I

Introduction

In recent years, Europe has become a main theater of Islamist terrorism, with major terrorist attacks in Madrid and London and dozens of foiled plots throughout the Continent. The 9/11 Commission listed European cities with Muslim communities (along with the Afghan-Pakistani border, the Horn of Africa, and Southeast Asia) among the places where terrorists seek sanctuary and operating bases. The U.S. perception of the problem of Islamist extremism in Europe is primarily one of radicalization as a stage in the progression toward terrorism. While also concerned about the radicalization and recruitment of European Muslims into terrorist groups, Europeans see radicalization in the context of the broader social problem of integration of the Continent’s Muslim communities. In Paris, Berlin, London, and Madrid, the integration problem is seen, first and foremost, in terms of inadequate economic, social, and political participation; high unemployment rates; criminality; and other social issues.

Europe is home to at least 15 million Muslims (not counting Turkey’s 68 million). Immigration and above-average birthrates make immigrants of Middle Eastern origin one of the fastest-growing demographic groups in European societies. But most of these Muslims lag behind the average in education, income, economic opportunities, and political participation. Integrating these communities, with their very different cultural backgrounds, is one of Europe’s most challenging social problems.

Conservatives in many European countries are disturbed by the resistance of Muslim immigrants or their descendants to integration and express fears about the development of parallel societies. The left is more willing to advocate multicultural approaches. Still, many draw a causal link between inadequate integration and marginalization of Muslims in Europe and the
upsurge in Islamist terrorism after 9/11. While the subject is highly contentious, both sides agree that the lack of integration is at the heart of the problem of Islamic radicalization. But is such a generalization correct?

The research on Islamist extremism in Europe supports the view that the integration of Muslim populations into European societies and the radicalization of sectors of those populations are distinct phenomena, although there may be an indirect relationship, to the extent that extremists are embedded in communities where they find some degree of support, tolerance, or indifference. The broad literature that examines the various social, economic, and political root causes of terrorism—a to include, for example, the political rights available to immigrants and their socioeconomic status—largely concludes that while the presence or absence of these types of variables helps shape the conditions under which radicalization is more or less likely, structural variables rarely bear out as proximate causes of terrorism.2

The ringleaders of the Madrid train bombings, three of the four 7/7 London bombers, Theo Van Gogh’s assassin Muhammad Bouyeri, and others involved in Islamist terrorist plots in Europe appeared on the surface to be well integrated. These individuals spoke their new home countries’ languages—Spanish, English, or Dutch; they were born and educated in European countries or, as in the case of the Madrid bombers, long-time residents; and some of them were economically successful and had attained middle-class status. But they still turned to violence against the societies of which they were part. A 2010 report published by the Center for Studies in Islamism and Radicalization at Aarhus University, *House of War: Islamic Radicalization in Denmark*, based on interview with 1,113 young Muslims residing in Denmark showed that 5.6 percent were radicalized and 17.8 percent sympathized with radical Islamism but did not support it directly. According to the study, the most radicalized are well educated, speak Danish well, watch Danish television, work and earn money.3 More recently, Johannes Kandel, an expert on radical Islamism

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2 The exception to this general rule is government repression of a politically active group, which has regularly been found to correlate with the adoption of violent tactics by the persecuted group. (See, e.g., Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens (2006); Crenshaw (1994, 2001); Della Porta (1985); Gurr (1970); and Weinberg (1991)).

with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, warned that in his estimation, almost a third of Muslim youths in Germany hold radical Islamist views.\footnote{Johannes Kandel, *Islamismus in Deutschland*, Zwischen Panik und Naivität, Herder 2011.}

The psychology of relative deprivation may have some explanatory value. A UK study found that although those involved in terrorism are more likely to be well educated, they are almost all employed in unskilled or low-skill jobs.\footnote{“MI5 report challenges views on terrorism in Britain,” *The Guardian*, August 21 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/aug/20/uksecurity.terrorism1/print.} This corresponds to the view of some scholars that the most aggrieved, and therefore the most likely to be recruited into radical groups, are not those at the lowest end of the socioeconomic scale, but those in the middle, whose expectations exceed their opportunities.\footnote{Gurr (1970).} Of course, there are cases that do not fit the pattern, for instance, the July 2007 UK “doctors’ plot,” which resulted in the arrest four medical doctors (one of whom subsequently died from injuries suffered in a terrorist attempt) for their role in failed car bomb attempts in London and Glasgow. All of the suspects had ties to Britain’s National Health Service and worked in two hospitals in England and Scotland.\footnote{Raffaello Pantucci, “Doctor’s Plot” Trial Examines Unexpected Source for UK Terrorist Attacks,” Jamestown Foundation, *Terrorism Focus*, Vol. 5 Issue 36, October 22, 2008, at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=5226.}

Clearly, the intricate relationship between integration and radicalization in Europe’s Muslim communities needs to be analyzed more rigorously. But first, what do we mean by radicalization and its ideological manifestation among Muslims, radical Islamism? Most dictionaries define radicalization as the process through which individuals or groups adopt extreme ideas. Radical or extreme variations are inherent in any society and what is considered radical depends on social and historical context. In some societies, there is broad acceptance of behavior that in the West is considered extreme, such as draconian punishments for deviations from religious orthodoxy, adultery, or homosexuality, whereas what is regarded in the West as normative, for instance, gender equality and the liberalization of sexual norms, is considered socially subversive.

Radicalization, therefore, is very much context dependent. Since the context of this study is Europe, radicalization is defined as “the rejection of the key dimensions of modern democratic culture that are at the center of the European value system.” The values include support for democracy and internationally recognized human rights, gender equality and freedom.
of worship, respect for diversity, acceptance of nonsectarian sources of law, and opposition to violence as a means to attain political ends. A radical organization may not be a violent one, although the attitudes of even ostensibly nonviolent organizations toward violence are often ambiguous and these groups can function as “conveyors belts” to violent extremism.

The ambiguous role of integration in the radicalization process can be better understood if the phenomenon of Islamist extremism in Europe is disaggregated into three separate, but related components:

- The problem of integration of members of European Muslim communities into the national societies;
- The radicalization of sectors of these communities; and
- The recruitment of radicalized individuals into extremist and terrorist groups.

Violent extremists, it should be noted, are extreme exceptions among Europe’s Muslims. The combination of a lack of integration and the absence of radicalization seems to be the norm for the majority of Muslims in Europe. Large numbers, if not the majority of Muslims in Europe, are neither well integrated nor radicalized. For the minority that becomes radicalized, the trajectories toward extremism and violence begin with a condition of disaffection or alienation. These feelings may lead an individual to seek out and join radical groups to find companionship, establish an identity, or take action to address perceived grievances.

The circumstances that generated these feelings of disaffection provide a cognitive opening into which radical ideas are more readily introduced. Scholars such as Olivier Roy (2004) argue that some second-generation Muslims find it difficult to live within either the traditional culture of their parents or the modern Western culture of the countries where they reside. Extremist Salafi ideologies offer a new identity that allows the individual to identify with an imagined worldwide Muslim community.

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Extremist groups and ideologies contribute to the radicalization of its members by first creating what Juergensmeyer (2003) calls a “culture of violence.” In this context, the use of violence by members is not only permitted but also encouraged, ostensibly in defense of the community. Threats to the community are often interpreted in a very expansive way, weaving international events into the narrative of the community’s persecution. Radical groups, for example, create a culture of violence through regular viewing of carnage tapes from Chechnya, Ambon, and Iraq, as well as discussions about the approved parameters of violent jihad in the context of broader religious discussions and of appropriate rationales, targets, and means. When these discussion groups are supplemented with pseudo-military or actual military training, locally or abroad, it reinforces the culture of violence and complements the theory with the development of practical skills.10

For those in the technologically adept generation born in the 1980s and 1990s, the propensity to radicalization is increased by the easy access to radical material through the digital media. The role of the Internet in the radicalization process is at the core of the argument that “self-radicalization” is taking place in the sheltered confines of private homes, and that jihad has become “leaderless,” driven by users who have access to bomb-building manuals and poison handbooks, wirelessly accessed while hiding in the suburbs of European cities.11 But such a view of the Internet is likely to be misleading. Many individuals today use the web to socialize and to make and maintain contact—a novelty that applies to an entire generation of “digital natives.”12

Such activity is all about turning online contact into off-line action, dissolving the dividing line between online and off-line. For younger generations, the web is accessed more and more through smartphones first and computers only second. The cell phone is not used in social isolation, but to break out of social isolation. Smartphones and social networking services are the fastest-growing segments of the new media industry today, not only in Europe, but also throughout the world. The view that lone-wolf militants self-radicalize secretly and in isolation through the Internet needs to


be updated to take account of the importance of networks, both digital and off-line.

One of the objectives of this book is to identify patterns of Islamist radicalization and terrorism in Europe. A generational distinction is at the center of our argument. First-generation Muslim immigrants to Europe arrived either for political or more frequently economic reasons. The political activists among them, and the few who were leaning toward extremist views by and large had a local (e.g., Middle Eastern) agenda, not a global one, shaped by their experiences in their countries of origin.

Europe’s second- and third-generation Muslims do not possess the same ties to their ancestral countries of origin, neither positive in the form of social contacts with families and friends, nor negative in the form of political grievances. Their home countries are now France, Germany, the United Kingdom, or the Netherlands. For the small number with a political impetus, the immediate source of grievance, logically, is not the government of their country of ancestry, but Europe, or more broadly “the West.” Europe, the Continent that was an economic or political refuge for their parents, has become for them a source of grievance and marginalization or a party to the perceived global conflict between the secular West and Islam. For a very small group among these youths, in a biographical and personal way, the “far enemy” has become the “near enemy.”

First-generation extremists shared a background in Middle Eastern political movements that turned violent. Some took part in veritable insurgencies against their own ruling regimes. These movements touted a cause, tapped into widespread grievances, and sometimes succeeded in mustering significant popular support. Europe’s second- and third-generation Islamist extremists are markedly different: they do not share their ideological predecessors’ experience of life under authoritarian Muslim regimes; the number of fellow Muslims who share a strong grievance and a willingness to act is comparatively small; and their goals are not related to concrete national or local concerns. The new Islamist terrorists do not share a background in local political movements – they turn first global and then violent.

The surprisingly large number of converts who get involved with Islamic extremism in various European countries illustrates this trend.

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13 An analysis of radical Islamic francophone websites, for example, reflects a younger generation in a constant search for identity; social issues are dominant, unlike the dominance of politics found in radical Arab websites. Deborah Touboul, “Francophone Internet Forums Shed Light on Concerns and Issues of Islamists in Europe,” Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, Vol. 3 No. 5 (September 2005) at http://www.e-prism.org/images/PRISM_no_6_vol_3_-_Islamic_sites_in_French.pdf.
Ethnic German, French, or British citizens turn to Islam for various reasons, but those reasons do not include failed integration into an alien recipient society. The attraction of Islam might be that the new faith, strictly interpreted, provides a sense of order, belonging, spirituality, and duty that is largely absent from liberal and largely secular European societies. This book will provide some detail on European converts with a history of radicalization.

Extremists may build on an underlying alienation and grievances, but the real driver of Islamist radicalization, recruitment, and ultimately violence lies elsewhere. It lies, we argue, not in a cause with a broad political potential, but in groups and ideologies that tilt to the extreme – extreme taken literally, as deviating from the mainstream and therefore bound to remain a fringe movement within the extremists’ communities. Latter-day Eurojihad is therefore self-limiting, but also stable and probably more difficult to eradicate than the violence rooted in Middle East politics that affected Europe in the 1990s.
Europe’s Muslim Populations

The nature of the radical Islamist presence in every European state is specific to the particular demographics of each country. There are also significant variations in the composition of European Muslim communities. “Muslim,” in Europe, denotes ethnicity as well as religion. As Jytte Klausen notes, individuals balance this in different ways. For some, faith is the key source of identity. For others, faith takes a backseat to origin.

Because the availability of data on religious identification varies by country, determining the total number, much less the composition, of Muslim communities in Europe is difficult. Nevertheless, a conservative estimate is that at least 17 million Muslims live in the countries that constitute the European Union, with some sources estimating higher numbers still. Regardless of the source one uses to estimate the number of Muslims in Europe, there is a broad consensus on the nations where these populations are most concentrated. These nations include France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and Spain. The Muslim population in each of these nations varies in its composition. Generally, the ethnic composition of these populations

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1. Julie DaVanzo and Clifford Grammich of the RAND CORPORATION contributed to the demographic analysis of European Muslim population in this chapter.
France reflects historical ties between their countries of residence and their home countries or their geographic proximity, as in the case of Spain and Morocco.

FRANCE

France is considered to have the largest Muslim population in Europe – 4 to 6 million persons, which corresponds to approximately 6 to 10 percent of the French population. This population is composed mostly of persons of North African descent. France also has a growing population of Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa, as well as nearly 250,000 Turkish nationals. The percentage is likely to grow as a result of future immigration – legal or not – and a higher birthrate among Muslims. This figure reflects the number of persons in France with a likely Muslim background and not necessarily of persons who regard themselves as Muslim. According to a 2005 survey conducted by the Institut National d’Études Démographiques (INED) and Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques (INSEE), 5 percent of people in France age 18–79 defined themselves as Muslim.6

When Algeria achieved independence from France in 1962, about half a million Muslims lived in the metropolitan territory of France. Independence left the many Algerians who had cooperated with the French with well-justified fears for their safety. France admitted its former loyalists, beginning a period of large-scale migration driven by the boom in the automobile industry and other labor-intensive sectors of the French economy. In 1974, an attempt to limit immigration from Algeria and other parts of previously French-ruled North Africa motivated Muslims already in France to bring their families before the window for immigration closed.


7 In the 2009 census of France, persons of foreign nationality included, from predominantly Muslim countries, 468,000 Algerians, 440,000 Moroccans, 144,000 Tunisians and 222,000 Turks. Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques (INSEE), Recensement de la population, Répartition des étrangers par nationalité, at http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau.asp?reg_id=0&ref_id=etrangersnat.


9 Not including France’s overseas departments and territories.
Estimates indicate that immigration, together with high birthrates, doubled the Muslim population to 1 million by 1973, doubled it again by 1981, and then doubled it again to 4 million in 1995.\(^8\)

The 2005 riots in France have re-opened the debate on the current size of the Muslim population, for which there still are no official statistics. The French secularist tradition limits the government’s capacity to collect census data on religious practices and dictates that no religious data be collected in the National Census, which is carried out every 10 years. Despite a flurry of statistical studies, private polling companies have also failed to reach convincing results, mainly because of the lack of scientific and officially recognized standards for measuring an individual’s religious identification.

Until recently, nonscientific and often highly politicized estimates of the Muslim population prevailed. A variety of semiofficial figures have been floated publicly in the decade after 2000, most of them in the range of 5 to 8 million. The first comprehensive statistical estimate of the Muslim population was conducted in 2001 and 2002 by the French government’s INED on a sample of 380,000 adults, and on the basis of the data collected during the 1999 census about “family history,” the closest the French government had come to gathering data on religion in more than a century.\(^9\) Based on the country of origin of both first- and second-generation immigrants, demographer Michèle Tribalat estimated the Muslim population in France at between 3.65 and 4 million in 1999,\(^10\) including 1.7 million first-generation, 1.7 million second-generation, and 300,000 third-generation descendants of immigrants from countries where Islam is the majority religion.\(^11\)

Estimates for 2008 indicate that about 1.8 million people living in France were descendants of immigrants from Maghreb states, that is, former French colonies in North Africa. The descendants of immigrants are a young population. Their average age is about 31.9 years, significantly lower than that of the population as a whole (40.5 years).\(^12\) Of the population older than age 15, only 1.7 percent of Turkish nationals,

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\(^8\) Estimate by RAND demographers.
\(^10\) A 10 percent margin of error was calculated to take into account various unknown quantities, such as converts.