1 Defining an Anthropological Biohistorical Research Agenda: The History, Scale, and Scope of an Emerging Discipline

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The proposal to erect a small monument, with a name affixed, to the final resting places of the worthy dead – or even the legendary resting place of near mythical figures like King Arthur or Homer . . . – is thus, explicitly, an act calling up them back or willing them into being through the voice of the imagination and the act of building memorials. (Laqueur, 2011: 806)

On September 23, 2003, one of us (CMS) received a letter from Father Conrad Harkins, OFM, Vice Postulator for the Cause of the Georgia Martyrs, Servants of God and Witnesses to the Sanctity of Marriage. The written request was rather simple. There was a skull (a calvaria, actually) in the collections of the Fort King George museum in Darien, Georgia purported to be that of Fray Pedro de Corpa, a Franciscan missionary killed in coastal Georgia in 1597 during a rebellion of the local Guale chiefdom. His body, along with that of his colleague Francisco de Verascola, was never found – one beheaded and the other supposedly scalped. Father Harkins was seeking professional expertise on confirming this association as part of an ongoing effort to canonize Pedro de Corpa and his companions, known collectively as the five “Georgia Martyrs” (Francis and Kole, 2011; Harkins, 1990). The story was too interesting to pass up and we agreed to “take the case.”

Thirteen years later that letter has resulted in this volume. In the interim we visited the museum on three different occasions, received the calvaria on loan, generated a basic biological profile, digitized the calvaria for more nuanced examinations of population affinity, documented the taphonomy and pathology evident on the specimen, researched the history of the Georgia Martyrs and the lives of the two missing priests from the 1597 uprising, explored vague references to weapons morphology (macana) and what type of reed was used to scalp individuals in sixteenth-century Georgia, generated a radiocarbon date, attempted DNA extraction, confirmed that soils extracted from the auditory meatus were local to that part of Georgia, sent lice carcasses from the auditory meatus to a louse morphologist (these were unfortunately lost), extracted light stable isotopes for dietary reconstruction, and even considered experimentally impaling pig skulls to determine if cranial ring fractures could be caused by impalement. We published some of these results (Duncan and Stojanowski, 2008, 2014; Stojanowski and Duncan, 2008, 2009, 2010), but not all of them, and therein lies a (or the) problem. We no longer think the calvaria belongs to one of the Georgia Martyrs, but neither were we able to falsify the claim. Instead, we were left wondering whose calvaria this is, how it came to be associated with the
missing friars in the first place, and why it mattered so much for the Catholic Church in their canonization procedures. By the time our study had concluded we realized that we had witnessed, and participated in, the skull’s transformation from a poorly provenienced specimen into a museum display and educational object, a piece of evidence in a canonization proceeding, and an enduring and named person and object (the Fort King George “skull”), regardless of its bearer’s continued anonymity.

The intensity with which we pursued the project and its subsequent lack of resolution prompted reflection on our part: Why were we so interested and invested in a simple question of identity about a non-descript calvaria that may have been a person who died 400 years ago, that few outside of Georgia had ever heard of? Clearly the story had resonated with us somewhere during the process and the “need to know the truth” trumped all sense of academic cost–benefit analysis. A cynical view might emphasize publication potential for two junior faculty; although in reality the impact of most biohistorical research is limited, which makes its popularity all the more in need of exploration and explanation. One could also relegate our engagement to pure academic curiosity as one of us (CMS) had just completed doctoral work on the missions of La Florida and was familiar with the story of the Georgia Martyrs. But the most compelling explanation for our interest is the desire to contribute to (and become part of) the story itself and to meaningfully engage the community of interest surrounding Pedro de Corpa and his companions. In short, we both are bioarchaeologists who came through graduate school shortly after the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) became law. We were (and are) keenly aware of how multiple, often opposing narratives regarding bodies and our work can exist at the same time, and we were happy to engage a community of people who viewed our work as a benefit to the public imagination and historical narratives surrounding a body. Personal curiosity and a compelling story can create an almost manic focus, and many cases with a similar scope and objective can be found in newspapers, newsfeeds, social media blogs, academic journal publications, and book chapters scattered across a bewildering array of disciplinary boundaries.

1.1 Defining and Delineating a Biohistorical Research Agenda

Reviewing the literature for similar cases made us aware that there is a growing body of work on historically driven, body-focused cases that forensic anthropologists, bioarchaeologists, and other professionals have engaged. At the same time it was apparent that this type of research remained largely under-theorized and unconsidered as a coherent unit. That this work is conducted at all is reflective of a general academic and public interest in research on the bodies of famous deceased individuals or bodies with the potential to inform well-known historical events – those with the potential to solve long-standing mysteries arising from the amnesia of time, innuendo, family feuds, the whims of despotic kings or regimes, or even profit motive. Komar and Buikstra (2008: 258) labeled this type of study as biohistory, a term we employ here. They define biohistory as an approach that uses scientific
methods applied to materials of biological origin in the analysis of “historical personages.” Biohistorical materials can be museum objects (Glaubrecht et al., 2013; Stojanowski and Duncan, 2009), relics (Charlier et al., 2010), objects of local legend (Klintschar and Kleiber, 2003), studio props (Snow, 1979), portrait subjects (Rollo et al., 2005), archaeological remains (Buckley et al., 2013; King et al., 2014), exhumed bodies (Gill et al., 1994; Jeffreys et al., 1992), or keepsakes obtained innocently (Martin, 2001; Sledzik and Barbian, 2001) or not (McAlister, 1974; Paterniti, 2001). The field, if it can be called that, is situated within the overlapping techniques and technologies of genetics, chemistry, history, forensics, and bioarchaeology, sharing the most in common with the latter two, in that the human body is the analytical focus.

As detailed below, there is clear overlap between bioarchaeology, forensic anthropology, and biohistory as defined by Komar and Buikstra (2008). We argue, however, that it is useful to consider biohistorical cases as a distinct area of practice, but not because we think they are inherently different from forensic or bioarchaeological analyses. In fact, in terms of practice the overlap is significant. Considering biohistorical research separately allows us to engage a unique set of circumstances surrounding certain human bodies, personhood, and aspects of embodiment, and to reflect upon the role that anthropologists play in the myriad, diverse narratives that “run through” a particular body (Buck and Pipyrou, 2014). Engaging the subject as a coherent field permits us to connect the practical mechanics of forensics and bioarchaeology (developing biological profiles from human remains) to a corpus of literature that deserves greater consideration, and thus theorize an emerging area of emphasis to the benefit of the field. This is particularly worthwhile because it is an area in which our work by definition articulates with a broad, public audience (Duncan and Stojanowski, 2014).

Biohistory exhibits a qualitatively different emphasis from bioarchaeology by virtue of the importance of context for the latter and the typical lack of named bodies from archaeological sites (Buikstra and Beck, 2006; Knüsel, 2010). One could reasonably argue that biohistory is simply a type of osteobiography, an approach that developed initially as the application of essentially “forensic” methods to the analysis of poorly preserved human remains from archaeological sites, notably in the Maya area (Saul, 1976; Saul and Saul, 1989). As Robb (2002: 160, emphasis added) notes “[b]y ‘osteobiography,’ Saul and Saul meant the interpretation of human skeletons to illuminate a wide gamut of life conditions and events; unlike studies of the skeletons of the famous deceased, the emphasis is upon illustrating the composite lives of the general population.” In this sense, the biohistory explored here is antithetical to the osteobiographic approach as initially defined. Only more recently has osteobiography come to be explicitly associated with narratives surrounding single individuals (cf. Hawkey, 1998), which is where the connection to forensic anthropology developed. Osteobiography is context-driven, archaeological, and framed around broader anthropological topics, including humanistic ones (Boutin, 2012; Hawkey, 1998; Robb, 2002; Stoddard and Palkovich, 2012; Zvelebil and Weber, 2013), which distinguishes this approach from that of biohistory.
However, the limits of biohistory and osteobiography can also blur (see Heathcote et al., 2012). For example, Tiesler and Cucina’s (2006) osteobiography of the Maya king Pakal has a distinct biohistorical component to it because the pre-Columbian past is thoroughly integrated into the Mexican national identity and ethos. Named, and partly reified by his pre- and postmortem life, Pakal’s postmortem narrative is both biohistorical and osteobiographical in nature. However, the principal difference is that biohistory focuses on individuals or events that have a pre-existing connection to public consciousness and historical imagination. As such, biohistory begins and ends along with, and as a part of, the narrative surrounding a historical personage, the public’s consciousness of that person, and his or her relationship to the reckoning of history. The body’s role here is one of a “boundary object” (sensu Moon, 2013) through which multiple narratives and interests intersect that unleashes the potential of biohistorical analysis. Nonetheless, whether or not one considers biohistory to be truly separate from osteobiography isn’t vitally important. The point is that it is constructive to recognize that the sociology surrounding bodies with a-priori connections to public consciousness and historical imagination is distinct.

Biohistory and forensic anthropology also overlap, particularly in their shared focus on the individual (Dirkmaat et al., 2008; Isçan, 1988; Stewart, 1979). Both fields use similar toolkits and address many of the same analytical goals: (1) developing a biological profile and establishing positive identification; (2) exploring matters of fact about a specific set of remains; and (3) reconstructing matters of fact about a specific event. In addition, both forensic anthropology and biohistory exist in the space of truth arbiters, leveraging technology to answer the questions: who it is and what happened. However, biohistory is distinct from most forensic work because it often does not occur in medicolegal contexts or typically address questions of medicolegal significance (exceptions, of course, exist — Komar and Buikstra, 2008: 261). In addition, the work of forensic anthropologists is historically guided by the goal to give voice to the voiceless, and serves a specific public good that is tangible to the lives of everyday people. This disjunction between the two disciplines is reflected by the absence of biohistorical research in overviews of forensic anthropology (Blau and Ubelaker, 2009; Cattaneo, 2007; Cunha, 2010; Cunha and Cattaneo, 2006; Dirkmaat et al., 2008; Dirkmaat and Cabo, 2012; Schiwy-Bochat et al., 2004; Ubelaker, 1996a, 2000, 2010), including reviews by Clyde Snow who produced some of the earliest biohistorical work (Snow, 1973, 1979, 1982; see also Joyce and Stover, 1991; Snow, 1979). Even Ubelaker’s (1996a) review of the discipline that discusses his work with Carl Austin Weiss (see Ubelaker, 1996b) highlights the middle-range inferences of that work and not the historical, event-based outcomes. In their lengthy review of “new perspectives” in forensic anthropology, Dirkmaat et al. (2008: 46) admit that “deviations into the study of historical (e.g., Maples and Browning, 1994) … individuals is acceptable within the realm of forensic anthropology” but do not develop this literature any further. The absence of historical casework from these discussions suggests these types of studies represent something of a side pursuit not fully embraced by the professional community. The volume by Komar and Buikstra (2008) is the exception, and that book in many ways stimulated our interest in the topic.
The apparent hesitation to engage and claim ownership of biohistory by the broader forensics community may be understandable. These cases are often compelled and initiated by avocationals or promoted by media interests. Both communities often have unclear intentions (as Toon and Stone amply point out in this volume). It is also nearly impossible to “own” biohistory as a focal point of personal professional branding without assuming something of a “hired gun” persona. Directed exhumations aside (Starrs and Ramsland, 2005; see also Hayden, 2005a and Lewis, 2006: fn. 8 for lists of exhumed historical bodies), there is simply not enough work of this kind to sustain a professional career in its entirety. Intensive medical investigations of the lives and deaths of historical personages are also problematic in their lack of problem orientation and weak evidentiary standards (see Brautbar, 1999; Christensen, 2004; Christensen and Crowder, 2009; Grivas and Komar, 2008; Saks and Koehler, 2005; see also Konigsberg and Meadows Jantz in Chapter 10), thus resulting in cottage industries of retrospective medical diagnoses resulting in a disjunct, atheoretical, and widely scattered literature filled with “pop” theories (Byard and Jensen, 2008; Karenberg, 2009; Masterton, 2010; Muramoto, 2014; Nelkin and Andrews, 1998; Paradise and Andrews, 2007). Specific historical figures have entire industries built around them such that resolving the historical question becomes impossible due to entrenched camps and the money to be made in continuing uncertainty. This is the academic equivalent of planned obsolescence. It effectively is a manufacturing of continued dependence where the goal is not to find resolution but to contribute to the production of “canon.” The business of Jack the Ripper (it even has a name, ripperology) is a textbook case of this. Another challenge for the professionalization of biohistorical research is that it is often not published at all, or is disseminated through non-traditional, non-peer-reviewed media such as newspapers, blogs, social media news stories, or television programs. Mass media is critical to both promoting and creating celebrity in the modern world (Buck and Pipyrou, 2014). Social media and science news aggregators provide a fertile outlet for disseminating research that has no specific academic home, which further justifies our goal of considering these cases as a coherent phenomenon. In 2015 alone, stories circulated about the remains, illnesses, or cause of death of numerous kings (Alfred the Great, Charlemagne, Richard III, Mattathiah Antogonius II, Olaf Guthfrithsson, Philip of Macedeon), luminaries (Charles Darwin, Lisa Gherardini (Mona Lisa), Miguel de Cervantes, Michelangelo Caravagio), and scoundrels (Lewis Powell), with blog posts entitled “Monarch Mining: Why Digging Up the Famous Dead is Now a ‘Thing’” (Broadley, 2015) and “Bones with Names: Long-Dead Bodies Archaeologists have Identified” (Pappas, 2015).

That a dynamic of non-traditional engagement may serve to discourage investing in biohistory as a field is not surprising. In fact, the one common thread among the relatively few prior surveys of the topic is a concern with ethics (Andrews et al., 2004; Buenger, 2004; Hayden, 2005a, 2005b; Komar and Buiksra, 2008; Lewis, 2006; Masterton, 2010; Paradise, 2005; Paradise and Andrews, 2007; in particular see Lawrence (2007) on the application of HIPAA’s Privacy Rule to historical documents), and ethical concerns are legion. Ultimately, biohistory engages human bodies that...
intersect with an interesting story or are associated with fame/infamy/celebrity. But who gives permission to perform an analysis? Who decides what constitutes a legitimate historical question or what methods are best suited to (or can actually) address that question? Who protects the interests of purported or actual descendants? What right do we have to subvert the wishes of a deceased notable person who may have taken his or her secrets to the grave? Do the famous dead deserve different treatment (better or worse) than the anonymous of the past? Anthropology has long grappled with the ethical implications for study subjects (Fluehr-Lobban, 1991, 1998, 2013; Tarlow, 2001). These tensions are particularly acute when dealing with past peoples and their bodies (de Baets, 2004; Jones, 2011; Walsh-Haney and Lieberman, 2005; Wilkinson, 2002), especially in the context of post-NAGPRA bioarchaeology (Clark, 2005; Jenkins, 2011; Lambert, 2012; Walker, 2008; Zuckerman et al., 2014). The tensions between communities of interest are obvious. The assignment of “bodies as objects” is equally complex (Brooks and Rumsey, 2006, 2007; Curtis, 2003; Fforde, 2004; Gell, 1998; Goodnow, 2006; Hallam, 2010; Hallam and Hockey, 2001; Hallam et al., 1999; Harper, 2010; Hockey et al., 2010; Hoskins, 2006) and when combined with individualized personhood, ethical considerations exponentiate in biohistorical research settings, a topic explored more fully by Jane Buikstra in Chapter 13.

1.2 The Scope of Biohistory

The Komar and Buikstra (2008) volume provides the most thorough compendium of biohistorical research to date, but only begins to scratch the surface of a scattered and poorly realized field (see also Paradise and Andrews, 2007; Starrs and Ramsland, 2005; Williams, 2013). We had intended on completeness ourselves but quickly came to appreciate the futility. Literatures sprawl quickly and bleed into areas that exist at the fringe of biohistory and forensic human rights (e.g., Solla and Isçan, 2001) or biohistory and osteobiography (e.g., Glaubrecht et al., 2013). Drawing boundaries becomes difficult. Dissemination sources are some of the grayest of the gray literature (so thinly indexed they border on white), complicating efforts to identify sources via keyword searches in online indices. Furthermore, there is relatively little cross-citation, which we argue reflects the lack of coherence and the absence of an overarching theoretical structure to the corpus of research. The task of identifying compelling case studies was further complicated by our adopting a more inclusive definition of biohistory that includes the identification of historical personages as well as the analysis of biological remains associated with historically significant events. In both cases the connection of bodies to a pre-existing historical narrative drives interest in the research, but the literatures are distinct.

Consideration of the broader literature identifies three research orientations. The first, as recognized by Komar and Buikstra (2008), seeks to establish positive identification of a set of remains as belonging to a specific known historical figure. Although there is tremendous variability in what constitutes a historical figure, the majority falls into one of four categories: political figures (kings, Nazis, communist leaders, revolutionaries, martyrs), criminals and outlaws, artistic/scientific
luminaries, and local folk heroes. The latter category provides some of the most compelling cases because the anthropologist, through his or her involvement, can elevate the individual’s historical status and visibility. Our work with Pedro de Corpa is one such case. More circuitous paths to historical identity also exist. For example, individuals that satisfy some superlative quality (first to do, last to do) often assume a historical persona through anthropological engagement. Examples here include Father Bachelot, who was the first Catholic missionary to Hawai‘i (Pietrusewsky and Willacker, 1997) and Margaret Clitherow, martyr and saint, one of few women in England subjected to *peine forte et dure* (death by crushing) (Roberts et al., 1992).

Finally, other individuals assume a historical dimension directly because of their relationship to anthropology and science, which is intimately entangled with colonialism. Examples here include the repatriated Fijian chief Vendovi (Adler, 2014; Kaeppler, 2005); the illustrated, lost, and rediscovered Aleut skull of Adelbert von Chamisso (Glaubrecht et al., 2013); and the exhumed and “confirmed not beheaded” King Mqolombe Sandle Nqqika of South Africa (Nienaber et al., 2008; see also Mkhize [2009] on the controversy surrounding the Xhosa King Hintsa’s skull). In these cases, the colonial bodies move from the category of “a skull” to “the skull” through the biohistorical analysis and have tremendous social value in the present through the nature of their relationship to a recent colonial past. They are politicized bodies in every sense of the word (Kearl and Rinaldi, 1983; Verduy, 1999).

There are numerous ethical and theoretical entanglements that arise from the process of positive identification, although these are rarely or ever addressed in the primary literature. Within the context of anthropological and sociological conceptions of the corpse, its ontological status, and accorded “rights” (Bogard, 2008; de Baets, 2004; Masterton, 2010; Quigley, 1996; Walter, 2013), this type of biohistory removes anonymity and assigns individualized personhood to a body. Doing so unleashes myriad possibilities in which that body or its associated personhood might be manifest – re-articulation, disassociation, reburial, descendant repatriation or other forms of enchainment, display, commodification, politicization, desecration via fetishization, and a postmortem life as an auto-icon and giver of secrets (without asking) previously taken to the grave (see below). Positive identification articulates theoretically with discussions of postmortem agency (Arnold, 2014; Crandall and Martin, 2014; Fontein and Harries, 2013; Harper, 2010; Krmpotich et al., 2010; Williams, 2004) and interrelated conceptualizations of postselves (Kearl, 2010; Schneidman, 1995), postmortals (Hirschauder, 2006), posthumous identity (Masterton, 2010), postpersons and neomorts (de Baets, 2004), celebrity “technological taxidermy” (Danowski and Park, 2009; Davies, 2010), and digital afterlives (Cann, 2014; O’Neill, 2008). Identification and subsequent interment also creates opportunities for commemoration (e.g., Huggins, 2012), thanatourism (Stone, 2006, 2012), and exposure to the memento trade (Penfold-Mounce, 2010)(see Rogers [2004] for an interesting take on the latter), while also positioning researchers to speak to the pastness or authenticity of a specimen (Holtorf, 2013; Holtorf and Schadla-Hall, 1999; Jones, 2010). In our work, the successful identification of the Fort King George skull as one of the Georgia Martyrs had the potential to create a relic of the Catholic
Church, to sacralize the skull, and to unleash infinite possibilities of theft, worship, contest, and scorn (Duncan and Stojanowski, 2014).

This type of biohistory satisfies a deeply human desire to establish personal meaning by connecting to larger narratives through “a form of magical communion through personal incorporation into that network [of relationships]” (Jones, 2010: 189). This is the essence of what this chapter’s epigraph by Laqueur is conveying, that place and name (or in the sense of biohistory, body and name) resurrect through memorial. In this sense, positive identification is a process of the scientist de-anonymizing a body (knowledge in) and the public consuming that knowledge and personalizing themselves through the establishment of a connection to a larger story (meaning out). In other words, the anthropologist enables enchainment (see Chapman and Gaydarska, 2007) by producing knowledge surrounding the body to which the public feels an emotional connection. The body is the focal point for this transfer, but we argue that assigning postmortem agency to the body misappropriates that term. The body can cause people to act and react, it may continue to reflect ongoing processes of embodiment, and certainly personhood may extend past the bounds of biological life and death, but it no longer is able to act independently with intent and free, independent choice (see Hallam, 2010; Hallam and Hockey, 2001; Harper, 2010; Hockey et al., 2010; Hoskins, 2006; Krmpotich et al., 2010; Verdery, 1999; Young and Light, 2013). There is a deep irony to this primary goal of identification, however. Much of the critical “body” literature disavows the anonymity and de-personified corpse of the modern, postcolonial, and postindustrial era, particularly within the ethos of Western anatomical science (Barilan, 2005; Crossland, 2009a, 2009b, 2013; Nystrom, 2014; Sappol, 2002). Positive identification should assuage such criticisms, but biohistorical engagement often lacks a key element. The stories told of the postmortem life are not that of the subject, but rather of the “body as object” through the “anthropological gaze” (Krmpotich et al., 2010: 374). Often framed outside of the bounds of human rights (cf. Renshaw, 2010), biohistorical narratives tell personal stories often intentionally left untold.

Once identified, exhumed, or exposed, the second approach to biohistory dissects the facts about a specific individual’s life and death for which an existing reputation often provides the postmortem analytical framework. This places biohistorians in an uncomfortable position of validating or falsifying rumor or innuendo (see Miller, 2005; Shibutani, 1966 for the sociology of rumor), or filling a “knowledge vacuum” about their lives (Buck and Pipyrou, 2014: 267). Throughout the course of the analysis an individual’s life is deconstructed; their celebrity possibly resurrected; their reputation possibly reformed or, more often, revised and questioned. Retrospective paternity assessments are particularly salacious and tap into a kind of voyeurism of celebrity sexuality with direct effects upon purported or real lineal descendants (cf. Foster et al., 1998, 1999; Greeff and Erasmus, 2013; Perego and Woodward, 2006 for very different sets of questions and ramifications). Lineage and property often go hand in hand and claims to legitimacy can be powerful economic and political tools. For example, Thomas Jefferson’s position as founding father has become highly politicized with both liberal and conservative positions.

The retrospective medical diagnosis (pathobiography or pathography or medical historiography) is by far the most common focus in this literature (Byard and Jensen, 2008; Karenberg, 2009; Masterton, 2010; Mitchell, 2011; Muramoto, 2014; Paradise and Andrews, 2007; Rushton, 2013; Taylor, 2008), which need not include a body or any biological materials at all (e.g., Hunter, 2008; Palermo and Bogaerts, 2014). A variety of health aspects are investigated, often by clinicians with limited historical training. For example, biological remains have been used to seek explanations for an individual’s peculiarities (on Van Gogh’s behavior, see Rose [2006]; on Darwin’s dyspepsia, see Hayman [2013] and Shanahan [2012]), or the source of his or her genius (on Einstein’s brain, see Diamond et al. [1985] and Witelson et al. [1999]; on whether Italian violinist Niccolò Paganini’s skill resulted from Ehlers–Danlos syndrome, see Smith [1982] and Yücel [1995]; on whether migraines caused Picasso’s genius, see Haan and Ferrari [2011]). Akin to modern media preoccupations, the sexuality and venereal history of historical personages is of perennial interest (for a list of composers, generals, and statesmen with syphilis see Breitenfeld et al. [2009]; Franzen [2008]; Marinković and Dukić [2010]). Retrospective trials about the untimely demise of historical personages clearly demarcate the boundaries of medicolegal and biohistorical death investigations (e.g., Tycho Brahe’s rumored poisoning by Johannes Kepler – see Jonas et al. [2012]; Kahr [2010]; Rasmussen et al. [2013]). Even when foul play is not suspected, attempts to confirm an individual’s cause of death can be compelling. Research on the life and death of Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart exemplifies the extent to which a historical personage’s medical history can be dissected. We identified 103 articles discussing a panoply of potential causes of Mozart’s death and the possible afflictions he suffered while living (such as Tourette’s syndrome). Purported causes of death include (in alphabetical order): acute rheumatic fever, acute thyrotoxic crisis, amyloidosis, bronchopneumonia, chronic post-traumatic epidural hematoma, congenital urinary tract defect with obstruction, congestive heart failure, endocarditis, hemorrhagic shock, hypertensive encephalopathy, infection following post-streptococcal glomerulonephritis, parasitic infection, poisoning, polyarthritis, post-streptococcal Henoch–Schönlein purpura, pylonephritis, streptococcal septicemia, stroke, tuberculosis, and uremia (Dawson, 2010). A Google search for “what killed Mozart” turned up 690,000 results (searched February 5, 2015). Although we did not verify the content of all 690,000 websites, it is safe to say that Mozart’s postmortem self has been industrialized, a process that both commemorates and desecrates through appropriation.

Such retrospective diagnoses have significant potential for abuse and have been most heavily scrutinized from an ethical perspective by previous authors (Byard and Jensen, 2008; Karenberg, 2009; Masterton, 2010; Muramoto, 2014; Nelkin and Andrews, 1998; Paradise and Andrews, 2007). Individual privacy is a major concern (see Lawrance, 2007). Connecting a body to a specific personage means the repercussions of postmortem diagnoses could directly affect living descendants’ medical
histories; yet there is no institutional review board oversight of such research (see Chapter 13). There is also the ever-present concern about health insurance implications that arise from genetic probing, which might say more about the modern American zeitgeist of healthcare than biohistory per se. Body-focused retrospective analyses have linkages to several broader theoretical literatures. For one, the postmortem rewriting of an individual’s narrative belies connections to notions of celebrity and requires reflection on why such inferences are worth knowing and who has the right to know. The primarily medical focus also requires thinking about the role of technology in establishing fact (and truth) about an individual no longer able to speak for themselves. The postmortem life is never curated to the same extent, especially in the hands of medical diagnostics.

The third focus of biohistory involves historical events for which existing questions or matters of debate can be addressed using scientific analysis of biological remains. The primary distinction here is that events, unlike people, have a specific location in space and time resulting in a somewhat self-contained historicity. Event-based biohistorical analyses are often not about the person except to the extent that the person’s biology speaks to an enduring uncertainty, a compelling story, or an event manifest in national consciousness. In this sense, biohistory is (loosely) also a microhistory (see Magnusson and Szijártó, 2013), or more appropriately an “incident analysis” (Darnton, 1984) (see Stone [2002] for a microhistory of St. Augustine’s bones). For example, examination of bodies associated with political assassinations (e.g., Bramwell and Byard [1989] on the sons of Edward IV); compelling disasters, massacres, or accidents (see below for examples of all three from the American West); or famous battles (e.g., Karasulas [2004] on whether high-class samurai were dispatched honorably at the battle of Zaimokusa) speak to public imagination surrounding these events. Events can also be elevated to historical status when associated with unexplained phenomena that are prone to pseudoscientific explanations and retrospective “forensic” analyses (e.g., the Dyatlov Pass Incident – Eichar [2014], McCloskey [2013]). The facts pertaining to a historical personage’s contested death (the event) can also fall within the purview of biohistory (see Wagner and Rosenblatt, Chapter 11), especially if a body is the key element to resolution (e.g., Michael Rockefeller’s disappearance – Hoffman, 2014). Media interests are clear in these cases, and this both explains and compels public fascination with such research. The linkage of “body” with “event” presupposes a certain grimness or melancholy (happy events typically have no associated bodies) suggesting overlap with literatures on thanatourism (Penfold-Mounce, 2010; Stone, 2006, 2012) and deathscapes (Maddrell and Sidaway, 2010; Romanillos, 2014) or corpse geographies (Young and Light, 2013). Once again, the epigraph by Laqueur is poignant in this regard.

However, event-based research can also figure prominently in regional imagining of the past. For example, analyses of the human remains associated with the ill-fated Donner party (Dixon et al., 2010; Ellis et al., 2011; Grayson, 1990), the deceit of Alferd (or Alfred) Packer (Rautman and Fenton, 2005; Starrs and Ramsland, 2005), the Willie Handcart Company disaster (Grayson, 1996), the Mountain Meadows