

## The Politics of Parliamentary Debate

Parliamentary debate is a fundamental aspect of democratic lawmaking. Although lawmakers everywhere seek to express their views in parliament, there are large discrepancies in who has access to the floor across political systems. This book explains how parties and their members of parliament (MPs) structure parliamentary debate. Parties may actively seek to prevent some members from taking the floor while promoting opportunities for others. In doing so, they attempt to control the message that their partisans convey in parliament. The authors provide a theoretical model to explain the design of procedural rules in parliament, how the party leadership interacts with rebel backbenchers, and how MPs represent voters. The book explores political institutions, intraparty politics, electoral politics, and legislative behavior. It develops and tests a new theory of parliamentary debate, using data from the United Kingdom, Germany, New Zealand, and the European Parliament.

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# The Politics of Parliamentary Debate

Parties, Rebels, and Representation

SVEN-OLIVER PROKSCH JONATHAN B. SLAPIN





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To Rebecca and Liam SOP

To Jann and Harold JBS





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#### Preface

While sitting together as students in a graduate seminar at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) about 10 years ago, we began to wonder how political scientists might improve on existing measures of party ideology in European politics. Political texts, such as election manifestos and parliamentary speeches, provide a tremendous source of information on the position-taking strategies of politicians. Parliaments meanwhile store their records in easily searchable online databases, making content accessible to researchers for analysis. Over the past decade, our musings on how to use these data have led us down a variety of paths. Initially, we were most interested in using political texts, such as party manifestos, to estimate ideology. This interest resulted in the development of Wordfish, a text-scaling approach we initially applied to party manifestos. As we turned our attention to parliamentary speeches, however, we quickly realized that our theoretical understanding of the language politicians use in speech was far inferior to our theoretical understanding of other sources of information regarding ideology, such as election manifestos and rollcall vote records. Without stronger theoretical guidance as to what speeches can tell us about ideology, we felt we could not make any further headway in the field of ideal point estimation. Parliamentary speech provides a wealth of information on policy stances, but to use it effectively, we need to know more about the politics driving speech itself. While digging deeper into the issue, we discovered that political debate, as a subject of research, had received little attention from legislative scholars. There has been little comparative theorizing to link parliamentary debate to the role that parties play in political representation, or how other institutions, such as electoral rules, may affect these relationships. This book represents the culmination of our efforts to provide such a theory and to explore these relationships.

Writing this book has been a multiyear project and we have benefited from the feedback of many colleagues and friends along the

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way. Several people have read complete versions of the manuscript, including Thomas Bräuninger, Thomas Gschwend, Chris Kam, Orit Kedar, Kira Killermann, Thomas König, James Lo, Will Lowe, and Mike Thies. Others have read previous versions of individual chapters. This list includes Eduardo Aleman, Tanya Bagashka, Ken Benoit, Serra Boranbay, Simon Hix, Justin Kirkland, Ken Kollman, Michael Shackleton, Elisabeth Schulte, Georg Vanberg, and Jonathan Woon. We have presented results from this project at many institutions and conferences over the years. We are grateful to seminar participants at Texas A&M, Rice University, the University of Houston, Penn State, Trinity College Dublin, Washington University in St. Louis, Essex University, Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models Europe, Deutsche Vereinigung für Politische Wissenschaft Working Group on Behavioral Decision Making, University of Mannheim, McGill University, and Nuffield College at Oxford University. Kira Killermann, Linh Nguyen, and Sander Ensink assisted with data collection, and Jann Slapin, who has selflessly served as Jonathan's editor since elementary school, assiduously proofread the final version. We also thank John Haslam and Sarah Green, editors at Cambridge University Press, whose encouragement facilitated the revision and ultimate completion of the manuscript. Lastly, we owe a debt of gratitude to George Tsebelis, who served as our mentor and advisor while at UCLA. His intellectual impact can be found throughout our work, and this book

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