Introduction

Islamism(s) of Academics and Islamists

This book focusses on Islamism as a political ideology by taking the case of Jamaat-e-Islami in contemporary India and Bangladesh. In this regard, I have used Ernesto Laclau's ideology and discourse analysis method in conceptually grasping and analyzing the rhetoric of Jamaat. Therefore, primarily, the study will be in the theoretical framework of Laclau in ideology studies. In this respect, this book elaborates on the underlying politics of Islamism with reference to Laclau's theoretical insights into ideology and discourse analysis, particularly with regard to the identification of the (political) enemy/antagonistic frontier and the construction of populist political discourses as a strategy of political mobilization. That is to say, the book will, firstly, address how, in a contemporary globalized world, Islamists construct an antagonistic frontier and mobilize ‘people’ behind their political project. Secondly, the book examines the dynamics of the formation of Islamist politics for struggle for hegemony and its failure to become a hegemonic force in Bangladesh. Thirdly, the contradiction between Islamic universalism/Islamist populism, on the one hand, and a politics of Muslim particularism in India, on the other, is revealed in this study. Fourthly, the book also deals with the Islamist cultural critique of atheism, blasphemy, live-in relationships and homosexuality, which the (Jamaati) Islamists construe as products of ‘Western cultural globalization’. In this respect, I try to analyze why Islamists are antagonistic to such issues. Finally, this book traces the contemporary crisis of Islamist populism in providing an alternative to neoliberalism. In this regard, I find a sophisticated conceptual signpost in Ernesto Laclau’s theoretical framework in analyzing the empirical findings of the research.
Today, neoliberal capitalism is passing through a global crisis. In this context, the study tries to answer the core question – can Islamism articulate a politics of alternative in a world marked by capitalist globalization and neoliberal consensus? Further questions related to the major theme are also addressed as follows – after the failure of the twentieth-century socialism, what happens to the promise and goal of Islamism in providing an alternative to capitalism? Can Islamism represent a politics of social transformation or is it only limited to a peculiar politics of resistance and critique to neoliberal capitalism?

Before analyzing the political ideology of Islamism, it is helpful to first survey the academic literature on Islamism, particularly Islamism as presented by Islamists and, then, re-presented by academics. In studying Islamism, first, one should question those assumptions that treat Islamism as a coherent and homogenous entity. The diversity of Islamism in varied spatio-cultural contexts is not only restricted to different genres of Islamist movements, but has also produced extensive debates over a range of analytical categories around which academics have studied Islamism. In this respect, I focus on the major themes and the logic that have been provided to explain the existence of Islamism. But before surveying the academic literature, let me first clarify the terms and concepts that I have often used in this book.

**Clarifying terminologies**

**Fundamentalism or Islamism:** Scholars and commentators have often used ‘Pan-Islam’, ‘militant Islam’, ‘radical Islam’, ‘Islamic
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fundamentalism, political Islam and Islamism as interchangeable concepts. Although some scholars have used semantic substitutions like political Islam and Islamism instead of fundamentalism, those usages have not successfully overcome the image of Islam within a section of mainstream media and academia as an anti-modern religious tradition. Many scholars have also confused the concept of Islamic fundamentalism with that of Islamic revivalism, extremism, fanaticism and even terrorism as if they all are the same. There are scholars, who have used fundamentalism as an analytical category. The coinage and usage of a loaded term like fundamentalism in a Muslim context seems to be immensely contestable and unacceptable for many. Scholars argue that the term fundamentalism was


originally used to describe strands within Protestant Christianity in the early decades of the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{10}

Most informed academics know that ‘fundamentalism’ is not specific to Islam and, in fact, ‘has surfaced in most religions and seems to be a worldwide response to the peculiar strain of late-twentieth century life’.\textsuperscript{11} Experts point out that at the beginning of the twentieth century, fundamentalism first surfaced in the United States, ‘the showcase of modernity’, and in this respect, both Christianity and Judaism had a much early experience of fundamentalist movements. Islam was among the last of the three monotheistic religions to develop a fundamentalist strand during late 1960s and 1970s when modernity began to take root in the Muslim world.\textsuperscript{12} However, irrespective of the origins of ‘fundamentalism’ in any particular context or religion, a fascinating debate over using the term as an analytical category can be seen in the works of Sahgal and Yuval-Davis and the response by Sayyid.

By using ‘fundamentalism’ as an analytical category, Sahgal and Yuval-Davis argue that fundamentalism generally has three main features: (a) it is a political project that practices rejection of pluralism with a return to the holy text; (b) it is a movement that deliberately combines religion and politics to further its goals; and (c) it is a programme for controlling women.\textsuperscript{13} In response, Sayyid’s theoretically sophisticated work from a broad ‘anti-essentialist’ and ‘anti-foundationalist’ epistemological framework convincingly objects and problematizes each of the features being labelled to describe the phenomena of ‘fundamentalism’ in general and Islamism in particular.\textsuperscript{14}

In this respect, the theoretical debate between Sahgal and Yuval-Davis on the one hand, and Sayyid on the other, repeats the binary construction of essentialist versus anti-essentialist representation of Islam(ism). While Sahgal and Yuval-Davis make broad generalizations and often stereotyped formulations about religious ideologies, Sayyid, avoids discussing certain core problems of gender inequality, like unequal property rights for women, unequal political rights for women and


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te the right to use contraception to control reproduction, within Islamist discourses.15 However, in agreement with Sayyid, in exploring the use of Islam for political protest and mobilization, conceptually, the term 'Islamism' is preferable because the terminology of 'Islamic fundamentalism' is problematic and using the term 'political Islam' is rather vague.16

Most academic works on Islamism, even that of Sayyid, regard it more as an identity-oriented political movement and less as an ideology. Although varied interpretations of the term exist, I shall use Islamism as a form of totalistic ideology that wishes to organize society, polity and economy around the centrality of Islamic religion. For the Islamists, Islam has something positive to offer and is better than any other existing ideological discourses. Islamists are those people who use the Islamic metaphorical language to think in terms of political destinies and see their political future through the prism of Islam.17 In this respect, as Sayyid argues, an Islamist is someone ‘who places her/his Muslim identity at the centre of her/his political practice’, while Islamism ‘is a discourse that attempts to centre Islam within the political order… (and) can range from the assertion of a Muslim subjectivity to a serious attempt ‘to reconstruct society on Islamic principles’.18 I agree with Sayyid on these counts with a caveat that one can replace ‘Muslim identity’ and ‘Muslim subjectivity’ with ‘Islamic identity’ and ‘Islamic subjectivity’ as I fundamentally distinguish between the terms ‘Muslim’ and ‘Islamic’.


Ibid. p. 17.

Ibid.
Muslim, Islamic and Islamist: In this study, I have differentiated the three distinct terms: (a) ‘Muslim’ or ‘Muslim identity’; (b) ‘Islamic’ or ‘Islamic identity’; and (c) ‘Islamist’ or ‘Islamist identity’. For this differentiation, I have relied on how the Islamists have defined Islam as a combination of din (faith/religion), dunya (life) and dawla (state). I argue that the term ‘Muslim’ constitutes a broad general category which both religious and non-religious persons can belong to or identify with. In other words, those people who do not practice Islamic religion in their everyday life but have faith in Islamic religion can be Muslims. Thus, ‘Muslim world’ in this study is used to represent the collective of those societies and countries, where the majority of the population has faith in Islamic religion but does not view Islam as a complete way of life or initiates political struggles to establish an Islamic political order. Whereas, people belonging to the second category of ‘Islamic’ are those who practise Islamic religion in their everyday life and might also believe that Islam is a way of life but do not have a political agenda to establish a Sharia-based Islamic state. However, ‘Islamists’ are those who not only believe that Islam is ‘a way of life’, but also claim that it is ‘a complete way of life’ and claim that it is an ideal holistic religion with a political agenda of building a Sharia-centric Islamic state. Therefore, the general formula according to my categorization in the book is that all ‘Muslims’ are not necessarily ‘Islamic’ or ‘Islamists’, whereas all ‘Islamic’ people are definitely ‘Muslims’ but not necessarily ‘Islamists’, and all ‘Islamists’ are certainly both ‘Muslims’ and ‘Islamic’. The examples of Islamic organizations are Tablighi Jamaat, Jamiat-Ulema-i-Hind, etc., while Jamaat-e Islami, Al-Qaeda, Taliban, Hamas, Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood etc. can be categorized as Islamist organizations.

However, Islamist organizations form a broad political spectrum, and one can categorize them into three distinct groups in terms of operational strategies and attendant tactical questions related to the modes of capturing political power: (a) Parliamentary Islamists (b) Militant Islamists and (c) Extremist Islamists. The parliamentary Islamists generally use and choose parliamentary democratic methods such as participation in elections and mass mobilizations, like the Jamaat-e Islami in South Asia, Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Refah Party in Turkey, etc. Militant Islamists use both parliamentary methods and armed violence like Hamas in

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Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Extremist Islamists, however, use only violent and terroristic methods like the Al-Qaeda network, Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also called as Islamic State of Iraq and Levant or in short, Islamic State (IS) and groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba which are based in Pakistan and operate in Kashmir. In this book, I am not only interested in the specific tactics and strategies of an Islamist party like the Jamaat in India and Bangladesh but am also interested to look at its ideological articulations. To do such an exercise, I must clarify what I mean by political ideology.

**Islamism as political ideology:** The term ‘political ideology’ in this study is employed in the same sense that Freeden defines it as ‘complex combinations and clusters of political concepts in sustainable patterns’ and ‘a wide-ranging structural arrangement that attributes decontested meanings to a range of mutually defining political concepts’. Since ‘ideologies are configurations of decontested meanings of political concepts’, any ideology would try to fix a definitive meaning to a particular concept that is essential for the subscribers of that particular ideology. For example, a particular ideology might assert that this is what ‘justice’ means or that is what ‘equality’ means or such a society might be ideal. In this respect, decontestation is the process of ending an ‘inevitable contention over concepts… by removing their meanings from contest’. Thus, decontestation helps to provide a consensus of meanings or fixation of meanings about a political concept or a particular set of political concepts. In this respect, decontestation is the process of ending an ‘inevitable contention over concepts… by removing their meanings from contest’.22 Since ‘ideologies are configurations of decontested meanings of political concepts’, any ideology would try to fix a definitive meaning to a particular concept that is essential for the subscribers of that particular ideology. For example, a particular ideology might assert that this is what ‘justice’ means or that is what ‘equality’ means or such a society might be ideal. In this respect, decontestation is the process of ending an ‘inevitable contention over concepts… by removing their meanings from contest’.22 Thus, decontestation helps to provide a consensus of meanings or fixation of meanings about a political concept or a particular set of political concepts for those who subscribe to a particular ideology. It is, therefore, opposed to deconstruction by which multiple meanings of any particular concept can be revealed. By such acts of decontestation, ideologies make truth claims and ‘closure of debate’23 to arrive at certain conclusive decisions. Since decision is an ‘expression of finality (real or manufactured), signalling the closure of discussion’, ideologies generally ‘strive to provide the certainty that underpins such finality’.24 In doing such acts of decontestation, the ideologues ‘claim to champion the “correct” meanings of the political concepts to which they refer’.25 While decontestation of political concepts might close the debate within a particular ideological tradition, competing ideological discourses can certainly challenge/contest such decontestation of several political concepts. For example, distinct ideologies like Liberalism, Marxism

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23 Ibid, p. 68.
25 Ibid.
and Islamism might have quite different notions of justice, equality or ideal society and would then disagree with each other on the ‘true’ or ‘correct’ meaning of those political concepts. Hence, ‘control of political language’ is a ‘necessary feature of ideological act’, which precisely is ‘the decontestation of the essentially contestable’.  

It is this problem of ‘closure’ or fixation of meaning via decontestation that brings Freeden close to Laclau’s concept of ideology as ‘the representational, metaphorical and precarious closure that stabilizes meaning within specific contexts’. As Laclau proclaims, ‘[the ideological] would consist of those discursive forms through which a society tries to institute itself as such on the basis of closure, of the fixation of meaning… The ideological would be the will to “totality” of any totalizing discourse’. At the same time, Freeden argues that ‘Decontestation, though central to political argument, is never conclusive’ to which Laclau and Mouffe had previously pointed out such ‘impossibility of an ultimate fixity of meaning’, implying that there would always be ‘partial fixations’. Thus, both ‘ambiguity’ and ‘certainty’ are two necessary features of any ideology. The tendency of cementing, closure, fixation and decontestation of meanings within any ideological discourse represents the certainty of ideological ‘truths’ or ‘correctness’, while ‘inconclusiveness’, ‘indeterminacy’ and ‘vagueness’ of meaning and decisions, on the one hand, and the existence of ‘ideological dissent’, on the other, might add to the ambiguity of ideology, thus, making ‘reasonable ideological disagreement’ possible. Thus, ideologies are not monolithic static belief systems, but they are like languages that contain certain concepts whose meaning(s) might change or evolve over time. The relative political success of an ideology depends on its ability to impose the belief that its own conceptual definitions are the ‘correct ones’.

By following the meaning of ‘ideology’ and ‘ideological’ in both Freeden and Laclau, the term Islamism is primarily used in this book to connote a modern political ideology, quite distinct from Islamic theology, with its universalistic appeal, and a particularistic ‘ideologization’ of Islamic religion around certain

31 Freeden, Ideology, p. 57.
33 Freeden, Ideology, p. 126.
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key decontexted concepts, whose meanings are generally fixed by the prominent Islamist ideologues, while closing down ideological dissent over the use of accepted definitions of any particular political concept. Nonetheless, over time, such fixation of meanings can change/vary under specific contexts. In this book, I will show how Islamist discourses can also reinterpret and reformulate meanings of specific political concepts within their ideological repertoire. By ‘ideologization’ of Islamic religion, I mean treating Islam not simply as a ritualistic religion in the private realm, but assigning political responsibility and duties to its core audience/constituency of Muslims to achieve distinct political goals, based on specific political concepts and rhetoric, where both private and public domains converge in constructing Islam as a complete way of life. This ideologization of religion, as argued later, is possible since religion itself gives that scope to particular political actors to idealize and politicize it.

Thus, Islamism can be defined as assigning political overtone to the religion of Islam, where Islam is not simply regarded as a religion but a political ideology comprising a set of political concepts with distinct political goals like the establishment of an Islamic state. For the Islamists, the religion of Islam in itself is a political ideology and a guide to programmatic political action.34 Therefore, Islamism is the idealization of Islam, while presenting Islam as a totality, by constructing it as a ‘holistic way of life’ which has socio-economic, political, moral and spiritual goals, and giving Islamic justifications for its specific modes of political thinking and action.35 So, when Islamists urge adherence to Islam in its totality, they hardly make any distinction between an ideological worldview and fundamental tenets of religion. In fact, they see Islam not as a religion but as an ideology. It is interesting to note that what scholars describe as ‘Islamism’, the Islamists describe as ‘Islam’. That is to say, the ideological articulations of Islamism by Islamists are justified in the name of Islam. Thus, for academicians,

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35 The JIH policy and programme claims that it ‘has been striving to establish Islam in its totality, in all aspects of human life – individual as well as collective – related to the inner self as well as the external world’. See JIH Policy and Programme, p. 3. The same argument can be also found in the pamphlet of Sayyid Abul Ala Maududi, The Islamic Way of Life, second edition (Lahore: Markazi Maktaba Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan, 1955).
Islamism is an ideology, whereas for Islamists, Islam is the ideology. For scholars, Islamism is only a particular interpretation of Islam, whereas, for Islamists, their interpretation of Islam as a complete way of life is the only correct form of Islam and, hence, all other interpretations where Islam is not presented as a totality violates the very spirit of Islam.

In this study, I describe the Islamist ideology of Jamaat-e-Islami as Jamaati Islamism. However, the book deals with the ideological articulations of Jamaat-e-Islami. In this respect, let me clarify how I have used the term articulation in this study.

Articulation: I have used ‘articulation’ in the Laclau and Mouffe’s sense of the term where it is regarded as any practice that establishes a relationship among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice (emphasis mine). Thus, articulation as a concept is related to practice within the theoretical framework of Laclau and Mouffe. In this book, one can see how Jamaat-e-Islami articulates its ideological positions by its specific politico-ideological practices. The concept of articulation, however, leads to the concept of discourse. Laclau and Mouffe state that ‘the structured totality resulting from the articulatory practice’ can be called discourse. But a discourse has to be available in order to be a discourse. In this respect, let me clarify how I have used the category of ‘available’/‘availability’ in this study. I have used the concept of ‘available’/‘availability’ in the Laclauian sense of the term. As Laclau argues, ‘[M]ere availability is on occasion enough to ensure the victory of a particular discourse… The discourse of a “new order” is often accepted by several sectors, not because they particularly like its content but because it is the discourse of an order, of something that is presented as a credible alternative to a crisis and a generalized dislocation. This does not mean, of course, that any discourse putting itself forward as the embodiment of fullness will be accepted. The acceptance of a discourse depends on its credibility, and this will not be granted if its proposals clash with the basic principles informing the organization of a group’. Therefore, Laclau uses the concept of availability in relation to the category of credibility within

36 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, p. 105.
38 Laclau and Mouffe take the concept of discourse from Foucault apart from complementing with analytical philosophy of Wittgenstein, the phenomenology of Heidegger and Lacanian theory. See Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, pp 10–11, pp 105–113. However, a Foucauldian framework or taking recourse to analytical philosophy of both early and later Wittgenstein, or the ‘existential analytic’ of Heidegger or Lacanian theory is beyond the scope of my book.