Niamh Dunne undertakes a systematic exploration of the relationship between competition law and economic regulation as legal mechanisms of market control. Beginning from a theoretical assessment of these legal instruments as discrete mechanisms, the author goes on to address numerous facets of the substantive interrelationship between competition law and economic regulation. She considers, amongst other aspects, the concept of regulatory competition law; deregulation, liberalisation and ‘regulation for competition’; the concurrent application of competition law in regulated markets; and relevant institutional aspects including market study procedures, the distribution of enforcement powers between competition agencies and sector regulators, and certain legal powers that demonstrate a ‘hybridised’ quality lying between competition law and economic regulation. Throughout her assessment, Dunne identifies and explores recurrent considerations that inform and shape the optimal relationship between these legal mechanisms within any jurisdiction.

Niamh Dunne is a lecturer in Law at King’s College London.
COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMIC REGULATION

Making and Managing Markets

NIAMH DUNNE
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This work started life as a doctoral research project exploring one of the apparent transatlantic divergences that continue to exist within competition law, namely the differing approaches to the issue of a regulated margin squeeze adopted by the EU and US antitrust systems. It soon became clear, however, that the concurrent application of competition law and economic regulation is merely a single aspect of their broader interrelationship. Thus, the focus of research shifted to providing a more systematic account of the interface between these instruments than could be found in the existing literature. This book provides an updated and slightly expanded version of that original research project.

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