Introduction

In 1973, Paul Howell, supervisor of the University of Cambridge Course on Development, noted with pride that the content of the course had recently changed. Rather than trying to teach 'what the natives need to know', it was now tailored to the real needs of its students, primarily drawn from developing countries, especially those within the Commonwealth.[1] The fact that in the preceding decade – some years after most British colonies had secured their independence – those teaching this course could still be construed as having been engaged in telling the 'natives' what they needed 'to know' reflects the complex dynamics of the British decolonization process, and the ways these played out in a domestic context. The Cambridge Course on Development was a legacy of British colonialism: a direct descendant of training courses delivered since the 1920s to young British entrants to the Colonial Administrative Service that survived into the postcolonial era to become, with modifications, a flagship element in Britain's contribution to the training of administrators in the public services of new states. In the 1950s small numbers from Britain's colonies and newly independent countries sat alongside expatriates still hoping for a career in the Colonial Service; by the early 1960s they constituted the entire intake.

The figure of the expatriate colonial officer, whether the heroic *Sanders of the River* or the more subversive depictions in the fiction of George Orwell or Somerset Maugham, has particular traction in popular ideas of empire, and few of the continuities from the colonial to the postcolonial era speak to the ambiguities of 'decolonization' as much as the presence at British universities of elites from countries newly freed from the British colonial yoke occupying desks once filled by generations of white British officers. These public servants of new Commonwealth states entering British higher education in the late 1950s and early 1960s were nonetheless only part of a much wider educational migration. Britain had a long tradition of recruiting overseas students, including from the Empire-Commonwealth, but the late colonial period saw an enormous

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[1] Cambridge University Library [CUL], University Archives [UA], GBR/0265/CDEV/2/23, P. P. Howell to Dr A. F. Robertson, Dr B. Van Arkadie and Dr H. W. West, 19 October 1973.

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increase in their numbers. By 1960, the year in which Macmillan's landmark 'wind of change' speech heralded an accelerated retreat from Britain's African Empire, Britain hosted over 31,000 students from British colonies and the independent Commonwealth enrolled on all kinds of training and higher education programmes.[2] Yet more striking, more than 14,000 pensionable officers were still serving in Her Majesty's Overseas Civil Service and a further 6,500 employed on contract terms still working overseas in some fifty countries.[3] In 1965 officials in Britain's new Ministry of Overseas Development, struggling to marshal sufficient resources and manpower to meet the need for technical assistance among emergent states within the Commonwealth, called for the mobilization of personnel across British society. A British 'professional career', they suggested, 'should normally include a period of work overseas in a developing country'.[4] By then the Commonwealth had been transformed from an association comprising a small number of predominantly white countries into a large multiracial community of states of diverse size and geostrategic interests.[5] Although a process of imperial retreat would continue in relation to smaller territories, most of the Empire had gone, and Britain had entered an era that many would consider 'postcolonial'. Yet even at the start of 1965 there still remained over 13,000 publicly funded Britons working in developing countries, including more than 11,000 British officials distributed across forty-one colonies and ex-colonies;[6] a number comparable to those employed in the Colonial Service at the height of Empire.[7] An on-going British involvement in emergent Commonwealth states engaged the resources of diverse British institutions and individuals, and, ensured that the formal 'end' of the British Empire not only left many legacies within Britain itself, but numerous threads and entanglements linking governments, institutions and individuals in Britain and its former colonies.

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[2] Calculated from *Technical Assistance from the United Kingdom for Overseas Development (March 1961)*, PP 1960–1 (Cmnd. 1308), annex II, pp. 30–1.

[3] Ibid., para. 27.

[4] *Ministry of Overseas Development. Overseas Development: The Work of the New Ministry (August 1965)*, PP 1964–5, XXX (Cmnd. 2736), paras. 121, 123.

[5] These developments can be followed in Ronald Hyam, *Britain's Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation, 1918–1968* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006); John Darwin, *The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World System, 1830–1970* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009); and, more briefly, in Sarah Stockwell, 'Ends of Empire' in Stockwell ed. *The British Empire: Themes and Perspectives* (Wiley Blackwell, Oxford, 2008), pp. 269–93.

[6] *Overseas Development*, para. 125; table 4, p. 66. They were in countries which had entered into agreements with the British government under the auspices of the British Overseas Service Aid Scheme introduced in 1961.

[7] The Colonial Service comprised 11,000 regular officers in 1947 and 18,000 in 1954: A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, *On Crown Service: A History of H.M. Colonial and Overseas Civil Services, 1837–1997* (I. B. Tauris, London, 1999), p. 51.

This book explores some of these aspects of the *British* end of the British Empire and Britain's transformation from a colonial power to a postcolonial one. It does so in part via a discussion of British governmental overseas civilian and military aid, but principally by means of a history of the overseas engagements of several British institutions: the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, the Bank of England, the Royal Mint and the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. These were all primarily domestic institutions, but had to differing extents become stakeholders in Britain's Empire, responsible for delivering or managing services to the colonies.[8] Oxford and Cambridge had many connections to Empire, including that on which this book focuses: their role in training members of the Colonial Administrative Service. This dated back to the 1920s, but after 1946 principally took the form of a year-long course attended by new Service recruits. The Bank of England's imperial role was the consequence of the City's place as the world's leading financial centre and its responsibilities to sterling as an international reserve currency. The Bank was directly involved in the dependent Empire via the management of the sterling area and its representation on some regional colonial currency boards, which, in the absence of national or central banks and independent currencies, issued and managed colonial currencies. In the course of the nineteenth century the third institution, the Royal Mint, had also taken on an increasingly international and imperial dimension when it began producing coins for other countries, including those within the British Empire. It had overseen the establishment of branches in Australia, Canada and South Africa and, although by 1945 some of these overseas branches had thrown off British control, the Mint continued to supply coins for colonial currency authorities in most British dependencies. Sandhurst's 'imperial role' channelled an important aspect of the wider imperial function of the British Army. Generations of British Army officers, trained at Sandhurst, had been deployed somewhere in Britain's Empire, principally as a result of the British Army's peacetime role garrisoning the colonies, but also in active combat in Britain's numerous nineteenth-century colonial small wars and in the global conflicts of the twentieth century. British officers were also seconded to command colonial forces. Since 1861 Sandhurst had had another more direct 'imperial' function, training British, and in the 1920s Indian, entrants to the Indian Army; after the Second World War it began admitting increasing numbers of cadets from Britain's remaining colonies and from new Commonwealth states.

[8] Elements of the argument presented in this book were first advanced in an embryonic form in Sarah Stockwell, 'Exporting Britishness: Decolonization in Africa, the British State and its Clients' in Miguel Banderia Jerónimo and António Costa Pinto eds., *The Ends of European Colonial Empires: Cases and Comparisons* (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2015), pp. 148–77.

These and other institutions provided the frames in which many lives were lived out across the Empire,[9] or through which even those who never left British shores might nevertheless be participants in the enterprise of empire. As Tamson Pietsch argues in her discussion of academic networks before the Second World War, institutions created opportunities for global interactions and exchanges, while also regulating and directing them.[10] They helped forge professional linkages that connected the different worlds of the British Empire, and that constituted what Gary Magee and Andrew Thompson describe for an earlier period as the 'software of empire'.[11] In the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, as the structures of imperial rule were rolled back, such institutional and professional connections beyond the state became more, not less, important. By building these domestic institutions into a history of decolonization, this book contributes to the furthering of discussion of the processes of decolonization below the level of Westminster policymaking and above the level of the individual, the two themes around which many other accounts are constructed.

The decision to approach the history of colonial-political change from the perspective of these particular domestic institutions derives from my long-standing interest in two areas: the history of decolonization as it affected British organizations beyond the state; and secondly, processes of institution-building in new states accompanying the creation of Westminster-style parliamentary systems. These interests led to an earlier book on British business and the end of Empire in Ghana, which, together with others' research, helped illuminate the ways in which decolonization affected British firms operating within the Empire. This work explored the firms' attempts to influence both imperial policymaking and colonial-political outcomes,[12] and my own investigation of the establishment of a Ghanaian central bank sparked an interest in the Bank of England as well as in the Royal Mint.[13] More recently, this engagement with

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[9] See, esp., D. Lambert and Alan Lester eds., *Colonial Lives Across the British Empire: Imperial Careering in the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006).

[10] Tamson Pietsch, *Empire of Scholars: Universities, Networks and the British Academic World 1850–1939* (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2013), esp. p. 4.

[11] Gary Magee and Andrew Thompson, *Empire and Globalisation: Networks of People, Goods and Capital in the British World, c. 1850–1914* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012), p. 16.

[12] S. E. Stockwell, 'The Political Strategies of British Business during Decolonization: The Case of the Gold Coast/Ghana, 1945–1957', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 23(1995), pp. 277–300; S. E. Stockwell, *The Business of British Business Strategies in the Gold Coast* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2000); Nicholas J. White, *Business, Government and the End of Empire: Malaya, 1942–1957* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996); R. L. Tignor, *Capitalism and Nationalism at the End of Empire* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1998); M. Misra, *Business, Race and Politics in British India* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999); L. J. Butler, *Copper Empire: Mining and the Colonial State in Northern Rhodesia, 1930–1964* (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2007).

[13] S. E. Stockwell, 'Instilling the "Sterling Tradition": Decolonization and the Creation of a Central Bank in Ghana', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 26 (1998), pp. 100–19.

how the end of Empire reverberated beyond the state has led me to explore its impact on the domestic Church of England.[14]

Like the Established Church, but unlike British businesses, the institutions discussed in what follows lay on the boundaries of the 'state' narrowly defined, which for these purposes we can describe as the Westminster and Whitehall policymaking centre. They were part of the interface between the state and civil society. They had their own lines of dialogue with the state, and were in some cases formally part of it. They could invoke the state more easily than, for example, most British companies were able to do (although some of the latter, especially where their activities bore directly on Britain's strategic interests, naturally had considerable leverage in Whitehall). In our period, the universities had the weakest ties to the state. Even so, they relied on state funding, including support for their role in delivering the Colonial Service training courses, and there was individual career mobility between departments of governments and the universities, with academics appointed to government committees serving as bridgeheads between these interconnected and porous worlds.

The British polity, however, was pluralistic in character and these institutions had acquired or been given a sense of agency, reflecting the distinctive nature of British political culture. They could not operate entirely independently of the state, but, even if subject in principle to ministerial control, still acted with considerable autonomy. As Patrick Joyce argues, the British state, as it developed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, was a 'liberal' one, not only because it was based on principles of political liberty, but also because it was one which permitted persons, places or institutions, which Joyce describes as 'designated governed entities', to operate 'ostensibly on their own, without outside interference'.[15] What is more these might be perceived as distinct from the British state, and their separate identities would be important in their ability to negotiate a changing overseas landscape brought about by decolonization. Within the British system institutions beyond the state also contributed to the business of governance, as Oxford and Cambridge did by training Britain's imperial administrators. Further, within British political culture there was a consensus even among public servants (in

[14] Sarah Stockwell, '"Splendidly Leading the Way?" Archbishop Fisher and Decolonisation in British Colonial Africa' in Robert Holland and Sarah Stockwell eds., *Ambiguities of Empire: Essays in Honour of Andrew Porter* (Routledge, London, 2009), pp. 199–218; Sarah Stockwell, '"Improper and Even Unconstitutional": The Involvement of the Church of England in the Politics of End of Empire in Cyprus' in S. Taylor ed., *From the Reformation to the Permissive Society: A Miscellany in Celebration of the the 400th Anniversary of Lambeth Palace Library* (Boydell, Woodbridge, 2010), pp. 583–655; Sarah Stockwell, 'Anglicanism in an Era of Decolonization' in Jeremy Morris ed. *The Oxford History of the Anglican Church. Volume 4: The Twentieth Century: Global Western Anglicanism, c. 1910 to the Present* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017), pp. 160–85.

[15] Patrick Joyce, *The State of Freedom: A Social History of the British State since 1800* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013), pp. 3, 17–24, 188–93.

the British case generally Oxbridge-educated rather than professionally trained) about the desirability of limiting central state power, that reflected the particular cultural capital of institutions such as Britain's oldest universities.

At different times, these institutions had all been more independent of the state and had evolved their own institutional cultures. Established in 1694, the Bank of England became banker and creditor to the government. At its inception those who subscribed to a loan to the state were incorporated as the 'Governor and Company of the Bank of England'. Over time, the Bank assumed responsibility for managing Britain's gold and currency reserves and for holding the reserves of Britain's other banks; acquired monopoly control over the note issue in England and Wales; and helped manage government borrowing, serving as the ultimate source of credit or as lender of last resort. By the end of the nineteenth century it had largely ceased to operate as a commercial bank and become in effect a public institution serving the national interest, acting as advisor to the Treasury. Yet the Bank was also part of the financial service nexus of the City, with most of its governors drawn from City institutions and companies, and it continued to be owned and controlled by private shareholders until nationalization in 1946.[16] Even then, although nationalization transferred responsibility for the appointment of its most senior figures to the government, the Bank continued to operate relatively free from ministerial control. Rather than diminishing its independent culture, nationalization seems initially to have encouraged the Bank as far as possible to maintain its autonomy from the Treasury. For its part, the Treasury generally continued to respect the Bank's position as an independent source of expertise. It was not until the 1960s that the Bank became a more integral part of government policymaking structures, with a corresponding erosion of its standing as a voice articulating City interests.[17]

The Mint occupied a similarly indeterminate position between 'state' and 'society'. By far the oldest of the institutions discussed, its origins go back to c. 650 and the foundation of a London mint. Until Henry VIII's closure of the last remaining ecclesiastical mints concentrated all coin production at the Tower of London, it was just one of many mints in southern England. The Mint operated independently by Royal prerogative, but in 1688 was brought under the control of the Treasury.[18] In 1870 a new constitution made the Chancellor

[16] Alec Cairncross, 'The Bank of England and the British Economy' in Richard Roberts and David Kynaston eds., *The Bank of England: Money Power and Influence, 1694–1994* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995), pp. 56–82.

[17] Elizabeth Hennessy, 'The Governors, Directors, and Management' in Roberts and Kynaston eds., *The Bank of England*, pp. 185–216; David Kynaston, 'The Bank and the Government' in ibid., pp. 19–55.

[18] Sir John Craig, *The Mint: A History of the London Mint from AD 287 to 1948* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1953), p. xvii.

of the Exchequer titular head, or Master, of the Mint, and overall management of the mint was vested in a Deputy Master and Comptroller, appointed by the Treasury. Staffs were recruited from other government departments or through the Civil Service Commission. The Mint nevertheless had a more distant relationship with the Treasury than the formal arrangements might indicate,[19] and it occupied an anomalous position within the public sector, engaging in commercial sales as well as discharging its primary responsibility to manufacture coin for domestic circulation. Beginning with changes in 1975 this commercial role was rationalized, culminating in 2010 with the Mint's transformation into a limited company, albeit one wholly owned by the government. It is a parastatal commercial organization of a kind that has received relatively little attention from historians.

On a spectrum from 'state' to 'nonstate' the universities of Oxford and Cambridge, while from their medieval foundation intended to serve the twin needs of church and state, were in some respects more obviously at the periphery, although from the mid-nineteenth century they became subject to greater state regulation. Legislation in 1854 and 1856 intervened to make them less religiously exclusive, which together with the Northcote-Trevelyan civil service reforms, aimed at the creation of a public service class. Further legislation in 1877 stipulated that research and teaching should be among the aims of the universities, while governments also had patronage over some key university appointments. The establishment of the University Grants Committee (UGC) in 1919 and introduction of state funding, in 1923 to Oxbridge, but earlier elsewhere, represented a further development in the relationship of universities to the state with the new Committee instituting quinquennial university reviews. The universities nonetheless retained considerable independence from the state, with government funding accounting for only a proportion of university income and the UGC not inclined towards intervention.[20]

In contrast, in our period Sandhurst was more subordinate to Whitehall. The Academy was re-opened by the War Office in 1947, when the Royal Military College Sandhurst, established at the turn of the nineteenth century, merged with the Royal Military Academy Woolwich. The latter's origins lay in 1741, when an academy had been opened on the site of the workshops of the Royal Arsenal to train recruits to the army's technical branches. Historically the RMC had had a fluctuating relationship to the state. It was built during the Napoleonic Wars with government money, but the return to European peace

19 *Fifth Report from the Estimates Committee, 1967–8: The Royal Mint*, PP 1967–8, IX (Cmnd. 364), para. 3; ibid., Minutes of Evidence Taken before Sub-Committee D of the Estimates Committee, paras. 136–9.

20 Robert Anderson, *British Universities: Past and Present* (Hambledon, London, 2006), pp. 4, 35–6, 45, 116–18, 131.

saw a steep decline in military spending,[21] and for a period the loss of all state support. Government funding was provided again after the Crimean War, and by 1878 all infantry and cavalry officer cadets of the British Army, as well as entrants to the Indian Army, attended either Sandhurst or Woolwich.[22] Sandhurst had its own distinct institutional culture, but it lacked the capacity for independent initiatives that characterized some of the other institutions. In particular, it did not operate independently of the Army, although the latter was itself not unpolitical, and constituted another 'player' within Britain's pluralistic system, competing for resources within Whitehall as a whole and in relation to Britain's other services, the RAF and Navy.[23] Sandhurst was run by officers in the British Army, appointed to the Academy for relatively short periods, and responsible through the Army's executive, the Army Council, to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Secretary of State for War.

Situated on the margins of the state or beyond, each of these institutions had assumed some form of imperial role and constituted part of the apparatus of the British imperial system. Together they reflect how within that system power was dispersed across the 'state' and 'society'. Insufficient attention has perhaps been paid to this – for all that the pluralistic nature of British imperialism is well established,[24] and postcolonial studies and the 'new imperial history' have illuminated the different forms which 'power' assumed within colonial contexts and the variety of sources from which it emanated.[25] The mixed economy of the British imperial system continued into the twentieth century and was even reinforced by the mid-century expansion of the state, not least because of the development in this period of social sciences and increased reliance on the 'expert'. In British colonial administration, as in other spheres of public life, numerous specialists were appointed to advisory bodies and investigatory commissions,[26] continuing and extending the plurality of the British system. As I will argue, while these experts and institutions were

[21] David French, *The British Way in Warfare, 1688–2000* (Unwin Hyman, London, 1990), pp. 226–7, 232.

[22] Hugh Thomas, *The Story of Sandhurst* (Hutchinson, London, 1961), pp. 53, 97, 121–31; Alan Sheppard, *Sandhurst: The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and Its Predecessors* (Country Life Books, London, 1980), p. 92; Christopher Pugsley and Angela Holdsworth, *Sandhurst: A Tradition of Leadership* (Third Millennium Publishing, London, 2005), p. 35.

[23] Huw Strachan, *The Politics of the British Army* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997).

[24] Best captured in John Darwin's characterization of the ramshackle collection of overseas British interests and dependencies as a 'world system', held together by a powerful British centre, India, the 'hinterland of the City of London', a "commercial republic"', and the white self-governing colonies: Darwin, *The Empire Project,* pp. 9–12.

[25] On the 'new imperial history' see esp., Kathleen Wilson ed., *A New Imperial History: Culture, Identity, and Modernity in Britain and the Empire, 1660–1840* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004).

[26] Joseph Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert: Agrarian Doctrines of Development* (Ohio University Press, Athens, OH, 2007).

bound to the state in multifarious ways, their knowledge gave them 'power' of
a semi-independent form. Conversely the co-option of experts and institutions
within structures of imperial administration provided the context in which they
acquired new expertise – 'knowledge' – which was sometimes thereafter the
platform from which they might make their own interventions in the decoloni-
zation process. In these and other ways the plurality of the British system gave
rise to a multiplicity of sites at which power was articulated, and generated
distinct institutional cultures and dynamics. As we will see, the priorities of the
Bank of England were not simply those of the Treasury, or the objectives of the
academics delivering courses at Oxford and Cambridge those of the Colonial
Office. Rather these domestic institutions could possess a form of corporate
vocation, an ethos or sense of purpose, which could itself require adjustment in
adapting to decolonization and the emergence of a postcolonial world.

   As repositories of the knowledge useful to building the governmental and
institutional structures deemed essential to independent nation-states, these
different institutions utilized their expertise at the end of Empire by developing
or becoming involved in delivering new programmes of technical education,
and through diasporas of British personnel acting in an advisory capacity or
seconded to senior roles within the new Commonwealth states. New states had
an urgent and compelling need for assistance and had entered independence
woefully ill-prepared, a legacy of colonialism and the speed with which they
attained independence, unanticipated by many at the time. Postcolonial states
were, Robert Jackson contends, 'quasi-states'. Constitutional decolonization
created 'territorial jurisdictions' recognized by the international community as
sovereign states, but which lacked established institutions and the personnel
to staff them.[27] As we shall see, initiatives on the part of domestic institutions
that had become stakeholders in Empire became part and parcel of Britain's
package of 'technical assistance' to new states.

   The exploration of these initiatives will demonstrate an on-going sense of
'imperial mission' – or perhaps more accurately 'Commonwealth mission' –
in a variety of different institutions enduring across the era of decolonization.
In private, British officials were realistic about the political difficulties inher-
ent in the translation of the 'old' Commonwealth into the 'new', a process
that began with the admission of India and Pakistan, and in which India espe-
cially became a significant player and source of influence among decolonizing
African states.[28] Nevertheless, this sense of mission reflects the purchase that
a Commonwealth ideal attained in public discourse and consciousness after

27 Robert Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* (Cam-
    bridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990), pp. 5, 22.
28 See, e.g., Gerard McCann, 'From Diaspora to Third Worldism and the UN: India and the Pol-
    itics of Decolonising Africa', *Past and Present* 218 (2013), Suppl. 8, pp. 258–80; Mélanie
    Torrent, 'A "New" Commonwealth for Britain? Negotiating Ghana's Pan-African and Asian

the war, not least because, as Richard Toye argues, Labour and Conservative politicians 'recruited' the Commonwealth concept into political debate for their own purposes and, in this rhetorical process, the Commonwealth idea was created as a 'public phenomenon'.[29] That a common sense of mission can be identified across quite different institutions within and beyond the state also reflects the values common to British elites, a product of their shared academic and social background.

Individuals were highly significant in fashioning these institutional cultures and practices. This was notably the case at the Bank of England, where institutional cultural norms were shaped by one governor of longstanding tenure. The case study of the Mint similarly shows the importance of individual, dynamic leadership at a potentially destabilizing moment, and illustrates, as others observe, not only that institutions are 'remarkably durable', but how for institutions crises can 'create opportunities of breakthrough'.[30] Appointment and promotion policies allowed values to be cascaded down institutional hierarchies and reproduced, ensuring that they continued to shape institutional cultures. Where British officials were seconded or transferred to emergent Commonwealth states, their return saw their experience fed back into the institutions, sometimes helping sustain interest in the Commonwealth. Equally, institutional lobbying, as those within institutions acted to preserve and perpetuate their own activities, also resulted in their values and distinct, institutionally informed, perspectives percolating up within the British system, feeding into wider assessments and shaping broader policy outcomes.

This consideration of the history of a range of important British institutions – some of which were not principally 'imperial' – will hence be revealed as being as eloquent of the prevalence and development of cultures of imperialism (and the supposedly 'post-imperial') as perhaps more obvious conjunctions and sources, such as the press and other media, or debates around immigration. In particular, it will be argued that British institutions exercised their own 'imperialism' at the end of Empire as they sought to substitute new roles for their established ones within the imperial system.

Whether to advance commercial interests or from a more disinterested sense of responsibility and service, British actors and institutions aimed to embed specifically *British* practices and customs rather than advance less specific

Connections at the End of Empire (1951–8)', *International History Review*, 38 (2016), pp. 573–613.

[29] Richard Toye, 'Words of Change: The Rhetoric of Commonwealth, Common Market and Cold War, 1961–3' in L. J. Butler and Sarah Stockwell eds., *The Wind of Change: Harold Macmillan and British Decolonization* (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2013), pp. 140–58, esp. 154.

[30] A. Born and T. Christensen, 'The Development of Public Institutions: Reconsidering the Role of Leadership', *Administration and Society*, 40 (2008), pp. 271–97, quotation 289. I owe this reference to Véronique Dimier.