presuppositions about how societies work, about what motivates social action, what institutions are most important, how they interact, and why (Alexander 1982). Theoretical rather than methodological logic determines the possibilities for getting empirical social science right. In studying the crisis of journalism, theoretical guidance has often been misleading, and sometimes downright wrong. The crisis of journalism can be reconsidered only if we get the theory right. Efforts to empirically assess the nature, causes, and effects of the crisis have been perniciously affected by technological and economic determinism. This reductionism needs to be challenged and corrected for understanding of the current crisis to move ahead.

It is obvious, for example, that the Internet has been centrally involved in creating the problems of contemporary journalism. What is not obvious at all, however, is that the social effects of this invention can be treated in a purely technological way. Like every major practical scientific discovery of the modern era (Alexander 2003), the Internet has exerted its force not only as technology but also as narrative, as a culture structure inspiring faith as an "agent of change" (Negroponte 1995a; cf. Sanz 2014; Couldry 2014). From the moment of its emergence, the Internet was wrapped up inside a radically utopian social narrative, promising to "flatten organizations, globalize society, decentralize control, and help harmonize people," as one of its most influential early proponents, MIT professor Nicholas Negroponte (1995b: 182), predicted two decades ago: "It is creating a totally new, global social fabric . . . drawing people into greater world harmony . . . It is here. It is now" (Negroponte 1995a: 183, 230–223; cf. Van Dijck 2005, Benkler 2006, Jarvis 2011). The Internet was introduced as a material technique that would make us cooperative and free. Its effect on the mass media was portrayed as wonderful and immense, liberating us from the stifling effect of an anti-democratic, professional elite. "From now on," promised Clay Shirky (2008: 64), Professor of New Media at NYU, "news can break into public consciousness without the traditional press weighing in."[2] Exclaiming "nothing like this has ever been remotely possible before," Dan Gillmor, nationally syndicated columnist from the *San Jose Mercury News* and blogger for *Silicon.Valley.com*, explained:

> Big media . . . treated the news as a lecture. We told you what the news was . . . It was a world that bred complacency and arrogance on our part. Tomorrow's news reporting and production will be more of a conversation. The lines will blur between producers and consumers . . . The communication network itself will be a medium for everyone's voice, not just the few who can afford to buy multimillion-dollar printing presses, launch satellites, or win the government's permission to squat on the public's airwaves. (Gillmor 2004: xii–xiii)

[2] In 2011, *The Economist* hailed Shirky as "one of the preeminent public intellectuals of the internet" (Ottawa 2011).

It was, in other words, as salvationary techno-culture that Internet's economic effects on journalism were far-reaching. "Technology has given us a communications toolkit that allows anyone to become a journalist at little cost," Gillmor explains (2004: xii). "What happens when the costs of reproduction and distribution go away? What happens when there is nothing about publishing anymore because users can do it for themselves?" asks Shirky (2008: 60–61): "Our social tools remove older obstacles to public expression, and thus remove the bottlenecks that characterized mass media. The result is the mass amateurization of efforts previously reserved for media professionals" (ibid).

With such utopian expectations, attaching a fee to liberation seemed not only conservative but downright profane. Even as public opinion compelled newspapers to make their products available online, the utopian expectations framing Internet culture prevented online access from being contingent on fees.[3] Efforts to erect paywalls – filters requiring payment for internet access – were broadly stigmatized. "Paywalls," Shirky (2010) predicted, "don't expand revenue from the existing audience, they contract the audience to that subset willing to pay." And, indeed, when paywalls were initially introduced, they encountered such critical and financial headwind that they were quickly shut down (Perez-Pena 2007). Meanwhile, the breathless spirit of freedom that energized Internet expansion allowed blogs to aggregate the fruits of journalism – "news" – without paying for the labor that created it.[4] "As career journalists and managers," wrote newspaper mogul and new technology advocate John Paton, "we have entered a new era where what we know and what we traditionally do has finally found its value in the marketplace, and that value is about zero" (in Mutter 2011).

The social effects of the cultural mantra "information will be free"[5] – not the materiality of the Internet strictly considered – forged the economic vise within which journalism finds itself squeezed today. Newspapers were compelled – for cultural reasons – to forgo compensation for the labor power that created their complex product. Only then did it become economically impossible to

[3] "Newspapers from the start were caught in a frustrating dilemma. Overwhelmingly, the culture of the Web is that content is free. If newspapers put the content of the newspaper online for free, they would encourage subscribers to drop their subscriptions and undermine the circulation of their print version. If they charged for content, the prospective audience would avoid them and go instead to other sites where content was free" (Jones 2009: 186).

[4] "Search engines and Web portrayals such as Google and Yahoo and AOL are all major providers of news, but very little of it is originated by them. They are 'free riders,' who get the benefit of offering their audience a range of reported news that has been generated by newspapers and other traditional media … Google, in other words, makes money from the news article while the newspaper does the work. The 'free rider' syndrome is also at the heart of the portion of the burgeoning blogosphere devoted to news and public affairs, because all of their commentary is based on the traditional media's reporting" (Jones 2009:187).

[5] This iconic phrase, which has assumed an almost folkloric status, is attributed to a presentation that Stuart Brand made at the first Hackers Conference in 1984. Brand was the creator of the *Whole Earth Catalogue*.

compensate newspapers for declining advertising.[6] At the same time, fierce market competition emerged from new business forms – news-aggregating blogs – that could commoditize journalism without paying production costs. No wonder newspaper expenses began to far exceed revenues. The vise forged by techno-culture began to tighten its grip. The bottom lines of newspapers caved in.

If Internet technology were simply material, and the current crisis purely economic, then the direction of the unfolding crisis would be a one-way street and its social consequences impossible to deter. Journalism would become Exhibit A of capitalist "creative destruction," the process Joseph Schumpeter believed "incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure *from within*, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one" (Schumpeter 1975 [1942]: 83, original italics). In the face of more efficient technology, such economic logic holds, more profitable forms of business organization must replace newspapers. The economic foundations of journalism will be destroyed so that information can be distributed in a more efficient way.

It is such reductionist logic that compelled *The New Republic* (2009) to headline "The End of the Press" and Philip Meyer (2009) to speak of the "vanishing newspaper"; that moved Alex Jones (2009: 51) to claim "the nation's traditional news organizations are being transformed into tabloid news organizations" and Marcel Broersma (2013: 29) to announce journalism "has entered a state of progressive degeneration," one that "will not be curable"; and that led Robert McChesney and Victor Pickard (2011) to ask, "will last reporter please turn off the lights."

JOURNALISM AS SACRED PROFESSION

Because the theoretical presuppositions of these arguments are misleading, their empirical predictions have not come to pass. Instead of being pushed over, journalism has pushed back. It is a profession, not only a market-responsive business.[7] Organized by a deeply entrenched cultural code, the twentieth century profession erected a virtual "wall" (Revers 2013: 7) between news reporting and profit-making, a cultural division perceived as protecting the sacred from the profane. Business managers devote themselves to trying every which way to commercialize the products of journalism, but crafts persons, not

[6] The economic consequences of the cultural equation of the Internet with freedom extend even into media systems that are not nearly as market-braced as the United States. Steen-Johnsen et al. (this volume) show that, while the Norwegian state generously subsidizes print media, it has refused such support to online newspapers, despite the fact that "it is precisely free access that has been blamed for the crisis in the industry."

[7] While in modern sociology Parsons (1954 [1939]) was the first to conceptualize professions as horizontal organizations resisting the instrumental forces of market and the hierarchical pressures of bureaucracy, the idea of professions as buffers was already deeply institutionalized in early twentieth century social theory and society (e.g. Tawney 1920: 94).

owners and managers, create the news. The culture that regulates investigating, writing, and editing news is so revered it long ago acquired a quasi-religious status. In 1920, complaining that "the news of the day as it reaches the newspaper office is an incredible medley of fact, propaganda, rumor, suspicion, clues, hopes, and fears," Walter Lippmann (1920: 47) declared "the task of selecting and ordering that news" to be "one of the truly sacred and priestly offices in a democracy." For Lippmann, the newspaper was "the bible of democracy, the book out of which a people determines its conduct" (ibid). A few years earlier, Walter Williams, University of Missouri's first journalism Dean, published what he called the *Journalists' Creed*, inscribing "clear thinking, clear statement, accuracy, and fairness" at the ethical core of the profession (in Farrar 1998). Contemporary practitioners sometimes refer to Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel's *Elements of Journalism* as the "bible" and Kovacs as journalism's "high priest" (Ryfe 2012: 51). The book asserts that "journalism's first obligation is to the truth" because "its first loyalty is to citizens," not to the powers that be. If journalists are to "serve as an independent monitor of power," then they "must maintain an independence from those they cover" and "exercise their personal conscience." If these moral obligations are met, this professional bible assures its readers, journalism can "provide a forum" not only for "public criticisms" but also for "compromise" (Kovacs and Rosenstiel 2007 [2001]: 5–6).

In *The Communist Manifesto*, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (1962 [1848]: 36) proclaimed that, with the coming of capitalism, "all that is holy is profaned," that there can be no "religious fervor," that there survives neither "honor" nor "reverent awe" for any professional occupation. But this was their reductionism speaking.[8] In the century and half since those predictions were made, journalism continued to inspire reverence, its professional ethics seeming sacred and holy, its moral obligations honored not only in the breech but in daily acts.[9] Matthias Revers (2013: 6) has documented how "symbols, myths,

[8] Shirky's predictions that the Internet will destroy journalism are based upon the reductionist equation of professional form with economic production: "The definition of journalist, seemingly a robust and stable profession, turns out to be tied to particular forms of production" (Shirky 2008: 70). In 2011, Anderson challenged Shirky's understanding of professions: "In the web era, we have usually told a particular story about institutions and the professions they house, one summed up nicely in Clay Shirky's [argument that] professions are monopolistic guilds designed to raise barriers to entry in order to maintain professional privilege at the expense of the public good . . . It is a story I've told myself. But it's not the only side to the tale. *The other side to institutions and professions*, a side long recognized by even the harshest critics of professional power, is that *they create non-material cultures that insulate workers from the ravages of the free market*. Professions create an alternative reward system in which status and pay are determined not simply though the workings of the market, but through *alternate hierarchies of worth*" (2011, original italics).

[9] That sacrality can powerfully structure social organization even in modern times is conceptualized in Durkheim's late work, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (1995 [1912]), and the premise has been foundational to the emergence of the cultural turn in contemporary sociology (Alexander and Smith 2003; Lynch 2014).

and narratives of triumph and failure" are "ingrained" in the occupation of journalism (Revers 2013). The profession's culture is organized not only around mundane practices but sagas of courageous heroes (Carlson, this volume cf., Revers 2013) who sacrifice, and sometimes even die, to uphold the values of autonomy, fairness, and critique, struggling against corrupt villains from the worlds of politics, money, ethnicity, religion, and state, who are motivated by greed and wanton disregard, acting in ways to undermine journalistic ideals.

Theoretical reductionism depicts the products of journalism as merely informational. If journalism is only about information, then it is indeed simply a technology, one bound to be superseded by the super-efficient, high speed, user-friendly information-processing capacities of the Internet Age.[10] In a biting critique, Dean Starkman links such Internet rhetoric to the vision of a "network-driven system of journalism in which news organizations will play a decreasingly important role."

> News won't be collected and delivered in the traditional sense. It will be assembled, shared, and to an increasing degree, even gathered by a sophisticated readership, one that is so active that the word 'readership' will no longer apply. This is an interconnected world in which boundaries between storyteller and audience dissolve [into] the transformative power of networks [and] faith in the wisdom of crowds and citizen journalism, in volunteerism over professionalism [and] in 'iterative' journalism – reporting on the fly, fixing mistakes along the way – versus traditional methods of story organization, fact-checking, and copyediting. (Starkman 2011)

Such reduction of news to information lends support to the fatalistic picture of journalism's displacement. Via a mechanical series of ineluctable facts, the all-powerful forces of capitalism's creative destruction will have sway. But if journalism is craft and profession, its product must be much more than the mechanical recording and transmission of information (Kreiss, this volume). Michael Schudson documents how journalism, once not so very different than stenography, gradually became a source of "fundamental translation and interpretation," projecting the "meaning of events" to "a public ill-equipped to sort [this] out for itself" (Schudson 1982: 99). Anthony Smith (1978: 168) describes news reporting as "the art of structuring reality, rather than recording it." Donald Matheson shows how, between 1890 and 1930, journalism became transformed from "raw information" into a nuanced, thickly construed, and esoteric kind of discourse, a "textual apparatus of interviewing, summarizing, quoting and editing that would allow it to be able to claim to represent reality" (Matheson 2000: 563) in a manner that was more objective, and thus authoritative, than other claims.

[10] "We are undoubtedly in an information age ... The information superhighway is about the global movement of weightless bits at the speed of light. As one industry after another looks at itself in the mirror and asks about its future in a digital world, that future is driven almost 100 percent by the ability of that company's product or services to be rendered in digital form ... Media will become digitally driven by the combined forces of convenience, economic imperative, and deregulation. And it will happen fast" (Negroponte 1995: 11–13).

JOURNALISM AS CIVIL INSTITUTION

Kovacs and Rosenstiel describe the elements of journalism as "principles that have helped ... people in self-governing systems to adjust to the demands of an ever more complex world," helping people "to be free" (2007 [2001]: 5). Journalism is not only about professional ethics but civic morals (Durkheim 1950). The neutrality, the perspective, the distance, the reflexivity, the narrating of the social as understood in this time and this place – all this points beyond the details of craft and the ethics of profession to the broad moral organization of democratic life. Even as the sacred codes of professional journalism reach downward into the practical production of daily, hourly, and minute-by-minute news, they reach upward into the more ethereal world of civic morals. When journalists make meaning out of events, transforming randomness into pattern, they do so in terms of the broader discourse of civil society (Alexander 2006: 75–85). Fairness to both sides is not just a narrowly professional obligation but a fundamental principle of citizenship, one that requires divided interests to play by the rules, to imagine themselves in place of the other even as they fight for interests of their own. Exercising individual conscience, being independent of one's sources, conducting interviews that allow sources to speak, providing neutral information that makes compromise possible – these professional mandates not only create news but contribute to the moral discourse that makes civil solidarity possible. As journalist and political scientist Jim Sleeper has put it, "journalism is a civic art."[11] Believing that a disinterested, more impersonal truth is possible allows demos to criticize cosmos and moral universalism to seem not just a cheap trick, a camouflage for self-aggrandizement, but a morality whose ideals have the power to reign.[12]

[11] Yale University seminar, January 28, 2014.

[12] Bourdieu theorizes disinterest as just this sort of camouflage, complexly constructed but still a cheap trick. He can do so because he ignores the relative independence of cultural power, viewing group struggles within and between fields merely as efforts to increase symbolic capital (Alexander 1995). But if journalism has significant autonomy as an independent field (Benson and Neveu 2005), it has secured this cultural capital because of the cultural power of professional ethics and their connections to their civic morals of the civil sphere in which journalism plays a central part. In his comparative study of the coverage of immigration in French and American journalism, Benson makes precisely this same critique of Bourdieu: "In both countries, a hybrid space exists in which the seemingly opposed civic and market logics are brought together. In the United States, civic ends have been financed by profit-driven news companies whose owners nevertheless retain a public service orientation. In France some subsidized, public service-oriented newspapers have worked hard to expand their audiences and revenues. It is generally in this hybrid space that we find the forms of professional practice richest in the symbolic capital of prestige: in the United States, investigative and other types of long-form daily journalism; in France, elegantly written, in-depth analysis and evaluation of ideas and social issues. Contra Bourdieu, this 'autonomous' journalism is not strictly opposed to the market but rather represents a variety of fragile, ongoing attempts to balance market and civic demands" (Benson 2013: 37).