REASONS AND INTENTIONS IN LAW
AND PRACTICAL AGENCY

This collection of new essays explores in depth how and why we act when we follow practical standards, particularly in connection with the authority of legal texts and lawmakers. The essays focus on the interplay of intentions and practical reasons, engaging incisive arguments to demonstrate both the close connection between them, and the inadequacy of accounts that downplay this important link. Their wide-ranging discussion includes topics such as legal interpretation, the paradox of intention, the relation between moral and legal obligation, and legal realism. The volume will appeal to scholars and students of legal philosophy, moral philosophy, law, social science, cognitive psychology, and philosophy of action.

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REASONS AND INTENSIONS IN LAW AND PRACTICAL AGENCY

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## CONTENTS

**List of contributors** vii  
**Acknowledgements** ix  

**Introduction** 1  

GEORGE PAVLAKOS AND VERONICA RODRIGUEZ-BLANCO

**PART I:** The Normative Meaning of Actions

1 Intentions, permissibility, and the reasons for which we act 11  
ULRIKE HEUER

2 Acting and satisficing 31  
SERGIO TENENBAUM

3 Interpretation without intentions 52  
HEIDI M. HURD

4 Metasemantics and legal interpretation 72  
ORI SIMCHEN

**PART II:** Normativity of Legal Authority

5 Doing another’s bidding 95  
MATTHEW HAN瑟

6 Legal authority and the paradox of intention in action 121  
VERONICA RODRIGUEZ-BLANCO

7 The deliberative and epistemic dimension of legitimate authoritative directives 140  
ANTONY HATZISTAVROU
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Public transit</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A. J. JULIUS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Ought we to do what we ought to be made to do?</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cohen and Nagel on the personal and the political</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WILLIAM A. EDMUNDSON</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Juridical laws as moral laws in Kant’s <em>The Doctrine of Right</em></td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BEN LAURENCE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>The relation between moral and legal obligation: an alternative Kantian reading</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GEORGE PAVLAKOS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>PART III:</strong> The Social Dimension of Normativity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Law’s artifactual nature: how legal institutions generate normativity</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KENNETH M. EHRENBERG</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>American Legal Realism and practical guidance</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MANUEL VARGAS AND JOSHUA P. DAVIS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>The authority of conventions, norms, and law</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BRUNO VERBEEK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Select bibliography</em></td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Index</em></td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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viii

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